The State Of Gujarat vs Dahyabhai Kalidas Parmar ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 16121 Guj

     R/CR.A/2235/2006                         JUDGMENT DATED: 13/10/2021




        IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                 R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2235 of 2006

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI
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      Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
 1                                                                   NO
      to see the judgment ?

 2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ?                          YES

      Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy of
 3                                                                   NO
      the judgment ?
   Whether this case involves a substantial question
 4 of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of            NO
   India or any order made thereunder ?

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                  THE STATE OF GUJARAT
                            Versus
   DAHYABHAI KALIDAS PARMAR A.H.C.B.NO.1398 & 2 other(s)
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Appearance:
MR HARDIK SONI, APP (2) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR MP SHAH(2418) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
MS. KRUTI M SHAH(2428) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No.
1,2,3
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 CORAM:HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE ASHOKKUMAR C. JOSHI

                          Date : 13/10/2021

                          ORAL JUDGMENT

1. Present appeal has been filed by the appellant - State under Section 378(1)(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 challenging the judgment and order dated 30.08.2006, passed in Special Case No. 15 of 2002 by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 15, Vadodara, recording the acquittal.

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2. The facts, in brief, are that a complaint was filed against one Ganpatbhai Budhabhai by Ibrahimbhai Malek, resident of Bhayali village being application No. 96/2002, investigation of which, was with accused No. 1 - Dahyabhai Kalidas Parmar, who was Writer - Constable and accused No. 2 - Punambhai Kishanbhai Bhaliya, Unarmed Head Constable, was the Assistant Writer of the accused No. 1 and the accused No. 3 - Smt. Lilaben Ramsinh Chauhan, ASI, was working as a Writer Head in the Taluka Police Station as well as was being Police Station Officer, had been handling the Station Diary duty. The accused No. 1 allegedly called the respondent in the said application - Jayantibhai Budhabhai at the Taluka Police station and demanded bribe of Rs.1,000/- for bail related procedures, which, after bargaining, eventually, finalized at Rs.400/-. The respondent of the said application was asked to remain present on 29.05.2002 at the Taluka Police Station along with a surety and the amount of bribe. The complainant, since, did not want to pay the bribe, approached Shri I. B. Vyas, Police Inspector, ACB, Vadodara on 28.05.2002, who, after completing preliminary procedures, arranged the trap. The accused No. 1, through the accused No. 2 received an amount of Rs.50/- for helping in investigation as well as the accused No. 3 also received Rs.50/- for necessary registration in the record and thereby, all the accused, in connivance with each other, committed the offence punishable under Section 7, 12, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (herein after referred to as "the PC Act") for which, FIR came to be registered against him.

2.1 Upon such FIR being filed, investigation started and the Investigating Officer recorded statements of as many as 6 witnesses and produced certain documentary evidence and after completion of the investigation, Charge-sheet was filed against

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the accused persons for the offences in question. The learned Judge trial Judge framed the Charge. Since the accused did not plead guilty, trial was proceeded against the accused. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.08.2006, the learned trial Judge acquitted the accused persons. Being aggrieved by the same, the State has preferred the present appeal.

3. Heard, learned APP Mr. Hardik Soni for the appellant - State and learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the respondents.

3.1 The learned Additional Public Prosecutor has mainly contended that the learned trial Judge has erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that there is legal sanction under Section 19(1) of the PC Act for prosecuting the accused. The learned trial Judge has also erred in holding that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused No. 1 demanded Rs.400/- from the complainant for bail and also induced to give Rs.50/- to accused No. 2 and Rs.50/- to accused No. 3 and also caught red- handed by accepting bribe and committed the offence in question.

3.2 The learned APP further contended that the learned trial Judge has failed to appreciate that PW-1 Dhirubhai Mahijibhai Parmar, Exh. 21 has clearly stated in his complaint that one complaint given by Ibrahimbhai Malek against Jayantibhai Budhalal to the Taluka Police Station, in which, prosecution was carried out by accused No. 1 being in-charge of the police station. He called Jayantibhai Budhabhai and demanded Rs.1,000/- bribe for releasing him on bail. The said deal eventually finalized for Rs.400/- and hence, he lodged the complaint before the PI, ACB and in the trap arranged by them, the accused Nos. 2 and 3

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found to have received Rs.50/- each whereas, the accused No. 1 accepted the whole amount of bribe. The accused persons were caught red-handed. This witness, thus, supported the case of the prosecution, however, the learned trial Judge disbelieved his deposition and thereby, materially erred.

3.3 The learned APP further, drawing the attention of the Court to the deposition of PW-2 Chhipabhai Makanjibhai Gamit, Exh. 34 submitted that this witness has also clearly supported the case of the prosecution and narrated the incident in detail that accused persons were caught red-handed taking bribe, however, the learned trial Judge has materially erred in disbelieving the case of the prosecution.

3.4 He further drew the attention of the Court to the deposition of PW-3 Indravadan Balkrushna Vyas, Exh. 55, who was the Trapping Officer and submitted that this witness has also fully supported the case of the prosecution and has deposed to state that the accused persons had taken bribe in his presence, however, the learned trial Judge has also not believed evidence of this witness in its true and proper perspective and thereby, has committed a grave error.

3.5 The learned APP, taking this Court through the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record, submitted that though the prosecution has proved the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge has not properly appreciated the evidence on record and thereby, has committed an error in recording acquittal. He submitted that though all the ingredients viz. demand, acceptance and recovery were fulfilled and proved beyond reasonable doubt, the learned trial Judge did not believe the same and therefore, the impugned judgment and

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order suffers from material illegality, perversity and contrary to the facts and evidence on record. He submitted that even demand is sufficient to implicate the accused.

3.6 The learned APP further submitted that under Section 20 of the PC Act, presumption is required to be drawn where public servant accepts gratification other than legal remuneration, where, in any trial of an offence punishable under section 7 or section 11 or clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 13 it is proved that an accused person has accepted or obtained or has agreed to accept or attempted to obtain for himself, or for any other person, any gratification (other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing from any person and it shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that he accepted or obtained or agreed to accept or attempted to obtain that gratification or that valuable thing, as the case may be, as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7 or, as the case may be, without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate. He submitted that onus is cast upon such person to prove otherwise, which, in the instant case, the accused persons have failed to prove. However, the learned trial Judge has failed to take into consideration such an important aspect of the matter and eventually, has erred in recording acquittal.

3.7 Thus, the learned APP has submitted although cogent and material evidence had been produced by the prosecution and the case was proved beyond reasonable doubt, the trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused and accordingly, he urged that present appeal may be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned judgment and order of acquittal.

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4. Per contra, learned advocate Ms. Kruti M. Shah for the respondents - accused, while supporting the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court, submitted that the learned trial Judge has, after due and proper appreciation and evaluation of the evidence on record, has come to such a conclusion and has acquitted all the accused, which is just and proper. She submitted that it is trite law that if two views are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality.

4.1 The learned advocate for the respondents - accused submitted that three ingredients in such type of cases are sine qua non viz. demand, acceptance and recovery, which are required to be proved, are not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against them.

4.2 The learned advocate for the respondents - accused further submitted that the complainant is in habit of filing false complaints against different persons. Further, drawing attention of the Court to the depositions of the prosecution witnesses, more particularly, the cross-examinations, she submitted that the complainant himself has admitted in his evidence that accused Nos. 2 and 3 had not demanded any money. Further, the record reveals that only bald allegations have been made against the accused No. 1 that he demanded the money, however, the demand is not proved against him. Further, she reiterated that

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the prosecution has materially erred in proving the core ingredients i.e. demand, acceptance and recovery and hence, the learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused of the charges levelled against them, which do not require any interference at the hands of this Court. Eventually, it is urged that the present appeal may be dismissed.

5. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties and gone through the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court as well as the material on record. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it would be worthwhile to refer to the scope in acquittal appeals. It is well settled by catena of decisions that an appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and consider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. However, the Appellate Court must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is prejudice in favour of the accused, firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court.

5.1 Further, if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. Further, while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal, the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrive at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person, and therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse.

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5.2 Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. That the duty is cast upon the the appellate Court, in such circumstances, re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether the accused is connected with the commission of the crime with which he is charged.

5.3 In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) represented through Legal Representatives v. State of Karnataka and Others, (2019) 2 SCC 752, the Apex Court has observed that, "The presumption of innocence which is attached to every accused gets fortified and strengthened when the said accused is acquitted by the trial Court. Probably, for this reason, the law makers felt that when the appeal is to be filed in the High Court it should not be filed as a matter of course or as matter of right but leave of the High Court must be obtained before the appeal is entertained. This would not only prevent the High Court from being flooded with appeals but more importantly would ensure that innocent persons who have already faced the tribulation of a long drawn out criminal trial are not again unnecessarily dragged to the High Court".

5.4 Yet in another decision in Chaman Lal v. The State of Himachal Pradesh, rendered in Criminal Appeal No. 1229 of 2017 on 03.12.2020, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 988 the Apex Court has observed as under:

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"9.1 In the case of Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189), this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. In paragraphs 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under:

12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P (1975) 3 SCC 219, Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar (1990) 4 SCC 17, Shailendra Pratap v. State of U.P (2003) 1 SCC 761, Narendra Singh v. State of M.P (2004) 10 SCC 699, Budh Singh v. State of U.P (2006) 9 SCC 731, State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh (2007) 13 SCC 102, S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (2008) 5 SCC 535, Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206, Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P (2009) 16 SCC 98 and Ram Singh v. State of H.P (2010) 2 SCC 445)

13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor AIR 1934 PC 227, the Privy Council observed as under: (IA p. 404) "... the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses."

14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been followed by this Court. (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State AIR 1954 SC 1, Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1957 SC 216, M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963 SC 200,

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Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar (1970) 2 SCC 450, Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P(2002) 4 SCC 85 and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran (2007) 3 SCC 755)

15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka (2007) 4 SCC 415, this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42)

"(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, 'substantial and compelling reasons', 'good and sufficient grounds', 'very strong circumstances', 'distorted conclusions', 'glaring mistakes', etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of 'flourishes of language' to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court."

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16. In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P (2008) 10 SCC 450, this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.

17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh (2009) 9 SCC 368, the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) "20. ... an order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused."

18. In State of U.P. v. Banne (2009) 4 SCC 271, this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include: (SCC p. 286, para 28) "(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position;

(ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record;

(iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice;

(iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case;

(v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court;

(vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal." A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State (2009) 10 SCC 401.

19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling

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circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference."

9.2 When the findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid decision, which reads as under:

"20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material. The finding may also be said to be perverse if it is "against the weight of evidence", or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality. (Vide Rajinder Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn (1984) 4 SCC 635, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312, Triveni Rubber & Plastics v.

CCE 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 665, Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad (2001) 1 SCC 501, Aruvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P (2009) 10 SCC

636)." (emphasis supplied)

9.3 It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court in the case of Kuldeep Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1999) 2 SCC 10, that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with.

9.4 In the recent decision of Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436, this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 Cr.P.C. and the interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:

"31. An identical question came to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai (1978) 1 SCC 228. In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the

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order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p.

233)

"10. Once the appeal was rightly entertained against the order of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to reappreciate the entire evidence independently and come to its own conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due importance to the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will not be applicable in the present case where the Sessions Judge has made an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case."

31.1. In Sambasivan v. State of Kerala (1998) 5 SCC 412, the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on re- appreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by the High Court.

While confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416)

"8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed to the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat (1996) 9 SCC 225 viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it

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were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is considering the validity of the judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at by it are demonstrably unsustainable and whether the judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the trial court judgment warranted interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case."

31.2. In K. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala (1999) 3 SCC 309, after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified in discarding the relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at

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all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge.

31.3. In Atley v. State of U.P. AIR 1955 SC 807, in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 80910) "5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 Cr.P.C came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order.

It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence.

It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal.

If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said to have been vitiated. (See in this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State AIR 1952 SC 52; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P AIR 1953 SC 122) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the

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appellant that the High Court was not justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.

31.4. In K. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1979) 1 SCC 355, this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be beset with fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule."

(emphasis supplied)."

6. In the aforesaid backdrop, if the evidence of complainant PW-1 Dhirubhai Mahijibhai Parmar, Exh. 21 - complainant is referred to, he has reiterated the contents of his complaint. If the cross-examination of this witness is referred to, he has admitted that impression of Jayantibhai Budhabhai in the village is of a headstrong person. Further, he used to file false complaints against different persons. It is admitted that one Dineshbhai Ramjibhai Parmar had filed a complaint against Ganpatbhai under Atrocity Act. It is also admitted by this witness that till the procedure related to yadi had been done, no demand was made by the accused No. 1 - Dahyabhai Parmar. Further, he has also admitted in his deposition that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 had neither demanded any money from him nor had he filed any complaint against them.

6.1 Further, he has admitted in his cross-examination to the effect that he had not stated before the police that Dahyabhai Jamadar had asked about the said transaction, that is about gratification money, to which, he answered that he had brought Rs.400/-. Further, this witness has also admitted in his cross- examination that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 had no knowledge about the conversations between them i.e. the complainant and the accused No. 1. He has also deposed that the accused No. 1 had not taken money when it was offered to him by the

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complainant. Further, he has deposed that the accused No. 1 had not asked him to pay Rs.50/- each to the accused Nos. 2 and

3. It is also deposed by the complainant that his friend Bhupendrabhai was not allotted the house by the Gujarat Housing Board and hence, he agitated before the Collector Office and also threatened to self immolate during which, Dahyabhai (accused No. 1) had arrested him. He has admitted that Bhupendrabhai had made such a drama at the instance of the complainant. He has also admitted that he had also join Bhupendrabhai in self immolation and sat before the Circuit House for Dharna. Thus, it has come from the evidence of this witness that the accused No. 1 had not taken any money. Moreover, the other two accused had not demanded any money.

6.2 So far as PW-2, Chhipabhai Makanjibhai Gamit, Exh. 34 is concerned, he is the panch witness. In his chief examination, he has stated about the details of trap. However, in his cross- examination, this witness has deposed to state that he had neither seen the bottle of anthracene powder by holding the same in his hand nor had he read manufacturing and/or the expiry date on the bottle. He has further deposed that he was informed by the ACB office that in case Dahyabhai would ask for the bribe amount then only he was advised to give that amount and he was not advised otherwise. Further, when he went to the police station along with the complainant, Dahyabhai had not met, however, after 15-20 minutes he came and they sat where Dahyabhai used to sit. He has further deposed that Dahyabhai had not asked for any bribe from the complainant. He has also deposed that neither Punambhai nor Lilaben had demanded any money towards bribe. However, the complainant handed over a note in denomination of Rs.50/- to Punambhai and before he understood anything, ACB officials took him into custody. He has

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also deposed that he had only signed the panchnama as was asked for. Thus, this witness has clearly deposed that none of the accused had asked for the bribe.

6.3 The prosecution has also examined the sanctioning officer i.e. Patel Piyushbhai, Superintendent of Police, who had granted the sanction.

6.4 Further, the prosecution has examined Indravadan Balkrushna Vyas, PW-4, Exh. 55, who was the Trapping Officer. If the cross-examination of this witness is referred to, he has deposed that he had taken complaint on blank paper. Further, despite inquiry, it could not come out as to whether the complainant himself was involved in any criminal case nor that the complainant had any mens rea. Also he could not know as to the fact that the complainant himself was the person blackmailing the government officers. He has also deposed that the complainant had not lodged any complaint against the accused Nos. 2 and 3. He has further deposed that he had not registered any FIR when the complainant gave his complaint. Further, when the complainant signalled and he rushed to the office, on inquiry he came to know that neither accused No. 2 nor the accused No. 3 had demanded Rs.50/-. He has also deposed to state that he did not know about the conversation between the complainant and Dahyabhai Parmar - the accused No. 1, in his cabin. He has denied that since the accused No. 1 had, earlier, registered some cases against the complainant, the complainant was keen on implicating the accused No. 1 falsely. Thus, this witness, the Trapping Officer, has also stated that he did not know about the talks between the complainant and the accused No. 1. Further, none of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 had demanded the bribe money.

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6.5 Thus, on re-appreciation and reevaluation of the ocular and the documentary evidence on record, it transpires that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch, as all the three material ingredients of the offence in question viz. demand, acceptance and recovery are not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. So far as the accused Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, it has come on record that there was neither any complaint against them nor had there been any allegation of demand of bribe qua them. So far as the accused No. 1 is concerned, so called demand of bribe is not proved against him beyond reasonable doubt. Further, as it has emered from the evidence on record, he had neither accepted the bribe money nor any recovery was made from him. It has further revealed from the record that the complainant himself appears to have been habituated of filing false complaints against different government officers. The Court has gone through in detail the impugned judgment and order and found that the learned trial Judge has meticulously considered the depositions of all the witnesses and came to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to prove the case against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, as three ingredients of the offence viz. demand, acceptance and recovery, which are sine qua non in such cases, are not proved and in the considered opinion of this Court, the learned trial Judge has rightly come to such a conclusion, which do not call for any interference at the hands of this Court.

6.6 So far as sanction under section 19(1) of the PC Act is concerned, the learned trial Judge has discussed the said issue in detail and after considering the material available on record, he has come to the conclusion that the sanctioning officer has given the sanction for prosecution mechanically and without proper

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application of mind. Further, it is observed that the complaint was given qua accused No. 1, whereas, there was no complaint against the accused Nos. 2 and 3 at all. This Court is in complete agreement with such finding of the learned trial Judge.

6.7 So far as the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is concerned, it trite that even the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

7. In view of the aforesaid discussion and observations, in the considered opinion of this Court, the prosecution has failed to bring home the charge against accused for want of sufficient material. The findings recorded by the learned trial Judge do not call for any interference. Resultantly, in fleri, the appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly. Impugned judgment and order dated 30.08.2006, passed in Special Case No. 15 of 2002 by the learned Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court No. 15, Vadodara, recording the acquittal is confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. R&P be transmitted back forthwith.

[ A. C. Joshi, J. ] hiren