[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Delhi Development Authority vs Kunal Food Products Pvt Ltd on 11 March, 2026
$~36
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Delivered on: 11.03.2026
+ O.M.P. (COMM) 407/2025
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Gaganmeet Singh Sachdeva, Mr.
Harshpreet Singh Chadha and Mr.
Hridyesh Khanna, Advs.
versus
KUNAL FOOD PRODUCTS PVT LTD .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Ajay Kumar, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J (OPEN COURT)
I.A. 25007/2025 (under Section 151 CPC r/w Section 5 of Limitation
Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present petition)
1. The present application has been filed by the petitioner seeking
condonation of delay in filing the present petition under Section 34 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter, 'the Act'). The present
petition has been filed challenging the arbitral award dated 31.05.2024.
2. It is stated in the application that the award dated 31.05.2024 was
received by the petitioner physically on 24.06.2024, however, objection
petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed by the petitioner before the
learned District Judge, Commercial Court-04, Shahdara, Karkardooma
Courts Delhi being OMP (COMM) 9/2024 on 27.09.2024, which was later
withdrawn on 19.05.2025 with liberty to seek appropriate remedy as per
law.
3. Mr. Gaganmeet Singh Sachdeva, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner submits that thereafter, the present petition under Section 34 of the
Act was filed on 29.08.2025 before this Court, since this Court has the
pecuniary jurisdiction.
4. Notice was issued by this Court vide order dated 09.10.2025, only
confined to the present application seeking condonation of delay.
5. A perusal of the facts delineated in the application indicates that the
physical delivery of the award to the petitioner was completed on
24.06.2024; however, a petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed before
the learned District Judge, Commercial Court, only on 27.09.2024. This
indicates that the petition was filed beyond the statutorily prescribed limit of
three months. The said petition was subsequently withdrawn on 19.05.2025.
6. Further, the petitioner filed a Section 34 petition before this Court on
29.08.2025, which shows that again more than three months were taken to
file the said petition.
7. In view of the foregoing factual background, even if the benefit of the
Section 141 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is given to the petitioner and the
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction.--(1) In computing the
period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence
another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant
shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith
in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.
(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been
prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or
revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted
in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to
entertain it.
period for which it was bonafidely pursuing its remedy before the learned
District Judge, Commercial Court, is excluded, still the petition has been
filed beyond the prescribed period of three months plus 30 days.
8. Therefore, the solitary issue that requires consideration is whether the
filing of the petition under Section 34 of the Act is beyond the statutory
limitation period provided under Section 34(3) of the Act. For the sake of
ready reference, the relevant sections are reproduced hereunder:
"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award.--(1)
Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made
only by an application for setting aside such award in
accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3).
(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only
if--
xxx xxx xxx
(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after
three months have elapsed from the date on which the
party making that application had received the arbitral
award or, if a request had been made under section 33,
from the date on which that request had been disposed of
by the arbitral tribunal:
Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant
was prevented by sufficient cause from making the
application within the said period of three months it may
entertain the application within a further period of thirty
days, but not thereafter."
(emphasis supplied)
9. From the language of Section 34(3) of the Act, it is clear that the
phrase "but not thereafter" indicates that the statutorily prescribed limit
under the aforesaid section is absolute and unextendible. The said phrase
leaves no manner of doubt that a petition under Section 34 cannot be
entertained after the expiry of the prescribed period, as any other
interpretation would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose.
10. Reference in this regard may be had to a recent decision of the
Division Bench of this Court in FAO(OS) (COMM) 107/2025 titled as
Union of India v. M/S GR-GAWAR (J.V.) dated 30.10.2025, wherein it was
observed thus:
"23. Therefore, the examination under Section 34 of the Act
of 1996 must necessarily encompass two essential
considerations. Firstly, whether the application has been
filed within the outer statutory limit of 120 days, as
explicitly mandated under Section 34(3). Secondly,
whether any delay in filing beyond the initial period of 90
days, but within the permissible extension of 30 days, is
accompanied by sufficient cause and an adequate day-to-
day explanation demonstrating bona fide reasons. The
statutory scheme unequivocally prescribes that no
application under Section 34 can be entertained beyond
the absolute outer limit of 120 days from the date of
receipt of the award. It follows that any delay within the
permissible 30-day extension must be accompanied by
cogent, satisfactory, and meticulous explanation, failing
which the delay cannot be condoned. Consequently, the
statute leaves no discretion to entertain a application filed
beyond 120 days, irrespective of the reasons advanced for
such delay"
(emphasis supplied)
11. The Decision in M/S GR-GAWAR (J.V.) (Supra), in turn followed the
ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Popular
Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470, wherein it was observed thus:
"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is
concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the
proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would
amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section
29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the
application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go
further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to
set aside the award beyond the extended period under the
proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly
otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.
xxx xxx xxx
14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the
conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to
challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation
Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main
objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in
the arbitral process" .....
xxx xxx xxx
16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a
court against an arbitral award may be made only by an
application for setting aside such award "in accordance with"
sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to
grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our
purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned
in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application "in
accordance with" that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of
Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award
cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of
the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the
provisions of Section 36 which provide that
"where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral
award under Section 34 has expired ... the award shall be
enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same
manner as if it were a decree of the court".
This is a significant departure from the provisions of the
Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set
aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to
pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the
judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow" (Section 17). Now
the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the
1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable
without any further act of the court. If there were any residual
doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34,
the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of
curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the
operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."
(emphasis supplied)
12. In view of the above, the delay in filing the present petition cannot be
condoned. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
O.M.P. (COMM) 407/2025 & I.A. 25006/2025 (under Section 36 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 read with Section 151 CPC
seeking stay of Arbitral Award)
13. In view of the order passed above, the present petition along with
pending application, is also dismissed.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J
MARCH 11, 2026/dss
