18. Ex facie, the explanation put forth by the Petitioner for seeking
condonation of delay beyond the statutorily permissible limit under
Section 34 of the A&C Act does not appear to be plausible or legally
sustainable.
19. A bare reading of the relevant provisions of the Limitation Act
reveals that the exclusion of time in obtaining certified copies is
governed by Section 12 of the Limitation Act. The said provision
contemplates exclusion only of the time requisite for obtaining a
certified copy of the impugned decree, sentence, order, judgment, or
award against which proceedings are to be initiated. It does not
envisage exclusion of the time taken for obtaining certified copies of
pleadings, records, or orders from a Court before which proceedings
had been erroneously instituted on an incorrect assumption of
jurisdiction. Consequently, the reliance placed by the Petitioner on the
time allegedly consumed in procuring certified copies of the record
from the learned District Court cannot furnish a legally tenable ground
for exclusion of limitation. For ready reference, the relevant portion of
Section 12 of the Limitation Act is reproduced hereunder:
"12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.-
*****
(2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an
application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a
judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was
pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or
reviewed shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree or order is appealed from or sought to be
revised or reviewed, or where an application is made for leave to
appeal from a decree or order, the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the judgment 1*** shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation for an application to set
aside an award, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award
shall be excluded.
Explanation.--In computing under this section the time requisite
for obtaining a copy of a decree or an order, any time taken by the
court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy
thereof is made shall not be excluded."
20. At this stage, even proceeding on demurrer and assuming, for
the sake of argument, that the present Petition was not otherwise
barred by limitation when filed before this Court, the Court cannot
lose sight of the fact that there exists an inordinate and unexplained
delay of more than 550 days in re-filing the present Petition.
21. As stated in the present Petition, the same was initially filed on
29.07.2023. However, a perusal of the log information maintained by
the Registry of this Court reveals that the Petition was ultimately re-
filed only on 01.03.2025. It was thereafter that the Petition came to be
duly registered and was listed before this Court for the first time on
05.03.2025.
22. The Delhi High Court Rules (Original Side), 2018,
unequivocally state that if any Petition is returned under defects, the
same has to be re-filed within a time period of 7 days at a time and 30
days in aggregate, beyond which, the said pleading shall be
accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay in re-
filing. The relevant rule, being Rule 3 of Chapter IV, is reproduced
below:
"3. Defective pleading/document. - (a) If on scrutiny, the
pleading/document is found defective, the Deputy
Registrar/Assistant Registrar, Incharge of the Filing Counter, shall
specify the objections, a copy of which will be kept for the Court
Record, and return for amendment and re-filing within a time not
exceeding 7 days at a time and 30 days in aggregate.
(b) If the pleading/document is not taken back for amendment
within the time allowed under sub-rule (a), it shall be registered
and listed before the Court for its dismissal for non-prosecution.
(c) If the pleading/document is filed beyond the time allowed
under sub-rule (a) the pleading/document must be accompanied
with an application for condonation of delay in re-filing for the
said pleading/document.
(d) Any party aggrieved by any order made by the Registrar under
this Rule may, within fifteen days for making such order, appeal
against it to the Judge in Chambers"
23. The sole question that thus arises for consideration is whether
the Petitioner has been able to demonstrate the existence of "sufficient
cause" so as to justify the condonation of the extraordinary delay in
re-filing the present Petition.
24. It is trite law that the discretion to condone delay is to be
exercised with due circumspection and sparingly, and only in cases
where exceptional circumstances are clearly demonstrated. The
burden squarely lies upon the Petitioner to furnish a cogent, credible,
and convincing explanation accounting for the entire period of delay.
It is equally well settled that condonation of delay is neither a vested
right of a litigant nor a relief that ought to be granted in a routine or
mechanical manner, as such an approach would defeat the legislative
intent, which seeks to ensure finality and expeditious resolution of
disputes arising out of arbitral proceedings.
25. For this Court to exercise the aforesaid discretion, the Petitioner
was required to demonstrate "sufficient cause" explaining the
inordinate delay in re-filing the present Petition. However, the
explanation furnished in the application seeking condonation of delay
in re-filing appears to be not only inadequate but also reflective of a
rather casual and cavalier approach towards the statutory timelines
governing such proceedings. For the sake of convenience and ready
reference, the relevant portion of the application attempting to explain
the delay in re-filing the Petition is reproduced hereunder:
"2. That there is a delay of 535 days in re-filing the aforesaid
petition after removal of objection raised by the Registry of this
before the Hon‟ble Court as the Petitioners‟ counsel has misplaced
the file in his office due to shifting of his office in the first week of
month of October 2023 as there was hundreds of files and due to
hundreds of running and disposed off files the original file with all
certified copies of this case have been tagged in the bundle of
disposed off files. Therefore, the counsel for the petitioner could
not able to fins the files of the present case. so many efforts have
been made to trace out the same but could not able to find the
same. Now, the file has been traced out, the Counsel for the
Petitioner could not file the petition in a stipulated time period after
removal of objections due to this reason."
26. While this Court is conscious that, in exceptional cases, delay
can be condoned upon a showing of "sufficient cause", the Petitioner
has failed to demonstrate any such compelling justification. Losing
the file, with no further attempts to even obtain another copy of the
same, cannot constitute a valid excuse for non-compliance with
mandatory statutory timelines. Attributing the delay to a clerical lapse
in the counsel‟s office only points to negligence. Such explanations
neither establish sufficient cause nor entitle a litigant to the indulgence
of condonation.
27. This Court is further guided by the Judgement of the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court in Sheo Raj Singh (D) Thr. LRs. v. Union of India7.
The Hon‟ble Supreme Court, while analysing the contentions of the
parties, reiterated that condonation of delay, being a discretionary
power available to the Courts, its exercise must necessarily depend
upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of
acceptability of the explanation. The Apex Court went on to
emphasise that the duration of the delay is immaterial, sometimes
even a delay of the shortest time period may not be condoned due to
want of „sufficient cause‟ or an acceptable explanation and sometimes
delay of long periods can be condoned if explanation is satisfactory
and acceptable. The relevant extracts are produced below:
(2023) 10 SCC 531
"29. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be
any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive
rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the
threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay.
However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that
condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to
courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the
sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of
the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes,
due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable
explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be
condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can
be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of
course, the courts must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and
an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give someone all of
the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the
circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point
out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really
not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an
„explanation‟ from an „excuse‟. Although people tend to see
„explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and struggle to find
out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which,
though fine, is real. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to
deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort
of a defensive action. Calling something as just an „excuse‟ would
imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true.
Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and,
therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or
absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At
this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not
explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long
delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose
sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the
higher courts for adjudication."
28. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court,
this Court believes that there is no cavil to the proposition that while
considering an application for condonation of delay in re-filing, the
Court must adopt a „liberal approach‟ and ought not to adopt a hyper-
technical approach. That being said, the law nevertheless requires the
Applicant to furnish a reasonable, credible, and cogent explanation for
the period sought to be condoned. In the present case, no such
explanation or „sufficient cause' is forthcoming, much less one that
inspires the confidence of this Court, which can sufficiently explain
the cause of the enormous delay of more than 500 days in re-filing of
the Petition.
29. It is trite that delay cannot be condoned as a matter of
generosity or benevolence. The quest for substantial justice cannot be
permitted to eclipse the corresponding right of the opposing party to
be free from undue prejudice occasioned by protracted and
unexplained inaction. In the present case, the Petitioner has not only
failed to disclose any reasonable or cogent explanation for the
enormous delay in re-filing the present Petition but has also shown a
lackadaisical approach that came to be followed. The foundational
requirement for invoking this Court‟s discretionary power to condone
the delay thus remains wholly unfulfilled.
30. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that the
present applications, particularly the application seeking condonation
of delay in re-filing the Petition, are devoid of merit and, therefore,
liable to be dismissed. The same are, accordingly, dismissed.
O.M.P. (COMM) 108/2025, I.A. 5843/2025 (STAY) & I.A.
5845/2025 (EX.)
31. As a necessary corollary, and as a result of the Petitioner being
unable to substantiate the entertaining of the Petition on merits, having
failed to satisfy this Court on the threshold mandate of approaching
the Court in a diligent and time bound manner, without entering into
the arena of a determination of the Petition on merits, the present
Petition stands dismissed as being time barred.
32. Accordingly, the present Petition, along with pending
Application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
33. No order as to costs.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
MARCH 17, 2026/sm/va
