[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Priya Ratan Jha vs Union Of India & Ors on 13 January, 2026
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 13th JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ W.P.(C) 5712/2019
PRIYA RATAN JHA ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Praveen Kumar and Ms. Sumaiya
Kalim, Advs.
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. T.P. Singh, Sr. Central Govt.
Counsel.
Mr. Ajay Pal Law Officer CRPF,
INSP Athurv CRPF, Mr. Ramniwas
Yadav CRPF.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J.
1. The present Writ Petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India with the following prayers:
"(i) Issue a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated
19.12.2018 issued by the disciplinary authority / DG,
CRPF imposing penalty of censure upon the petitioner.
(ii) Quash the order dated 19.12.2018 rejecting the
representation of the petitioner.
(iii) Issue a writ of mandamus directing the
respondents to promote the petitioner in the rank of
Deputy Commandant from the date the batch mates of
the petitioner were promoted to the said rank in 2010
pursuant to DPC held on 20.08.2009 for vacancy year
2009-10 with all consequential benefits and reckon
eligibility of petitioner for the purposes of promotion in
the rank of 21/C on that basis with benefits of seniority
as well.
(iv) issue appropriate orders to find out reasons for
delayed enquiry as a 7 year long time to finish the
enquiry and issue final orders has resulted in taking
away the promotion from a combatant which was due
to him.
(v) issue any other writ/direction that this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts of this
case."
2. Shorn of unnecessary details, facts leading to the present case are as
follows:
a) The Petitioner joined the Central Reserve Police Force (hereinafter
referred to as "CRPF") on 04.01.1997, as a Sub-Inspector (General
Duty). Pursuant thereto, on 03.10.2003, the Petitioner was appointed
as the Assistant Commandant after qualifying in the Limited
Competitive Departmental Examination held for the said post.
b) During the period from April, 2004 to November, 2006 - the
Petitioner was functioning as Officer Commanding of D/54 Bn.
CRPF. It is alleged that he committed a serious act of misconduct on
10.04.2006, wherein he disbursed the pay and supplementary TA/DA
amount in respect of No.830730441 HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of
his Coy to No.850849614 HC/GD J.M. Jha on authority slip though
the latter was not authorised to receive the same. Further, when the
HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav requested for his dues, the Petitioner
pressurized him to give authority slip to HC/GD J.M. Jha on a back
date.
c) Subsequently, major penalty proceedings under Rule 14 of Central
Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965
[hereinafter referred to as "CCS (CCA) Rules"] were initiated
against the Petitioner vide Presidential Memo dated 26.03.2009. The
Presidential Memo is being reproduced hereinbelow for ease of
reference:
" ARTICLE-I
That the said Shri P R Jha, A/C, while functioning as
Officer Commanding of D Company, 54 Bn CRPF
during the period from April 2004 to November 2006
committed a serious act of misconduct in that on
10/04/06, with ulterior motive, he disbursed the pay
and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect of No.
830730441 HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy to
No.850849614 HC/GD J M Jha on authority slip
though the latter was not authorized to receive the
same. Subsequently, when HC Ram Bharose Yadav
requested for his dues, he harassed and pressurized
him to give authority slip to HC JM Jha on back date.
Thus, the said Officer misused his official position and
failed to maintain devotion to duty thereby violating
the provisions contained in Rule 3 (1) (ii) of CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964.
ARTICLEL-II
That during the aforesaid period and while functioning
in the aforesaid office, the said Shri P R Jha, A/C
committed a serious act of misconduct in that when HC
Ram Bharose Yadav reported about non-receipt of his
pay and TA/DA amount, Shri PR Jha, in order to
conceal his wrong doing, tampered with the signature /
entries in disbursement register and cash book, by
applying whitener, overwriting and cancelling entry
etc. and returned the amount to main office on
01/05/06. Thus, the said Shri PR Jha, A/C failed to
maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty,
thereby violating the provisions contained in Rule 3 (1)
(1) & (li) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964."
d) Thereafter, a Memorandum of charges was served on the Petitioner on
01.05.2009.
e) It is stated that the Petitioner, vide his Application dated 08.05.2009,
requested additional documents, in addition to the listed documents
(article of charges), for submissions of his statement of defence,
including a copy of the CVC proposal and the Preliminary Enquiry
Report, as well as documents relating to the Disciplinary Enquiry
conducted against HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of D/54 Bn. CRPF.
f) It is stated that the Petitioner submitted his written statement of
defence dated 22.06.2009, denying all the charges levelled against
him. Accordingly, vide Order No.D.IX-26/2008-CRC dated
30.07.2009, the President in the exercise of the powers conferred
under Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules appointed Sh. Amar Singh
Negi, Comdt (Staff) to DIGP CRPF Jammu, as the Inquiring
Authority to inquire into the charges framed against the Petitioner.
Subsequently, due to administrative reasons, vide Order No.D.IX-
26/2008-CRC dated 02.12.2009, the President in the exercise of the
powers conferred under Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules further
appointed another officer as the Inquiring Authority to inquire into the
charges framed against the Petitioner.
g) Pursuant thereto, the Inquiry Officer examined the Petitioner, 10
prosecution witnesses, and Defence Assistant Sh. S.C. Jha, Ex-DC,
CRPF and ultimately, in June, 2011, came to a conclusion that both
the Article of Charges levelled against the Petitioner - stands not
proved.
h) The Disciplinary Authority after going through the entire records of
the enquiry proceedings tentatively disagreed with the report of the
Inquiry Officer and came to a finding that Article 1 had been partially
proved and Article 2 had been proved against the Petitioner, on the
principles of preponderance of probabilities.
i) A copy of the Inquiry Officer's Report along with the tentative
disagreement note dated 21.03.2012 was served upon the Petitioner
vide Letter dated 21.03.2012 for submission of a representation.
j) The Petitioner submitted his representation dated 05.05.2012 against
the tentative disagreement note of the Disciplinary Authority on the
Inquiry Officer's Report. Pursuant thereto, the Disciplinary Authority
forwarded the proposal to the Union Public Service Commission
(hereinafter referred to as "UPSC") for its advice on the quantum of
penalty to be imposed upon the Petitioner.
k) The UPSC conveyed its opinion vide Letter No.F.3/142/12-SI dated
30.11.2012 advising that the ends of justice would be met, if the
penalty of "censure" were imposed upon the Petitioner. Further, as
there was a difference of opinion between the Disciplinary Authority
and UPSC with regard to the quantum of penalty, the Ministry of
Home Affairs vide note dated 21.02.2013 referred the proposal to
DoP&T, for resolving the matter because the quantum of penalty of
"censure" as advised by UPSC seems to be disproportionate and low
as compared to the charges levelled against the Petitioner. The said
advise of the UPSC is extracted herein below for ease of reference:
"Subject: Major Penalty Proceedings under Rule 14 of
CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 against Shri P.R. Jha, Asstt.
Commandant (IRLA-5963) CRPF.
Sir,
I am directed to refer to your letter No. D.IX-
26/2008-CRC (CRPF/MHA dated 23.07.2012 on the
above mentioned subject and to convey the advice of
the Commission as under:
2. The Commission note that the Competent Authority
vide Memorandum No. D.IX-26/2008-CRC, dated
26.03.2009 initiated disciplinary proceedings against
Shri P.R. Jha, Asstt. Comdt. (IRLA No.5963)
[hereinafter called Charged Officer (CO)] under Rule
14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification,
Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 and asked the CO to
explain the following Articles of Charge.
Article of Charge I
That the said Shri P.R. Jha, AC, while
functioning as Officer Commanding of D Company, 54
Bn CRPF during the period from April 2004 to
November 2006 committed a serious act of misconduct
in that on 10/04/06, with ulterior motive, he disbursed
the pay and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect
of No. 830730441 HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of his
coy to No.850849614 HC/GD J.M. Jha on authority
slip though the letter was not authorized to receive the
same. Subsequently, when HC Ram Bharose Yadav
requested for his dues, he harassed and pressurized
him to give authority slip to HC J.M. Jha on back date.
Thus, the said Officer misused his official position and
failed to maintain devotion to duty thereby violating
the provisions contained in Rule 3(1)(ii) of CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964.
Article of Charge II
That during the aforesaid period and while
functioning in the aforesaid office, the said Shri P R
Jha, A/C committed a serious act of misconduct in that
when HC Ram Bharose Yadav reported about non-
receipt of his pay and TA/DA amount, Shri P R Jha, in
order to conceal his wrong doing, tampered with the
signature/entries in disbursement register and cash
book, by applying whitener, overwriting and
cancelling entry etc. and returned the amount to main
office on 01/05/06. Thus, the said Shri P R Jha, A/O
failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to
duty, thereby violating the provisions contained in
Rule 3(1) (i) & (ii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
3. A statement of imputations of misconduct or
misbehavior in support of the Articles of Charge, a list
of documents by which and list of witnesses by whom
the Articles of charges framed against the CO were
proposed to be sustained were also enclosed with the
Memorandum dated 26.03.2009 as Annexure I, III and
IV respectively. The CO vide his reply dated
08.05.2009 requested for certain documents so that he
could submit his written statement of defence. After
examining the reply of the CO, the case was referred
for oral inquiry and IO was appointed vide Order
dated 02.12.2009 and also a PO was appointed vide
Order dated 30.07.2009. The IO concluded his report
on 31.10.2011 by stating that the both the Articles of
Charge I and II are not proved. The DA disagreed with
the findings of IO with regard to both the Articles of
Charge and held Article of Charge I as partly proved
and Article II as fully proved. The DA forwarded a
copy of the IO‟s Report, along with tentative reasons
for disagreement with regard to both the Articles of
Charge I and II, to the CO vide letter dated 21.03.2012
for submission of his representation, if any. The CO
submitted his representation vide letter dated
05.05.2012. After examining the representation of the
CO, the DA found that the CO has not been able to put
forth any cogent point which warrants reconsideration
of the disagreement note. After considering the
Charge-sheet, IO‟s Report, representations of the CO
and all other aspects relevant to the case, the DA
observed that Article of Charge I is partly proved
whereas Article of Charge II is fully proved and took a
tentative decision to impose a suitable major penalty
and sent the case records to the Commission for
advice.
4. The case records have been carefully examined by
the Commission and their observations are given
below:
ARTICLE - I
4.1 The Commission note that the first charge against
the CO is that he, with an ulterior motive, disbursed
the pay and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect of
Shri Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy to Shri J M Jha on
authority slip although the latter was not authorized to
receive the same. Further, when Shri Ram Bharose
Yadav requested for his dues, the CO harassed and
pressurized him when he refused to give authority slip
to Shri J M Jha on back date. The Commission further
note that the IO had held this Article of Charge as not
proved and the DA had disagreed with the findings of
the IO and held the Article of Charge as partly proved
to the extent that the CO, with an ulterior motive, had
disbursed the pay and supplementary TA/DA amount
respect of Shri Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy to Shri J
M Jha on authority slip though the latter was not
authorized to receive the same with.
4.2 The Commission note that the CO at no point of
time had stated that he had not directed the payments
pertaining to Shri Ram Bharose Yadav be made by
Ct/GD Shri Haste Lal Ram to Shri J M Jha. In fact, the
CO had himself admitted it and stated that this was
done because of orders of the Commandant that no
cash should lie un-disbursed. The Commission further
note that the then Commandant (Shri S S Yadav) had
deposed during the oral enquiry that he had ordered
that no amount should lie un-disbursed in Government
Cash Book and the Government Cash Book should
always have „nil‟ balance. This fact was also
collaborated by several PWs. Further many PWs had
also added during their deposition that the
Commandant visited the 54 Battalion and had
admonished the CO and the Company Writer for the
pendency of amount in Government Cash.
4.3 The Commission further note that the payment of
pay for the month of March 2008 was disbursed by the
Company, after three days of the Commandant‟s visit
and at that time Shri Ram Bharose Yadav was not
present in the Company, because he was on training.
Therefore, the amount towards the pay and TA/DA of
Shri Ram Bharose Yadav would have lied un-disbursed
had someone not withdrawn it. The Commission also
note that PWs had deposed that the CO had directed
for payment of the pay and TA/DA amount to ensure
the compliance with the instructions of the
Commandant and presuming that Shri Ram Bharose
Yadav would give the proper authority slip on return
from the training and the amount would be paid to him
by the person viz. P R Jha, who had drawn the amount
on his behalf.
4.4 The Commission further note that all the PWs,
including the Commandant, Deputy Commandant and
even the Complainant had deposed that when Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav returned from the training, he was
requested to give an authority slip and accept the
payment after deducting the amount of sold ration and
mess cutting. Shri Ram Bharose Yadav refused to give
the authority slip and also refused to accept the
payment because he did not had faith in the CO that
the money would be returned. The Commission further
note that certain PWs had deposed that Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav wanted the full amount without
deduction of the amount for mess cutting and sold
ration. The Commission further note that the
Commandant and the Deputy Commandant and also
other PWs had stated that the CO had drawn the
money without any malafide intention and that the CO
had done so in good faith. None of the PWs had
deposed that the CO was not willing to make the
necessary admissible payment to Shri Ram Bharose
Yadav but the complainant himself was not willing to
give the authority slip and accept the payment.
4.5 The Commission further note that Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav had himself deposed that he had erased
an amount of Rs. 936.96 (the sold ration amount of
Bhandara), by pasting paper on the accounts register
before handing over charge of Mess NCO D/54 Bn
CRPF to HC/GD Dhuli Chand. He had justified this
act by stating that when he took over the charge of
Mess NCO, HC/GD, Shri J M Jha and his predecessor
told him that he should not charge any amount from
the OC (i.e. CO) for the ration purchased by him for
his personal use from the ration store of the Mess and
because of fear of the CO he did not enter the amount
of sold ration to the CO in the sold ration register and
that he maintained this account on a separate piece of
paper. The amount of ration provided to the CO till
13.03.2006 amounted to Rs. 927.33 and on that day
while handing over the charge of the Mess NCO, he
had informed and handed over the amount spent on
personal ration to his incumbent Shri Dhuli Chand.
However, the incumbent refused to accept this and
thereafter, he had brought this fact to the knowledge of
SI/GD Shri K. B. Thapa, who told him to do as deemed,
fit. Therefore, he had erased the amount of Rs. 936.96/-
spent on Bhandara from the account by pasting the
page on which it was entered, thereby making good for
his loss. The Commission observe that this argument of
the Shri Ram Bharose Yadav is devoid of any merit and
weightage because Shri Dhuli Chand had deposed and
contradicted the statement of Shri Ram Bharose Yadav.
Further, Shri K B Thapa had deposed that the
discrepancy of Shri Ram Bharose Yadav was noticed
by Shri Dhuli Chand and it was reported by him that a
paper had been pasted on the entry of the sold ration
amount pertaining to „Bhandara‟ by Shri Ram Bharose
Yadav. The Commission also note that Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav had not brought the fact that ration
were being supplied to the CO without payment and
that because of his fear, it is not being posted in the
relevant register to the knowledge of seniors of the CO,
viz., the Commandant or the Deputy Commandant at
that time.
4.6 The Commission observe that Shri Ram Bharose
Yadav had himself deposed that a disciplinary
proceedings was initiated against him for
misappropriation of mess cutting, improper mess
accounting and upkeep of records. It is also a fact that
Shri Ram Bharose Yadav had preferred a complaint on
17.01.2007 to DIGP, CRPF, New Delhi (Exhibit-1)
wherein he had made numerous allegations against the
CO. It was on the basis of this complaint that the
instant disciplinary proceedings were initiated against
the CO. During the course of the oral enquiry, the IO
found that the allegations levelled could not be
corroborated by even a single witness. This gives a
very firm impression that Shri Ram Bharose Yadav had
lodged the complaint against the CO after the enquiry
was ordered against him. Hence, the contention of the
CO that allegations were made against him by Shri
Ram Bharose Yadav only after an enquiry of
misappropriation/embezzlement of sum of Rs. 936.96
pertaining to the sold ration amount for the Bhandara
was ordered against Shri Ram Bharose Yadav holds
good. The Commission further note that none of the
PWs, except for the complainant, had stated that the
CO was not a person to be trusted upon rather
everyone had pointed that Shri Ram Bharose Yadav
had refused to accept the money and give the authority
slip. The Commandant had also deposed that Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav was an in-disciplined problem creator
HC/GD and that he had ordered to keep him under
watch in Bn Hqr for having a close eye on his conduct.
4.7 The Commission observe that although the element
of charge that the CO disbursed the pay and
supplementary TA/DA amount in respect of Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav of his coy to Shri J M Jha on authority
slip though the latter was not authorized to receive, is
established but this was without any malafide intention
or ulterior motive and is in contradiction to what has
been mentioned in the Statement of Imputations and
also in the Disagreement Note of the DA. It was done
in good faith to comply and ensure compliance of the
directions of the Commandant by minimizing the
amount unpaid in the Cash Book Register. Further, the
preponderance of probability shows that Shri Ram
Bharose Yadav, i.e., the complainant vide which the
instant case had resulted, had lodged the complaint
only after an enquiry was ordered against him and
thereby had an ulterior motive. Therefore, Article of
Charge I is partly proved.
4.8 The Commission note that the second charge
against the CO is that when Shri Ram Bharose Yadav
reported about non-receipt of pay and TA/DA amount,
the CO tampered with the signature/entries in
disbursement register and cash book by applying
whitener, overwriting and canceling entry etc. and
returned the amount to main office on 01.05.2006.
4.9 The Commission note that the CO had done his
level best to hand over the withdrawn money
pertaining to Shri Ram Bharose Yadav and had
requested him to give the authority letter. However,
Shri Ram Bharose Yadav refused to accept this.
Further, when the matter came into the knowledge of
the Commandant, he had deputed the Deputy
Commandant for settling the matter and even after the
request of the Deputy Commandant, the complainant
had refused to accept the money. Thereafter, the
Commandant had called Shri Ram Bharose Yadav and
requested him to accept the money, but even then, he
had refused to do so. Therefore, the Commandant had
directed the CO to get money deposited as
undistributed money in the Government account. This
was accordingly done by the CO but instead of making
fresh entries for accounting purpose, the CO had done
corrections with the signature/entries in disbursement
register and cash book. Therefore, Article of Charge II
is fully proved.
5. In view of the findings as discussed above and after
taking into account all other aspects relevant to the
case, the Commission are of the view that the ends of
Justice would be met in this case if the penalty of
„Censure‟ be imposed upon Shri P.R. Jha (the CO).
They advise accordingly.
6. The case records as per enclosed list are returned
herewith. Receipt of the same may kindly be
acknowledged.
7. A copy of the order passed by the Ministry in this
regard may kindly be forwarded to the Commission for
perusal and records.
Yours faithfully,
(Signature)
(Sanjay Prasad)
Under Secretary
l) Subsequently, vide Presidential order dated 24.07.2013, the penalty of
"censure" was imposed on the Petitioner. The said order is being
reproduced herein below for ease of reference:
" ARTICLE-I
That the said Shri P R Jha, A/C, while functioning as
Officer Commanding of D Company, 54 Bn CRPF
during the period from April 2004 to November 2006
committed a serious act of misconduct in that on
10/04/06, with ulterior motive, he disbursed the pay
and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect of No.
830730441 HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy to
No.850849614 HC/GD J M Jha on authority slip
though the latter was not authorized to receive the
same. Subsequently, when HC Ram Bharose Yadav
requested for his dues, he harassed and pressurized
him to give authority slip to HC JM Jha on back date.
Thus, the said Officer misused his official position and
failed to maintain devotion to duty thereby violating
the provisions contained in Rule 3 (1) (ii) of CCS
(Conduct) Rules, 1964.
ARTICLEL-II
That during the aforesaid period and while functioning
in the aforesaid office, the said Shri P R Jha, A/C
committed a serious act of misconduct in that when HC
Ram Bharose Yadav reported about non-receipt of his
pay and TA/DA amount, Shri PR Jha, in order to
conceal his wrong doing, tampered with the signature /
entries in disbursement register and cash book, by
applying whitener, overwriting and cancelling entry
etc. and returned the amount to main office on
01/05/06. Thus, the said Shri PR Jha, A/C failed to
maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty,
thereby violating the provisions contained in Rule 3 (1)
(1) & (li) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.
4. AND WHEREAS the Memorandum of charge was
served on the Charged Officer (C/O) through the
Commandant 168 Bn., CRPF on 01/05/2009. In his
written statement of defence dated 22/06/2009, the C/O
denied the charge levelled against him. The DE was
hence set in motion by appointing Shri Amar Singh
Negi, Commandant and the Inquiry Officer and Shri
Vivek Bhandral, Second-in-Command as Presiding
Officer vide Presidential order dated 30/07/2009. Due
to administrative reasons Shri Shallendra.
Commandant appointed as IO in place of Shri Amar
Singh Nagi, Commandant vide Presidential order
dated 02/12/2009. Shr S.C. Jha, Dy. Commandant
(Retd), was engage as Defence Assistant by the
Charged Officer. The Charged Officer participated in
the enquiry along-with his Defense Assistant from
beginning to end.
5. AND WHEREAS the IO has conducted the DE as
per Instructions on the subject and the Charged Officer
was provided with reasonable opportunity to defend
his case at every stage during the enquiry. In the DE,
statement of all the 6 listed PWs and 4 additional PWs
has been recorded. The Charged Officer has neither
produced and DW nor submitted any exhibits in his
defence. During the course of enquiry, the Charged
officer refuted the charge leveled against him and
deposed that in order to comply the directions of
Commandant-166 Bn to keep the Govt. cash balance in
Coy Cash Book as zero, he had disbursed the said
amount to another HC/GD J.M. Jha of 166 Bn on
authority slip with the view to further hand over the
same to HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy on his
arrival from course.
6. AND WHEREAS in the DE, the IO has held the
charge at Article-l and Article-II as not proved. The
Inquiry Officer in his report has held that allegations
leveled by complainant (HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav)
against the Charged Officer, and false and are not
corroborated by any witnesses rather they stand
contradicted by the other witnesses. It could not be
substantiated that the Charged Officer had disbursed
the pay and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect
of HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav to HC/GD J.M. Jha on
unsigned authority slip with any ulterior motive, rather
it stands substantiated that the CO had done so in good
faith and in order to keep the balance zero in cash
Book in compliance of the verbal directions of the
Commandant and in the belief that the above HC/GD
Ram Bharose Yadav would sign on the unsigned
authority slip while taking the amount. Further, the IO,
in regard to Article-ll held that the signature/entries in
disbursement register and cash book were tampered by
applying whitener and overwriting was not done to
conceal any wrong doing of the CO, but the same was
necessitated as the complainant had refused to receive
the said two amounts and as a result thereof, the
amounts were required to be taken back in the cash
book for returning them to the Bn Hqrs as undelivered
amounts. The disciplinary authority did not agree with
the findings of the 10 and held the charges at Article-
and Il as tentatively proved, Accordingly, a copy of
tentative disagreement not along-with copy of IO's
report, was served on the Charged Officer vide Dte
letter of even No. dated 21/03/2012 through the
Commandant 168 Bn for submission of representation
if any, within 15 days from the date of its receipt. The
Charged Officer submitted representation dated
05/05/2012, in response, to tentative disagreement
not/l.O's report through 168 Bn vide letter No. G-II-
1/2012-168-Steno dated 07/05/2012. In his
representation, the Charged Officer has mainly put
forth that the complainant HC/GD Ram Bharose
Yadav, leveled the allegation against the him (Charged
Officer) when Rs.936.96/- on account of
misappropriated/embezzled amount of Coy mess was
deducted from his pay and the
cutting/erasing/tempering in Cash Book was necessary
as the above HC/GD Ram Bharose Yadav refused to
accept the amount. The Charged Officer failed to bring
out any new fact on, cogent point worth consideration
in his representation dated 5/5/2012.
7. AND WHEREAS on evaluation of the proceedings of
the DE along-with report of the IO and tentative
disagreement note and various aspects related to the
case, it is observed that the Charged Officer disbursed
the pay and supplementary TA/DA amount in respect
of Shri Ram Bharose Yadav of his coy to HC/GD J.M.
Jha on authority slip and latter was not authorized to
receive the same, is established. Since HC/GD Ram
Bharose Yadav refused to accept his amounts which
was already paid by Charged Officer to HC/GD JM.
Jha on unsigned authority lip, the Charged Officer had
made corrections with the signature/entries in
disbursement register and cash book. Thus,
considering the above facts, the Disciplinary Authority
came to the conclusion that both the charges framed
against Shri P.R. Jha, Asstt. Commandant (CO) stand
proved. Accordingly, case was referred to the UPSC
for their advice. The Commission after examination of
the case, vide their letter No.F.3/142/12-S1 dated
30/11/2012, advised for Imposition of the penalty of
"Censure" upon Shri P.R. Jha (the CO).
8. AND WHEREAS the Disciplinary Authority found
that the UPSC after taking into account all other
aspects relevant to the case, has held Article of
Charge-l as partially proved and Article of charge-ll
as fully proved. However the quantum of penalty of
'Censure' Imposed on the Charged Officer seemed to
be disproportionate and very low as compared to
gravity of charge. DoP&T OM No.39023/02/2006-Estt
(B) dated 5/12/06 states that "in disciplinary and other
cases if Disciplinary Authority/competent authority
disagree with the advice of UPSC, a reference is
required to be made to DoP&T (Estt. Division) in the
relevant file indicating reasons for the proposed
disagreement and its advice taken Into consideration
before a final order is passed. Accordingly the matter
was referred to DOP&T for resolving the difference of
opinion between DA and UPSC. The Under Secretary
to Government of India vide DoP&T's UO
No.39034/04/2013-Estt(B) dated 12/06/2013 has
Intimated that Keeping in view of all the facts and
merits of the case, observations of UPSC, reports of
1.0 and observations of Ministry of Home Affairs and
other records and circumstances of the case, the
Competent Authority Le., Hon'ble Prime Minister has
approved/accepted the recommendation of the UPSC
for imposition of minor penalty of "Censure" on Shri
P.R. Jha, Asstt. Commandant, the CO.
9. NOW THEREFORE, in the light of above and
having regard to all aspects of the case, the President
coonsideres that the ends of justice would be met in
this case, if the penalty of "Censure", is imposed on
Shri P.R. Jha, Asstt. Commandant, CRPF 9IRLA-5963)
of 166 Bn (now posted in 168 Bn) the Charged Officer
and orders accordingly. A copy of the UPSC letter No.
F.3/142/12/SI dated 30/11/2012 is enclosed."
m) The Petitioner submitted his Representation dated 06.09.2013
requesting to constitute review DPC to consider his promotion to the
rank of Deputy Commandant and restore his seniority with all
consequential benefits. However, after the award of the said penalty
of "censure", the Petitioner was considered by DPC held on
20.09.2013 for the year 2013-14 in normal course and graded Fit with
a rider that he be promoted after completion of penalty. Further, the
Representation dated 06.09.2013 submitted by the Petitioner was
examined and the factual position / reply to the same was sent to Spl.
DG, CZ, CRPF vide Letter dated 27.09.2013 for further information
of the Petitioner. Further, since the penalty of "censure" has no
currency, he was released on promotion to the rank of Deputy
Commandant vide Dte. signal dated 24.10.2013.
n) The Petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.9170/2014 before this Court with the
prayer to "consider his promotion and seniority in the rank of Deputy
Commandant above his juniors by quashing the order dated
24.07.2013 of penalty of censure and order dated 27.09.2013
rejecting his representation". This Court vide Order dated 22.12.2014,
directed the Union of India/Respondents to decide the Petitioner's
Representation dated 06.09.2013 and thereafter, if the Petitioner is
still aggrieved by the decision of the Respondents, then the Petitioner
may approach this Court again. Further, this Court also directed the
Respondents to decide the Petitioner's Representation within a period
of two months from the date of this Order.
o) Thereafter, Director General, CRPF had gone through the whole case
of the Petitioner and came to a conclusion that the Representation
dated 06.09.2013 of the Petitioner warrants no favourable
consideration and thus, the same was rejected. The same was
communicated to the Petitioner vide Order No.P.VII-6/2013-Pres-DA-
I on 23.02.2015.
p) It is stated that the Petitioner aggrieved by the Order dated 23.02.2015
passed by the Director General, CRPF, filed another W.P.(C)
No.3453/2015 before this Court for quashing the Respondent's Orders
dated 27.09.2013 and 23.03.2015 respectively, vide which the
Petitioner's Representation dated 06.09.2013 was rejected. The
Petitioner further prayed to quash Order dated 24.07.2013 issued by
the Disciplinary Authority imposing penalty of "censure" upon the
Petitioner and also to promote the Petitioner in the rank of Deputy
Commandant with all consequential benefits from the date his
batchmates were promoted to the said rank in 2010, including taking
eligibility for promotion to 2-I/C w.e.f 2010. Further, this Court vide
Order dated 16.11.2015, was pleased to allow the W.P.(C)
No.3453/2015 filed by the Petitioner. The said Order is being
reproduced herein below for ease of reference:
"The petitioner's limited grievance is that the penalty
of censure imposed on him after completion of
disciplinary proceedings was not preceded by any
information or reference to him of the advice tendered
by UPSC to the appropriate authority under Article
320 (3) of the Constitution of India. The petitioner
relies upon the decision of Supreme Court in Union of
India vs. R.P.Singh (2014) SCC 340. The court in that
decision had highlighted that besides following the
procedure prescribed i.e. completion of enquiry,
furnishing of an enquiry report as a prelude to the
imposition of the penalty, wherever law mandates prior
consultation with the UPSC, the opinion tendered by
the UPSC has to be furnished to the concerned
officer/employee before penalty is actually imposed.
In the present case, the advice/opinion actually
tendered by the UPSC was not furnished to the
petitioner. Consequently, the writ petition is entitled to
succeed. The impugned order is hereby quashed. Since,
the petitioner now possesses a copy of the opinion
tendered by the UPSC, it is open to him to represent to
the appropriate authorities, i.e. Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF) within four weeks. The CRPF shall pass
appropriate order within four weeks after duly
considering the representation and other material on
record including the enquiry report etc.
The writ petition is allowed in the above terms."
q) Further, the Petitioner in compliance with the Order dated 16.11.2015
passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.3453/2015, submitted his
Representation dated 08.12.2015 with the Respondent. The same was
received through Pers. Branch ION No.P.VII-6/2013-Pers-DA-I dated
25.01.2016 in the CR & Vig. branch of the Respondent. The said
Representation of the Petitioner was examined and submitted to MHA
vide UO note dated 17.06.2016 with recommendation to review the
punishment of "censure" imposed upon the Petitioner in terms of CCS
(CCA) Rules. It is stated that MHA thereafter, returned the proposal
vide its UO note dated 19.10.2016 with the following remarks: "none
of the ground raised by the CRPF appears to be sufficient to change
their previous stand or for reviewing the penalty of „censure‟ ".
r) Thereafter, the case of the Petitioner was re-submitted to MHA vide
UO note dated 07.11.2016 with justification for obtaining approval of
competent authority to review the penalty of "censure" imposed on
the Petitioner. The MHA after examination of the case forwarded it to
UPSC vide Letter dated 14.03.2017 for seeking its advice. Further,
UPSC vide Letter No.F.3/400/2016-S.I dated 23.06.2017 informed the
MHA that vide Order dated 16.11.2015 passed by this Court in
W.P.(C) No.3453/2015, this Court issued directions to the
Disciplinary Authority to examine the Petitioner's Representation and
not to the UPSC. It was further clarified by UPSC that "as such,
presently, UPSC has no further role with regard to the disciplinary
case of Shri. P.R.Jha".
s) Pursuant thereto, a proposal was made to the MHA vide Directorate
UO note dated 14.07.2017. Thereafter, the MHA vide UO note dated
07.11.2017 returned the proposal stating that as the Disciplinary
Authority is not in agreement with the advice of the UPSC and as
such the case referred to DoP&T for advice. Thereafter, MHA vide
UO note dated 07.06.2017 returned the proposal to furnish a self-
contained note with the reasons for disagreement with the advice of
the UPSC incorporating various details of the case.
t) Thereafter, the proposal was re-submitted to MHA vide UO note
dated 29.11.2017 in chronological manner incorporating all details of
the case. Further, the MHA vide UO note dated 30.11.2018
intimidated that the proposal of DG, CRPF has been considered in the
Ministry and no justification was found by the Competent Authority
i.e. Hon'ble Home Minister for reviewing the penalty of "censure"
imposed on the Petitioner. Further, the representation dated
08.12.2015 submitted by the Petitioner was rejected, being devoid of
merit vide Presidential Order dated 19.12.2018.
u) Aggrieved by the same the Petitioner approached this Court by filing
the present Writ Petition seeking to quash the impugned order dated
19.12.2018 passed by the Disciplinary Authority / DG, CRPF,
imposing penalty of "censure" upon the Petitioner.
3. Before adverting to merits of the present Petition, this Court deems it
necessary to delineate the contours of judicial review in context of
administrative enquiries. It is trite law that the High Courts under Article(s)
226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution do not sit as a second Court of first
appeal in disciplinary matters and, therefore, this Court, while exercising its
powers under Article(s) 226 and 227 of the Indian Constitution, shall not
venture into re-appreciation of evidence. The limited scope of interference
that is permissible is to see whether there has been any procedural
irregularity or violation of principles of natural justice and fair play or
whether the findings in the administrative enquiry are based on no evidence
at all.
4. The scope of administrative review is further circumscribed when it
comes to disciplinary proceedings relating to members of the Armed Forces
and Paramilitary Forces. These are disciplined forces where the paramount
consideration is maintaining cohesion, discipline and respect for hierarchy
and chain of command. The Courts are not meant to sit over in appeal as
second courts of first appeal. The Apex Court in the case of Union of India
v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, has held as under:
"12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully
disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an
appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings,
reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry
officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the
disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the
Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary
proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a
second court of first appeal. The High Court, in
exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the
Constitution of India, shall not venture into
reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can
only see whether:
(a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority;
(b) the enquiry is held according to the
procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is
violation of the principles of natural justice in
conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities
have disabled themselves from reaching a fair
conclusion by some considerations extraneous to
the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the
authorities have allowed themselves to be
influenced by irrelevant or extraneous
considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very
face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious
that no reasonable person could ever have
arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary
authority had erroneously failed to admit the
admissible and material evidence; (h) the
disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted
inadmissible evidence which influenced the
finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no
evidence."
(emphasis supplied)
5. The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan v. Bhupendra Singh, 2024
SCC OnLine SC 1908, has reiterated the settled principle that the High
Courts while exercising its powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Indian
Constitution, does not sit as an appellate forum over the decisions of the
disciplinary authorities. The Apex Court while relying on its earlier decision
in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao, 1963 SCC OnLine SC 6, has held that
as long as there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion that
the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the
High Court to review the evidence and arrive at an independent finding on
the evidence. The Apex Court clarified that the Courts shall not ordinarily
interfere with administrative decisions unless it is illogical or suffers from
procedural impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of the Court. The
relevant paras of the judgment read as under:
"23. The scope of examination and interference under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter
referred to as the „Constitution‟) in a case of the present
nature, is no longer res integra. In State of Andhra
Pradesh v. S Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723, a 3-
Judge Bench stated:
„7. ... The High Court is not constituted in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a
Court of appeal over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant : it is concerned to
determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf, and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Where there is some evidence, which the
authority entrusted with the duty to hold the
enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not
the function of the High Court in a petition for a
writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and
to arrive at an independent finding on the
evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly
interfere where the departmental authorities have
held the proceedings against the delinquent in a
manner inconsistent with the rules of natural
justice or in violation of the statutory rules
prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the
authorities have disabled themselves from
reaching a fair decision by some considerations
extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the
case or by allowing themselves to be influenced
by irrelevant considerations or where the
conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly
arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable
person could ever have arrived at that conclusion,
or on similar grounds. But the departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there
be some legal evidence on which their findings
can be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to
be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the
Constitution.‟
(emphasis supplied)
24. The above was reiterated by a Bench of equal
strength in State Bank of India v. Ram Lal
Bhaskar, (2011) 10 SCC 249. Three learned Judges of
this Court stated as under in State of Andhra
Pradesh v. Chitra Venkata Rao, (1975) 2 SCC 557:
„21. The scope of Article 226 in dealing with
departmental inquiries has come up before this
Court. Two propositions were laid down by this
Court in State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao [AIR
1963 SC 1723 : (1964) 3 SCR 25 : (1964) 2 LLJ
150]. First, there is no warrant for the view that
in considering whether a public officer is guilty of
misconduct charged against him, the rule
followed in criminal trials that an offence is not
established unless proved by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court
must be applied. If that rule be not applied by a
domestic tribunal of inquiry the High Court in a
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is
not competent to declare the order of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry
invalid. The High Court is not a court of appeal
under Article 226 over the decision of the
authorities holding a departmental enquiry
against a public servant. The Court is concerned
to determine whether the enquiry is held by an
authority competent in that behalf and according
to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and
whether the rules of natural justice are not
violated. Second, where there is some evidence
which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold
the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may
reasonably support the conclusion that the
delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not
the function of the High Court to review the
evidence and to arrive at an independent finding
on the evidence. The High Court may interfere
where the departmental authorities have held the
proceedings against the delinquent in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in
violation of the statutory rules prescribing the
mode of enquiry or where the authorities have
disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision
by some considerations extraneous to the
evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing
themselves to be influenced by irrelevant
considerations or where the conclusion on the
very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and
capricious that no reasonable person could ever
have arrived at that conclusion. The departmental
authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise
properly held, the sole judges of facts and if there
is some legal evidence on which their findings can
be based, the adequacy or reliability of that
evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to
be canvassed before the High Court in a
proceeding for a writ under Article 226.
xxx
23. The jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
under Article 226 is a supervisory jurisdiction.
The Court exercises it not as an appellate court.
The findings of fact reached by an inferior court
or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of
evidence are not reopened or questioned in writ
proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on
the face of the record can be corrected by a writ,
but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact
recorded by a tribunal, a writ can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the
tribunal had erroneously refused to admit
admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Again if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would
be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. A finding of fact
recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged on
the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal is
insufficient or inadequate to sustain a finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the
said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. See Syed Yakoob v. K.S.
Radhakrishnan [AIR 1964 SC 477 : (1964) 5 SCR
64].
24. The High Court in the present case
assessed the entire evidence and came to its own
conclusion. The High Court was not justified to
do so. Apart from the aspect that the High Court
does not correct a finding of fact on the ground
that the evidence is not sufficient or adequate, the
evidence in the present case which was
considered by the Tribunal cannot be scanned by
the High Court to justify the conclusion that there
is no evidence which would justify the finding of
the Tribunal that the respondent did not make the
journey. The Tribunal gave reasons for its
conclusions. It is not possible for the High Court
to say that no reasonable person could have
arrived at these conclusions. The High Court
reviewed the evidence, reassessed the evidence
and then rejected the evidence as no evidence.
That is precisely what the High Court in
exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari
should not do.
xxx
26. For these reasons we are of opinion that
the High Court was wrong in setting aside the
dismissal order by reviewing and reassessing the
evidence. The appeal is accepted. The judgment of
the High Court is set aside. Parties will pay and
bear their own costs.‟
(emphasis supplied)
xxx
26. In Union of India v. K.G. Soni, (2006) 6 SCC 794,
it was opined:
„14. The common thread running through in
all these decisions is that the court should not
interfere with the administrator's decision unless
it was illogical or suffers from procedural
impropriety or was shocking to the conscience of
the court, in the sense that it was in defiance of
logic or moral standards. In view of what has
been stated in Wednesbury case [Associated
Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., [1948] 1 K.B. 223 : [1947] 2 All ER 680
(CA)] the court would not go into the correctness
of the choice made by the administrator open to
him and the court should not substitute its
decision to that of the administrator. The scope of
judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the
decision-making process and not the decision.
15. To put it differently, unless the punishment
imposed by the disciplinary authority or the
Appellate Authority shocks the conscience of the
court/tribunal, there is no scope for interference.
Further, to shorten litigations it may, in
exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate
punishment by recording cogent reasons in
support thereof. In the normal course if the
punishment imposed is shockingly
disproportionate, it would be appropriate to
direct the disciplinary authority or the Appellate
Authority to reconsider the penalty imposed.‟
(emphasis supplied)
27. The legal position was restated by two learned
Judges in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Man Mohan Nath
Sinha, (2009) 8 SCC 310:
„15. The legal position is well settled that the
power of judicial review is not directed against
the decision but is confined to the decision-
making process. The court does not sit in
judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open
to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise
the evidence led before the inquiry officer and
examine the findings recorded by the inquiry
officer as a court of appeal and reach its own
conclusions. In the instant case, the High Court
fell into grave error in scanning the evidence as if
it was a court of appeal. The approach of the
High Court in consideration of the matter suffers
from manifest error and, in our thoughtful
consideration, the matter requires fresh
consideration by the High Court in accordance
with law. On this short ground, we send the
matter back to the High Court.‟
6. In Bhupendra Singh (Supra), the Apex Court has also placed reliance
on the case of State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma, (1996) 3 SCC 364.
However, we deem it apposite to deal with it separately because in S.K.
Sharma (Supra) the Apex Court has drawn clear cut distinctions between
substantial and procedural violations. The gist of the Apex Court's
observations is that a violation of a substantial statutory rule would ipso
facto vitiate the enquiry. However, when it comes to procedural rules the
metric of assessment would be the test of prejudice. The relevant parts of the
observation of the Apex Court reads as under:
"33. We may summarise the principles emerging
from the above discussion. (These are by no means
intended to be exhaustive and are evolved keeping in
view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of
punishment imposed by an employer upon the
employee):
(1) An order passed imposing a punishment on an
employee consequent upon a disciplinary/departmental
enquiry in violation of the rules/regulations/statutory
provisions governing such enquiries should not be set
aside automatically. The Court or the Tribunal should
enquire whether (a) the provision violated is of a
substantive nature or (b) whether it is procedural in
character.
(2) A substantive provision has normally to be
complied with as explained hereinbefore and the
theory of substantial compliance or the test of
prejudice would not be applicable in such a case.
(3) In the case of violation of a procedural
provision, the position is this: procedural provisions
are generally meant for affording a reasonable and
adequate opportunity to the delinquent
officer/employee. They are, generally speaking,
conceived in his interest. Violation of any and every
procedural provision cannot be said to automatically
vitiate the enquiry held or order passed. Except cases
falling under -- "no notice", "no opportunity" and
"no hearing" categories, the complaint of violation of
procedural provision should be examined from the
point of view of prejudice, viz., whether such violation
has prejudiced the delinquent officer/employee in
defending himself properly and effectively. If it is found
that he has been so prejudiced, appropriate orders
have to be made to repair and remedy the prejudice
including setting aside the enquiry and/or the order of
punishment. If no prejudice is established to have
resulted therefrom, it is obvious, no interference is
called for. In this connection, it may be remembered
that there may be certain procedural provisions which
are of a fundamental character, whose violation is by
itself proof of prejudice. The Court may not insist on
proof of prejudice in such cases. As explained in the
body of the judgment, take a case where there is a
provision expressly providing that after the evidence of
the employer/government is over, the employee shall be
given an opportunity to lead defence in his evidence,
and in a given case, the enquiry officer does not give
that opportunity in spite of the delinquent
officer/employee asking for it. The prejudice is self-
evident. No proof of prejudice as such need be called
for in such a case. To repeat, the test is one of
prejudice, i.e., whether the person has received a fair
hearing considering all things. Now, this very aspect
can also be looked at from the point of view of
directory and mandatory provisions, if one is so
inclined. The principle stated under (4) hereinbelow is
only another way of looking at the same aspect as is
dealt with herein and not a different or distinct
principle.
(4)(a) In the case of a procedural provision which is
not of a mandatory character, the complaint of
violation has to be examined from the standpoint of
substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order
passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside
only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to
the delinquent employee.
(b) In the case of violation of a procedural
provision, which is of a mandatory character, it has to
be ascertained whether the provision is conceived in
the interest of the person proceeded against or in
public interest. If it is found to be the former, then it
must be seen whether the delinquent officer has waived
the said requirement, either expressly or by his
conduct. If he is found to have waived it, then the order
of punishment cannot be set aside on the ground of the
said violation. If, on the other hand, it is found that the
delinquent officer/employee has not waived it or that
the provision could not be waived by him, then the
Court or Tribunal should make appropriate directions
(include the setting aside of the order of punishment),
keeping in mind the approach adopted by the
Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC
727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] .
The ultimate test is always the same, viz., test of
prejudice or the test of fair hearing, as it may be
called.
(5) Where the enquiry is not governed by any
rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only
obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice
-- or, for that matter, wherever such principles are
held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the
order/action -- the Court or the Tribunal should make
a distinction between a total violation of natural justice
(rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of a facet
of the said rule, as explained in the body of the
judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made
between "no opportunity" and
no adequate opportunity, i.e., between "no notice"/"no
hearing" and "no fair hearing". (a) In the case of
former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid
(one may call it „void‟ or a nullity if one chooses to). In
such cases, normally, liberty will be reserved for the
Authority to take proceedings afresh according to law,
i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram
partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of
violation (of a facet of the rule of audi alteram partem)
has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in
other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is
whether in the totality of the circumstances, the
delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair
hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon
the answer to the said query. [It is made clear that this
principle (No. 5) does not apply in the case of rule
against bias, the test in which behalf are laid down
elsewhere.]
(6) While applying the rule of audi alteram partem
(the primary principle of natural justice) the
Court/Tribunal/Authority must always bear in mind the
ultimate and overriding objective underlying the said
rule, viz., to ensure a fair hearing and to ensure that
there is no failure of justice. It is this objective which
should guide them in applying the rule to varying
situations that arise before them.
(7) There may be situations where the interests of
State or public interest may call for a curtailing of the
rule of audi alteram partem. In such situations, the
Court may have to balance public/State interest with
the requirement of natural justice and arrive at an
appropriate decision."
7. Applying the aforesaid law to the facts of the present case and after
having perused the two Representations given by the Petitioner i.e., one
given prior to Order dated 22.12.2014 passed in W.P.(C) No.9170/2014 i.e.,
Representation dated 06.09.2013, and the second Representation given after
the Order dated 16.11.2015 passed in W.P.(C) No.3453/2015 i.e.,
Representation dated 08.12.2015. This Court is of the opinion that no extra
material has been furnished by the Petitioner in his fresh representation after
obtaining recommendation of the UPSC which would warrant any change of
opinion by this Court. The UPSC after perusing the records of the case was
of the opinion that the Article of Charge No.1 is partly proved and that the
Article of Charge No.2 is fully proved and, therefore, penalty of censure be
imposed on the Petitioner.
8. As held by the Apex Court, this Court is of the opinion that the
Enquiry that has been held is in accordance with the procedure prescribed,
there is no violation of principles of natural justice and the authorities have
not been influenced by irrelevant and extraneous considerations. Material on
record does not show that conclusion of the authorities imposing punishment
of censure is so wholly arbitrary and extraneous that no reasonable person
would have ever arrived at such a conclusion or would have not imposed the
penalty. It is well settled that the High Courts do not substitute their
conclusion to an independent finding based on the evidence arrived at by the
authority. Viewed in this manner, the Order dated 19.12.2018 rejecting the
representation of the Petitioner does not warrant any interference.
9. Coming to the third prayer in the present Petition regarding as to
whether the Petitioner would be entitled to consideration for promotion to
the rank of Deputy Commandant from the date of his batch mates or not
because of the punishment of censure, the said issue has not been considered
in the Order dated 19.12.2018. Promotion to the rank of Deputy
Commandant would depend on the relevant promotion rules. The issue as to
whether the punishment of censure would deprive the Petitioner of the
promotion or not can be considered after examining the relevant promotion
rules and the Order dated 19.12.2018 does not have any discussion regarding
what was the relevant promotion rules and as to how the Petitioner would
not be entitled for promotion on the basis of punishment of censure which
has been imposed upon the Petitioner vide Order dated 24.07.2013.
10. In view of the above, the present petition is disposed of by directing
the Respondents to consider the case of the Petitioner regarding promotion
to the post of Deputy Commandant based on the relevant promotion rules,
pursuant to the DPCs held for the vacancy in the year 2009-10 and as to
whether the Petitioner would be entitled to further promotions as and when
eligibility of the Petitioner arose. The Respondents are directed to consider
the said case of the Petitioner within a period of eight (08) weeks from the
date of this Judgment and communicate the decision to the Petitioner.
11. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
JANUARY 13, 2026
S. Zakir/JR
