Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 451 Gua
Judgement Date : 29 January, 2026
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GAHC010180012025
2026:GAU-AS:1207
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : WP(C)/4693/2025
LIC HOUSING FINANCE LTD
A HOUSING FINANCE COMPANY (REPRESENTED BY MANAGER
OPERATIONS GUWAHATI BACK OFFICE) HAVING ITS REGISTERED
OFFICE AT 131, MAKER TOWER-F, 13TH FLOOR, CUFFE PARADE, AND ONE
OF ITS BACK OFFICE AT 2ND FLOOR, JEEVAN NIVESH BUILDING,
LAKHTOKIA POINT, PAN BAZAR, GUWAHATI-781001, ASSAM
VERSUS
THE PRESIDING OFFICER, LABOUR COURT, KAMRUP (M) AND ANR
AT GUWAHATI
2:NISANT AANAND
S/O SHRI JIB LAL
R/O HOUSE NO. 16
FIRST FLOOR
SOUTH SARANIA
BYE LANE NO. 2
LACHIT NAGAR
GUWAHATI-781007
P.S.- PALTAN BAZAR
KAMRUP (M)
GUWAHAT
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEVASHIS BARUAH
For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. S. Dutta, Sr. Advocate
: Ms. S. Mochahary, Advocate
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For the Respondent(s) : Mr. K. N. Choudhury, Sr. Advocate
: Ms. R. R. Kakati, Advocate
· Date on which Judgment was reserved : N/A
· Date of Pronouncement of Judgment : 29.01.2026
· Whether the pronouncement is of
the Operative Part of the Judgment : No
· Whether the full Judgment has been
Pronounced : Yes
JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL)
Heard Mr. S. Dutta, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. S. Mochahary, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner and Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned Senior counsel assisted by Ms. R. R. Kakati, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2.
2. At the outset, this Court deprecates the conduct of the Petitioner in impleading the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court, Kamrup (M) as a party to the instant proceedings. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Kamrup (Metro) who has been arrayed as the Respondent No.1 is struck off.
3. The dispute involved in the instant proceedings pertains to the maintainability of a proceedings initiated under Section 2A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short 'the Act of 1947') registered as Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 pending before the learned Labour Court, Kamrup (Metro) at Guwahati (hereinafter referred to as 'the Learned Labour Court') and the orders which have been passed in the said proceedings including the order dated 29.07.2025 passed in Misc. Case No.03/2025 arising out of Case U/S Page No.# 3/11
2A No.02/2025.
4. The brief facts of the instant case as would appear from the materials on record is that the Respondent No.2 herein is a permanent employee of the Petitioner company who was working in the capacity of a Cluster Head, Guwahati. The Respondent No.2 was transferred by the Petitioner company to Kolkata to join as the Credit Manager, Kolkata. The Respondent No.2 challenged the said transfer order before the learned Labour Court in a proceedings under Section 2A of the Act of 1947. Upon filing of the said application which was registered as Case U/S 2A No.02/2025, the learned Labour Court vide an order dated 19.06.2025 passed an injunction order in Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 thereby staying the transfer order dated 24.04.2025 and issued notice to the Petitioner. The Petitioner thereupon filed an application for rejecting the application filed under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 which was registered and numbered as Misc. Case No.03/2025.
5. The grounds so taken for rejection of the application filed by the Respondent No.2 under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 were two folds. First, the Respondent No.2 is not a workman as defined under Section 2(s) of the Act of 1947 and secondly, the application so filed challenging a transfer order is not an industrial dispute and as such, the application filed under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 was not maintainable.
6. The learned Labour Court vide the order dated 29.07.2025 rejected the application being Misc. Case No.3/2025 and the interim order which was passed was directed to continue to the next date. It is under such Page No.# 4/11
circumstances, the present writ petition has been filed by the Petitioner challenging the proceedings initiated under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 which was registered as Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 as well as all consequential orders passed.
7. Mr. S. Dutta, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioner submitted that a transfer of an employee from one post to the other would not come within the ambit of the definition of industrial dispute. In addition to that, the learned Senior counsel submitted that what is mandated in a proceedings under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 is that an individual workman can approach the learned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal only when the employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, or in respect to any dispute or difference between the workman and his employer connected with or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. He therefore submitted that as it is merely a transfer order from one place to the other, the very proceedings so initiated by the Respondent No.2 before the learned Labour Court is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and not maintainable. In that regard, the learned Senior counsel has referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another Vs. Krishna Kant and Others
reported in (1995) 5 SCC 75.
8. Per contra, Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No.2 submitted that Respondent No.2 was the Cluster Head at Guwahati and he had been transferred to Kolkata in the Page No.# 5/11
capacity as Credit Manager and it was a punitive transfer. The learned Senior counsel further submitted that the said application so filed before the learned Labour Court was merely not an application under Section 2A of the Act of 1947 but it was read with Section 33 and Section 33(3)(b) of the Act of 1947 and as such, the said application was maintainable.
9. This Court has duly heard the learned Senior counsels appearing on behalf of the parties and has given an anxious consideration to their respective submissions and also perused the materials on record.
10. Taking into account that the Respondent No.2's application so filed before the learned Labour Court was an application under Section 2A read with Section 33 and Section 33(3)(b) of the Act of 1947, this Court finds it pertinent to reproduce Sections 2A, 33(1), 33(2) and 33(3) of the Act of 1947.
"2A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be deemed to be an industrial dispute - (1) Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make an application direct to the Labour Court or Tribunal for adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the application to the Conciliation Page No.# 6/11
Officer of the appropriate Government for conciliation of the dispute, an in receipt of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of three years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).
33. Conditions of service, etc., to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of proceedings.-- (1) During the pendency of any conciliation proceeding before a conciliation officer or a Board or of any proceeding before [an arbitrator or] a Labour Court or Tribunal or National Tribunal in respect of an industrial dispute, no employer shall,--
(a) in regard to any matter connected with the dispute, alter, to the prejudice of the workmen concerned in such dispute, the conditions of service applicable to them immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, any workman concerned in such dispute,
save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the proceeding is pending.
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(2) During the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, the employer may, in accordance with the standing orders applicable to a workman concerned in such dispute [or, where there are no such standing orders, in accordance with the terms of the contract, whether express or implied, between him and the workman] --
(a) alter, in regard to any matter not connected with the dispute, the conditions of service applicable to that workman immediately before the commencement of such proceeding; or
(b) for any misconduct not connected with the dispute, discharge or punish, whether by dismissal or otherwise, that workman:
Provided that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed, unless he has been paid wages for one month and an application has been made by the employer to the authority before which the proceeding is pending for approval of the action taken by the employer.
(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), no employer shall, during the pendency of any such proceeding in respect of an industrial dispute, take any action against any protected workman concerned in such dispute--
(a) by altering, to the prejudice of such protected workman, the conditions of service applicable to him immediately before the commencement of such proceedings; or
(b) by discharging or punishing, whether by dismissal or otherwise, such protected workman,
Save with the express permission in writing of the authority before which the Page No.# 8/11
proceeding is pending.
Explanation.-- For the purposes of this sub-section, a "protected workman", in relation to an establishment, means a workman who, being [a member of the executive or other office bearer] of a registered trade union connected with the establishment, is recognised as such in accordance with rules made in this behalf."
11. A perusal of Section 2A of the Act of 1947 as above quoted would clearly show that the said proceedings can be filed when an employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, or if there is any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with or arising out of such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination. The Petitioner herein was admittedly transferred from Guwahati to Kolkata. Transferring the Petitioner from Guwahati to Kolkata under no stretch of imagination can be said to come within the ambit of the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and/or otherwise termination.
12. In this regard, this Court finds it pertinent to take note of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) wherein at Paragraph No.20, the Supreme
Court categorically observed that Section 2A of the Act of 1947 covers only cases of the discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination otherwise of services of an individual workman and not other matters. It was further observed that if there is a reduction in rank pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the dispute raised by the workman does not come within the ambit of an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2A of the Act of 1947.
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Paragraph 20 of the said judgment being relevant is reproduced herein under:
"20. The expression "Industrial Dispute" is defined in Section 2(k) to mean any dispute or difference (i) between employers and employers; (ii) between employers and workmen; and (iii) between workmen and workmen, provided such dispute is connected with the employment, non-employment, terms of employment or conditions of labour of any person. It is well settled by several decisions of this Court that a dispute between the employer and an individual workman does not constitute an industrial dispute unless the cause of the workman is espoused by a body of workmen (see Bombay Union of Journalists v. "The Hindu"9). Of course, where the dispute concerns the body of the workers as a whole or to a section thereof, it is an industrial dispute. It is precisely for this reason that Section 2-A was inserted by Amendment Act 35 of 1965. It says "where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute". By virtue of this provision, the scope of the concept of industrial dispute has been widened, which now embraces not only Section 2(k) but also Section 2-A. Section 2-A, however, covers only cases of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination otherwise of services of an individual workman and not other matters, which means that -- to give an example -- if a workman is reduced in rank pursuant to a domestic enquiry, the dispute raised by him does not become an industrial dispute within the meaning of Section 2-A. (However, if the union or body of workmen espouses his cause, it does become an industrial dispute.) We have given only one instance; there may be many disputes which would not fall within Section 2(k) or Section 2-A. It is obvious that in all such cases, the remedy is only in a civil court or by way of arbitration according to law, if the Page No.# 10/11
parties so choose. The machinery provided by the Industrial Disputes Act for resolution of disputes (in short Sections 10 or 12) does not apply to such a dispute."
13. From the above quoted paragraph of the judgment in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (supra) reproduced herein above
as well as a perusal of Section 2A of the Act of 1947, it is absolutely clear that the Respondent No.2 could not have approached the learned Labour Court under Section 2A of the Act of 1947.
14. Now let this Court take note of Section 33 of the Act of 1947 which is also reproduced herein above. Section 33 of the Act of 1947 stipulates that the conditions of service etc. to remain unchanged under certain circumstances during pendency of the proceedings. The said Section would not apply to confer a right upon the Petitioner to file an application before the learned Labour Court taking into account that there is no proceedings pending.
15. Under such circumstances, it is the opinion of this Court that the very application so filed by the Respondent No.2 before the learned Labour Court which has been registered as Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 is nothing but an abuse of the process of the Court and cannot be permitted to continue.
16. Accordingly, the instant writ petition therefore stands disposed of with the following observations and directions:
(i) The proceedings being Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 pending before the learned Labour Court, Kamrup (M) at Guwahati stands set aside and Page No.# 11/11
quashed.
(ii) All other miscellaneous proceedings including Case U/S 2A No.02/2025 as well as the orders so passed in the said proceedings stands set aside and quashed.
(iii) The judgment passed in the instant proceedings however shall not preclude the Petitioner to approach the competent Court of Civil Jurisdiction wherein the grievances of the Petitioner can be redressed.
(iv) Mr. K. N. Choudhury, the learned Senior counsel submitted that the Petitioner is enjoying certain interim directions and a cushion period of 10 days be provided to the Petitioner so that the Petitioner can approach the competent Civil Court. Taking into account that the Petitioner has been enjoying certain interim protections, this Court observes that the status quo as on today shall be maintained for a period of 10 days from today i.e. up till 08.02.2026.
(v) This Court further observes that the direction to maintain status quo for a period of 10 days, however, shall not influence the competent Civil Court in deciding whether the Petitioner is entitled to any interim protection. The appropriate forum shall decide as regards the entitlement of the Respondent No.2 to any interim directions on its merits, uninfluenced by the observations made herein above.
Bijoy Saha JUDGE
Bijoy Saha Date: 2026.01.30
19:54:05 +05'30'
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