Gauhati High Court
Sanjib Mahanti vs The State Of Assam on 21 February, 2025
Author: S.K. Medhi
Bench: Sanjay Kumar Medhi
Page No.# 1/18
GAHC010138062020
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THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : CRL.A(J)/71/2020
SANJIB MAHANTI
BISWANATH CHARIALI, ASSAM.
VERSUS
THE STATE OF ASSAM
REP. BY PP, ASSAM.
BEFORE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MEDHI
HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND
Advocate for the appellant : Shri B. Prasad, Amicus Curiae
Advocate for the respondents : Ms. S. Jahan, Addl. Public Prosecutor.
Date(s) of hearing : 18.02.2025 & 19.02.2025
Date of judgment : 21.02.2025
Page No.# 2/18
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(S.K. Medhi, J)
The instant appeal has been preferred from jail against the judgment
dated 27.11.2019 passed by the Addl. Sessions Judge, (FTC), Biswanath,
Chariali, Sonitpur in Sessions Case No. 16/2019 (GR Case No. 873/2018)
convicting and sentencing the appellant under Section 302 of the I.P.C with R.I.
for life and fine of Rs. 2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand). The accusation against
the appellant is of causing death to his wife.
2. The criminal law was set into motion by lodging of an Ejahar on
22.10.2018 by the PW1, who is the consanguine brother of the appellant. It has
been alleged in the Ejahar that on the previous evening at about 7 PM, the
appellant had assaulted his wife with an axe causing her death. It is alleged that
the appellant was having suspicion on his wife of having extra marital affair.
Based on the aforesaid Ejahar, the formal F.I.R. was registered and investigation
was made leading to laying of the charge sheet. The charges were accordingly
framed and on denial of the same, the trial had begun in which the prosecution
had adduced evidence through 14 numbers of witnesses.
3. PW1 is the informant, who in his deposition had stated that the appellant
had assaulted the deceased and fled away in the night. On the following day,
the appellant was caught and brought back. He had also deposed of witnessing
blood stuck on the reverse side of the axe. In the cross-examination, it is stated
that the place where the appellant was found on the next day is Khudibasti
which is about 3-4 kms. He had also stated that the houses of the informant
and the appellant were adjacent and that, on being apprehended, the appellant
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was assaulted. He has however clarified that he was not an eyewitness.
4. PW2 is a co-villager who deposed about hearing of the matter. PW3 is
another co-villager who is also the President of the VDP. He deposed that on the
following morning of the day of the occurrence, the appellant was found near
Baligarh. In his cross-examination, he had stated that he found the deceased
lying injured on bed and the bed had got wet with blood. He had deposed
regarding witnessing injury on the forehead and another injury on the backside
of the head of the deceased.
5. PW4 is a sister of the appellant who had deposed that on the fateful
evening at about 7 PM, she went for duty and at about 10 pm, the VDP
Secretary called her over phone. She had deposed about hearing about the
assault. She had also deposed that the appellant was found the next morning at
Moratupa.
6. PW5 is the sister-in-law who is a crucial witness in the present case. She
had deposed that after having dinner, they had gone to bed when she could
hear the deceased saying something to the appellant. Accordingly, she had gone
to the house of the appellant when the door was opened by the appellant and
he had asked her to go back. She, however, peeped inside and could find the
deceased in an injured state on the bed. In her cross-examination, she had
clarified that she had peeped by taking a lamp in her hand when the appellant
had shoved her. Thereafter, he had fled away and she had gone inside the
house and had lit another lamp and found the deceased in an injured state lying
on the ground.
7. PW6 is a seizure witness and a co-villager who had deposed about hearing
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about the incident. In his cross-examination, he had, however, stated that he
had put the signature on the Seizure List after two days of the incident. PW7 is
another neighbour and a seizure witness who deposed about hearing about the
incident. PW8 had deposed that he could hear from a boy of tender age about
the incident and accordingly came to the place of occurrence where he found a
woman lying with her face downward in the courtyard.
8. PW9 is a co-villager who had stated that he was informed by phone by
PW8 regarding the incident and on reaching, he found the deceased in an
injured state on the ground. He had also deposed that the accused had fled and
the people present had said that the accused/appellant had assaulted the
deceased.
9. PW10 is the owner of the ambulance which had carried the deceased in an
injured state from the Sadharu Tea Estate Hospital to the Biswanath Chariali
Civil Hospital. He had deposed that while being transported to the Chariali Civil
Hospital, the deceased was alive.
10. PW11 is the sister-in-law of the appellant who deposed that after
assaulting of the deceased, the appellant had fled away. PW11 is also a seizure
witness and the seizure list was exhibited as Ext. 1. She had also deposed about
the axe which was used for the offence and was exhibited as Material Ext. 1. In
her cross examination, she had however stated that the neighbours were
already there at the place of occurrence before she had reached and had
clarified that she did not see the assault herself.
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11. PW12 is the niece of the appellant and the daughter of the informant. She
had stated that at the relevant time she was sleeping and on the next morning,
PW5 - her mother had told her about the incident. According to her, the
appellant was caught at Sudhibasti.
12. PW13 is the Doctor, who had conducted the autopsy and the Autopsy
Report was proved as Ext. 2. As per PW 13, there were two injuries which were
caused by heavy blunt object and heavy sharp object.
13. PW14 is the Investigating Officer, who had done the investigation. He had
proved the Ejahar as Ext 4. He had also deposed that the appellant had
admitted his involvement in the offence and that the axe was seized, as shown
by the appellant. In his cross-examination, however, he had clarified that there
was no mention of blood on the axe and there was no prayer to send the axe
for forensic examination.
14. After completion of the prosecution evidence, the materials against the
appellant were put to him in his examination under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C.
Against two questions, the response was, however, of suggesting a defence of
alibi. The appellant had replied that he was not at home at the relevant point of
time.
15. Based on the aforesaid evidence and the materials on record, the learned
Judge has passed the impugned judgment which is the subject matter of
appeal.
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16. We have heard Shri B. Prasad, learned Amicus Curiae for the appellant.
We have also heard Ms. S. Jahan, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam.
17. Shri Prasad, the learned Amicus has submitted that admittedly the present
case is one where there is no eye witness and therefore, it is only on the basis
of circumstantial evidence that the conclusion has to be arrived at. He has
highlighted that when the evidence is only circumstantial, there is a necessity to
build up an unbroken chain which leads to only one conclusion which is towards
the guilt of the accused and no other hypothesis is possible.
18. It is submitted that there is only one witness, namely, PW5 from whom it
may be inferred that the appellant was last seen with the deceased. He has,
however, submitted that the evidence of PW5 is not trustworthy as the story
narrated by her is highly improbable. It is submitted that the PW5 had narrated
that she had a lamp while peeping and it would not be possible to see inside a
room by having a lamp in her hand when admittedly there was no electricity or
any light burning inside the house. He has also highlighted the aspect that the
said PW5 had thereafter deposed that on such peeping she could see that the
deceased was lying in an injured state on the bed. Thereafter, she had deposed
that on entering the room she had lit another lamp and could find the deceased
on the floor. The learned Amicus has submitted that the inconsistencies are such
that the deposition of PW5 is not trustworthy and therefore, the aspect of last
seen theory cannot be taken into consideration.
19. He has also submitted that the axe, the bed sheet and the clothes of the
appellant were not sent for forensic test. It is submitted that to make a
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connection of the offence with the appellant, such serological and forensic test
were necessary which were not done. He has also submitted that so far as the
fact of apprehending the appellant on the next morning is concerned, the places
are said to be different by different witnesses. While PW1 had deposed that the
appellant was apprehended from Khudibasti, PW3 had deposed that he was
apprehended near Baligarh. On the other hand, PW12 had deposed that the
appellant was caught at Sudhi basti. He submits that all these inconsistencies
are material in nature which would go to the root of the prosecution case and
thereby the benefit of doubt is required to be given to the appellant.
20. In support of his submission on the aspect of circumstantial evidence, the
learned Amicus has cited the landmark case of Sharad Biridhichand Sarda vs.
State of Maharashtra reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 the relevant observations
of which are extracted herein below:
"151. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would
like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof
required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone.
The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, 1952 SCR 1091 . This case has been uniformly
followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions
up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1969) 3 SCC 198 and Ramgopal v State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC
656. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in
Hanumant's case (at pp. 345-46 of AIR) (supra) :
"It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion
of guilt is to be drawn should in the first instance be fully
established and all the facts so established should be consisent
only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the
circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and
they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of
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evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for
a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it
must be such as to show that within all human probability the act
must have been done by the accused."
7. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following
conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said
to be fully established :
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established.
It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be'
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction
between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was
held by this Court in Shivaji Sahebrao Bobade v. State of
Maharashtra, (1973) 2 SCC 793 where the following observations
were made :
"certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a Court can convict and the mental
distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions."
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused
is guilty.
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one
to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave
any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
probability the act must have been done by the accused.
8. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the
panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence."
Page No.# 9/18
21. Per contra, Ms. S Jahan, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, Assam has
submitted that the materials on record including the depositions are sufficient to
come to a conclusion of guilt. She has submitted that amongst the witnesses,
the deposition of PW5 is crucial who has seen the appellant and the deceased in
one room and had also deposed that the appellant had shoved her and had fled
away immediately after the incident. She has submitted that the deposition of
PW5 does not appear to be unreliable or untrustworthy. She has highlighted
that from the materials on record including the Sketch Map which has been
exhibited as Ext. 5, the house of the appellant appears to be adjacent and
therefore, the deposition of PW5 that she could hear something being uttered
by the deceased to her husband is believable. She has also highlighted that the
PW5, on hearing such uttering, had gone to the house of the appellant and on
calling, the appellant had come out and asked her to go back, whereafter, she
had peeped into the house and saw the deceased in an injured state on the bed
and at that moment the appellant had shoved her and fled away.
22. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has also submitted that the version of
PW5 is corroborated by the evidence of PW1 who had stated that on the fateful
evening at about 7 to 8 pm, they were going to bed when the appellant and the
deceased were having their meal. The said evidence is also corroborated by the
evidence of her daughter PW12 who had stated that it was PW5 who had told
her about the incident in the next morning. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor
has contended that the medical evidence, as would appear from the deposition
of the Doctor as PW13 along with the Autopsy Report which has been exhibited
as Ext. 2 would support the ocular evidence. She has submitted that admittedly,
Page No.# 10/18
an axe was recovered from the place of occurrence and the description of the
injuries found on the body of the deceased matches with the assault which has
been said to be caused by an axe.
23. On the aspect of the application of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act
which requires a particular person to give some explanation, if he had special
knowledge, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has cited the case of Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan vs. State of Maharashtra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681 It is
submitted that when such an offence is committed in the privacy of a house, the
provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act would have an application. She
clarifies that though lack of proper explanation would not be the sole factor, the
same however would be an additional link to the chain of events. For ready
reference, the relevant portion is extracted herein below:
"14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such
circumstances where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and
commit the offence at the time and in circumstances of their choice, it
will be extremely difficult for the prosecution to lead evidence to establish
the guilt of the accused if the strict principle of circumstantial evidence,
as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge does not
preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is
punished. A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not
escape. Both are public duties. (See Stirland v. Director of Public
Prosecution 1944 AC 315 _ quoted with approval by Arijit Pasayat, J. in
State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271). The law does not
enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which
is almost impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led.
The duty on the prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable
of leading, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Here
it is necessary to keep in mind Section 106 of the Evidence Act which
says that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person,
the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b) appended to
this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision
and it reads:
Page No.# 11/18
(b) A is charged with traveling on a railway without ticket. The
burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him."
15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house,
the initial burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the
prosecution, but the nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to
establish the charge cannot be of the same degree as is required in other
cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden would be of a comparatively
lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence Act there will be
a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the
house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet and offering no
explanation on the supposed premise that the burden to establish its case
lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no duty at all on an
accused to offer any explanation."
24. As regards the suggestion given by the appellant in his examination under
Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. wherein he had stated that he was not at home at the
relevant point of time, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has submitted that a
plea of alibi is required to be proved in accordance with law. She has submitted
that simply by giving such an explanation and declining to adduce evidence on
the said point will not give any benefit to the appellant. In this regard, she has
cited the case laws of Sunita Sharma vs. State of Delhi reported in (2016)
15 SCC 551 to bring home the point that such a defence has to be made at the
earliest point of time and not belatedly. She has relied upon the following
observations made in the said case.
"10. The plea of alibi set up by the accused Sunita Sharma has been
considered by the learned courts below and we have relooked into the
circumstances surrounding the claim. First of all, it was a belated plea set
up at the stage of examination of the accused Sunita Sharma under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and that too about
five years after the incident. She had not taken the said stand at any
earlier point of time though she was consistently present in Court in
connection with her trial. That apart, the evidence of DW-1, DW-2, DW-3
contain self-contradictory statements with regard to the occasion
(marriage) in connection with which she had claimed to have visited
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Jalandhar. We, therefore, reject the plea of alibi set up by the accused
Sunita Sharma."
25. On the aspect of defence of alibi, reliance has also been placed on the
case of Binay Kumar Singh vs. State of Bihar reported in (1997) 1 SCC
283 wherein the following observations have been made:
"22. The Latin word alibi means " elsewhere" and that word is used for
convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when
the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of
occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have
participated in the crime. It is basic law that in a criminal case, in which
the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person,
the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present
at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be
lessened by the mere fact that the accused had adopted the defence of
alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only
when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily.
But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is
incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with
absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the
place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of
occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through
reliable evidence, normally the Court would be slow to believe any
counter-evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the
occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of
such a quality and of such a standard that the Court may entertain some
reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the
occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the
benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound
proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on
the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is
required for establishing the plea of alibi. This Court has observed so on
earlier occasions."
26. On the aforesaid aspect of alibi, the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has
also relied upon a very recent judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Deen Dayal Tiwari vs. State of U.P. [dated 16.01.2025 in Crl. Appeal
Page No.# 13/18
No. 2220 of 2221 of 2022.] wherein the following observations have been made:
"13. Alibi & Section 106 of the Evidence Act- The Appellant's principal
defense is that he was sleeping in his barn (khalihan) at the time of the
murders, thereby suggesting a possibility that unknown miscreants killed
his family. However, he has produced neither documentary evidence nor
any witness to substantiate this claim. Once it is established that the
Appellant was found at the scene and his family members were
discovered murdered in the very room to which he had access and
control, the burden to explain how the murders occurred within his locked
premises shifts to him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. His failure
to offer a plausible explanation--particularly when there is no material on
record supporting his alibi-- fortifies the prosecution's case."
27. The learned Addl. Public Prosecutor has submitted that the materials on
record and the aspect of lack of any explanation from the appellant would
constitute an unbroken chain of events to come to the conclusion of guilt which
has been rightly done by the learned Trial Court and therefore, the instant
appeal is liable to be dismissed.
28. The rival submissions have been duly considered and the
materials, including the LCRs placed before this Court have been carefully
examined.
29. In the instant case, there is admittedly no eyewitness and the prosecution
case rests on circumstantial evidence. In view of the above, it would be
necessary to examine the circumstances against the appellant in the instant
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case. The prosecution, as indicated above, had examined 14 nos. of witnesses.
The evidence of PW5 who is the sister-in-law of the appellant would be crucial
in this matter as it is this witness who was at the place of occurrence
immediately after the occurrence when the appellant was still inside the house
with the deceased.
30. From the depositions as well as the Sketch Map (Ext. 5), the houses of
the appellant and the informant were adjacent and in the same campus. It is
also on record that the appellant and the informant are consanguine brothers.
As per the version of PW5, who is the wife of the informant, when they had
retired to bed after dinner, she could hear something being told by the deceased
to her husband in their house which was adjacent. As indicated above, the
houses were proximate to each other. The PW5 had accordingly gone to the
house of the appellant and asked him to open the door and on that moment the
appellant had opened the door and said "go back". The PW5 however had
peeped into the house and could find the deceased lying on the bed with blood
on her back side of the head. At that moment, she was shoved by the appellant
who had fled away. The PW5 had thereafter gone inside the house and on
lighting a lamp could find that the deceased was lying on the ground in an
injured state and a hue and cry was raised whereupon her husband and other
neighbouring people had come and the injured was taken to the hospital where
she had succumbed. The murder weapon i.e., the axe was seen at the place of
occurrence.
31. Though none of the witnesses had mentioned about blood stains on the
axe, the medical evidence in this regard is required to be taken into
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consideration. The medical evidence, including the deposition of PW13, the
Doctor would establish that there were two major injuries, one by heavy blunt
object and the other by heavy sharp object and both the injuries matches with
the use of an axe for commission of the offence. The version of PW5 is well
supported by the version of PW1 - informant who was with her in the house and
had gone to the place of occurrence on raising a hue and cry by PW5. The
description by PW5 is also supported by the deposition of PW12 who had stated
that PW5 had narrated her the entire story on the next morning.
32. So far as the deposition of PW5 is concerned, apart from the same not
being shaken in the cross examination, the same would also be relevant under
Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act and the doctrine of res gestae would be
very much applicable. The deposition by the PW5 is a part of the same
transaction and is of a time which is contemporaneous to the fact in issue,
namely, the assault on the victim which has caused her death.
For ready reference, Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act is extracted herein
below:
"6. Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction - Facts
which, though not in issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as to
form part of the same transaction, are relevant, whether they occurred at
the same time and place or at different times and places."
33. For indirect evidence (hearsay) to be relevant under Section 6 of the
Indian Evidence Act, there is a requirement for establishing that the same was
contemporaneous with the act in question and so proximate that there cannot
be any scope of manipulation. It should be almost a part of the same
transaction or done immediately thereafter. Section 6 and the illustrations
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thereunder make it clear that facts, though not in issue are so connected with
the fact in issue as to form part of the same transaction would be relevant.
Section 6 is only a codification of the principle of res gestae.
34. The principle of res judicata has been elaborately explained by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of Krishan Kumar Malik vs. State of Haryana
reported in 2011 7 SCC 130 and the relevant observations are extracted herein
below:
"35. Black's Law Dictionary defines Res Gestae as follows:
(Latin: "things done") The events at issue, or other events
contemporaneous with them In evidence law, words and
statements about the res gestae are usually admissible under a
hearsay exception (such as present sense impression or excited
utterance)."
36. The said evidence thus becomes relevant and admissible as res
gestae under Section 6 of the Act.
37. Section 6 of the Act has an exception to the general rule where-under,
hearsay evidence becomes admissible. But as for bringing such hearsay
evidence within the ambit of Section 6, what is required to be established
is that it must be almost contemporaneous with the acts and there could
not be an interval which would allow fabrication. In other words, the
statements said to be admitted as forming part of res gestae must have
been made contemporaneously with the act or immediately thereafter. ..."
35. With regard to the aspect of confession, though the IO, in his deposition
as PW 14, had stated that the appellant had admitted his complicity, however in
view of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, such confession is no confession
in the eyes of law and therefore the said statement would not be material.
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36. On the aspect of not sending the blood stained clothes and the axe for
forensic test, the learned Amicus has submitted that such omission would not be
fatal in all cases when the other evidence is sufficient to come to a conclusion of
guilt. This Court finds force in the aforesaid submission as there was no dispute
with the seizure of the axe from the house of the appellant and the medical
evidence matches and corroborates with the use of the same as a murder
weapon. This Court is of the view that when the other evidences are
overwhelming in nature, such omission may not be fatal to the prosecution
case.
37. As regards the aspect of alibi which was sought to be taken as an excuse
in two questions put to the appellant in his examination under Section 313 of
the Cr.P.C., we are of the view that such defence of alibi is not a defence which
comes under Chapter IV of the IPC which is on "General Exception" and is
simply to be governed by the rule of evidence. We have also noticed that even
there was no foundation laid down for such a defence as no suggestion of any
such nature was given in the cross-examination of PWs that the accused
appellant was not present at the place of occurrence or that there was any false
implication. The defence of alibi has to be proved by adducing evidence which
the appellant had chosen not to do. Though the standard of proof of such
defence evidence may not be as strict as the same which is required to be
discharged by the prosecution side, there has to be some evidence which is
found trustworthy and acceptable to a prudent mind. However, there is no such
evidence adduced in the instant case. The discrepancy with regard to the place
from where the appellant was found in the next morning, which has been
pointed out by the learned Amicus is a trivial one and will not be material in the
Page No.# 18/18
adjudication of the case.
38. There is another aspect which has come to our notice which is with regard
to the fact that the deceased was having 36 weeks of pregnancy. The P.M.
report (Ext. 2) read with the deposition of the Doctor, PW13 would show that a
female fetus was recovered on section of the uterus. It appears that the
appellant was not at all concerned of those aspects and had indulged in the
commission of the offence. The injuries were also not one but two major
injuries which would establish the intention to cause death.
39. In conspectus of the aforesaid discussion and the materials on record, we
are of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the learned Addl. Sessions
Judge, (FTC), Biswanath, Chariali, Sonitpur in convicting and sentencing the
appellant in Sessions Case No. 16/2019 (GR Case No. 873/2018) vide judgment
dated 27.11.2019 does not warrant any interference.
40. The appeal accordingly stands dismissed.
41. Send back the LCRs.
42. Before parting, we put on record our appreciation for the assistance
rendered by Shri B. Prasad, the learned Amicus Curiae, who would be entitled to
the prescribed fee.
JUDGE JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
