[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Vishwajyoti vs Virender Kumar Sardana on 24 March, 2026
Author: Sanjeev Narula
Bench: Sanjeev Narula
$~13 to 17
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision: 24th March, 2026
+ CONT.CAS(C) 1365/2016 & CM APPLs. 22846/2017, 1962/2021
VISHWAJYOTI .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva and
Mr. Arindam Gupta, Advocates.
versus
VIRENDER KUMAR SARDANA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Ms. Manaswee,
Mr. Vivek Chandrasekar and Mr.
Jigyasa, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for DoE.
Mr. Hitendra Kr. M., Advocate for
Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabhba.
+ W.P.(C) 7884/2019 & CM APPLs. 1177/2021, 1209/2021
ANJU RANI .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva and
Mr. Arindam Gupta, Advocates.
versus
DAYANAND ADARSH VIDYALAYA AND ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Ms. Manaswee,
Mr. Vivek Chandrasekar and Mr.
Jigyasa, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for DoE.
Mr. Hitendra Kr. M., Advocate for
Signature Not Verified
Dgitally Signed CONT.CAS(C) 1365/2016 & connected matters Page 1 of 25
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.03.2026
13:39:26
Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabhba.
+ W.P.(C) 5053/2020 & CM APPLs. 18234/2020, 9904/2021,
17558/2022, 50004/2024, 75400/2024
DEEPA CHHIBBER & ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Asha Jain Madan and Mr.
Mukesh Jain, Advocates.
versus
DAYANAND ADARSH VIDYALAYA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Ms. Manaswee,
Mr. Vivek Chandrasekar and Mr.
Jigyasa, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for DoE.
Mr. Hitendra Kr. M., Advocate for
Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabhba.
+ W.P.(C) 17353/2022
VISHWAJYOTI .....Petitioner
Through: Dr. Vikrant Narayan Vasudeva and
Mr. Arindam Gupta, Advocates.
versus
DAYANAND ADARSH VIDYALAYA & ORS. .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Ms. Manaswee,
Mr. Vivek Chandrasekar and Mr.
Jigyasa, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for DoE.
Mr. Hitendra Kr. M., Advocate for
Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabhba.
+ W.P.(C) 227/2023 & CM APPLs. 21488/2023, 2831/2025
RAM ROOP SHARMA AND ORS. .....Petitioners
Through: Ms. Asha Jain Madan and Mr.
Signature Not Verified
Dgitally Signed CONT.CAS(C) 1365/2016 & connected matters Page 2 of 25
By:ANITA BAITAL
Signing Date:31.03.2026
13:39:26
Mukesh Jain, Advocates.
versus
DAYANAND ADARSH VIDYALAYA AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr. Manish Gupta, Ms. Manaswee,
Mr. Vivek Chandrasekar and Mr.
Jigyasa, Advocates for R-1.
Mr. Yeeshu Jain, ASC with Ms. Jyoti
Tyagi, Ms. Vishruti Pandey and Mr.
Sachin Garg, Advocates for DoE.
Mr. Hitendra Kr. M., Advocate for
Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabhba.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEEV NARULA
JUDGMENT
SANJEEV NARULA, J. (Oral):
1. These five matters are being disposed of by this common order. They
arise out of the affairs of the same recognised private school, namely
Dayanand Adarsh Vidyalaya, Tilak Nagar, and, though instituted by
different Petitioners, raise substantially common questions. The core
controversy in the batch concerns salary and service dues, and the legal
effect of the school having stopped functioning from 1 st April, 2020 without
any formal order of closure from the Directorate of Education. One of the
matters is a contempt petition instituted by Vishwajyoti. The others are writ
petitions by present or former members of the teaching and non-teaching
staff. The overlap in facts, record, and issues is such that the matters are
more appropriately decided together than in isolation. It is clarified that, for
the sake of convenience, references to the parties by their respondent
numbers are in terms of their array in W.P.(C) 5053/2020, and the same
nomenclature is followed for all connected petitions.
Claims and controversy
2. There is no serious controversy on the limited point that salaries and
retiral dues, if otherwise found payable, were obligations of the school. The
real dispute begins when the school seeks to found legal consequences on
what it describes as closure. According to the Petitioners, salaries were paid
only up to 31st March, 2020, and substantial arrears also remain due on
account of implementation of the 7th Central Pay Commission with effect
from 1st January, 2016. It is their case that, from 1 st April, 2020 onwards, the
management stopped paying the staff and simultaneously brought the
educational activity of the school to a halt. It is argued that this could not
amount to lawful closure, since prior approval of the Directorate of
Education was never obtained.
3. The school, on the other hand, says that the institution had become
financially unviable and that student strength had fallen sharply. It points out
that a request for closure had already been made on 17 th July, 2019 with
effect from 1st April, 2020; that no fresh admissions were taken thereafter;
that there was no meaningful academic activity or fee inflow; and that
salaries up to 31st March, 2020 were met out of donations and sale of assets.
The further submission on behalf of the school is that, whatever be the legal
position on formal approval, the school had in substance ceased to exist
from 1st April, 2020. It is also said that no liability beyond the assets of the
school itself can be fastened upon the society, the managing body, or any
other entity merely associated with the premises.
4. That is where the real controversy begins. The question is whether a
recognised school can be treated as closed merely because the management
stopped admissions, discontinued classes, issued communications to parents,
and put the institution under lock, though no approval for closure was ever
granted by the Directorate of Education. Put differently, can stoppage in fact
be treated as closure in law, or does the statute require something more
formal and exacting? The answer affects not only the legal status of the
school after 1st April, 2020, but also the service rights of the Petitioners and
the continuing obligation to meet salary and other dues.
5. The second question follows close behind. If there was no lawful
closure, and yet the school was stopped by those in control of it, can liability
be confined to the school alone, especially when it is said that the school has
no real assets left? The Petitioners submit that the record shows that the
school was being run within a larger management structure, and that the law
does not permit those who took the decision to stop the school to retreat
behind the plea that the school, viewed as a separate unit, has no attachable
assets. The school resists this. It says that the land does not belong to it, that
the society cannot be made answerable merely because of historical
association, and that no provision of the Act or the Rules authorises the
Court to convert the dues of the school into a general liability of the society
or the management.
6. The stand of the Directorate of Education also has an important place
in the controversy. In the material placed before the Court, the Directorate
records that the request for closure was still under consideration and that the
matter had to be examined at different levels in terms of the statutory
scheme. It also records that the school had, in fact, stopped its educational
activities on its own without awaiting prior approval, and that closure would
be permitted only after the salary of all staff had been paid up to date. The
inspection carried out by the Directorate likewise records that, as on the date
of inspection, the premises were not functioning as a school in any real
sense. That position, however, was itself attributed to the management
having shut down activities without the necessary approval.
7. The Petitioners also rely on the course of prior proceedings to say that
the management has, for years, resisted compliance with salary obligations
while repeatedly invoking financial difficulty as an answer. Vishwajyoti's
earlier litigation forms part of that backdrop. At the same time, the contempt
petition cannot be treated as if it were simply another writ petition in a
different form. It stands on a narrower footing and must be examined with
care, particularly because an earlier order had left subsequent causes of
action to be worked out in appropriate independent proceedings. That is
why, although all five matters can appropriately be heard together, the
contempt petition may still require a separate conclusion on its scope and
maintainability.
The Rival Stands
8. The rival stands may now be noticed in some greater detail. On the
Petitioners' side, the argument is direct. They say the school could not, by
its own unilateral act, put itself outside the statutory framework. According
to them, salaries were first withheld, the functioning of the school was then
gradually brought to a halt, students were pushed out or transfer certificates
were issued, and the management now seeks to describe that factual
shutdown as a legal closure. Their submission is that the statute does not
permit that course. So long as prior approval for closure was not granted by
the Directorate of Education, the school continued to exist in law, the
Petitioners continued in service, and the obligation to pay salary and other
service dues did not disappear. They also say that the plea of financial
distress is not new, has been taken before, and cannot once again be used as
a shield against salary obligations, including those arising from
implementation of the pay commission regime.
9. The Petitioners further argue that the school was never an isolated
unit acting on its own. Their stand is that the institution was originally set up
by Arya Samaj, Tilak Nagar; that what came to be described at one stage as
Arya Vidya Parishad formed part of the larger management structure; and
that Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, after affiliation, exercised real control over
the affairs of the school. On that basis, they seek to carry liability beyond the
school itself and onto the bodies or entities said to have actually controlled
it. In substance, their submission is that those who could decide to stop the
school cannot now step back and say that there is no one left to answer the
teachers' claims.
10. The school's answer proceeds on a different footing. It says the Court
should see the matter as one of institutional collapse rather than deliberate
wrongdoing. Dayanand Adarsh Vidyalaya was a no-profit, no-loss school
run on modest fee receipts; it had no reserves worth the name; the burden of
revised pay scales, falling enrolment, and mounting expenditure made
continued operation impossible; and repeated litigation only worsened an
already fragile financial position. It says a formal request for closure was
made on 17th July, 2019 with effect from 1st April, 2020, after the
management concluded that it could no longer run the institution. It also
says that staff, parents and students were informed of that decision in
advance, that there were no fresh admissions, no students in any meaningful
sense, no fee inflow, and no classes, and that by 1 st April, 2020 the school
had ceased to function for all practical purposes. On this case, salaries up to
31st March, 2020 were paid out of donations and sale of assets, terminal dues
of some employees were also cleared, and nothing further can be demanded
from a school which had, in substance, come to an end.
11. The school also resists the attempt to widen the net of liability. It says
that, whatever may have been the historical background of the institution,
the Petitioners cannot move from one entity to another in search of a deeper
pocket. In its telling, the school was established by Arya Samaj, Tilak
Nagar; the structure described by the Petitioners is confused; the so-called
Arya Vidya Parishad Society was wrongly described; and Delhi Arya
Pratinidhi Sabha has no role in the internal management of the school. The
school therefore maintains that, even assuming any amount remains payable,
that liability cannot automatically be shifted onto some other society merely
because of affiliation, historical association, or the circumstance that the
land or building is said to have been made available by another body.
12. The Directorate of Education occupies a more guarded position. Its
affidavits do not support the proposition that closure stood approved. On the
contrary, the Directorate records that the school had applied for closure
under Rule 46 with effect from 1st April, 2020; that the request had to be
examined on several parameters, including financial viability, employee
liabilities, and the interest of students; and that the decision on closure
remained pending before the competent authority. At the same time, the
material placed by the Directorate records what the management was
asserting on the ground, namely that the school had stopped functioning
from 1st April, 2020, that students had largely taken transfer certificates or
moved elsewhere, and that salaries up to 31st March, 2020 had been paid out
of donations and sale of assets. In the later inspection as well, the manager's
stand, as noted by the Directorate, was that the school was under closure
from 1st April, 2020 because of financial constraint, though no order
approving closure was placed on record.
13. Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabha, once impleaded, took a position of
complete dissociation. It says that it is only an affiliating charitable body
which brings various Arya Samaj institutions under a common umbrella, but
does not run this school, did not appoint its staff, did not manage its daily
affairs, and cannot be turned into an answering Respondent merely because
the Petitioners now seek to treat affiliation as management. It also points to
the Directorate's later affidavit to say that, according to the official record,
the school was run by Arya Samaj, Tilak Nagar, and not by Delhi Arya
Pratinidhi Sabha. In short, its stand is that neither factual control nor legal
responsibility has been shown against it.
14. Set against that is the Petitioners' rejoinder to Delhi Arya Pratinidhi
Sabha, which is not merely a formal denial. The Petitioners say that the
reply of Respondent No. 6 carefully avoids the real question, namely who in
fact exercised control over the school over the years. They rely on
correspondence, internal documents, and the constitutional framework of the
Arya Samaj bodies to say that affiliation in this case was not merely
nominal, and that management and control had, in substance, come to rest
with Respondent No. 6 and bodies operating under it. They also rely on the
later dispute concerning the land and building to say that the facts now
emerging do not support a complete disavowal by the wider management
structure.
Issues
15. That, then, is the field of contest. The Petitioners say there was no
closure in law, only an unlawful stoppage of functioning, and that salary
liability continues and can be enforced not only against the school but also
against those who were truly running it. The school says the institution had,
by force of circumstance, ceased to exist in any workable sense from 1 st
April, 2020, that salaries could be borne only up to that point, and that no
liability can be fastened beyond the school itself. The Directorate says
closure was never approved, though the management had stopped running
the school and the matter remained under consideration. Delhi Arya
Pratinidhi Sabha says it has been wrongly drawn into a dispute with which it
has no managerial connection. The questions that now require determination
are, therefore, these: what is the legal effect of the school having stopped
functioning without prior approval; whether the Petitioners must still be
treated as continuing in service after 1st April, 2020; and whether, on the
material placed on record, liability can be carried beyond the school to any
society, committee, or parent body said to stand behind it.
16. One qualification may be noted at this stage. Although the common
questions are substantial, the reliefs claimed are not entirely identical across
the batch. At least one Petitioner has confined her claim up to the date of
resignation, and some claims may require separate treatment at the stage of
relief, depending on resignation, retirement, gratuity, or the period for which
salary is claimed. That variation, however, does not affect the central
questions of closure and liability, which remain common across the matters.
Discussion and reasons
17. Before the Court can address who must pay, it must first decide what,
in law, happened to the school. That question comes first for a reason. If the
school stood lawfully closed with effect from 1 st April, 2020, the shape of
the Petitioners' rights, and the corresponding obligations of the
Respondents, would have to be examined in one way. If, however, there was
no closure known to law, and what occurred was only a unilateral stoppage
of functioning by the management, the matter looks altogether different. In
that event, the school could not, by locking its premises or discontinuing
classes, step outside the statutory regime that governs recognised schools,
nor could the service rights of employees be extinguished by administrative
fait accompli. The issue of liability therefore cannot be approached in the
abstract, still less on sympathy or hardship alone. It turns, at the threshold,
on the legal character of what the management did. That is why the Court
must begin with closure, because until that question is answered, every
further submission on salary, dues, continuing service, and the reach of
responsibility remains suspended in the air.
Whether the school can be treated as closed in law merely because it
stopped functioning from 1st April, 2020
18. The school's submission, essentially is this: student strength had
fallen, finances had collapsed, no fresh admissions were taken, classes
stopped, the premises were locked, and from 1st April, 2020 the institution
had, for all practical purposes, come to an end. That submission describes a
state of affairs on the ground. It does not, by itself, answer the legal
question. The Act and the Rules do not leave closure of a recognised school
to factual drift or managerial declaration. They place that subject inside a
statutory process.
19. That position becomes plain once the scheme is read as a whole.
Section 3 of the Delhi School Education Act makes the establishment,
opening of higher classes, and closing down of existing classes subject to the
Act and the Rules. Section 4, in turn, treats financial stability and regular
payment of salary and allowances as continuing conditions of recognition.
The law, therefore, does not proceed on the footing that once a school
becomes financially weak, the management may simply stop operating it
and then invite the Court to accept the stoppage as closure. Financial
weakness is itself one of the matters regulated by the statute.
20. Rule 46 then states the matter in direct terms. No managing
committee can close a recognised school, or even an existing class in such
school, without full justification and without prior approval of the Director,
who must consult the Advisory Board before granting that approval. The
insistence on prior approval is mandatory. It is the legal control through
which the law protects students, staff, and the integrity of the regulatory
framework. A recognised school is not permitted to decide for itself that it
will stop functioning today and seek legal validation later, still less to claim
that physical shutdown is enough.
21. Rule 55 does not assist the school. At first sight, the management may
be tempted to rely on the provision that recognition lapses if a recognised
school ceases to function without previous approval. But that rule speaks to
the regulatory consequence of an unlawful act. It does not confer legitimacy
on that act. In other words, unlawful cessation may trigger lapse of
recognition; it does not convert that cessation into an approved closure under
Rule 46. The difference matters. Rule 46 concerns lawful closure. Rule 55
deals with what follows when the statutory conditions are broken. The latter
cannot be used to neutralise the former.
22. The decision in Manju Tomar & Ors. v. NCT and Ors.1 carry this
issue almost to the point of conclusion. The Division Bench of this Court
held that closure of the school without prior permission of the Director was
illegal, even though the school had in fact become non-functional on the
ground. It nevertheless granted ex-post facto sanction only because the
factual situation had become irreversible, while making it clear that the
management could not take advantage of its own wrongful conduct and
could not alter the service conditions of employees to their detriment. The
Supreme Court has now stated the position even more clearly.2 It held that
the "closure" contemplated for the purpose of Rule 47 must be a valid
closure, that is to say, one carried out with prior approval under Rule 46. It
further held that where the school was closed de hors Rule 46, the
management could not use that very illegality to shift the burden of staff
salaries and service benefits elsewhere.
23. That reasoning fits the present controversy with considerable force.
On the school's own showing, what existed here was, at best, a request for
closure and not an order of closure. The management may have decided to
stop admissions, suspend classes, communicate its intention to parents, or
lock the premises. None of that amounts to a closure in the eye of law so
long as the Director had not granted approval under Rule 46. On the present
record, the Directorate's position has consistently been that the application
for closure remained under consideration and that the school had stopped
educational activity on its own without waiting for approval. The matter
must therefore be approached on the footing that what occurred from 1 st
2009 SCC OnLine Del 4036
NDMC & Anr. v. Manju Tomar & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2272
April, 2020 was unilateral stoppage of functioning, not lawful closure.
24. This distinction is not technical. It goes to the root of the defence. If
factual shutdown alone were enough, Rule 46 would be reduced to a
formality that managements could ignore first and explain later. The law is
framed to prevent exactly that. The Director must examine whether the
justification is real, whether employee liabilities can be met, whether
students can be protected, and whether closure should at all be permitted.
That is why consultation with the Advisory Board is built into the rule itself.
It is also why the Director, while granting closure, may impose conditions.
The decision in Anjna Sharma v. Shishu Bharti Vidyalaya,3 recognises this
expressly and holds that Rule 47 may serve as a guide while framing
conditions under Rule 46, including conditions concerning absorption of
teachers and students in other schools run by the same society.
25. Once that is understood, the school's argument from practical reality
loses much of its force. A lock on the gate may show that the management
has stopped discharging its obligations. It does not prove that those
obligations have come to an end. The law draws a distinction between "the
school has been shut by the management" and "the school stands closed in
law". The first may be a fact. The second requires statutory approval. Until
that approval is granted, the management cannot be heard to say that the
institution had already ceased to exist for legal purposes.
26. There is another reason why the school's case cannot be accepted.
The Act does not treat salary obligations and financial viability as matters
that disappear upon managerial choice. Section 10 secures parity of scales of
pay and benefits for employees of recognised private schools. Section 8
protects service conditions and, in the case of termination, insists on prior
approval of the Director. Section 20 empowers the Administrator to take
over management where the managing committee or manager has neglected
duties imposed by the Act or the Rules. The statutory response to default,
therefore, is regulation, correction, and, where necessary, takeover. It is not
self-effected extinction by the management.
27. In fact, Section 20(5) makes the position especially clear. Even where
the school building belongs to another person and rent is payable for it, the
statute still contemplates takeover of management, with rent continuing to
be paid to the person entitled. The ownership of the premises, therefore, has
no bearing on whether the school can be treated as having lawfully
disappeared. A school may function in premises owned by another body, yet
remain fully subject to statutory control.
28. For these reasons, the Court is unable to accept the proposition that
the school stood closed in law from 1st April, 2020 merely because the
management stopped running it from that date. What the record discloses is
not lawful closure under Rule 46, but unilateral cessation of functioning
pending, and without, statutory approval. The legal consequences must
follow from that finding. The management cannot derive an advantage from
its own decision to stop the school first and seek legal recognition of that
position later. So long as approval under Rule 46 was absent, the school
remained within the statutory fold, and the rights of its employees could not
be treated as having been washed away by the management's act of closure
in fact. The issue is answered accordingly.
Whether liability can be carried beyond the school and, if so, upon whom
2013 SCC OnLine Del 4933
29. Once the plea of lawful closure is rejected, the argument that the
matter ends because the school has no funds loses much of its force. The Act
does not treat payment of salary as a matter left to managerial convenience.
Recognition itself depends upon adequate funds to ensure financial stability
and regular payment of salary and allowances. The Act also protects
employees against unilateral termination by insisting upon prior approval of
the Director, and it secures parity in pay and service benefits with employees
of corresponding status in schools run by the appropriate authority. In that
statutory setting, financial inability may explain the management's
predicament, but it does not dissolve the obligation.
30. It is also difficult to accept the Respondents' argument to view the
school as a free-standing shell, entirely detached from the society or trust
behind it. The Act defines the "manager" as the person entrusted with the
management of the affairs of the school, and the "managing committee" as
the body entrusted with the management of a recognised private school.
Every recognised school must have an approved scheme of management.
The Rules then carry that idea forward: the managing committee is to be
constituted in part in accordance with the rules and regulations of the society
or trust by which the school is run, and the scheme of management must
provide that the managing committee remains subject to the control and
supervision of that society or trust. Bills, including salary bills of teachers
and non-teaching staff, are to be jointly signed by the manager and the head
of school. The statute, in other words, does not treat the school, the
managing committee, the manager, and the running society as wholly
unrelated compartments.
31. The financial rules point in the same direction. They do create a
discipline of separate accounting: the trust or society running a recognised
school cannot itself collect fees from students; the school must collect them
in its own name; the fund is to be kept in the name of the school; and
withdrawals are to be made jointly by the head of school and the manager.
But that separation of accounts is not the same thing as insulation from
responsibility. On the contrary, in the case of a recognised unaided school,
fee income must be applied in the first instance towards pay, allowances and
other employee benefits. Only the savings, after making provision for
retirement benefits, developmental needs and reserve, may be used by the
managing committee for capital expenditure of the school or for establishing
or assisting another institution under the same society or trust. The statutory
design therefore gives employees' dues priority and, at the same time,
recognises the reality of a shared educational enterprise under one society or
trust.
32. For that reason, the fact that the land or building may stand in the
name of a society does not, by itself, answer the issue. The Act gives a wide
meaning to school property and includes property belonging to, or in the
possession of, the school, along with the rights and interests arising out of it.
More importantly, Section 20 proceeds on the footing that management of a
school may be taken over even where rent for the building remains payable
to another person entitled to receive it. The statute therefore recognises that
the premises may not belong beneficially to the school as owner, yet the
school remains a regulated institution whose obligations survive and whose
management may still be proceeded against. A rent-free or permissive
occupation from a society, by itself, does not place the institution outside
that framework.
33. The case law cited by the Petitioners also point in the same direction,
though with an important limit. In Anjna Sharma, this Court upheld the
Director of Education's power, while granting closure under Rule 46, to
impose conditions requiring the same society to absorb students and teachers
in other schools run by it and to continue paying the teachers their existing
pay and perks. The Court also observed that, in such a setting, the liability
was ultimately that of the society from its accruals, whether or not the
particular branch that had closed remained operational. That line of
reasoning is significant because it shows that, where the school is in truth
one unit within a society-run network, the law does not insist on treating the
closed branch as the only pocket from which relief may be drawn.
34. The decision in Manju Tomar supplies the second piece. The
Supreme Court, while affirming the decision of the High Court, made it
clear that a management which closes a school without prior approval under
Rule 46 cannot use Rule 47 to push the burden of salaries and service
benefits onto another authority. The High Court's direction permitting
payment to the staff and reimbursement from the management was left
undisturbed, and the Supreme Court expressly reiterated that NDMC could
pursue reimbursement from the management responsible for the illegal
closure. The principle that emerges is plain enough: an unlawful closure
does not scatter liability into the air. It keeps responsibility anchored to those
who ran and controvert the functioning of the school and took the decision
to stop it contrary to law.
35. That, however, does not mean that every body with some historical or
organisational association can automatically be made liable. The law
supports liability against the society or trust by which the school is run, or
against the management which in fact controlled the school's affairs. It does
not justify fastening salary liability upon a body merely because it granted
affiliation, shared a common name, or had some structural linkage.
Affiliation simpliciter is too thin a foundation. The better test is one of real
and effective control: who established the school, who constituted or
controlled the managing committee, who dealt with the Directorate, who
managed the funds, and who took or authorised the decision to stop the
school.
36. On the present record, however, that factual position is not free from
difficulty. On one hand, Respondent No. 1 itself asserts that Arya Samaj
(Regd.), Tilak Nagar established the school, constructed the building, and
brought it into existence, and the Scheme of Management places the
Governing Body and constitution of the Managing Committee within its
fold.
37. On the other hand, the material relied upon by the Petitioners, as well
as the stand reflected in the Directorate's own record, indicates the
involvement of Arya Vidya Parishad and the broader organisational
framework of Delhi Arya Pratinidhi Sabha. The Directorate's affidavit refers
to Respondent No. 2 as the body running the school and records that the
request for closure was made by it. The said affidavit also, though without
clarity or supporting particulars, describes Respondent No. 2 as a "society".
Certain communications on record also indicate that the Managing
Committee was reconstituted by Arya Vidya Parishad and that it
corresponded with statutory authorities in relation to the affairs of the
school.
38. These circumstances do suggest that the school functioned within a
larger institutional framework and that entities other than Respondent No. 7
may have had a role in its affairs. At the same time, there is no clear and
consistent material demonstrating that the approved Scheme of Management
stood altered, or that control over the Managing Committee, finances, and
administration was formally transferred in accordance with law.
39. The record, therefore, presents a mixed and inconclusive picture.
While there are indicators pointing towards the foundational role and
structural control of Arya Samaj (Regd.), Tilak Nagar, there are also
materials suggesting operational involvement of Arya Vidya Parishad and
references in the Directorate's record attributing responsibility to it. The
factum of affiliation itself is also not supported by formal documentation on
record, but is sought to be inferred from surrounding circumstances.
40. In these circumstances, it would not be appropriate for this Court, on
the present record, to conclusively determine whether effective control over
the school, at the relevant time, vested in Respondent No. 7, or in
Respondent Nos. 2 and 6, or in some combination thereof. To fasten liability
upon any one of these entities would require a definitive finding as to actual
control over management, finances, and the decision to close the school,
which the present material does not clearly establish.
41. What is, however, clear in law is that liability cannot be avoided
altogether. The statutory scheme, read with the decisions in Anjna Sharma
and Manju Tomar, makes it plain that the obligation to satisfy salary and
service dues rests not merely on the school as a nominal unit, but extends to
the society or management which in fact ran the school and took the
decision to cease its functioning.
42. Accordingly, while primary liability remains with Respondent No. 1
school, the question as to which of the respondent entities, i.e., Respondent
Nos. 2, 6, or 7, was in effective control of the school at the relevant time,
and is therefore liable to meet the dues, is left to be examined by the
Directorate of Education on the basis of its records and such further material
as may be called for, in the manner indicated hereafter.
Conclusions and Directions
43. Accordingly, the Directorate shall examine the material on record,
including the approved Scheme of Management, records relating to
constitution and reconstitution of the Managing Committee, financial
control, correspondence with statutory authorities, and the decision-making
process leading to cessation of the school's functioning, and determine
which entity or entities were in actual management and control of the
school. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of 8 weeks
from today. Liability to satisfy the dues determined in these proceedings
shall extend to such entity or entities so identified. All rival contentions of
the parties in that regard are kept open.
44. The contempt petition stands on a different footing. Vishwajyoti's
earlier contempt proceedings were closed after the Court found that the
arrears covered by the earlier order stood paid, and when a later grievance
was raised in respect of a subsequent period, liberty was expressly granted to
take recourse to appropriate independent proceedings. The present batch
already includes such independent proceedings. In that view, it is neither
necessary nor appropriate to continue the contempt petition as an
independent vehicle for adjudicating later salary claims.
45. Accordingly, the following directions are issued:
45.1 CONT.CAS(C) 1365/2016 is disposed of. No further orders in
contempt are called for in that matter. It is, however, clarified that if the
present common order is not complied with, it will be open to the Petitioner
to seek enforcement in accordance with law, including by appropriate
execution, contempt, or other permissible proceedings.
45.2 W.P.(C) 7884/2019, W.P.(C) 5053/2020, W.P.(C) 17353/2022, and
W.P.(C) 227/2023 are allowed in part in the above terms.
45.3 It is declared that Dayanand Adarsh Vidyalaya was not lawfully
closed from 1st April, 2020. Any stoppage of activity from that date was
only unilateral cessation of functioning without approval under Rule 46 and
cannot, by itself, defeat the salary, emolument, service, and retiral claims of
the Petitioners.
45.4 Liability to satisfy the directions in this order shall rest jointly and
severally upon:
(i) Respondent No. 1 school; and
(ii) such other entity or entities as may be determined by the Directorate
of Education, in terms of this order, to have been in actual management and
control of the school at the relevant time.
45.5 The Director of Education shall, within three weeks from today,
nominate a responsible officer, preferably not below the rank of Deputy
Director/Accounts Officer, to carry out a Petitioner-wise computation of
dues in all four writ petitions. The Directorate shall, within eight weeks from
today, undertake and conclude the exercise indicated above for determining
the entity or entities in actual management and control of the school at the
relevant time.
45.6 Within three weeks thereafter, each Petitioner shall file before the said
officer a concise statement of claim setting out:
(i) the period for which salary/emoluments are claimed;
(ii) the claim, if any, based on implementation of the 7 th Central Pay
Commission from 1st January, 2016;
(iii) gratuity, leave encashment, provident fund, pensionary or other retiral
dues, wherever applicable; and
(iv) amounts already received, if any.
Within the same period, all concerned Respondents, including Respondent
Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 7, shall produce before the said officer the complete service
and pay records of every Petitioner, including appointment letters, pay
fixation, increments, attendance/service books, resignation papers if any,
retirement records if any, gratuity/PF details, and full particulars of
payments already made.
45.7 The nominated officer shall give hearing to the concerned parties and
shall, within eight weeks thereafter, prepare a reasoned Petitioner-wise
computation. That computation shall include:
(i) unpaid salary and emoluments for the admissible period, including
statutory benefits such as maternity benefits, leave salary, and other service-
related entitlements, wherever applicable;
(ii) arrears arising from the Petitioners' claim to revised pay, including 7 th
CPC, and claims based on ACP/MACP or other service progression
benefits, to the extent found legally due and not already settled or paid;
(iii) gratuity, leave encashment, provident fund, pensionary and other
retiral dues, wherever applicable;
(iv) adjustment of payments already made; and
(v) simple interest at 6% per annum from the date each amount fell due
until the date of actual payment.
The computation so prepared shall be binding as to quantification of dues,
and liability to satisfy the same shall be enforced against the entity or
entities identified by the Directorate of Education in terms of this order.
45.8 In Vishwajyoti's case, the computation shall be made keeping one
caveat in view. Nothing in the present order reopens the matters already
concluded by the earlier orders in the previous contempt proceedings for the
period there dealt with. Her entitlement shall be worked out only for the
later period left open to be pursued in independent proceedings, including
her claim in W.P.(C) 17353/2022, together with admissible retiral dues
consequent upon superannuation on 30th December, 2024.
45.9 In Anju Rani's case, the computation shall be restricted to the period
up to 5th September, 2022, being the date of resignation stated on her behalf,
together with such terminal dues as may be admissible in law.
45.10. In the case of the Petitioners in W.P.(C) 5053/2020 and W.P.(C)
227/2023, and any other Petitioner in the connected batch, the computation
shall be Petitioner-specific. If any Petitioner had neither resigned nor
superannuated, the computation shall run up to the date of this judgment.
For any such Petitioner, salary/emoluments shall also continue to be paid
month to month until one of the following events occurs: lawful closure
under Rule 46 with compliance of conditions, lawful termination in
accordance with the Act and Rules, or superannuation.
45.11. The amounts so computed shall, upon determination of liability in
terms of this order, be paid within four weeks thereafter. In default, the
unpaid balance shall thereafter carry simple interest at 9% per annum until
payment.
45.12. Any amount already paid pursuant to the interim order dated 23 rd
December, 2024 in W.P.(C) 5053/2020 shall be given due adjustment in the
final computation. The costs imposed by the orders dated 14th February,
2025, 10th March, 2025 and 25th March, 2025 shall remain separately
payable and shall be cleared within three weeks, if not already paid.
45.13. The Director of Education shall also take a final, reasoned decision
on the school's application for closure within ten weeks from today, after
hearing the school, representatives of the staff, and the concerned managing
bodies. While doing so, the Director shall proceed on the footing that there
was no lawful closure till approval is granted. If closure is considered, it
shall not be permitted to operate in a manner that wipes out accrued
employee dues. The Director shall ensure, before granting any such
approval, that the dues determined under this order are fully paid or
adequately secured, and shall impose such conditions as are permissible in
law.
45.14. The Director of Education shall, in the same exercise, take a
reasoned view on whether action under Section 20 or any other regulatory
provision of the Act and Rules is called for in light of the admitted position
that the school stopped functioning without prior approval and withheld
salaries thereafter.
46. The petitions are disposed of in the above terms. All pending
applications also stand disposed of.
SANJEEV NARULA, J
MARCH 24, 2026
as/ab
