Surajsingh A Yadav vs Surat Mahanagarpalika
2022 Latest Caselaw 258 Guj

    C/SCA/10060/2004                                     JUDGMENT DATED: 07/01/2022



              IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

              R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10060 of 2004

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE: sd/-
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
================================================================

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed No to see the judgment ?

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? Yes

3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No of the judgment ?

4 Whether this case involves a substantial question No of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?

================================================================ SURAJSINGH A YADAV Versus SURAT MAHANAGARPALIKA & 2 other(s) ================================================================ Appearance:

MR MUKESH A PATEL(636) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1 MR.KAUSHAL PANDYA for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2

================================================================ CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA Date : 07/01/2022 CAV JUDGMENT [1] In the present writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner is praying for quashing and setting aside the inquiry officer's report, order dated 28.05.2004 dismissing the petitioner from service and the order dated 12.12.2019 rejecting the appeal of petitioner.

FACTS AND SUBMISSIONS:

[2] The brief facts giving rise to filing of the

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present petition are that the petitioner was appointed as a Security Supervisor on 22.09.1997, in Watch and Ward Department of the Surat Mahanagarpalika. The petitioner was appointed formerly in the Army as a Sepoy on 27.02.1974. During the service, as Subedar, in the year 1991, the petitioner was operated for the Structure Urethra at Military Hospital, Jalandhar. Thereafter, the case of the petitioner was examined by the Medical Board and he was declared as unfit for Defence Security Corps (DSC).

[2.1] The petitioner was served with the suspension order dated 03.07.2002 on the ground of misbehaviour, indiscipline and dishonesty and was placed under suspension with immediate effect. The said suspension letter states that the same has been issued on the basis of prior approval of the Commissioner on 02.07.2002. On 20.07.2002, a charge-sheet came to be served upon the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner (Special), wherein total 11 charges have been levelled for holding the departmental inquiry.

[2.2] The petitioner filed a detailed reply to the charge-sheet by the letter dated 26.07.2002. Thereafter, the petitioner had addressed representations and request letters dated 18.07.2002, 10.10.2002, 13.01.2003 and 18.02.2003

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requesting to take the petitioner on duty revoking the suspension order and for completion of the inquiry.

[2.3] On 30.01.2003, the respondent No.2 issued an Office order appointing Shri Manharbhai D. Solanki as Inquiry Officer. On 14.02.2003, the Inquiry Officer had issued a notice intimating about his appointment as Inquiry Officer and fixed the hearing.

[2.4] The petitioner preferred a writ petition being Special Civil Application No.3042 of 2003 for setting aside the suspension order dated 03.07.2002 and for completion of the inquiry expeditiously. The said petition came to be disposed of as withdrawn by an order dated 21.03.2003. In the said order it has been observed that "it will be open to the petitioner to move to the Inquiry Officer and/or to the Disciplinary Authority to complete the inquiry within the stipulated time of 6 months. If such application is made by the petitioner to the Disciplinary Authority and/or to the Inquiry Officer, as the case may be, same shall be given due consideration and the proceedings of the departmental inquiry shall be completed as early as possible preferably within a period of 6 months from the date of receipt of such

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application made by the petitioner."

[2.5] The Inquiry Officer submitted a report dated 24.11.2003 and a copy thereof was made available to the petitioner, whereby it has been

are proved, whereas the charges no.7 and 9 are partly proved. A show-cause notice for the purpose of imposition of punishment came to be issued to the petitioner on 03.12.2003. The petitioner submitted reply to the show cause notice on 03.12.2003, 10.12.2002 and 13.01.2004. Thereafter, the impugned order under challenge dated 28.05.2004 came to be passed by the respondent no.2, whereby the petitioner has been dismissed from service.

[2.6] Since, the Appeal dated 21.06.2004 filed by the petitioner before the Standing Committee was pending, this Court vide interim order dated 20.09.2019 had directed the Municipal Corporation, to decide the same. Thereafter, the appeal of the petitioner has been rejected by the respondent-Corporation vide order dated 12.12.2019, the same is also challenged by amending the prayer clause. No submissions are advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Patel to declare it as illegal.

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[3] Learned Advocate Mr.Mukesh Patel appearing for the petitioner, has raised a preliminary contention with regard to the jurisdiction and power of the Deputy Commissioner (Special), who has passed the impugned order. It is submitted that the appointing authority in the case of the petitioner is Commissioner, whereas the whole issue has been taken over under the name of Deputy Commissioner (Special) and the termination order has been issued by the Deputy Commissioner (Special). He has submitted that it is settled legal position that a person below the rank of appointing authority cannot pass any order of termination. It is submitted that the post of Deputy Commissioner (Special) is below the rank of appointing authority i.e. Commissioner, hence the impugned order is passed without authority of law.

[3.1] While referring to all the individual charges, he has submitted that the same are leveled and proved due to mala fide intention. It is submitted that the petitioner's medical category was shown as "BEE" category and hence, such category does not make the petitioner unfit for rendering duties on a civil post. He has submitted that at the time of selection, the entire documents of the petitioner were verified, including the Discharge Certificate issued by the

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Army, hence it cannot be said that the petitioner has secured the appointment in the Corporation by suppressing the details with regard to his discharge from the Army. It is submitted that the petitioner was relieved because he was unfit for Army due to his health condition, but the category, in which he has been relieved cannot make him unfit for the post he was holding in the Corporation. Thus, he has submitted that the charge no.1 is misconceived.

[3.2] For the other charges, learned Advocate Mr.Patel has submitted that a bare perusal of the same it becomes clear that the charges and evidence are one and the same qua the charge nos.2 to 9. Thus, it is submitted that it is clear that it is an attempt to show more charges to create the bad impression about the petitioner by showing more charges apart from the charges no.10 and 11 are nothing but a repetition of initiation of proceedings for the same cause. It is submitted that the petitioner is victimized for discharging his duties in strict manner since he had reprimanded the employees for misbehaviour. It is submitted that the petitioner was not heard before accepting the Inquiry Officer's report. He has also referred to the affidavits dated 16.04.2006 sworn by three employees namely Shivdutt Shukla, Kamalnath

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Rajput and Chintamani R Pandey stating that they were pressurized by their superiors to give statements against the petitioner. Finally, it is submitted that the punishment is harsh looking to the misconduct, hence the impugned orders may be set aside. Except the aforesaid submissions, no further submission is advanced.

[4] In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate Mr.Pandya appearing for the Corporation has submitted that the petitioner was appointed formerly in the Army as a Sepoy on 27.02.1974 and during the services of the petitioner as a Subedar in the year 1992 the petitioner was operated for the Structure Urethra at Military Hospital, Jalandhar and after examining by the Medical Board the petitioner was declared unfit for Defence Security Corps (DSC) and due to this reason the services of the petitioner is put to an end on medical ground from the services of the Army. It is further submitted that the petitioner has wrongly interpreted the meaning of BEE and the petitioner was unsuitable for duties in civil life.

[4.1] It is further submitted that there were many complaints filed against the petitioner by other employees of the respondent-Corporation with regard to causing unnecessary harassment to

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them and also making false and reckless remarks against the senior officers. It is submitted that on 03.07.2002, the services of the petitioner was suspended on the ground of misbehaviour, indiscipline and dishonesty and was placed under suspension with immediate effect. It is further submitted that the respondents have followed the due process of law and after holding a departmental inquiry, and affording full opportunity to the petitioner the impugned order of dismissal is passed.

[4.2] It is further submitted that when the charges levelled against the petitioner are proved beyond reasonable doubt by considering all the facts, statements and depositions of the witnesses working with the petitioner, therefore, there is no illegality or error committed by the respondent in dismissing him from service. It is submitted that all the charges levelled against the petitioner have been proved beyond reasonable doubt after following due procedure of law and also by considering various statements and deposition of the witnesses. It is submitted that the judicial review in the cases of the disciplinary proceedings are very limited, and the same is only confined to decision making process. It is submitted that looking to the proved misconduct,

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the punishment of dismissal cannot be said to be harsh or disproportionate, hence, the dismissal order may not be interfered with.

[4.3] Learned Advocate Mr.Pandya has further submitted that the present petitioner Suraj Singh Yadav was appointed as a Security Supervisor by the respondent-Corporation vide order dated 12.09.1997, and the said Office Order was signed by the Assistant Municipal Commissioner (P & I) of SMC as he was delegated with the powers to sign the said order on behalf of the Corporation. It is further submitted that the said order of dismissal was signed by the Deputy Municipal Corporation (Special), who had passed the order under section 56(1) read with 56(2)(h) of the Gujarat Provincial Municipal Corporation Act (GPMC). It is further submitted that under section 49(1) of the GPMC Act, the Municipal Commissioner is empowered and authorized to delegate the powers to the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Special) and thereby vide Office Order issued on 21.07.1997, the Municipal Commissioner, delegated the powers under Section 49(1) of the GPMC Act to the Deputy Municipal Commissioner (Special) and the power to impose penalty under Section 56 (e to h) of the GPMC Act were also conferred subject to the condition that he shall obtain prior approval of the

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Commissioner. It is further submitted that at that time the pay-scale of the cadre of the petitioner was Rs.5000 to 8000 and for that pay- scale, the authority to impose penalty was with the Commissioner and his subordinates Deputy Commissioner under delegation of power and before passing the impugned order the prior approval was obtained from the Municipal Commissioner. [4.4] It is submitted that in view of the interim order passed by this Court, the Standing Committee passed a Resolution on 10.10.2019 informing the petitioner to remain present for personal hearing on 17.10.2019 for deciding his appeal. The petitioner personally remained present before the Standing Committee on 12.12.2019. Thereafter, the Standing Committee decided the Appeal of the petitioner by passing Resolution on 12.12.2019

OPINION [5] I have heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties at length. The relevant documents are also perused.

[6] The principal contention raised by the petitioner challenging the impugned order of dismissal is that the same is passed without any authority of law. It is alleged that the Deputy Commissioner (Special) has no authority to

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dismiss the petition since he is below the rank of appointing authority i.e. Commissioner. The petitioner is dismissed from service under the provision of section 56(h) of the GPMC Act. The Municipal Commissioner, under the powers vested under section 49(1) of the GPMC Act, has issued an Office Order NO.DP/5/ dated 21.07.1997 vesting the powers to the Deputy Commissioner (Special). The "Schedule to Powers" attached to the Office Order reveals that the power to impose any penalty under section 56 of the GPMC Act, has been delegated to the Deputy Commissioner (Special). The same reads as under:-

Power to impose penalties under Section 56 of the Act in respect of Municipal Officers and servants of the departments, placed under his control whose pay scale does not exceed Rs.22/- to Rs.4,000/- or such equivalent pay scale as may be revised from time to time. However, the powers to impose penalties prescribed under Clauses (e) to (h) of Sub-section (2) of Section 56 of the Act in respect of officers and servants whose pay scales exceeds Rs.1,150/- to Rs.1,500/- or such a equivalent pay scales as may be revised from time to time shall subject to the condition to obtain the prior approval of the Municipal Commissioner.

Explanation:-

Appointment includes the order of the Commissioner forwarded by Deputy Commissioner (Special). Further the said authority shall be considered as appointing authority for the purpose of Section 56 of the Act."

The petitioner was appointed as a Security Supervisor vide order dated 12.09.1997 in the

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pay-scale of Rs.1400-2600 which is subsequently revised to Rs.5000-8000. When the petitioner was dismissed from service his pay was Rs.5600/-. The aforesaid provision stipulates imposition of penalties on two set of employees, (a) who are having pay-scale, which does not exceed Rs.2200 to 4000, and (b) whose pay-scale exceeds Rs.1150 to 1500/-. Both the categories specifically stipulate the expression "or such equivalent pay- scales as may be revised from time to time ". The second part of the aforesaid provision also states that for the imposition of penalties specified under clauses (e) to (h) on the employees, whose pay-scales exceed Rs.1150 to 1500, the prior approval of Municipal Commissioner is required. The explanation to the aforesaid clauses also state that "the authority shall be considered as appointing authority for the purpose of section 56 of the Act ". Thus, the combined reading of the aforesaid clauses will clarify that the Deputy Commissioner (Special) is authorized and empowered to impose the penalty of dismissal, and he can be construed as appointing authority. It is also not in dispute that prior to passing of the impugned order of dismissal by the Deputy Commissioner(Special), the Commissioner of respondent-Corporation had approved the same on 27.05.2004, which is

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reflected at reference no.8 of the impugned order. Thus, the submission with regard to the lack of power and authority of Deputy Commissioner (Special) in passing the impugned order of dismissal does not merit acceptance.

[7] The petitioner was issued charge-sheet dated 28.07.2002, inter alia, containing 11 charges, which are incorporated as under:

Charge no.1:

The petitioner had cheated the respondent no. 1 by suppressing the fact of removal of service from the army declaring him medically unfit.

Charge no.2:

The second charge is that the petitioner is in habit of argument with the Security officer who is the superior authority.

Charge no.3:

It is the charge that during the point checking by the petitioner at night time majority of security guards were found to be in alert position on that security point whereas at earlier point of time majority of the security guards were found sleeping on their security points and therefore it can be presumed that the petitioner was giving intimation in advance before going for checking on security points.

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Charge no .4:

During the duty, the petitioner was gathering the security guards at main gate and was instigating them was responsible for floating rumours and thereby he was misguiding them. Such facts are verified from the written report given by such security guards.

Charge No.5:

After congregation of the security guards, he did not cooperate with the higher officers, and entered into arguments, misbehaving with the colleagues, did not remain faithful towards duties.

Charge no.6:

The delinquent was getting the information about night inspection and was informing the guards not to sign the report of duty if he is sleeping or is in drunken condition. It is alleged that accordingly the secret information was being supplied to the guards and due to disclosure of secret information's the petitioner lost the confidence of the municipality and has not remained faithful and thereby has acted dishonestly.

Charge no.7:

While visiting the security point, he used to

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talk against the security officer and department and was misguiding them not to obey the order of the security officer and that is how the petitioner has shown negligence in discharging duties by going against the interest of the municipality.

Charge no.8:

It is stated that the petitioner was not giving respect to his senior and junior officers and that is how it is damaging the image of security department and thereby the petitioner has lost the confidence and is not entitled to continue in the service.

Charge no.9:

It is stated that when the show cause notice was issued by the chief security officer it was argued by the petitioner that he has no right to use the word "Captain" and that is how he has challenged the power and the post held by the higher officer.

Charge no.10:

On 19.1.2002, between 8:20 to 8:40 hours, he had broken the lock of the office of the Security officer and opened the office, and neither did he inform his higher officer about the reason for breaking the lock nor prepared any report in this

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regard, and when in this regard a notice dated 29.1.2002 was issued to him, he had passed an order issuing 'warning' against the Chief Security Officer.

Charge no.11:

From 20.03.2002 to 31.3.2002, i.e, for 12 days when he was on leave, he was required to report on 01.04.2002, however he did not remain present. Despite this in front of the higher officer, he had signed in the work diary in the date of 01.04.2002, and when a show cause notice was issued to him on 12.4.2002 in this regard, he had passed an order of putting the security officer in basic pay for recovery of fine and also entry in this regard was made in the service book.

[8] The inquiry officer vide his report dated 24.11.2003 has held charges No.1 to 6, 8, 10 and 11 as proved, whereas the charges no.7 and 9 are partly proved.

[9] This Court has perused the findings of the

witnesses are examined in the disciplinary proceedings. So far the 1st charge of obtaining the appointment by suppressing the medical certificates and discharge from the Army is

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concerned, the Inquiry officer has opined that none of the parties have produced any material to show that the documents concerning the discharge from Army was produced at the time of joining the service and the personnel who had interviewed the petitioner is not examined in the inquiry proceedings. However, the charge has been held as proved by holding that the petitioner has not said anything that he had produced the Discharge Book from Army. After holding the departmental inquiry, the petitioner was issued the show-cause notice dated 3.12.2003, calling upon him as to why any of the penalties specified under section 56(2) of the GPMC Act may not be imposed upon him. A copy of the Inquiry officers report was also supplied to the petitioner along with the show-cause notice. The petitioner filed two replies dated 10.12.2003 and 31.01.2004 (Pg.89287). In both the replies the petitioner has not stated that he had supplied the Discharge Book or the medical papers at the time of his selection. While declaring the petitioner as medically unfit for Army duties, it has been certified in the Medical Certificate that the petitioner has been "released" from service, and the disability will not affect the efficiency of performance of all kinds of suitable duties in civil life. The respondents in their Affidavit

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have not categorically denied that the said documents were not produced by the petitioner at the time of selection, but the expression MED CAT "BEE" (PERMIT) used in the Discharge Book of the petitioner, has been construed that the petitioner is not suitable for the job of Security Supervisor. Reliance is also placed by the respondent on the statement of witnesses Shri S.G.More and Shri D.B.Bhadoriya, who were also working as security officers. Thus, there is a dispute with regard to the interpretation of the terms "BEE" expressed in the Discharge Book of the petitioner from Army. This Court, in absence of any relevant material, cannot interpret the true meaning of such term which describes the nature of duties which can be performed by the petitioner on a post of Security Supervisor and reverse the findings given by the Inquiry Officer.

[10] As stated hereinabove total seven witnesses were examined during the inquiry proceedings, who have deposed against the petitioner. The petitioner was also afforded full opportunity to cross-examine them. In the cross-examination, the witnesses have made serious allegations against the petitioner. The inquiry officer in his comprehensive report has held the charges as proved and partly proved. The charges which are

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proved against the petitioner canbe said to be very serious in nature. The petitioner was appointed as a Security Supervisor, and indulgence in activities as stated in the charges will definitely be against the interest of the Corporation. The charges are distinct in nature and are intrinsically connected. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings are not tainted with any vice of violation of principles of natural justice or with mala fide. With regard to the reliance placed on the affidavits dated 16.04.2006 sworn by three employees in favour of the petitioner; the same cannot rescue him since they are subsequent to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and passing of the impugned order. This Court cannot place any reliance on any material which was not forming part of the disciplinary proceedings and was not subject to scrutiny in such proceedings.

[11] At this stage, I may with profit refer to the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of SBI vs Ajai Kumar Srivastava, 2021 (2) SCC 612. The Supreme Court has reiterated the principles governing the judicial review in the disciplinary proceedings. The Apex Court has held thus:

"22. The power of judicial review in the matters of disciplinary inquiries, exercised by the

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departmental/appellate authorities discharged by constitutional courts under Article 226 or Article 32 or Article 136 of the Constitution of India is circumscribed by limits of correcting errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice and it is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority which has been earlier examined by this Court in State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan [State of T.N. v. T.V. Venugopalan, (1994) 6 SCC 302 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 1385] and later in State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian [State of T.N. v. A. Rajapandian, (1995) 1 SCC 216 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 292] and further examined by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] wherein it has been held as under: (B.C. Chaturvedi case [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , SCC pp. 759-60, para 13) "13. The disciplinary authority is the sole judge of facts. Where appeal is presented, the appellate authority has coextensive power to reappreciate the evidence or the nature of punishment. In a disciplinary enquiry, the strict proof of legal evidence and findings on that evidence are not relevant. Adequacy of evidence or reliability of evidence cannot be permitted to be canvassed before the court/tribunal. In Union of India v. H.C. Goel [Union of India v. H.C. Goel, (1964) 4 SCR 718 : AIR 1964 SC 364] this Court held at SCR p. 728 (AIR p. 369, para 20) that if the

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conclusion, upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority, is perverse or suffers from patent error on the face of the record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued."

23. It has been consistently followed in the later decision of this Court in H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya [H.P. SEB v. Mahesh Dahiya, (2017) 1 SCC 768 : (2017) 1 SCC (L&S) 297] and recently by the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pravin Kumar v. Union of India [Pravin Kumar v. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 103] .

24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness

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or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:

(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;

(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.

26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.

27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a

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reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings."

[12] Thus, the Supreme Court has asserted that "the Constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained." The three parameters, as mentioned hereinabove are only required to be examined and determined by the Court while dealing with the propriety of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court has only to see that (i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with; and (iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and

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authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion. In the present case, all the three parameters are satisfied. It cannot be held that the findings of the Inquiry Officer is based on no evidence. The disciplinary proceedings are held in compliance of the natural justice since full opportunity was granted to the petitioner to defend his case.

[13] The Apex Court has also enunciated that "It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion." Neither in the writ petition nor in the submissions advanced before this Court, there is whisper with regard to the violation of any rule or regulations governing the disciplinary proceedings. In fact the provisions regulating the disciplinary proceedings are not at all referred, hence in absence of any such averments or contention, it has to be presumed that the disciplinary proceedings do not suffer from any illegality or perversity and the decision making process is apposite. With regard to the allegations of mala fide intention, no material is produced before the inquiry officer in this regard and this Court

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is also not apprised with any cogent and convincing material. With regard to the Government Resolution dated 12.12.2019 passed by the Standing Committee rejecting the appeal of the petitioner, no submissions are advanced by the learned advocate Mr.Patel. From the memo of writ petition, it appears that the petitioner has not cared to even annex the copy of his appeal, however, the same is annexed by the respondent Corporation in its reply dated 25.04.2019. A perusal of the appeal reveals that the same is very cursorily filed without elaborately dealing with the findings of the Inquiry Officer. In absence of such material, this Court, while exercising its powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot act as an appellate authority and venture into an unchartered territory by undertaking its own fact finding inquiry for examining each and every finding of the Inquiry Officer.

[14] On the substratum of the foregoing observations and analysis, this Court does not find any convincing reason to interfere with the findings of the Inquiry officer or with the impugned order of dismissal confirmed in appeal. Hence, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. RULE discharged.

(A. S. SUPEHIA, J) NABILA