1. The respondent/ landlord1 filed an Eviction Petition being E.P.
No.78636/2016 under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25(B) of the Delhi
Rent Control Act, 19582, against the petitioner/ tenant3 before the learned
Additional Rent Controller-01, Central District, Tis Harari Courts, Delhi4,
seeking eviction from property bearing no.4980/40, ground floor, front
portion, Netaji Subhash Marg, Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110 002.5
2. Succinctly put, it was the case of the landlord therein that the subject
Hereinafter referred to as "tenant"
Hereinafter referred to as "learned ARC"
Hereinafter referred to as "subject premises"
premises earlier belonged to his late grandfather, Sh. Mangal Sen, however,
subsequent to his death, by virtue of a Will dated 14.05.1990 (Will), the
same came into the share of his late father, Sh. Ramesh Goyal. Thereafter,
based on the said Will, in a Suit for declaration bearing no.307/1998
entitled 'Harish Goel vs. Rajeshwar Goel & Anr'. vide order/ judgment
dated 08.12.1999 (judgment), the interests/ rights qua the subject premises
which came to the share of his father was affirmed. Subsequent to the
demise of his father Sh. Ramesh Goyal, to demarcate the respective shares
of his legal heirs, namely Sh. Neeraj Goel, Smt. Manju Goel and the
landlord, they entered into a Memorandum of Settlement dated 16.07.2012
(MoS), whereafter a Memorandum of Understanding dated 05.12.2014
(MoU) was also executed inter se the landlord and his uncle Sh. Harish
Goel. Based thereon, he became the owner/ landlord of a portion of the
subject premises, i.e., 75% of the tenancy.
3. As per landlord, the tenant was initially inducted in the subject
premises by his late grandfather Sh. Mangal Sen, and after his demise, he
was paying the rent to his uncle Sh. Harish Goel and Smt. Manju Goel. As
such, since there was severance of estate and a huge portion of the tenancy
fell to his share, he issued a letter dated 08.12.2014 (letter) to the tenant
requesting him to attorn the tenancy in his favour, however, despite due
receipt, the tenant did not attorn the landlord. Additionally, till recently, the
landlord was assisting his mother in her business of electronics with his
brother Sh. Neeraj Goel, however, owing to disputes between them, they
could no longer continue working together. Further, as he had gained
experience and intended to start his own business, there was a bona fide
requirement for the subject premises as the same was in the locality where
there were various other shops selling electronic goods, and as he had no
suitable alternative accommodation(s) available with him.
4. After service, in its application under Section(s) 25B(4) and 25B(5)
of the DRC Act seeking leave to defend, the tenant denied the unregistered
MoS and MoU and the letter, as also the landlord tenant relationship as it
was tendering the rent to Sh. Harish Goel and Smt. Manju Goel. Also, the
Site Plan filed by the landlord was incorrect and bereft of material
particulars of all the accommodations in the entire property where the
subject premises was situated. Further, the Eviction Petition was not
maintainable as the landlord could not claim ownership and eviction qua
the three separate tenanted shops, and since there was no partition by metes
and bounds in terms of settled law, partial eviction was not permissible
under the DRC Act. Also, as per tenant, since the landlord became the
owner of the subject premises by virtue of the MoU, the Eviction Petition
was not maintainable in view of Section 14(6) of the DRC Act as it had
been filed within five years thereof. Lastly, the landlord was already
running two businesses and there was no description of the new business
which he intended to commence. More so, the landlord already had suitable
and sufficient alternative accommodation(s) in the same property where the
subject premises was situated as also various shops in Chandni Chowk and
Lajpat Nagar, as well.
5. In response thereto, as per landlord, the Eviction Petition was
maintainable as a single proceeding with respect to a composite and
indivisible tenancy covering the entire front portion/ a single tenanted unit,
i.e., subject premises and the tenant was in occupation of an undivided area
without any internal partitions, despite there being three shutters due to the
size of the premises. The entire property where the subject premises was
situated, having other accommodations were either occupied or belonged to
the other members of his family by virtue of the said Will.
6. Thereafter, the learned ARC vide an order dated 23.09.20196, after
holding that on account of admission and severance of estate there existed a
landlord tenant relationship between the parties and there was a genuine
bona fide requirement of the subject premises by the landlord, passed an
order of eviction in favour of the landlord.
7. Aggrieved thereby, the tenant filed the present revision petition
seeking setting aside of the impugned order dated 23.09.2019 passed by the
learned ARC.
8. This Court vide order dated 27.01.2020 granted stay on the execution
arising out of the impugned order dated 23.09.2019, and thereafter vide
order dated 10.12.2024 fixed the use and occupation charges, which was
rectified later on vide subsequent order dated 13.02.2025.
9. Mr. Akhil Mittal, learned counsel for the tenant submitted that since
the landlord sought eviction of 75% of the single composite tenancy of the
tenant without remaining 25% of the tenancy without any physical partition
by metes and bounds between the landlord and others, partial eviction qua
the subject premises was not maintainable. In view of the MoS and MoU
being unregistered a full-fledged trial was called for. In support thereof, the
learned counsel relied upon Sayesh Chandra Sarkar vs. Haji Jillar
Rahman7, Keshav Prasad Singh Bahadur of Damraon vs. Mathura Kaur
Hereinafter referred to as "impugned order"
1918 (27) Calcutta Law Journal 438
& Ors.8, Nani Bai vs. Gita Bai Kom Rama Gunge9, Jawahar Lal vs.
Ravinder Kumar Khanna & Anr.10, Vinod Ahuja vs. Anil Bajaj & Anr.11,
Sukh Dev Raj Sharma vs. Kuljeet Singh Jass12, O.P. Gupta vs. R.K.
Sharma,13 Gopal Das & Sons vs. Dinseshwar Nath Kedar14 and Sh.
Najmul Arafeen Chawla & Anr. vs. Dr. Mohd. Najeeb.15
10. Mr. Akhil Mittal, learned counsel then disputed the Site Plan filed by
the landlord and submitted that no positive material was placed to show his
bona fide requirement being honest and genuine or that alternative
accommodation(s) within the property where the subject premises was
situated and at multiple places in Delhi, which could not satisfy his bona
fide requirement. Barring the aforesaid, Mr. Akhil Mittal, learned counsel
did not raise and/ or press any other issues.
11. Per Contra, Ms. Deepika V. Marwah, learned counsel for the
landlord, supporting the impugned order, submitted that there was
severance of estate by virtue of the judgment whereby the Will was legally
affirmed and decreed, and it was thereafter that both MoS and MoU
demarcated the respective shares of the legal heirs of late Sh. Ramesh
Goyal whereby the landlord herein acquired 75% of the share of the
tenancy. The learned counsel placed reliance upon SK Sattar SK Mohd.
Chowdharv vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate16, Sait Nagjee Purushotam
AIR 1922 Patna 608-69 Indian Cases 704
AIR 1958 SC 706
2012 (195) DLT 239
2012 (194) DLT 203
2012 (195) DLT 56
2001 (90) DLT 276
2012 (133) DRJ 468
2025 (318) DLT 631
(1996) 6 SCC 373
& Co.Ltd. vs. Vimalabai Prabhulal & Ors.17 and A.K. Nayar vs. Mahesh
Prasad.18
12. Regarding alternative accommodation(s) Ms. Deepika V. Marwah
submitted that the tenant is trying to reagitate the same contentions which
have been dealt in great detail by the learned ARC in the impugned order.
13. Heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the
documents and pleadings on record as also the judgments cited.
14. The moot issue for consideration herein is qua maintainability of the
Eviction Petition whereby the landlord was/ is seeking eviction of the
tenant from the subject premises situated at the ground floor, i.e. 75% of
the tenancy, without the remaining 25% of the same. In effect, is a partial
eviction of the subject premises permissible under the eyes of law without
there being a partition inter se the owners by metes and bounds.
15. The law as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in SK Sattar
SK Mohd. Chowdhary (supra) it set out as under:-
"13. This section contemplates a transfer as a result of which
the property is divided into several shares and each share
comes to be vested separately in each owner. In such a
situation, each of the several owners will be entitled to his
share of the rent or benefit of any other obligation relating
to the property as a whole. But before the tenant can be
required to split up the rent and pay separately to each
owner, he has to be informed of the transfer by a notice
Which, by itself, will be sufficient to convert the single
obligation into several obligations and he will be liable to
pay rent to each co-sharer separately."
(Emphasis Supplied)
16. Admittedly, since the tenant in the present proceedings had first
(2005) 8 SCC 252
2008 SCC OnLine Del 1025
accepted Mr. Mangal Sen, late grandfather of the landlord as its landlord
and subsequent to his death was paying rent to his uncle Sh. Harish Goel
and Smt. Manju Devi by operation of law, as also since the Will has also
been affirmed vide the subsequent judgment, there can be no dispute that
the subject premises, i.e., 75% of the tenancy, came to the share of Sh.
Ramesh Goel, late father of the landlord. Therefore, the landlord tenant
relationship between the parties stood established. Later, by virtue of
execution of both MoS and MoU, the subject premises, i.e., 75% of the
tenancy, fell within the share of the landlord.
17. In fact, while dealing with the aforesaid, the learned ARC has held in
the impugned order as under:-
"69. It has been contended by the respondent that the
petitioner is seeking partial eviction from the tenanted
premises which is not permissible. It is argued that splitting
of tenancy cannot be permitted. In this context, the
respondent has relied upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the case of S.K. Sattar S.K. Mohd.
Chowdhary Vs. Gundappa Amabadas Bukate AIR 1997 SC
70. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned case
of S.K. Sattar held that tenancy cannot be split up either in
estate of in rent or any other obligation by unilateral Act of
one of the co-owners. It was held that if, however, all the
co-owners or co-lessors agree and split by partition, the
property by metes and bounds and come to have definite,
positive and identifiable shares in that property, they
become separate individual owners of each severed portion
and can deal with that portion as also the tenant thereof as
individual owner/lessor.
71. The portion in possession of the respondent is what has
been shown in the site plan on page no. 15 of the documents
accompanying the eviction petition. The respondent has the
portion shown in red color and also the portion described
as 25% of Mr. Harish Goyal. The portion in possession of
the respondent has been split by partition between the
petitioner and Mr. Harish Goyal by virtue of the Will of Mr.
Mangal Sen and the Memorandum of Understanding dated
05.12.2014. The respondent is not entitled to challenge the
Memorandum of Understanding. In this regard, reliance is
placed upon the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in the
case of A.K. Nayar Vs. Mahesh Prasad 153 (2008) DL T
72. In the rejoinder filed by the respondent, it has denied for
want of knowledge that properties of Late Mr. Mangal Sen
Goel were divided amongst his legal heirs, that there was a
partition between the sons and wife of Late Mr. Ramesh
Gael, terms of which were reduced in writing by executing a
Memorandum of Family Settlement and that a second
Memorandum of Partition was acted upon by and between
the parties. In the case of Muddasani Vankatta Narsaiah Vs.
Muddasani Sarojana Civil Appeal No. 4816 of 2016 decided
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 05.05.2016, it was held
that denial for want of knowledge is no denial at all. In view
of this decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the denial by
the respondent that the property in its possession has been
divided between the petitioner and Mr. Harish Goel by
metes and bounds is no denial at all."
18. In view of the aforesaid detailed analysis and findings rendered by
the learned ARC, with which this Court is in agreement with, it is well-
established that the Will affirms that the landlord is incontrovertibly a co-
owner of the subject premises, i.e. 75% of the tenancy, and for which he
also sent a letter of attornment dated 08.12.2014 to the tenant for intimating
that the rent for the same ought to be paid to the landlord. As such, in view
of what has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indian Umbrella
Manufacturing Co. vs. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (dead) by Lrs. Smt.
Savitri Agarwalla & Ors.,19 since an Eviction Petition of a premises filed
by a co-owner, independently, is very much maintainable, the one filed by
the landlord was very much maintainable. Even sans the MoS and/ or MoU
also, it is apparent that the estate stood severed the moment the Will was
affirmed and the subject premises was "transferred/ conveyed" to the late
father of the landlord, Sh. Ramesh Goel, and subsequent to his demise, the
same devolved upon his legal heirs including the landlord.
19. Moreover, since the tenant had/ has merely raised a bald and
superfluous contention regarding the subject premises which were in fact
three different shops which called for filing of three different Eviction
Petition(s) by the landlord, cannot be taken into consideration. More so,
since it was never the case of the tenant that there ever were/ was a
partition/ demarcation of the alleged three shops on the subject premises.
Thus, as held in Baldev Singh Bajwa vs. Monish Saini20 and Ramesh
Chand vs. Uganti Devi21, such bald assertions without any cogent proof,
being unsubstantiated, are without any merit.
20. Similar is the position qua the Site Plan, as the tenant had/ has never
filed any counter Site Plan and/ or given any material reasoning(s) to
dispute the same. The same, thus, cuts no ice. In fact, this Court is in
agreement with the findings rendered by the learned ARC in the impugned
order to the effect that "... ...without such site plan being filed, the mere
contentions raised to this effect will be considered meritless. In view of
these decisions, the allegation of the respondent with respect to the site
(2004) 3 SCC 178
(2005) 12 SCC 778
157 (2009) DLT 405
plan filed by the petitioner does not give rise to any triable issue.".
21. Regarding bona fide requirement of the subject premises by the
landlord, as held in Raghunath G. Panhale vs. Chaganlal Sundarji and
Co.22, the need to commence his own business was sufficient for the
landlord to secure an order of eviction against the tenant and there is no
impediment, even if the landlord was engaged in other businesses. Even
otherwise, as held in Deena Nath vs. Pooran Lal,23 Sarla Ahuja vs. United
India Insurance Co. Ltd.24 and Ragavendra Kumar vs. Firm Prem
Machinery & Company25, it is settled law that the landlord is the best
judge of his need as also the moment bona fide requirement is pleaded with
prima facie averments/ materials, the presumption is drawn and same is
assumed to be honest and genuine, especially considering the principal of
summary procedure which governs an Eviction petition filed under the
Section 14(1)(e) of the DRC Act. In the present case, since there was no
substantive denial by the tenant, the bona fide requirement for the subject
premises professed by the landlord was/ is honest, sincere, and genuine,
and not a mere whimsical desire.
22. Adverting to the (non)availability of alternative accommodation(s)
by the landlord, this Court finds that the learned ARC has dealt with all of
them as alleged by the tenant as under:-
"50. Since no material has been placed on record by the
respondent to substantiate that the petitioner indeed has
alternative suitable accommodation, the contention of the
petitioner that there is no other premises available for his
(1999) 8 SCC 1
(2001) 5 SCC 705
(1998) 8 SCC 119
AIR 2000 SC 534
stated requirements will be accepted to be correct. Even
otherwise, the Will of Mr. Mangal Sen placed on record by
the petitioner has not been disputed by the respondent. As
per this Will, other than the portion in possession of the
respondent herein, the only portion of the ground floor
which fell in the share of Mr. Ramesh Goel, father of the
petitioner is the portion shown in blue color in the site plan
on page no. 29 of the documents accompanying the eviction
petition. As per the petitioner, this portion has fallen in the
share of his brother Mr. Neeraj Goel after the execution of
the Memorandum of Family Settlement. Even if the
Memorandum of Family Settlement is ignored since it is not
registered, at best, the petitioner will also have the portion
in blue color in the site plan on page no. 29. This portion in
blue color does not have access from the road since it is in
middle of the plot. Therefore, this portion in blue color
cannot be considered as a property as suitable as is the
tenanted premises for the new business of the petitioner.
51. As per the Will of Mr. Mangal Sen which has not been
disputed, besides the portion on the ground floor, only the
top floor of the property no.4980/40, Netaji Subhash Marg,
Daryaganj, fell in the share of Mr. Ramesh Goel. As per the
petitioner, this floor is being used for residence of his
family, his brother's family and of their mother. The
assertion of the petitioner that his floor is being used for the
residence of the petitioner's family has not been denied by
the respondent. Since this floor is already being used, it is
not vacant and therefore, cannot be held to be an alternative
suitable accommodation for the business of the petitioner.
52. In the cases of Dhannalal Vs. Kalawatibai (2002) 6
SCC 16 and Uday Shanker Upadhyay Vs. Naveen
Maheshwari (2010) 1 SCC 503, it was held that judicial
notice can be taken of the fact that the upper floors are
generally not commercially viable and consumers and
patrons of the market are reluctant to walk into the same
and are more prone to walk into a shop on the ground floor.
Relying on these decisions, the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi
in the case of M/s A.K. Woolen Industries & Ors. Vs. Shri
Narayan Gupta RC. Rev. No. 495/2017 dated 31.10.2017
held that availability of upper floors above the tenanted
premises on the ground floor cannot be said to be alternate
suitable accommodation. In view of this decision, the
mezanine floor, first floor, second floor and the third floor
of the building cannot be considered to be as suitable as is
the tenanted premises which is on the ground floor for the
business of the petitioner.
53. Besides making ipse dixit self-serving statements about
availability of alternative suitable accommodation, no
material has been placed on record by the respondent in
support of its contention that the petitioner has other
commercial property in Daryaganj or surrounding area of
Chandni Chowk.
54. The shop at Old Lajpat Rai Market is stated to be an
exclusive property of Smt. Manju Goel, mother of the
petitioner. The petitioner is at least the co-owner of the
tenanted premises herein, if not the sole owner. Merely
because the respondent does not wish to vacate the property
of the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be called upon to take
the property of his mother for his new business. The
petitioner owns a property and wishes to do business from
it. In view of the refusal of the respondent to vacate the
property, the petitioner cannot be expected to go and ask his
relatives to give their properties to him for doing his
exclusive business. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the
property at Old Lajpat Rai Market is already being used for
doing business by the mother of the petitioner. Therefore,
this property is not vacant and therefore, cannot be held to
be an alternative suitable accommodation available for the
petitioner's business.
xxx xxx xxx
58. In view of the above discussion, the allegation of the
respondent that the petitioner has alternative suitable
accommodations does not give rise to any triable issue."
23. In any event, once the bona fide requirement of the landlord is
established to be honest and genuine, the factor of alternative
accommodation(s) becomes mere incidental and the choice thereof
becomes vested therewith, and/ or is under the exclusive domain of the
landlord to exercise such an option. Further, as held in Akhileshwar
Kumar vs. Mustaqim26, Sarla Ahuja (supra) and Kanahaiya Lal Arya vs.
Md. Ehshan & Ors.27, giving due regard to his own needs/ requirements/
circumstances of the landlord to choose the subject premises based on his
assessment of its convenience, reasonableness, and suitability for his
overall use, in accordance with his satisfaction, the tenant much less this
Court, cannot dictate to him about what/ which is the best suitable
alternative accommodation for the bona fide requirement of the landlord.
24. Accordingly, reliance upon Sayesh Chandra Sarkar (supra),
Keshav Prasad Singh (supra), Nani Bai (supra), Jawahar Lal (supra),
Vinod Ahuja (supra), Sukh Dev Raj Sharma (supra), O.P. Gupta (supra)
and/ or Gopal Das (supra) by learned counsel for the tenant offer no
assistance to him as they are not applicable to the facts and circumstances
of the present lis.
25. Even otherwise, as held in Abid-Ul-Islam vs. Inder Sain Dua28,and
Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited vs. Dilbahar Singh29 this
Court while sitting in revisional jurisdiction is not sitting in appeal over
(2003) 1 SCC 462
MANU/SC/0264/2025
(2022) 6 SCC 30
(2014) 9 SCC 78
the impugned order passed by the learned ARC of which setting aside is
sought by the tenant herein.
26. Considering the foregoing analysis and reasoning, since this Court is
in agreement with the findings rendered by the learned ARC, the
impugned order needs no interference by this Court in a revisional
jurisdiction. More so, since the conclusions arrived therein are/ is very
much a plausible one. Finding no infirmity therein, the impugned order
dated 23.09.2019 passed by the learned ARC is hereby upheld.
27. Ergo, the tenant is directed to pay user and occupation charges in
terms of the order dated 13.02.2025 and the stay granted by this Court vide
order dated 27.01.2020 is vacated.
28. Accordingly, the tenant is liable to hand over vacant, peaceful and
physical possession of the subject premises bearing no.4980/40, ground
floor, front portion, Netaji Subhash Marg, Darya Ganj, New Delhi-110
002 to the landlord as the time period in terms of the Section 14(7) of the
DRC Act has already lapsed.
29. As such, the present petition along with pending application is
dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
SAURABH BANERJEE, J.
JANUARY 09, 2026/Ab/aks
