Madhubhai Virjibhai Dhanani vs State Of Gujarat
2022 Latest Caselaw 4209 Guj

     R/CR.MA/5947/2013                             JUDGMENT DATED: 19/04/2022




              IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

               R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION NO. 5947 of 2013


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL

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1      Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed Yes
       to see the judgment ?

2      To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                    No

3      Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy No
       of the judgment ?

4      Whether this case involves a substantial question No
       of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
       of India or any order made thereunder ?

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                         MADHUBHAI VIRJIBHAI DHANANI
                                   Versus
                         STATE OF GUJARAT & 1 other(s)
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Appearance:
MR NANDISH THACKER, ADVOCATE for THAKKAR AND PAHWA
ADVOCATES(1357) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR B. B. NAIK, SR. ADVOCATE with MR PARTHIV A BHATT(5331) for the
Respondent(s) No. 2,2.1
MS M D MEHTA, APP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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     CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIKHIL S. KARIEL

                               Date : 19/04/2022
                               ORAL JUDGMENT

1. Heard learned Advocate Mr. Nandish Thacker for Thakkar and Pahwa Advocates for the applicant, learned APP Ms. M.D. Mehta for the respondent-State and learned Senior Advocate Mr. B.B. Naik with learned Advocate Mr. Parthiv Bhatt for the respondent No.2.1.

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2. By way of this petition the petitioner seeks quashment of the FIR being C.R. No.I- 100 of 2013 registered on 06.04.2013 with the Varachha Police Station, District Surat, for the offence punishable under Sections 465, 467, 468, 471 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

3. In the complaint, the complainant inter alia alleges that he was working on various posts with the Government of Gujarat and had retired in the year 1995 as a Mamlatdar and his father namely Pranshankar Ravishankar Raval had expired on 03.11.1999. It is stated that his father was owner of the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 343 situated at village Katargam admeasuring 13390 sq. mtrs. and whereas after the death of his father, the land had been devolved upon him i.e. complainant, his brother and sister and whereas it is alleged that the land had been granted to his father on 01.03.1973 and vide revenue entry No. 4250 dated 05.02.1974 his father's name had been mutated in the revenue record.

3.2 It is further alleged that a civil suit being Special Civil Suit No. 482 of 1987 came to be instituted in the Civil Court at Surat on 09.10.1987 by the applicant-accused herein and upon the complainant coming to know about the same, it was revealed that the applicant had prepared forged documents including possession letter and had also forged signature of the complainant as well as father of the complainant and based upon such documents the said civil suit is filed. It is further alleged that the document in question being a land development agreement dated 12.06.1978 in which the signatures of the complainant and his father have been forged and whereas it is alleged that they have not signed on the said deed. Similar allegations have been made with regard to possession receipt dated 07.07.1982 issued by father of the complainant as well as the complainant and it is alleged that the signatures on the said document are none of them. Broadly making such allegations of forgery and cheating, the aforesaid FIR came to be registered.

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4. It appears that immediately upon the lodgement of the FIR, the applicant had approached this Court and whereas this Court had been pleased to protect the applicant by directing the Investigating Officer not to take any coercive steps against the applicant.

5. Learned Advocate Mr. Nandish Thacker for the applicant would submit that the impugned FIR has been instituted with mala fide intention with a view to pressurize the applicant in settling with the complainant. Learned Advocate would submit that the complainant, though having stated ambiguously in the FIR, was aware about the institution of the Civil Suit by the present applicant in the year 1987 and whereas the complainant by engaging a lawyer had contested the Civil Suit and whereas after bi-parte hearing, vide order dated 13.08.1996, learned Civil Court had been pleased to grant interim injunction in favour of the present applicant. Learned Advocate would submit that while the development agreement and the possession receipt were in fact signed by the father of the complainant and the complainant himself, since the complainant and his family had not adhered to their part of the agreement and in the year 1987 the civil suit was filed, from which time, the complainant was aware about the existence of alleged forged documents. Learned Advocate would submit that even though it was in the knowledge of the complainant with regard to the alleged forged documents, the impugned FIR is filed after a delay of 26 years, therefore only on the ground of gross delay, this Court may quash the impugned FIR. Learned Advocate would further submit that as such vide a judgment dated 31.12.2019, the learned Civil Court had finally decided the civil suit and whereas the learned Civil Court had accepted the contentions raised in the civil suit, more particularly the contention that father of the complainant had signed on the development agreement. Learned Advocate would further submit that insofar as the possession of the land in question is concerned, the possession receipt which is one of the documents allegedly

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forged was also believed to be true by the learned Civil Court. Learned Advocate would submit that the learned Civil Court having believed genuineness of both the deeds in full-fledged trial even for such reason the impugned FIR deserves to be quashed and set aside. Learned Advocate would further submit that the delay in filing the FIR has to be considered in correlation with the subsequent development i.e. in the year 2011 some third party has filed a civil suit on the strength of an agreement by the complainant and his family. It is submitted that the impugned FIR had been filed after a delay of 26 years with a mala fide intent to pressurize the applicant to settle the issue, therefore this Court may interfere and quash the impugned FIR. Learned Advocate Mr. Thacker would rely upon a decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs Vs. Gurpal Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775 in support of his contentions.

6. This petition is strongly resisted by learned Senior Advocate Mr. B.B. Naik for the complainant, who would submit that the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short "Cr.P.C.") does not set out any period of limitation with regard to filing of an FIR. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that while Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. bars the Magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence if it is after a period of limitation, but at the same time the bar of limitation is only a bar of taking cognizance after expiry of period of limitation with regard to an offence which is punishable for a period not exceeding three years and whereas there is no bar of taking cognizance on the ground of limitation for an offence which is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding three years. Learned Senior Advocate would therefore submit that an FIR cannot be quashed merely on the ground of delay. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that when the complaint inter alia raises disputed issues, this Court could not quash the complaint. Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that when the

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allegations raised in the complaint are such that it could be proved only by leading of evidence, then the Court ought not to interfere. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. could quash a complaint only in exceptional circumstances, more particularly on plain reading of complaint does not reveal any cognizable offence having been committed. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that in the instant case, a plain reading of the FIR would reveal allegations of commission of serious offence against the applicant herein and under such circumstances, this Court may not quash the impugned complaint.

6.1 Insofar as the aspect of delay is concerned, learned Senior Advocate would submit that that since in the interregnum the ULC proceedings had been initiated, the complainant was busy in prosecuting the said proceedings and therefore delay had occurred in approaching the police for filing of an FIR.

6.2. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that insofar as the judgment and order passed by the learned Civil Court in a civil suit preferred by the applicant, though the suit was partly decreed, the same is challenged by the applicant by preferring an appeal and the same is pending consideration before this Court. Learned Senior Advocate would submit that even otherwise insofar as the proceedings before a Civil Court and proceedings before a Criminal Court operate in two separate spheres and whereas it is well settled position of law that findings of the Civil Court is not binding on a Criminal Court, considering the very selfsame aspect with regard to the allegations of offence punishable under the applicable laws.

6.3 Learned Senior Advocate would further submit that averment with regard to a civil suit having been preferred by some other person to whom

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the complainant has allegedly sold the land is not mentioned in the application and whereas the applicant has also not filed any rejoinder to the reply filed by the present complainant and therefore this Court may not consider the submission in that regard. Learned Senior Advocate in support of his submissions relied upon the following decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court:

(1) HMT Watches Limited Vs. M.A. Abida and Another, (2015) 11 SCC 776;

(2) Kishan Singh (Dead) through LRs. Vs. Gurpal Singh and Others, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 775;

(3) Skoda Auto Volkwagen (India) Private Limited Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2021) 5 SCC 795;

(4) State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Yogendra Singh Jadon and Another, (2020) 12 SCC 588;

(5) State of Telangana Vs. Managipet Alias Mangipet Sarveshwar Reddy, (2019) 19 SCC 87;

(6) State of M.P. Vs. Awadh Kishore Gupta and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 691; and

(7) State of Maharashtra Vs. Sayed Mohammed Masood and Another, (2009) 8 SCC 787.

7. Learned APP Ms. M.D. Mehta on behalf of the respondent-State would submit that while it is undoubtedly true that the offence of forgery etc. have been alleged in the FIR, but the fact of the FIR preferred after a delay of 26 years and the proceedings pending before the learned Civil Court are relevant aspects which cannot be lost sight of. Learned APP

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would therefore submit that the impugned FIR requires to be interfered by this Court.

8. In rejoinder, learned Advocate Mr. Thacker would submit that undoubtedly the fact of the suit filed by the third party purchaser is not mentioned in the application, but at the same time learned Advocate draws the attention of this Court to the averments made at Para 11 of the affidavit- in-reply and would submit that though the averments are in context of an appeal preferred by the present applicant before this Court being First Appeal No. 233 of 2015 and whereas according to learned Advocate, Para No.11 states about Special Civil Suit No. 497 of 2011 filed by one Vasantbhai Haribhai Gajera against the legal heirs of the father of the complainant and whereas it is mentioned in the said paragraph that the civil suit was for specific performance of agreement to sell and whereas it is also mentioned in the said paragraph that the said suit had been compromised and a consent decree was passed in the year 2015 and the applicant having preferred the First Appeal against the said decree. Learned Advocate would submit that it is this civil suit preferred in the year 2011 which had led to filing of the impugned FIR so as to facilitate sale of the land to third party. Since the fact of consent decree has been mentioned in the affidavit-in- reply, this Court had put a query to both the learned Advocate Mr. Thacker and learned Senior Advocate Mr. Naik as to the date of decree, to which learned Advocate Mr. Thacker would submit that the order below Exh.1 recording the settlement and directing drawing of decree was passed on 11.03.2013. Learned Advocate Mr. Thacker would submit that the complainant had preferred the FIR immediately upon the matter being settled with the subsequent purchaser and whereas the said fact would clearly establish that the FIR was preferred with a mala fide motive. Learned Advocate would therefore submit that this Court may quash the impugned FIR.

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9. Heard learned Advocates for the parties who have not submitted anything further.

10. At the outset before discussing the submissions of learned Advocates for the parties, the following undisputed aspects require to be stated for better appreciation.

(1) The applicant had filed a civil suit praying for specific performance of agreements and whereas agreements concerned are alleged to be forged agreements in the FIR. The civil suit had been preferred on 09.10.1987 by the applicant and the complainant had contested the suit from its very inception. It is not the case of the complainant that he become aware about pendency of the civil suit near about the period during which they had filed the impugned FIR. The learned Civil Court in the suit filed by the applicant had granted an order of injunction on 13.08.1996 after bi-parte hearing.

(2) A civil suit came to be preferred by certain third parties with whom the complainant and or his family members had entered into an agreement to sell. The suit had been settled between the parties and a final order on basis of settlement had been passed in the civil suit on 11.03.2013. The impugned FIR came to be filed on 06.04.2013.

11. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual position, it clearly appears that the complainant was aware about the fact of filing of the civil suit from the year 1987 or thereabouts itself and whereas for a period of approximately 26 years the complainant had not filed the impugned FIR. From the narration of the admitted fact as hereinabove, it also appears that the proximate cause for filing of the FIR is the settlement decree between the complainant and his family and a third party purchaser on 11.03.2013. Thus, while the FIR is preferred after a delay of 26 years, the explanation offered by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Naik about pendency of

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proceedings under the Urban Land Ceiling Act, neither appears to be plausible nor a reasonable explanation for delay. That the complainant who was already contesting a civil litigation for performance of the forged document, did not find time to file FIR for 26 years, even though according to the complainant the document is forged, is an explanation which cannot be acceptable.

This fact is also required to be appreciated from the context of the employment of the original complainant. The original complainant, as narrated in the FIR itself, was a person who was working in the various capacities in the Revenue Department and had retired in the year 1995 as a Mamlatdar, it is incomprehensible that a person holding such a key position in the Revenue Department did not think it appropriate to file an FIR with regard to alleged forged signatures of his own and his father, raises a question mark over the veracity of the allegations of the complainant.

12. At this stage, this Court seeks to rely upon the observations of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kishan Singh (supra). Para Nos. 21 and 22 of the said decision being relevant for the purpose of deciding the issue in question are reproduced hereinbelow for benefit.

"21. Prompt and early reporting of the occurrence by the informant with all its vivid details gives an assurance regarding truth of its version. In case, there is some delay in filing the FIR, the complainant must give explanation for the same. Undoubtedly, delay in lodging the FIR does not make the complainant's case improbable when such delay is properly explained. However, deliberate delay in lodging the complaint is always fatal. [vide: Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 1997 SC 3247].

22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging a FIR, the Court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal.

The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an after thought or had

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given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the Civil Court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party.

Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (vide : Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2008) 12 SCC 531)."

The Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia observed that delay in lodging an FIR may not be fatal, if the delay is properly explained, however, deliberate delay in lodging an FIR is always fatal. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further elaborated that explanation of delay should be plausible and non-explanation would not be countenanced. The Hon'ble Apex Court has also laid down that the Court while dealing which such cases should examine the facts to found out whether the FIR is by a frustrated litigant who wants to wreak vengeance with a ulterior motive or mala fide intention.

Appreciating the issue raised in the application from the view point of the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court, it becomes clear that the impugned FIR is preferred with a ulterior motive, more particularly there being no plausible explanation offered in the body of the FIR and as noted hereinabove by the complainant in this application. The complainant

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had contested the civil suit preferred by the applicant for almost quarter of a century, and thereafter he chose to file the FIR. That as noted hereinabove, no plausible explanation has been coming-forth either in the body of the FIR or in the reply affidavit or in the submission by learned Senior Advocate for the complainant. Furthermore, it also requires to be noted that in the interregnum, another suit came to be preferred by a third party for specific performance of some agreements between the third party and the family of the complainant and the parties to the suit had thereafter settled the matter. It is only after such settlement and after civil suit had been decreed on the basis of the said settlement, the complainant had immediately filed the FIR. Thus, it clearly appears that the FIR was preferred with an ulterior motive to pressurize the applicant into settling with the complainant, thus in the considered opinion of this Court, the FIR was a clear and palpable abuse of process of law.

13. Insofar as the submission made by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Naik that where a prima facie case is made out, this Court ought not to interfere with the complaint, in the considered opinion of this Court, such principle as enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court is not unqualified. The Hon'ble Apex Court in various decisions reference to which would be hereinafter, clearly held that in case the FIR appears to be manifestly attended with mala fides, this Court would be justified in quashing the FIR. Furthermore, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also held that where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the High Court can interfere and quash the FIR.

14. Insofar as the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of HMT Watches Limited (supra) as relied upon by learned Senior Advocate Mr. Naik to contend that the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia held that the High Court should not have expressed its view on disputed question of fact in a petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to come to a conclusion that

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offence is made out. In the considered opinion of this Court, the Hon'ble Apex Court, in the said decision, was concerned with a case where the accused in a criminal complaint had taken factual defences as to the cheque in question having been given as security and no outstanding liability on his behalf etc. The Hon'ble Apex Court in that context, laid down the law as noted hereinabove. In the instant case, this Court has not gone into any disputed question and expressed its view thereupon, this Court as noted hereinabove, has formed an opinion as regards the FIR being an abuse of process of law, more particularly the same is filed after a extraordinary delay which is not explained and whereas facts show that the FIR is manifestly attended with mala fide.

15. Insofar as the decision of Skoda Auto Volkwagen (India) Private Limited (Supra), while the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia observed that mere delay in filing FIR, cannot by itself be a ground to quash the FIR, and whereas the Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the law is too well settled to on this aspect to warrant any reference to precedents. That this Court, relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kishan Singh (supra) where the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the delay if not explained with plausible reasons, the same could be fatal to the complaint, has come to the aforesaid conclusion. As a matter of fact, it appears that in the decision of the Skoda Auto Volkwagen (India) Private Limited (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court was referring to an earlier decision which has not been quoted and whereas one of such decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court with regard to the delay has been relied upon by this Court.

16. In case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Yogendra Singh Jadon (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had inter alia laid down that power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. cannot be exercised where allegations are required to be proved in court of law. In the considered opinion of this Court, the said proposition would not be applicable to the facts of the

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present case, more particularly since this Court is of the opinion that the FIR requires to be interfered on the ground of unexplained delay and mala fides. In this context, it is observed that delay in filing of the FIR may not dilute the allegations levelled in the FIR, but at the same time the delay in the instant case clearly reflects that filing of the FIR is an afterthought and as elaborately noted by this Court that it is preferred for a mala fide purpose. Under such circumstances, while in normal course without the attendant circumstances, the allegations would be required to be proved in Court of law, but in the instant case, the attendant circumstances are so glaring that not quashing of the impugned FIR would be, in the considered opinion of this Court, nothing less than a miscarriage of justice. Furthermore, this Court also notes that the case before the Hon'ble Apex Court was with regard to grant of cash credit limit to the respondents when their father was President of the Bank and such grant was in disregard of the relevant rules and regulations. The Hon'ble Apex Court in context of the fact situation was observing that when such serious allegations have been made at pretrial stage, the High Court ought not to have examined the issue to prima facie come to a conclusion that offence under Sections 420 and 120-B of IPC are not made out.

17. In case of Awadh Kishore Gupta (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court had inter alia held that the High Court for the purpose of prima facie satisfaction about existence of sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused can evaluate material and documents but it cannot appreciate evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that the High Court should not act on annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be termed as evidence without being tested and proved. In the considered opinion of this Court, the proposition relied upon by the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Nauk is too well settled and whereas this Court has not relied upon the materials which are required to be proved. On the

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contrary, the observations of this Court, as regards the FIR being grossly delayed and no plausible explanation coming-forth with regard to the delay and the FIR being mala fidely instituted, are not arrived at by appreciating any evidence whatsoever. It is on basis of the undisputed facts that this Court has come to the said conclusion.

18. At this stage, this Court would seek to rely upon the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of M/s. Neeharika Infrastructure Private Limited Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2021 SCC Online SC 315. In the said decision the Hon'ble Apex Court has inter alia held in conclusion at Para No. 57 (x) and

(xiv) with regard to exercise of extraordinary powers of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and inherent powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. as under:

"57. (x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

(xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint."

Reading the conclusion at Para No. 57 (x) and (xiv) as quoted hereinabove, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court appears to be in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in miscarriage of justice, the Court can interfere, at the same time interference should be according to the broad parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866 and in case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of State of Haryana and others Vs. Bhajan Lal and others, reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335 has inter alia laid

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down certain categories of cases by way of illustrations, wherein extraordinary powers under Article 226 or inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure could be exercised by this Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. Para No.102 of the said decision being the relevant, the same is reproduced hereinbelow for benefit.

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code, which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

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without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge."

20. The issue in question viewed in perspective of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, appears to be a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction to quash the complaint. As noted hereinabove, this Court already having observed that the FIR is a clear abuse of the process of law, more particularly since the FIR is preferred after an extraordinary delay of 26 years during which period the complainant was contesting the civil suit preferred by the present applicant for specific performance of the very selfsame document which the complainant claims to be forged in the FIR. As noted hereinabove, the complainant has not offered any plausible explanation for the delay. Furthermore, facts reveal that the proximate cause for filing of the FIR was a settlement in a civil suit by a third party preferred in the year 2011 for executing agreements with regard to the same property in question. The suit being disposed of on the basis of settlement on 11.03.2013 and the FIR being filed on 06.04.2013

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clearly reveals that the FIR is instituted for mala fide purpose. In this view of the matter, it clearly appears that instance (7) of the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) would be squarely applicable to the facts of this case.

21. Insofar as the submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Naik that findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa, reference being had to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kishan Singh (supra), this Court is inclined to accept such contention. The observation of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the said decision in Para No. 18 being relevant, the same is reproduced hereinbelow :

"18. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue stands crystallized to the effect that the findings of fact recorded by the Civil Court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of Sections 41 to 43 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous Judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration."

Having regard to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, even though the learned Civil Court has come to a conclusion that the father of the complainant appears to have signed the deed in question and veracity of the possession receipt also being upheld, yet that by itself would not be a good ground and whereas, this Court does not rely upon any of the observations made by the learned Civil Court in the civil suit preferred by

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the applicant to come to the conclusion that the impugned FIR is an abuse of the process of law.

22. Having regard to the observations, reasoning and conclusion arrived at hereinabove, in the considered opinion of this Court, the present application deserves to be allowed. Hence, the FIR being C.R. No.I- 100 of 2013 registered on 06.04.2013 with the Varachha Police Station, District Surat, is hereby quashed and set aside qua the present applicant. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

(NIKHIL S. KARIEL,J) BDSONGARA