Shivam Petrol Station vs Bharat Petroleum Corporation ...
2021 Latest Caselaw 5351 Guj

      C/SCA/12658/2016                                CAV JUDGMENT




         IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

     R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.            12658 of 2016


FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI
=====================================================

1 Whether Reporters of Local Papers may No be allowed to see the judgment ?

2 To be referred to the Reporter or not ? No

3 Whether their Lordships wish to see the No fair copy of the judgment ?

4 Whether this case involves a No substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution of India or any order made thereunder ?

===================================================== SHIVAM PETROL STATION Versus BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LIMITED ===================================================== Appearance:

MR MITUL K SHELAT(2419) for the Respondent(s) No. 1 ===================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE VIPUL M. PANCHOLI

Date : 5/05/2021

CAV JUDGMENT

1. This petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in which, the petitioner has prayed that the order dated 10.08.2013 passed by the respondent be quashed and set aside and, thereby, the respondent be directed to restore sales and supply of

retail outlet of the petitioner.

2. Heard learned advocate Mr.D.C. Sejpal for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Mitul K. Shelat for the respondent.

3. Looking to the issue involved in the present petition and as the petition is pending at admission stage since 2016, the learned advocates appearing for the parties jointly requested that this petition be heard and finally disposed of at admission stage. Hence, Rule. Learned advocate Mr.Mitul Shelat waives service of notice of Rule for the respondent.

4. Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal appearing for the petitioner submitted that the respondent issued an advertisement inviting application from people at large for the purpose of allotment of retail outlet. The application submitted by the petitioner was accepted by the respondent after due verification. It is submitted that the petitioner is having retail outlet of the respondent since 31.12.2010. A dealership agreement was executed for fifteen years. It is submitted that Undertaking was taken from the petitioner that if allotment is made in her favour, she will execute a Lease Agreement for the land from the land owner and the same is also duly executed, which is still in force.

4.1 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal thereafter submitted that on 25.04.2012, it is alleged that the Officers

of the respondent visited the outlet of the petitioner. It was informed that no inspection was to be carried out and the same will be done after three to four days. Thereafter, on 30.04.2012, a team of authorised representative visited the retail outlet of the petitioner and carried out the inspection. The inspection report was duly signed by both the parties. At this stage, it is contended that on the same day, the letter purported to have been written on 25.04.2012 was handed over to the retail outlet whereby it was informed that one inspection was carried out on 25.04.2012 observing some violations of Marketing Discipline Guidelines, 2005 (MDG) and supplies of the product was suspended with immediate effect. At this stage, it is pointed out by the learned advocate Mr.Sejpal that if the actual inspection which was carried out on 30.04.2012 is carefully seen, some glaring contradictions emerged from the report as well as the conduct of the officers of the respondent, from which, it can be said that no inspection was carried out on 25.04.2012. It is submitted that as per the letter dated 25.04.2012, if some violation of the MDG was noticed, why the supply was made to the petitioner's outlet upto 30.04.2012 and if there is a violation of MDG, there was no need for team to visit once again on 30.04.2012. It is also pointed out that even presuming that inspection was carried out on 25.04.2012 as alleged, then column of the inspection report would mention the date of last visit as 25.04.2012 but in fact, the column mentions the date

of previous visit as 20.03.2012. Learned advocate would further submit that there are no discrepancies except short supply even as per the inspection report. It is contended that the report further mentions that inspection has been carried out using mechanical totalizer. The report also confirms after physical verification by the officers that weight and measures seals including totalizer seals are intact.

Thus, learned advocate Mr.Sejpal would submit that some vested interests are operating against the petitioner and the petitioner is victimized.

4.2 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal further submitted that in response to the alleged communication dated 25.04.2012 handed over to the petitioner on 30.04.2012, a detailed communication was addressed to the respondent on 01.05.2012 wherein the petitioner has pointed out the relevant aspects and it is stated that no report for alleged inspection dated 25.04.2012 was given to the petitioner and, thereby, the respondent has violated the principles of natural justice. It is submitted that thereafter, Show-cause Notice dated 20.06.2012 came to be issued to the petitioner for termination of dealership of the petitioner and the petitioner gave reply to the said notice on 27.07.2012 pointing out in detail all factual aspects and narrating the facts as to how the officers of the respondent are acting in collusion with some person having vested interest to ruin the business of the petitioner.

4.3 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal submitted that the petitioner thereafter filed Special Civil Application No.16611 of 2012 before this Court. This Court issued notice and, thereafter, the said petition came to be disposed of vide order dated 22.06.2016 with a liberty to the petitioner to challenge the decision dated 10.08.2013 taken by respondent by filing separate substantive petition. At this stage, it is pointed out that during the pendency of the said petition, which was filed in the year 2012, the impugned order dated 10.08.2013 came to be passed by the respondent terminating the dealership of the petitioner and, therefore, now, the present petition has been filed.

4.4 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal submitted that the respondent has violated the principles of natural justice and no personal hearing was given to the petitioner. It is also submitted that the impugned action of the respondent is prejudicial and the same was taken with malafide intention and ulterior motive. Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal has referred the MDG and, thereafter, submitted that for the alleged violation made by the petitioner, at the most, the respondent can impose fine. However, no powers are vested with the respondent to terminate the dealership of the petitioner for the alleged violation.

4.5 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal submitted that there

is no adulteration nor there is any tampering with seals. Even the samples were not sent to the FSL for testing and, therefore, the impugned decision taken by the respondent be quashed and set aside.

4.6 At this stage, it is further submitted that the respondent has alleged that the petitioner has forged documents. However, for the said alleged forgery, no FIR has been registered and, therefore, the respondent cannot presume that the petitioner has forged documents. Even the so-called forged documents are not placed on record and copies of the same were not supplied to the petitioner.

4.7 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal further contends that in the Show-cause Notice, there was a reference with regard to the CD containing movie, which shows the vehicle of other petrol company supplying material to the petitioner's pump. The petitioner replied to the respondent after receipt of the said CD and pointed out that with the assistance of technology, any person can make such movie. The said CD was sent to the respondent by someone else. Thus, it is submitted that some vested interests are acting in collusion with the officers of the respondent. It is, therefore, urged that the impugned order passed by the respondent be quashed and set aside.

4.8 Learned advocate Mr.Sejpal has placed reliance upon the order dated 10.05.2013 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No.7619 of 2011. After

referring to the same, it is submitted that in the matter of contract also, the concept of fair play in action by the State or its instrumentality would come into play, which requires a judicial scrutiny on touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that the said decision rendered by the learned Single Judge has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.811 of 2014, which was decided on 16.12.2016.

5. On the other hand, learned advocate Mr.Mitul K. Shelat appearing for the respondent has opposed this petition and at the outset submitted that by way of the impugned order dated 10.08.2013, the respondent has terminated the dealership agreement dated 30.12.2010 in accordance with relevant clause of the agreement entered into between the parties. The relief sought by the petitioner is of specific performance of the dealership agreement and, therefore, the present petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. The respondent has exercised its contractual right to terminate the dealership and there are disputed questions of fact involved in the present petition, which can be adjudicated by the competent Civil Court. It is, therefore, urged that this petition be dismissed.

5.1 Learned advocate Mr.Mitul K. Shelat thereafter submitted that after the dealership agreement was

executed with the petitioner, the respondent received a letter from Adarsh Co-operative Bank, in which, it was stated that the present petitioner had obtained a loan of Rs.1,10,00,000/- from the said Bank by mortgaging retail outlet property. The said loan was obtained on the basis of No Objection Certificate issued by the respondent. In fact, the respondent has not issued any No Objection Certificate for grant of loan and the said document is forged document. It is submitted that written complaint was given to Commissioner of Police, Rajkot. Learned advocate Mr.Shelat further submits that the officer of the respondent visited the site of the petitioner on 25.04.2012 and certain irregularities were noticed in relation to the dealership of the petitioner. Learned advocate Mr.Shelat has referred the said alleged irregularities. Thereafter, it is contended that the Show-cause Notice was also issued to the petitioner, in which, all the irregularities were pointed out to her. It is further submitted that Vigilance Department of the respondent received a communication along with the CD. Recording of that CD showed a tank lorry of another company being unloaded at the dealership of the petitioner. It is submitted that after considering the reply submitted by the petitioner, the respondent has terminated the dealership of the petitioner as per the terms and conditions of the Agreement and, thereby, no illegality is committed. Learned advocate, therefore, urged that this petition may not be entertained.

5.2 Learned advocate Mr.Shelat submitted that there is no procedure impropriety pointed out by the petitioner before passing the impugned order. It is also submitted that the essence of dealership agreement entered into between the parties is trust and, therefore, when there is a breach of trust on the part of the petitioner, the respondent was justified in terminating the dealership agreement. It is submitted that standard of review in such type of matter is limited and this Court has to examine only the decision making process but this Court would not like to sit in an appeal over the decision taken by the respondent. It is urged that this petition be dismissed.

5.3 Learned advocate Mr.Shelat has placed reliance upon the following decisions:

(1) Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education V/s. K.S. Gandhi reported in (1991) 2 SCC 716

(2) Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. T. Natrajan reported in (2018) 9 SCC 235

6. Having heard learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the material placed on record, it would emerge that the petitioner was appointed as a dealer pursuant to Dispensing Pump & Selling License Agreement (Dealership Agreement) executed between the parties on 30.12.2010. It is

revealed that on 30.04.2012, the officers of the respondent inspected the premises of the petitioner and, thereafter, letter dated 25.04.2012 came to be issued alleging certain irregularities committed by the petitioner at her place. The petitioner gave reply to the said letter dated 25.04.2012 pointing out that in fact, no inspection was carried out on 25.04.2012 at the place of the petitioner and, thereafter, Show-cause Notice came to be issued to the petitioner on 21.06.2012. The petitioner gave reply to the said notice on 27.07.2012 and, thereafter, on 10.08.2013, the impugned order has been passed terminating the dealership of the petitioner.

7. It is a specific case of the petitioner that some of the officers of the respondent Company in collusion with certain persons who are having vested interest have malafidely and with ulterior motive taken the impugned action against the petitioner. If the alleged irregularities are carefully seen, it is revealed that for the said alleged irregularities, only fine can be imposed. Further, it is alleged by the respondent that the petitioner has forged document i.e. No Objection Certificate of the respondent, which was placed before the concerned Bank for obtaining loan. It is pertinent to note, at this stage, that for the alleged forged document, the respondent has not filed any FIR against the petitioner before the concerned Police Station. It is merely alleged that said NOC is a forged document.

Further, it is also pertinent to note at this stage that the officer of the respondent has not prepared any CD alleging that tank lorry of other Company was unloading petrol at petrol pump of the petitioner. It is a specific case of the respondent that the said CD was sent to the respondent by some person. It is a specific case of the petitioner that someone has prepared forged and fabricated CD and the said CD is got-up.

8. From the record, it is further revealed that the petitioner has specifically alleged that during inspection on 30.04.2012, no report for inspection dated 25.04.2012 was given to the petitioner and, thereby, the respondent has violated the principles of natural justice. Further, before passing the impugned order, opportunity of personal hearing was also not accorded to the petitioner.

9. It is pertinent to note that during the course of hearing, while this Court has inquired from learned advocate for the respondent that after passing the impugned order terminating the dealership of the petitioner, whether the respondent has allotted the said place to any other person by executing any agreement. Learned advocate Mr.Shelat, after taking instructions, submitted that till today, the respondent has not allotted the place in question to any other person. Thus, no third party right is created in the place in question.

10. In the aforesaid factual aspects of the matter, this Court would like to refer the order passed by this Court in the case of Induben Laxmanbhai Dudakhiya Proprietor of M/s. Utsav Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited & Anr. This Court after considering various decisions rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court, observed in Paragraphs-21 to 24 as under:

"21. A useful reference can also be made observation made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment in case of Harbanslal Sahnia & Anr. (supra), wherein again the observation has been made with regard to the termination of the dealership and similar contention about misuse of writ petition was considered. It has been observed as under:-

The rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case, in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at lease three contingencies;

               (i)   where            the  writ        petition  seeks
               enforcement           of any of         the fundamental
               rights;

(ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice; or

(iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged.

The present case attracts applicability of the first two contingencies. Moreover the petitioners' dealership, which is their bread and butter, came to be terminated for an

irrelevant and non-existent cause. In such circumstances, the appellants should have been allowed relief by the High Court itself instead of driving them to the need of initiating arbitration proceedings.

22. Another facet of argument that at pre- contract stage when it is a matter of providing an opportunity or equal opportunity, the Court may examine with reference to Article 14 of the Constitution of India but at post contract i.e. after the parties have entered into an agreement or the contract, it would be governed by the mutual obligation under the contract is required to be considered in background of a case or the facts of the case. In the facts of the present case, it is merely a violation or breach of the agreement or a clause in the agreement but it is a matter with regard to the termination of the dealership agreement, which is arbitrarily in violation of natural justice without any basis or material and, therefore, such decision as discussed above could be examined in a judicial review. Again it is not a decision but decision making process, which is required to be considered in order to decide whether there is any element of fair play or not. It is in this context, when the contentions have been raised, it cannot be said that it is a matter purely within the realm of contract and there is an alternative remedy. In a given set of facts with regard to the claim for money or counter claim or other issues, there might be a disputed questions of fact and/or there might be a purely dispute with regard to mutual obligations, which are required to be fulfilled. The Court may decline to exercise the discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the facts of the case, it is not specifically stated that there is any breach or a particular breach of agreement or clause in the agreement but focus is on the malpractice or irregularity, which is inferred on the basis of the fact that there is a short delivery by the dispensing unit. Again at the cost of repetition, the inference is not based on any material and is not supported by

any report or scientific test, which could lead to a conclusion or prima facie conclusion about the alleged irregularity. Therefore, when there is no foundation led for the inference, any such inference cannot be sustained. A useful reference can be made to a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of ABL International Ltd. and Another Vs. Export Credit Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd. and Others, , more particularly in para no. 27, where the observations have been made with regard to the maintainability of writ petition. Similarly in a judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Allied Motors Ltd. Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd., , the observations have been made by the Hon'ble Apex Court quoting earlier judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Karnataka State Forest Industries Corpn. Vs. Indian Rocks as under:-

Although ordinarily a (superior court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction would not enforce the terms of a contract qua contract, it is trite that when an action of the State is arbitrary or discriminatory and, thus, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, a writ petition would be maintainable.

In this case also, issue which was addressed was with regarding the termination of the dealership agreement without notice.

23. One more aspect which is required to be considered is that if this submission made by learned counsel, Shri Chhatrapati has to be accepted on the face value that the unit was installed in the premises of the petitioner and there is short delivery by itself would lead to an inference about the tampering with it, it could be a situation where a person like the petitioner is held guilty without affording any opportunity. The short delivery by dispensing unit as stated above does not necessarily lead to irresistible conclusion about the tampering or irregularity as there is no technical report, by which, it could be inferred that there has

been tampering with the unit. The report which is sought to be subsequently relied upon and which is given by the manufacturer-MIDCO as discussed above cannot be considered as it was not available at the time of taking impugned decision regarding the termination. Therefore, it could not be basis or foundation for such a termination of agreement. Therefore, if such a report was not available and was not base or foundation, there was no other material, by which, such decision could have been taken for termination of the dealership agreement or mere ipse dixit about tampering with the unit or malpractice. Again even this report by manufacturer, which is sent subsequently after the decision for termination of agreement, does not satisfy as to whether it was properly maintained in a sealed condition and it was in a proper or safe custody where the unit is kept lying with proper care, which would lead to any such result. The submission about the chip that it was not original again does not necessarily suggest that it was duplicate or it was replaced by the petitioner in as much as the unit itself is sealed and there is no evidence that it may have been opened for replacing the microchip. It is the only manufacturer, who could have stated or who could have clarified that whether such a chip could be tampered with when the unit is intact. Moreover again, it has to be considered with reference to whether the unit has been kept in a sealed condition and whether it was received in same condition when it was tested by the manufacturer. Time lag during which it was kept idle by the respondent would also give rise to a question about whether it was properly maintained in a sealed condition. There is no mentioned about the application of seal at the time of joint inspection and taking away unit by the respondent. On the other hand, the report of the manufacturer relied upon by the respondent themselves with the photographs of the unit referred to seal number, meaning thereby, there is some system of applying seal number and there is no evidence with regard to the exact identification of the unit taken from the petitioner, which could be said to have matched

with the report. It is in this background, the submissions made by learned counsel, Shri Chhatrapati cannot be accepted. Reliance placed by learned counsel, Shri Chhatrapati upon the judgment of the High Court in case of Natvarlal & Sons Through Partner (supra) also has to be considered in background of the facts. Again the judgment in case of G.B. Mahajan and others Vs. The Jalgaon Municipal Council and others, referring to the contractual matter with two aspects like public law element and private law has to be considered with reference to each individual case. In other words, though the dealership agreement entered into between the private individual and corporation is contractual matter, it cannot be said that it is purely a matter of private law element where the parties have voluntarily agreed to abide by terms and conditions stipulated regarding the mutual obligation. It again depends upon the facts and the controversy or issue involved in each case like in the present case i.e. though it is a matter of contract, the termination is claimed to be arbitrary in violation of Rules of natural justice as well as their own guidelines with regard to providing of opportunity or show cause notice. It is in these circumstances even though it is a matter of contract, the concept of quality and fair play in action by the State or its instrumentality would come into play which requires a judicial scrutiny on touch stone of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. A useful reference can also be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Kumari Shrilekha Vidyarthi and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others, , where it has been observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under:-

Even assuming that it is necessary to import the concept of presence of some public element in a State action to attract Article 14 and permit judicial review, we have no hesitation in saying that the ultimate impact of all actions of the State or a public body being undoubtedly on public interest, the requisite public element for this purpose is present also in

contractual matters. We, therefore, find it difficult and unrealistic to exclude the State actions in contractual matters, after the contract has been made, for the purview of judicial review to test its validity on the anvil of Article 14.

24. Another facet of arguments referring to the provisions of the Specific Relief Act would not have any application in the facts of the present case."

11. At this stage, it is pertinent to note that the aforesaid decision rendered by the learned Single Judge has been confirmed by the Division Bench of this Court.

12. Learned advocate for the respondent has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education V/s. K.S. Gandhi (supra), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs-37 and 38 as under:

"37. It is thus well settled law that strict rules of the Evidence Act, and the standard of proof envisaged therein do not apply to departmental proceedings or domestic tribunal. It is open to the authorities to receive and place on record all the necessary, relevant, cogent and acceptable material facts though not proved strictly in conformity with the Evidence Act. The material must be germane and relevant to the facts in issue. In grave cases like forgery, fraud, conspiracy, misappropriation, etc. seldom direct evidence would be available. Only the circumstantial evidence would furnish the proof. In our considered view inference from the evidence and circumstances must be carefully distinguished from conjectures or speculation.

The mind is prone to take pleasure to adapt

circumstances to one another and even in straining them a little to force them to form parts of one connected whole. There must be evidence direct or circumstances to deduce necessary inference in proof of the facts in issue. There can be no inferences unless there are objective facts, direct or circumstantial from which to infer the other fact which it is sought to establish. In some cases the other facts can be inferred with as much practical as if they had been actually observed. In other cases the inferences do not go beyond reasonable probability. If thee are no positive proved facts, oral, documentary or circumstantial from which the inferences can be made the method of inference fails and what is left is mere speculation on conjecture. Therefore, when an inference of proof that a fact in dispute has been held established there must be some material facts or circumstances on record from which such an inference could be drawn. The standard of proof is not proof beyond reasonable doubt "but" the preponderance of probabilities tending to draw an inference that the fact must be more probable. Standard of proof cannot be put in a straight Jacket formula. No mathematical formula could be laid on degree of proof. The probative value could be gauged from facts and circumstances in a given case. The standard of proof is the same both in civil cases and domestic enquiries.

38. From this legal setting we have to consider whether the inference deduced by the Education Standing Committee that the fabrication of moderators' mark-sheets was done at the behest of either the examinee or the parent or guardian is based on the evidence on record. It is already found that the examinees admitted the forgery of their concerned moderators' mark- sheets resulting the increase of marks to their advantage. The fabrication of the moderators 'mark- sheets was done after the scrutiny by the concerned officials in the office of the State Board at Bombay and before the moderators' mark- sheets were taken out to Pune to feed the computer. Why one is expected or interested to

wade through eighty thousand moderators' marks- sheets to locate only the 283 examinees mark- sheets and add marks by fabrication? Unless either the examinee or parent or guardian approached the fabricator; given the number and instructed him/them to fabricate the marks, it would not be possible to know their number to fabricate. The act of fabrication is an offence. Merely it was done in one subject or more than one makes little difference. Its gravity is not mitigated if it is committed in one subject alone. This is not an innocent act or a casual mistake during the course of performance of the official duty as is sought to be made out. It was obviously done as a concerted action. In view of the admitted facts and above circumstances the necessary conclusion that could unerringly be drawn would be that either the examinee o r the parent or guardian obviously was a privy to the fabrication and that the forgery was committed at his or her or parent's or guardian's behest. It is, therefore clear that the conclusion reached by the Education Standing Committee that the fabrication was done at the instance of either the examinees or their parents or guardians is amply borne out from the record. The High Court in our view over-stepped is supervisory jurisdiction and trenched into the arena of appreciation of evidence to arrive its own conclusions on the specious plea of satisfying 'conscience of the court'."

13. In the case of Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. & Anr. Vs. T. Natrajan (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has observed in Paragraphs-38 and 39 as under:

"38. In out opinion, the writ Court (Single Judge) was, therefore, justified in dismissing the respondent's writ petition and upholding the rejection on the ground that the High Court cannot interfere in the administrative decision of IOC and nor it can substitute its decision by acting as an Appellate Court over such decision in exercise of writ jurisdiction. It is more so when such decision is based on reasons involving no arbitrariness of any nature therein which may call for any interference by the High Court.

39. The Division Bench, in our opinion, committed an error in interpreting the award. The Division Bench proceeded on entirely wrong assumption that since the award was in respondent's favour, the IOC had to simply issue a consequential order in compliance thereof directing the IOC to revive the respondent's dealership and restore the supply of fuel to the respondent. As held supra, this approach of the Division bench was erroneous and is, therefore, legally unsustainable."

14. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court as well as the Honourable Supreme Court, it is revealed that this Court can exercise jurisdiction vested in it under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if the action of the respondent is arbitrary or discriminatory, which is violated by Article 14 of the Constitution of India. If the contract is terminated for irrelevant or non-existent cause, discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be exercised by this Court. In a given set of facts with regard to the claim for money or counter claim or other issues, there might be a disputed question of fact and/or there might be a purely dispute with regard to mutual obligations, which are required to be fulfilled. In this type of

cases, this Court may decline to exercise discretion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

15. Keeping in view the aforesaid decisions, if the facts of the present case are carefully examined, it is revealed that the petitioner has specifically alleged malafide against the respondent. It is further revealed that opportunity of personal hearing was not afforded to the petitioner before passing the impugned order. For the alleged forgery committed by the petitioner, the respondent has not filed any FIR. Further, for the alleged malpractice or irregularity alleged to have been committed by the petitioner as per MDG, only fine can be imposed and no powers are vested with the respondent to terminate the dealership of the petitioner for the alleged violation. Thus, in the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that the present petition is maintainable and this Court can exercise the power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India vested in it and interfere with the decision taken by the respondent.

16. It is pertinent to note that learned advocate for the respondent, after taking instructions, submitted that though the dealership of the petitioner has been terminated in the year 2013, till date, the same has not been awarded to any other party. Thus, the place in question is still vacant. Further, the dealership agreement was executed on 31.12.2010 for a period of fifteen years i.e. upto

31.12.2025.

17. In view of the aforesaid discussion and in the facts of the present case, this Court is of the view that this is a fit case, in which, the impugned order dated 10.08.2013 is required to be quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the same is quashed and set aside. Resultantly, the respondent shall restore the sales and supply of the retail outlet of the petitioner on, or before, 10.06.2021.

16. The petition is allowed accordingly. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.

(VIPUL M. PANCHOLI, J) LAVKUMAR J JANI