Gauhati High Court
Sattar Ali vs State Of Assam And Anr on 26 February, 2021
Page No.# 1/12
GAHC010201722018
THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT
(HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH)
Case No. : Crl.A./346/2018
SATTAR ALI
S/O MUSA SHEIKH, R/O VILL. FULAKAKATA PART-I, P.O. MILOKIYA,
P.S.SOUTH SALMARA, DIST. DHUBRI, ASSAM.
VERSUS
STATE OF ASSAM AND ANR
REPRESENTED BY PP, ASSAM.
2:MALBOR HUSSAIN
S/O HASEM ALI
R/O VILL. GHUTIPARA PART-III
P.O. GHUTIPARA P.S. BOGRIBARI
SUBDIVISION BILASIPARA
DIST. DHUBRI ASSAM
PIN 78334
Advocate for the Petitioner : MR H R A CHOUDHURY
Advocate for the Respondent : PP, ASSAM
BEFORE
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MIR ALFAZ ALI
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MANISH CHOUDHURY
JUDGMENT & ORDER
Date : 26-02-2021
(Mir Alfaz Ali, J.)
The learned senior counsel Mr. HRA Choudhury, assisted by Mr. A. Ahmed,
Advocate appearing for the appellant and the learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. B.
Page No.# 2/12
Bhuyan as well as Mr. M.U. Mondol, learning counsel appearing for the informant-respondent
no. 2 were heard.
2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 18.07.2018 passed by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bilasipara in Sessions Case No. 26 of 2008, whereby the
appellant was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life
and fine of Rs.15,000/- with default stipulation.
3. Prosecution case in brief was that the deceased Sahiton Nessa, cousin sister of the
informant, was given in marriage to the appellant Sattar Ali, who were living in the homestead
of Montaz Ali. The appellant Sattar Ali was trying to compel the deceased to engage in
prostitution. As the deceased declined to engage in such immoral activities, she was
threatened to kill and eventually on 24.03.2003 the present appellant along with Montaz Ali,
Mohor Ali, Asraf Ali and some other villagers killed the deceased Sahiton Nessa. PW-2 Malbor
Hussain having receipt the information about the death of the victim immediately arrived at
the place of occurrence and lodged the FIR (Exhibit-1), on the basis of which Police registered
Bagribari P.S. Case No. 31/2003 under Sections 143/376/511/302 IPC.
4. During investigation, Police recorded the statement of the witnesses, prepared Inquest
Report, subjected the body of the victim to post-mortem examination and after completion of
the investigation submitted charge-sheet against the present appellant under Section 302 IPC.
5. During trial, learned Sessions Judge framed charge against the accused under Section
302 IPC, which was abjured by him. Prosecution examined 9 (nine) witnesses to
substantiate the charge. After completion of the prosecution evidence the appellant was
examined under Section 313 CrPC wherein he pleaded innocence and stated that at the time
of occurrence he was at Dhubri. Upon appreciation of evidence the learned Sessions Judge
convicted the appellant and awarded sentence as indicated above.
6. On our assessment of the evidence, we find that there was no direct evidence or eye
witness to the occurrence and the learned Sessions Judge primarily relying on, the
circumstantial evidence and extra judicial confession recorded the conviction of the appellant
under Section 302 IPC. The circumstances on which the learned trial Court placed reliance for
recording conviction of the appellant has been summarized in Paragraph-36 of the judgment.
We noticed in the impugned judgment that the learned trial Court relied on the following
Page No.# 3/12
circumstances to record the conviction of the appellant.
(i) The appellant tried to engage the victim, being his wife, in flesh trade and when she
refused, she was murdered. This circumstance was taken into consideration as motive of the
offence, (ii) the death was homicidal as the deceased died due to manual strangulation, (iii)
deceased died in the matrimonial house where she used to reside with her husband, (iv) the
accused was with the deceased in the same house on the date of incident where the
occurrence took place (v) the accused failed to offer any explanation as to how his wife died in
the secrecy and (vi) the appellant absconded and tried to avoid the arrest after the occurrence.
7. The law as to the circumstantial evidence is well settled by a catena of decisions of the
Apex Court. It has been held by the Apex Court in long line of decisions that in a case where
the prosecution case rest solely on the circumstantial evidence, prosecution has to prove all
the circumstances beyond reasonable doubt and that the circumstances so proved much form
a chain which leads to the lone conclusion consistent with the guilt of the accused and
inconsistent with any hypothesis of innocence of the accused. The Apex Court in Sharad
Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 dealing
with the standard of proof resting in circumstantial evidence held as under:
""152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions
must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully
established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be
drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court
indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be'
established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between
'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in
Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. V. State of Paharashtra where the following
observations were made
"Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not
merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance
between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures
from sure conclusions."
(2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the
hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not be
explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency.
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of
the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must
Page No.# 4/12
have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we
may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on
circumstantial evidence."
8. PW-2 Malbor Hussain (the informant) stated in his evidence that about one week prior
to the death, the victim told him that her husband Sattar Ali tried to get her raped by some
wicked boys, namely, Tamser Ali, Noor Islam, Ajahar Ali, Asiruddin, Mohor Ali (PW-8) and
Ashraf Ali (PW-7). He further stated that on 25.03.2013 at about 5 AM in the morning he
received the information that the victim died. Having come to know about the death of the
victim he along with other members of the family came to the house of Montaz Ali where the
victim was residing with her husband and found the victim lying dead inside the house of
Montaz Ali. He also stated to have seen the injuries on the neck of the victim. During cross-
examination of this witness it was elicited that he had no knowledge as to when the victim
died. He also admitted in cross that the deceased did not tell him that Azahar, Tomser and Nur
Islam had raped her at the house of Sattar Ali. It was also elicited from his cross-examination
that three sons of Montaz Ali were also living in the same campus with their wives and children
where the appellant used to reside with his wife. This witness also admitted, that he did not
state in his statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC, that about one week prior to her
death, the victim told regarding her husband Sattar Ali trying to get her raped by some wicked
boys. Thus, it is evident from the oral testimony of PW-2, that for the first time in Court PW-2
stated that the appellant Sattar Ali tried to engage his wife in immoral activity, like prostitution.
The omission of such a vital fact in the previous statement cannot be considered as
insignificant, and the same in our considered opinion amounted to contradiction on material
facts which certainly eroded the credibility of the oral testimony of this witness. Once the
testimony of the PW-2 that appellant tried to engage the victim in immoral activity is
discarded, there shall be no evidence to ascribe motive to the offence sought to be relied by
the learned trial court.
9. PW-3 Surat Jamal Seikh deposed that having come to know that Suraton Nessa died at
Munsipara he went to the place of occurrence and found the victim lying dead. He also stated
that when the people assembled there, the PW-1 Abdul Samad, the VDP Secretary of Boyzer
Alga as well as he himself interrogated the appellant Sattar, who confessed before the public
that at around 1 AM he had strangulated his wife Suraton Nessa. He further stated that he
along with the PW-1 handed over the appellant Sattar to Police. During cross-examination he
stated that he was informed by PW-2 about the occurrence when he was at Dhubri and he
Page No.# 5/12
came to the place of occurrence at about 8.30 AM in the next morning. PW-3 also stated in
cross-examination that he could not recollect whether he met the appellant Sattar Ali at the
place of occurrence. He also stated that he had no knowledge whether Sattar Ali was at Dhubri
at the time of occurrence.
10. PW-1 Abdul Samad, who happens to be the VDP Secretary of Boyzer Alga, stated in his
evidence that after two days of the occurrence he was called by Police for assistance to
apprehend the accused-appellant Sattar. He further stated that he along with the VDP
volunteers apprehended the appellant and handed over him to Police. This witness was,
however, declared hostile by the prosecution. While this witness was cross-examined by the
prosecution a suggestion was put to him, referring to his previous statement before Police that
on being asked by him, the villagers told that Sattar Ali had quarrel with his wife regarding
domestic matter and at around 1 AM while Suraton Nessa was sleeping he killed her by
pressing her neck and giving punch on her abdomen. During cross-examination by the defence
this witness stated that he did not call PW-3 Surat Jamal Seikh and Nuruddin (PW-4) to the
place of occurrence. It is the settle position, that testimony of the hostile witness does not get
washed off the record only because of declaring him hostile by the prosecution, rather,
testimony of hostile witness to the extent found to be reliable and consistent with other
prosecution evidence can very well be taken into consideration. What is discernible from the
evidence of PW-1 is that even in his statement before Police he never stated about Sattar
making any confession before him to the effect that he had killed his wife. From the cross-
examination of PW-1 by the prosecution itself it is discernible, that there was nothing to show
that this witness resiled from his previous statement, so as to render him unworthy of reliance.
11. PW-4 was also declared hostile by the prosecution. Evidently, PW-2 (the informant)
arrived at the place of occurrence in the morning and PW-3 came to the place of occurrence
on being informed by the PW-2. But PW-2 nowhere stated either in his evidence or in the FIR
that when the accused was interrogated by the villagers as well as PW-3, he confessed to have
killed his wife at 1 AM. Though in his examination-in-chief PW-3 stated that the accused Sattar
made a confession in presence of him and the other villagers when he was interrogated by
them, during cross-examination he has stated that he could not recollect whether he met
Sattar at the place of occurrence. He also stated that he had no knowledge if Sattar was at
Dhubri at the time of occurrence. In view of the above evidence of the PW-3 himself, that he
was not sure whether he had met the appellant Sattar Ali at the place of occurrence or that he
Page No.# 6/12
was not aware, whether Sattar Ali was at Dhubri at the time of occurrence, coupled with the
evidence of PW-2 (the informant), the testimony of the PW-3 with regard to the extra-judicial-
confession alleged to have been made by the accused, hardly appears to be worthy of inspiring
confidence.
12. The circumstances, upon which learned trial court heavily relied was that the victim
met with homicidal death in the matrimonial house in privacy and the appellant being her
husband failed to offer any explanation as to how the death occurred, which pointed figure to
the appellant to be perpetrator of the offence. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 as
well as the learned Addl. P.P. placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Trimukh
Maroti Kirkan Vs. State of Maharastra reported in (2006) 10 SCC 681, submitted that
when murder was committed in secrecy in the matrimonial home, the appellant being her
husband cannot get away, without giving a plausible explanation on the supposed premise that
burden to prove the case is on the prosecution. Let me reproduce here the paragraphs 14, 15
and 22 of the said judgment relied by the prosecution.
"14. If an offence takes place inside the privacy of a house and in such circumstances
where the assailants have all the opportunity to plan and commit the offence at the
time and in circumstances of their choice, it will be extremely difficult for the
prosecution to lead evidence to establish the guilt of the accused if the strict principle
of circumstantial evidence, as noticed above, is insisted upon by the Courts. A Judge
does not preside over a criminal trial merely to see that no innocent man is punished.
A Judge also presides to see that a guilty man does not escape. Both are public duties.
(See Stirland v. Director of Public Prosecution 1944 AC 315 quoted with approval by
Arijit Pasayat, J. in State of Punjab vs. Karnail Singh (2003) 11 SCC 271). The law does
not enjoin a duty on the prosecution to lead evidence of such character which is almost
impossible to be led or at any rate extremely difficult to be led. The duty on the
prosecution is to lead such evidence which it is capable of leading, having regard to the
facts and circumstances of the case. Here it is necessary to keep in mind Section
106 of the Evidence Act which says that when any fact is especially within the
knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Illustration (b)
appended to this section throws some light on the content and scope of this provision
and it reads:
(b) A is charged with travelling on a railway without ticket. The burden of
proving that he had a ticket is on him."
15. Where an offence like murder is committed in secrecy inside a house, the initial
burden to establish the case would undoubtedly be upon the prosecution, but the
nature and amount of evidence to be led by it to establish the charge cannot be of the
same degree as is required in other cases of circumstantial evidence. The burden
would be of a comparatively lighter character. In view of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act there will be a corresponding burden on the inmates of the house to give a cogent
explanation as to how the crime was committed. The inmates of the house cannot get
away by simply keeping quiet and offering no explanation on the supposed premise
Page No.# 7/12
that the burden to establish its case lies entirely upon the prosecution and there is no
duty at all on an accused to offer any explanation."
22. Where an accused is alleged to have committed the murder of his wife and the
prosecution succeeds in leading evidence to show that shortly before the commission
of crime they were seen together or the offence takes placed in the dwelling home
where the husband also normally resided, it has been consistently held that if the
accused does not offer any explanation how the wife received injuries or offers an
explanation which is found to be false, it is a strong circumstance which indicates that
he is responsible for commission of the crime. In Nika Ram v. State of Himachal
Pradesh AIR 1972 SC 2077 it was observed that the fact that the accused alone was
with his wife in the house when she was murdered there with 'khokhri' and the fact
that the relations of the accused with her were strained would, in the absence of any
cogent explanation by him, point to his guilt. In Ganeshlal v. State of
Maharashtra (1992) 3 SCC 106 the appellant was prosecuted for the murder of his wife
which took place inside his house. It was observed that when the death had occurred
in his custody, the appellant is under an obligation to give a plausible explanation for
the cause of her death in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The mere denial of
the prosecution case coupled with absence of any explanation were held to be
inconsistent with the innocence of the accused, but consistent with the hypothesis that
the appellant is a prime accused in the commission of murder of his wife. In State of
U.P. v. Dr. Ravindra Prakash Mittal AIR 1992 SC 2045 the medical evidence disclosed
that the wife died of strangulation during late night hours or early morning and her
body was set on fire after sprinkling kerosene. The defence of the husband was that
wife had committed suicide by burning herself and that he was not at home at that
time. The letters written by the wife to her relatives showed that the husband ill-
treated her and their relations were strained and further the evidence showed that
both of them were in one room in the night. It was held that the chain of
circumstances was complete and it was the husband who committed the murder of his
wife by strangulation and accordingly this Court reversed the judgment of the High
Court acquitting the accused and convicted him under Section 302 IPC. In State of
Tamil Nadu v. Rajendran (1999) 8 SCC 679 the wife was found dead in a hut which had
caught fire. The evidence showed that the accused and his wife were seen together in
the hut at about 9.00 p.m. and the accused came out in the morning through the roof
when the hut had caught fire. His explanation was that it was a case of accidental fire
which resulted in the death of his wife and a daughter. The medical evidence showed
that the wife died due to asphyxia as a result of strangulation and not on account of
burn injuries. It was held that there cannot be any hesitation to come to the conclusion
that it was the accused (husband) who was the perpetrator of the crime."
13. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to the statement of the appellant recorded
under Section 313 CrPC, more particularly the answer to question no. 9 to submit that at the
time of occurrence the appellant was with his wife in the same house, where the deceased was
killed, and as such, the appellant owed an explanation in view of Section 106 of the Evidence
Act, as to how the death of the victim was caused. The appellant did not put forward any
explanation and as such, failure of the appellant to give any explanation as to how the victim
was killed when he was in the same house is a strong circumstance pointing to the guilt of the
Page No.# 8/12
appellant, submits learned Addl. P.P. as well as Mr. M.U. Mondal.
14. Evidently, the statement of the appellant under Section 313 CrPC was recorded twice.
At the first instance when the statement was recorded, the question no. 9 was not put to him
and when he was again examined under Section 313 CrPC the question no. 9 was put to him,
to which the appellant gave the answer in affirmative. It would be apposite to reproduce the
question No. 9 and the answer given by the appellant. The question no. 9 put to the appellant
during his examination under Section 313 CrPC for the second time and the reply thereto were
as under.
"Question No. 9: As per Exhibit 5 sketch map you are staying with your
wife at your family member Montaz's house at the time of death of
your wife Sahiton Nessa. What do you want to say?
Ans: Yes."
15. In the sketch map which has been proved as Exhibit-5 it has been mentioned that
there were five houses in the campus of Montaz Ali where, in one of the house, the accused
used to live with his wife, which has been shown as 'A' in the sketch map. In the same campus
another house where Montaz Ali was residing has been marked as 'B'. As per Exihibit-5 sketch
map, occurrence took place in the house belonging to Montaz Ali, marked as Exhibit-'B' and
not in the house where usually the accused and the victim used to reside and marked as
Exhibit-A. Therefore, as per the prosecution case the occurrence did not take place in the
house 'A' where the accused and the victim used to reside, rather, the occurrence, as per
prosecution, took place in the house 'B' belonging to Montaz Ali, where the dead body was
found. It has also been mentioned in the note of the Investigating Officer appended to Exhibit-
5 that " 'A' is the room where the deceased Suraton Nessa and the accused Sattar Ali used to
live. 'B' is the house made of straw where Montaz Ali, maternal uncle of accused Sattar Ali,
used to reside". All the houses as shown in the Exhibit-5 in the same campus had a common
courtyard shown as 'X' in the Exhibit-5. It has also been mentioned in the Exhibit-5 that
"Suraton Nessa was killed in room 'B' and was taken to room 'A' in the morning". What is
therefore admitted position from the sketch map relied by the prosecution is that in the
campus of Montaz Ali, his three sons and their families as well as the accused with his wife
(the victim) used to reside in different houses. Evidently, the occurrence took place in the
house of Montaz Ali and not in the house 'A' where the accused and the deceased used to
reside usually. Therefore, in the Exhibit-5 referred to in Question No. 9 during the examination
Page No.# 9/12
of the accused for the second time nowhere it was mentioned, that the appellant was with the
deceased in his house "A" in the campus of Montaz Ali on the relevant night. What is
discernible from Exhibit-5 is that the appellant usually used to reside in house 'A' with his wife.
Therefore, the answer given by the appellant in response to the Question No. 9 even if
assumed to be an admission of the appellant that he used to reside in the house marked 'A'
with his wife, that would not necessarily establish, that the appellant was with his wife on the
night of occurrence, nor any inference can be drawn there from, that on the date of
occurrence also the appellant was with his wife, more particularly when, the occurrence
admittedly did not take place in the house, where the appellant usually used to reside with his
wife (deceased) rather, the deceased was killed in the house of Montaz Ali, who was also
named as an accused in the FIR. Therefore, from the aforesaid reply of the appellant to the
question No. 9 as pointed out above, it can by no stretch of imagination be held, that the
accused was with his wife on the date of occurrence in his house shown at Mark-'A' of the
sketch map. Besides this reply of the accused-appellant to question no. 9, there was absolutely
no evidence on-record to show that the appellant was with his wife at the time of occurrence
in the house of Mantaz, wherein the deceased was killed. When admittedly occurrence took
place in a different house belonging to Montaz Ali and not in the house of the appellant where
he usually used to reside with his wife there cannot be an inference or presumption without
any evidence that on the date of occurrence the appellant and the victim were in the house of
Montaz where the occurrence took place.
16. It is also discernible from the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313
CrPC that he claimed to be at Dhubri at the time of occurrence. Evidently, the appellant was
arrested after 4/5 days when he was found ploughing in his land. Although PW-3 claimed that
immediately on the next morning of the occurrence when he went to the place of occurrence,
he found accused Sattar Ali in his residence, such statement was belied by his own admission
during cross-examination where he stated that he could not recollect whether he had met the
appellant Sattar on his arrival at the place of occurrence. He also stated that he had no
knowledge if Sattar was at Dhubri at the relevant time. Though PW-3 stated that on the same
day they handed over Sattar to Police, it is also discernible from the evidence and materials
on-record that the appellant was arrested after 4/5 days which belied the entire evidence of
PW-3, that the appellant was apprehended by them on the following morning of the
occurrence, rather, the evidence of the PW-3 coupled with the fact that the appellant was
Page No.# 10/12
arrested after 4/5 days from the field when he was found ploughing tend to probabilise the
explanation of the appellant that he was at Dhubri at the time of occurrence.
17. Section 106 of the Evidence Act provides that when a fact is within the special
knowledge of any person, the burden to prove such fact is upon him. Therefore, provision of
Section 106 of the Evidence Act put a corresponding reverse burden on the accused by way of
exception to the general rule that burden to prove the case is on the prosecution. However, it
must be borne in mind that the provision of the section 106 does not absolve the prosecution
from its liability or burden to prove the prosecution case. Therefore, before putting a
corresponding reverse burden on the accused by virtue of Section 106 of the Evidence Act,
prosecution is obliged to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Once the prosecution
discharged its initial burden and establishes certain facts to be within the special knowledge of
the accused, which unless satisfactorily explained, may tend to inculpate the accused, then
only accused can be saddled with a reverse burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to
explain the circumstance within his special knowledge. It must also be borne in mind that the
accused in a criminal case has a right to remain silent and mere silence of the accused cannot
be used by prosecution for drawing any adverse inference against him.
18. The principle laid down in the case of Trimuk Maroti Kirkan (supra) is that when the
wife is killed in the privacy and there was none except the husband or the family members
who were with deceased at the relevant time of occurrence and it is in the special knowledge
of the husband or family members, as to how the death of the victim occurred in the privacy,
the husband or family members has a corresponding burden to explain as to how the victim
was killed. The Supreme Court therefore held that when an offence like murder is committed in
secrecy inside the house, there shall be a corresponding burden under Section 106 of the
Evidence Act, or the inmates of the house to give a cogent explanation as to how the crime
was committed. The inmate of the house cannot get away by simply keeping quiet with
specious argument that burden to prove guilt is on the prosecution. Therefore, in the
circumstances when death of the deceased occurred in the secrecy where none other than the
accused was present with the deceased, the accused being husband, has corresponding
burden to explain as to how the death was caused. If the prosecution failed to discharge its
initial burden to establish the foundational fact that the victim and the appellant were in the
Page No.# 11/12
house where the victim was killed and it is within the special knowledge of the accused-
appellant as to how the death was caused, the appellant cannot be saddled with the
corresponding reverse burden under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain as to how the
death of the deceased was caused.
19. As already indicated above, there was no evidence on-record to establish that the
appellant was with the victim in the house marked as 'A' in the sketch map at the time of
occurrence, nor there is any evidence that the victim was killed in the said house marked as 'A',
wherein the appellant used to reside with the victim. Rather, evidence on record established
that the death of the victim was caused in the house 'B' belonging to Montaz Ali. However, the
prosecution failed to bring on record any evidence to show that the appellant was with his wife
(deceased) in the house of Mantaz marked as 'B' on the date of occurrence. In view of above
evidence, there could be no reason to ascribe any special knowledge to the appellant with
regard to the homicidal death of the deceased. In the instant case, when prosecution failed to
establish that the accused had any special knowledge, by adducing evidence, the appellant
also could not be held to be under obligations to give any explanation as to how the death was
caused. This apart, it is not a case, where the appellant did not put forward any explanation,
inasmuch as, appellant stated clearly in his examination under Section 313 CrPC that he was at
Dhubri at the relevant time. The facts that the appellant was arrested after 4/5 days of the
occurrence and the evidence of PW-3, that he could not recollect whether the victim was
present at the place of occurrence and that he was also not aware whether the victim was at
Dhubri at the relevant time, goes to probabilise the defence plea of the appellant, that he was
away from the place of occurrence on the relevant date. Therefore, when the prosecution has
not been able to establish that the appellant was with the deceased at the place of occurrence,
where the death was caused, appellant could not have been asked for an explanation nor
could he be saddled with any corresponding reverse burden under Section 106 of the Evidence
Act. Therefore, the circumstances relied by the learned trial Court that the appellant did not
put forward any explanation as to how the death of the deceased was caused can by no
stretch of imagination be considered as an incriminating circumstances against the appellant in
the facts and circumstances of this case.
20. Another circumstances relied by the trial Court was that the appellant absconded after
Page No.# 12/12
the occurrence. Evidently, the appellant was arrested only after 4/5 days of the occurrence
when he was ploughing in his field. Therefore, in view of the oral testimony of the PW-3 and
the plea taken by the appellant that he was away from home at the time of occurence, arrest
of the appellant after 4/5 days of the occurrence, per-se cannot give rise to a presumption that
the appellant was absconding, inasmuch as, the prosecution evidence that after 4/5 days he
was found ploughing his field clearly suggested that he did not make any attempt to abscond.
In the above fact and circumstances of the case, arrest of the appellant after 4/5 days, in our
considered view cannot be construed as an incriminating circumstance. Therefore, we are
constraint to hold that not to speak of an unbroken chain of circumstance leading to the
inference of guilt of the accused/appellant, even the individual circumstances relied by the
learned trial Court have not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, we are unable
to persuade ourselves to concur with the findings of the learned trial Court, to sustain the
conviction and sentence of the appellant. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction and
sentence of the appellant.
21. The appeal stands allowed. The appellant shall be released forthwith, if not warranted
in any other case.
22. Send back the LCR.
JUDGE JUDGE
Comparing Assistant
