[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
M/S Pouring Pounds Pvt Ltd vs Shoogloo Network Pvt Ltd (Formerly Omg ... on 28 January, 2026
$~8
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 28.01.2026
+ ARB.P. 1885/2025
M/S POURING POUNDS PVT LTD .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Raghav Wadhwa, Mr.
Amitoj Chadha and Ms. Jahnvi
Ghai, Advocates.
versus
SHOOGLOO NETWORK PVT LTD (FORMERLY OMG
NETWORK PVT LTD) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Suhail Malik and Mr. Aqib
Zaman, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
1. The present petition has been filed under Section 11 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961, seeking the appointment of
a Sole Arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes between the parties in
terms of Clause 13 of the Marketing Agreement dated 14.12.20212.
2. The said Agreement contains an Arbitration Clause, being
Clause 13, which reads as under:
"13. ARBITRATION:
13.1 The Parties shall endeavour to amicably settle and mutually
resolve any dispute arising out of or in relation to this Agreement.
13.2 In the event Parties are unable to resolve the dispute or
difference amicably within 30 (Thirty) days of receipt of written
notice from the other Party about existence of such dispute, either
1
The Act
2
Agreement
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BHATIA
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Party may refer such dispute or difference to arbitration to be
conducted under the aegis of a sole arbitrator jointly appointed by
the Parties. In case the Parties fail to appoint an arbitrator, within
30 (Thirty) days from the submission of dispute for settlement
through arbitration, the arbitrator shall be appointed in accordance
with the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
The seat and venue of arbitration shall be New Delhi and the
arbitration shall be conducted in the English language.
13.3 The arbitration shall be conducted in accordance with the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the rules made
thereunder. The Parties agree that they shall bear their respective
costs incurred towards the arbitration.
13.4 The decision of the arbitrator shall be final, binding and non
appealable except in the event of manifest error, In those instances
where the dispute or difference referred to arbitration relates to or
involves any matter or thing in respect of which the decision,
opinion or determination is final and binding on Parties in terms of
the Agreement, such decision, opinion and/or determination as the
case may be, shall be final, binding, and not subject to further
appeal.
13.5 Notwithstanding anything contained in this Agreement, both
Parties acknowledge and agree that the covenants and obligations
with respect to the matters covered by this Agreement and set forth
herein relate to special, unique and extraordinary matters, and that
a violation of any of the terms of such covenants and obligations
will cause irreparable loss and injury to the aggrieved Party,
Therefore, notwithstanding the provisions of this Agreement, either
Party shall be entitled to approach any appropriate forums for
obtaining an injunction, restraining order or such other equitable
relief as a court of competent jurisdiction may deem necessary or
appropriate.
13.6 - This clause 13 shall survive termination of the Agreement."
3. The material on record indicates that the Petitioner herein
invoked arbitration in terms of Section 21 of the Act vide legal notice
dated 19.07.2025.
4. This Court is cognizant of the scope of examination and
interference at the stage of a Petition under Section 11(6) of the Act.
The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial scrutiny
under Section 11(6) of the Act has been fairly well settled. A
Coordinate bench of this Court, in Pradhaan Air Express Pvt Ltd v.
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Air Works India Engineering Pvt Ltd3, has extensively dealt with the
scope of interference at the stage of Section 11. The Court, in the said
judgment, held as under:-
9. The law with respect to the scope and standard of judicial
scrutiny under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act has been fairly well
settled. The Supreme Court in the case of SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spinning, while considering all earlier
pronouncements including the Constitutional Bench decision of
seven judges in the case of Interplay between Arbitration
Agreements under the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 &
the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, In re has held that scope of inquiry at
the stage of appointment of an Arbitrator is limited to the extent
of prima facie existence of the arbitration agreement and nothing
else.
10. It has unequivocally been held in paragraph no. 114 in the case
of SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. that observations made
in Vidya Drolia v. Durga Trading Corpn., and adopted in NTPC
Ltd. v. SPML Infra Ltd., that the jurisdiction of the referral court
when dealing with the issue of "accord and satisfaction" under
Section 11 extends to weeding out ex-facienon-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would not apply after the decision of Re :
Interplay. The abovenoted paragraph no. 114 in the case of SBI
General Insurance Co. Ltd. reads as under:--
"114. In view of the observations made by this Court in In
Re : Interplay (supra), it is clear that the scope of enquiry
at the stage of appointment of arbitrator is limited to the
scrutiny of prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement, and nothing else. For this reason, we find it
difficult to hold that the observations made in Vidya
Drolia (supra) and adopted in NTPC v. SPML (supra) that
the jurisdiction of the referral court when dealing with the
issue of "accord and satisfaction" under Section 11
extends to weeding out ex-facie non-arbitrable and
frivolous disputes would continue to apply despite the
subsequent decision in In Re : Interplay (supra)."
11. Ex-facie frivolity and dishonesty are the issues, which have
been held to be within the scope of the Arbitral Tribunal which is
equally capable of deciding upon the appreciation of evidence
adduced by the parties. While considering the aforesaid
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court in the
case of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Sokrati Technologies (P)
Ltd., however, has held that the referral Courts under Section 11
3
2025 SCC OnLine Del 3022
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must not be misused by one party in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time-consuming and
costly arbitration process. Few instances have been delineated such
as, the adjudication of a non-existent and malafide claim through
arbitration. The Court, however, in order to balance the limited
scope of judicial interference of the referral Court with the interest
of the parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, has held that the Arbitral Tribunal
eventually may direct that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne
by the party which the Arbitral Tribunal finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the other
parties to the arbitration.
12. It is thus seen that the Supreme Court has deferred the
adjudication of aspects relating to frivolous, non-existent
and malafide claims from the referral stage till the arbitration
proceedings eventually come to an end. The relevant extracts
of Goqii Technologies (P) Ltd. reads as under:--
"20. As observed in Krish Spg. [SBI General Insurance
Co. Ltd. v. Krish Spg., (2024) 12 SCC 1 : 2024 INSC
532], frivolity in litigation too is an aspect which the
referral court should not decide at the stage of Section 11
as the arbitrator is equally, if not more, competent to
adjudicate the same.
21. Before we conclude, we must clarify that the limited
jurisdiction of the referral courts under Section 11 must
not be misused by parties in order to force other parties to
the arbitration agreement to participate in a time
consuming and costly arbitration process. This is possible
in instances, including but not limited to, where the
claimant canvasses the adjudication of non-existent and
mala fide claims through arbitration.
22. With a view to balance the limited scope of judicial
interference of the referral courts with the interests of the
parties who might be constrained to participate in the
arbitration proceedings, the Arbitral Tribunal may direct
that the costs of the arbitration shall be borne by the party
which the Tribunal ultimately finds to have abused the
process of law and caused unnecessary harassment to the
other party to the arbitration. Having said that, it is
clarified that the aforesaid is not to be construed as a
determination of the merits of the matter before us, which
the Arbitral Tribunal will rightfully be equipped to
determine."
13. In view of the aforesaid, the scope at the stage of Section 11
proceedings is akin to the eye of the needle test and is limited to
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BHATIA
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the extent of finding a prima facie existence of the arbitration
agreement and nothing beyond it. The jurisdictional contours of the
referral Court, as meticulously delineated under the 1996 Act and
further crystallised through a consistent line of authoritative
pronouncements by the Supreme Court, are unequivocally confined
to a prima facie examination of the existence of an arbitration
agreement. These boundaries are not merely procedural safeguards
but fundamental to upholding the autonomy of the arbitral process.
Any transgression beyond this limited judicial threshold would not
only contravene the legislative intent enshrined in Section 8 and
Section 11 of the 1996 Act but also risk undermining the sanctity
and efficiency of arbitration as a preferred mode of dispute
resolution. The referral Court must, therefore, exercise restraint and
refrain from venturing into the merits of the dispute or adjudicating
issues that fall squarely within the jurisdictional domain of the
arbitral tribunal. It is thus seen that the scope of enquiry at the
referral stage is conservative in nature. A similar view has also
been expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Ajay
Madhusudan Patel v. Jyotrindra S. Patel".
5. Mr. Suhail Malik, learned Counsel enters appearance on behalf
of the Respondent and raises objections to the appointment of an
Arbitrator on the following grounds:
i. the Agreement does not bear the signature of both parties.
ii. the Arbitration Clause, as agreed between the parties,
provides that the Parties shall endeavour to amicably
settle and mutually resolve any dispute arising out of or
in relation to the said Agreement. Since the same has not
been followed, the present Petition is premature.
iii. De hors the fact that Clause 13.2 expressly states that the
seat and venue for arbitration shall be New Delhi; since
the cause of action has not arisen in New Delhi,
therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to pass any
Orders qua the appointment of Sole Arbitrator in the
present Petition.
6. The dispute is stated to be for an amount of approximately
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BHATIA
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Rs. 1.20 Crores.
ANALYSIS:
7. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and,
with their able assistance, gone through the documents annexed to the
present Petition.
8. This Court is of the opinion that the objections as raised by the
Respondent, firstly, with respect to the submissions that the
Agreement itself is not signed, is of no consequence since it is not
disputed that the parties have entered into a settlement and have also
acted on the basis of the said Agreement.
9. With respect to the second contention, as is apparent, Clause
13.1, being more in the nature of a clause that seeks to lay down that
the parties would endeavour to settle or mutually resolve its disputes,
has been interpreted by the various judgments of the Courts to be
directory and not mandatory in nature. The same finds mention in
Jhajharia Nirman Ltd. v. South Western Railways4, relevant paras of
which have been extracted hereinbelow:
"19. In this regard, reference may be made to Oasis Projects Ltd. v.
National Highway & Infrastructure Development Corporation
Limited, (2023) 1 HCC (Del) 525, wherein the Court has observed
as under:
"12. The primary issue to be decided in the present
petition is, therefore, as to whether it was mandatory for
the petitioner to resort to the conciliation process by the
Committee before invoking arbitration. Though Article
26.2 clearly states that before resorting to arbitration, the
parties agree to explore conciliation by the Committee, in
my opinion, the same cannot be held to be mandatory in
nature. It needs no emphasis that conciliation as a dispute
resolution mechanism must be encouraged and should be
one of the first endeavours of the parties when a dispute
4
2024 SCC OnLine Del 7133
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BHATIA
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arises between them. However, having said that,
conciliation expresses a broad notion of a voluntary
process, controlled by the parties and conducted with the
assistance of a neutral third person or persons. It can be
terminated by the parties at any time as per their free will.
Therefore, while interpreting Article 26.2, the basic
concept of conciliation would have to be kept in mind."
[Emphasis supplied]
20. In Kunwar Narayana v. Ozone Overseas Pvt. Ltd. 2021 : DHC
: 496, the Court has made the following observations:
"5. Ms. Pahwa, learned Counsel for the respondents
submitted that her only objection, to the petition, was that
the petitioner has not exhausted the avenue of amicable
resolution, contemplated by Clause 12 of the Share
Buyback Agreement. I am not inclined to agree with this
submission. The recital of facts, as set out in the petition,
indicate that efforts at trying to resolve the disputes,
amicably were made, but did not succeed. Even otherwise,
the Supreme Court in Demarara Distilleries Pvt. Ltd. v.
Demerara Distilleries Ltd. and this Court, in its judgment
in Ravindra Kumar Verma v. BPTP Ltd., opined that
relegation of the parties to the avenue of amicable
resolution, when the Court is moved under Section 11(6)
of the 1996 Act, would be unjustified, where such
relegation would merely be in the nature of an empty
formality. The arbitration clause in the present case does
not envisage any formal regimen or protocol for amicable
resolution, such as issuance of a notice in that regard and
completion of any stipulated time period thereafter, before
which arbitral proceedings could be invoked. In the
absence of any such stipulation, I am of the opinion,
following the law laid down in Demarara Distilleries Pvt.
Ltd. and Ravindra Kumar Verma v. BPTP Ltd. nothing
worthwhile would be achieved, by relegating the parties to
explore any avenue of amicable resolution. Besides, the
appointment of an arbitrator by this Court would not act as
an impediment in the parties resolving their disputes
amicably, should it be possible at any point of time."
21. This Court in Subhash Infraengineers (P) Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd.,
2023 SCC OnLine Del 2177 has held as under:--
"21. In this regard, it is relevant to note that in terms of
Section 62(3) of the Act, it is open for a party to reject the
invitation to conciliate. Further, in terms of Section 76 of
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BHATIA
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the Act, the conciliation proceedings can be terminated by
a written declaration of a party and there is no legal bar in
this regard. In the present case, Clause 7.2.5 of the GCC
expressly provides that "parties are free to terminate
Conciliation proceedings at any stage as provided under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996."
***
28. In the present case, the clause/pre arbitral mechanism
contemplates mutual consultation followed by
conciliation. As noticed in Abhi Engg. and Oasis Projects,
conciliation is a voluntary process and once a party has
opted out of conciliation, it cannot be said that the said
party cannot take recourse to dispute resolution through
arbitration."
10. With respect to the third objection raised, that although the
Agreement expressly stipulates New Delhi as the seat and venue of
arbitration, no part of the cause of action has arisen within the
territorial jurisdiction of this Court and, consequently, this Court lacks
the jurisdiction to pass any orders for the appointment of a Sole
Arbitrator.
11. However, on this contention, this Court is of the view that once
the parties have mutually agreed upon a particular place as the seat
and venue of arbitration, they cannot raise an objection as to the
maintainability on the said ground. This position stands reflected in
the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in BGS SGS SOMA JV
v. NHPC5 the relevant extract whereof is reproduced hereinbelow:
"49. Take the consequence of the opposite conclusion, in the light
of the facts of a given example, as follows. New Delhi is
specifically designated to be the seat of the arbitration in the
arbitration clause between the parties. Part of the cause of action,
however, arises in several places, including where the contract is
partially to be performed, let us say, in a remote part of
Uttarakhand. If concurrent jurisdiction were to be the order of the
day, despite the seat having been located and specifically chosen
by the parties, party autonomy would suffer,
5
(2020) 4 SCC 234
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which BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] specifically
states cannot be the case. Thus, if an application is made to a
District Court in a remote corner of the Uttarakhand hills, which
then becomes the court for the purposes of Section 42 of the
Arbitration Act, 1996 where even Section 34 applications have
then to be made, the result would be contrary to the stated intention
of the parties -- as even though the parties have contemplated that
a neutral place be chosen as the seat so that the courts of that place
alone would have jurisdiction, yet, any one of five other courts in
which a part of the cause of action arises, including courts in
remote corners of the country, would also be clothed with
jurisdiction. This obviously cannot be the case. If, therefore, the
conflicting portion of the judgment of BALCO [BALCO v. Kaiser
Aluminium Technical Services Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4
SCC (Civ) 810] in para 96 is kept aside for a moment, the very fact
that parties have chosen a place to be the seat would necessarily
carry with it the decision of both parties that the courts at the seat
would exclusively have jurisdiction over the entire arbitral process.
50. In fact, subsequent Division Benches of this Court have
understood the law to be that once the seat of arbitration is chosen,
it amounts to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, insofar as the courts
at that seat are concerned. In Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon
GmbH [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1
: (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , this Court approved the dictum
in Shashoua [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957 (Comm) :
(2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] as follows : (Enercon
case [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5 SCC 1 :
(2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] , SCC p. 55, para 126)
"126. Examining the fact situation in the case, the Court
in Shashoua case [Shashoua v. Sharma, 2009 EWHC 957
(Comm) : (2009) 2 Lloyd's Law Rep 376] observed as
follows:
„The basis for the court's grant of an anti-suit injunction of
the kind sought depended upon the seat of the
arbitration. An agreement as to the seat of an arbitration
brought in the law of that country as the curial law and
was analogous to an exclusive jurisdiction clause. Not
only was there agreement to the curial law of the seat, but
also to the courts of the seat having supervisory
jurisdiction over the arbitration, so that, by agreeing to
the seat, the parties agreed that any challenge to an
interim or final award was to be made only in the courts of
the place designated as the seat of the arbitration.
Although, "venue" was not synonymous with "seat", in an
arbitration clause which provided for arbitration to be
conducted in accordance with the Rules of the ICC in
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Paris (a supranational body of rules), a provision that
"the venue of arbitration shall be London, United
Kingdom" did amount to the designation of a juridical
seat....‟
In para 54, it is further observed as follows:
„There was a little debate about the possibility
of the issues relating to the alleged submission
by the claimants to the jurisdiction of the High
Court of Delhi being heard by that Court,
because it was best fitted to determine such
issues under the Indian law. Whilst I found
this idea attractive initially, we are persuaded
that it would be wrong in principle to allow
this and that it would create undue practical
problems in any event. On the basis of what I
have already decided, England is the seat of
the arbitration and since this carries with it
something akin to an exclusive jurisdiction
clause, as a matter of principle the foreign
court should not decide matters which are for
this Court to decide in the context of an anti-
suit injunction.‟"
(emphasis in original)
51. The Court in Enercon [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH,
(2014) 5 SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] then concluded : (SCC p.
60, para 138)
"138. Once the seat of arbitration has been fixed in India,
it would be in the nature of exclusive jurisdiction to
exercise the supervisory powers over the arbitration."
(emphasis in original)
52. In Reliance Industries Ltd. [Reliance Industries Ltd. v. Union
of India, (2014) 7 SCC 603 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 737] , this Court
held : (SCC pp. 627, 630-31, paras 45, 55-56)
"45. In our opinion, it is too late in the day to contend that
the seat of arbitration is not analogous to an exclusive
jurisdiction clause. This view of ours will find support
from numerous judgments of this Court. Once the parties
had consciously agreed that the juridical seat of the
arbitration would be London and that the arbitration
agreement will be governed by the laws of England, it was
no longer open to them to contend that the provisions of
Part I of the Arbitration Act would also be applicable to
the arbitration agreement. This Court in Videocon
Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [Videocon Industries
Ltd. v. Union of India, (2011) 6 SCC 161 : (2011) 3 SCC
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(Civ) 257] has clearly held as follows : (SCC p. 178, para
33)
„33. In the present case also, the parties had agreed that
notwithstanding Article 33.1, the arbitration agreement
contained in Article 34 shall be governed by laws of
England. This necessarily implies that the parties had
agreed to exclude the provisions of Part I of the Act. As a
corollary to the above conclusion, we hold that the Delhi
High Court did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the
petition filed by the respondents under Section 9 of the
Act and the mere fact that the appellant had earlier filed
similar petitions was not sufficient to clothe that High
Court with the jurisdiction to entertain the petition filed by
the respondents.‟
***
55. The effect of choice of seat of arbitration was
considered by the Court of Appeal in C v. D [C v. D, 2008
Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] . This
judgment has been specifically approved by this Court
in Balco [BALCO v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services
Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 810] and
reiterated in Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon
Gmbh [Enercon (India) Ltd. v. Enercon GmbH, (2014) 5
SCC 1 : (2014) 3 SCC (Civ) 59] . In C v. D [C v. D, 2008
Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] , the Court of
Appeal has observed : (C case [C v. D, 2008 Bus LR 843 :
2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] , Bus LR p. 851, para 16)
„Primary conclusion
16. I shall deal with Mr Hirst's arguments in due course
but, in my judgment, they fail to grapple with the central
point at issue which is whether or not, by choosing
London as the seat of the arbitration, the parties must be
taken to have agreed that proceedings on the award should
be only those permitted by English law. In my view they
must be taken to have so agreed for the reasons given by
the Judge. The whole purpose of the balance achieved by
the Bermuda form (English arbitration but applying New
York law to issues arising under the policy) is that judicial
remedies in respect of the award should be those permitted
by English law and only those so permitted. Mr Hirst
could not say (and did not say) that English judicial
remedies for lack of jurisdiction on procedural
irregularities under Sections 67 and 68 of the 1996 Act
were not permitted; he was reduced to saying that New
York judicial remedies were also permitted. That,
however, would be a recipe for litigation and (what is
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worse) confusion which cannot have been intended by the
parties. No doubt New York Law has its own judicial
remedies for want of jurisdiction and serious irregularity
but it could scarcely be supposed that a party aggrieved by
one part of an award could proceed in one jurisdiction and
a party aggrieved by another part of an award could
proceed in another jurisdiction. Similarly, in the case of a
single complaint about an award, it could not be supposed
that the aggrieved party could complain in one jurisdiction
and the satisfied party be entitled to ask the other
jurisdiction to declare its satisfaction with the award.
There would be a serious risk of parties rushing to get the
first judgment or of conflicting decisions which the parties
cannot have contemplated.‟
56. The aforesaid observations in C v. D [C v. D, 2008
Bus LR 843 : 2007 EWCA Civ 1282 (CA)] were
subsequently followed by the High Court of Justice,
Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (England)
in Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v. Enesa
Engelharia SA [Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros
SA v. Enesa Engelharia SA, (2013) 1 WLR 102 : 2012
EWCA Civ 638 : 2012 WL 14764 (CA)] . In laying down
the same proposition, the High Court noticed that the issue
in that case depended upon the weight to be given to the
provision in Condition 12 of the insurance policy that "the
seat of the arbitration shall be London, England". It was
observed that this necessarily carried with it the English
Court's supervisory jurisdiction over the arbitration
process. It was observed that:
„this follows from the express terms of the Arbitration Act,
1996 and, in particular, the provisions of Section 2 which
provide that Part I of the Arbitration Act, 1996 applies
where the seat of the arbitration is in England and Wales
or Northern Ireland. This immediately establishes a strong
connection between the arbitration agreement itself and
the law of England. It is for this reason that recent
authorities have laid stress upon the locations of the seat of
the arbitration as an important factor in determining the
proper law of the arbitration agreement.‟"
(emphasis in original)
53. In Indus Mobile Distribution (P) Ltd. [Indus Mobile
Distribution (P) Ltd. v. Datawind Innovations (P) Ltd., (2017) 7
SCC 678 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 760] , after clearing the air on the
meaning of Section 20 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, the Court in
para 19 (which has already been set out hereinabove) made it
clear that the moment a seat is designated by agreement between
the parties, it is akin to an exclusive jurisdiction clause, which
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would then vest the courts at the "seat" with exclusive jurisdiction
for purposes of regulating arbitral proceedings arising out of the
agreement between the parties."
12. In any event, the parties are at Gurugram, and the performance
of the contract has been at Gurugram, which is a part of the NCR
region, and therefore, New Delhi, being the seat and venue, does not
render the said objection sustainable to the present petition.
13. In view of the foregoing, and as the dispute is stated to be for an
amount of Rs. 1.20 Crores approximately, Mr. Saurabh Seth,
Advocate (Mobile No. 9811393402), who is empanelled with the
Delhi International Arbitration Centre6, is appointed by this court
to adjudicate the disputes as between the parties.
14. The arbitration would take place under the aegis of the DIAC
and would abide by its rules and regulations. The learned Arbitrator
shall be entitled to fees as per the Schedule of Fees maintained by the
DIAC.
15. The learned Arbitrator is also requested to file the requisite
disclosure under Section 12 (2) of the Act within a week of entering
reference.
16. The Registry is directed to send a receipt of this order to the
learned Arbitrator through all permissible modes, including through e-
mail.
17. All rights and contentions of the parties in relation to the
claims/counter-claims are kept open, to be decided by the learned
Arbitrator on their merits, in accordance with law.
18. Needless to say, nothing in this order shall be construed as an
expression of opinion of this Court on the merits of the controversy
6
DIAC
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed
ARB.P. 1885/2025 Page 13 of 14
By:HARVINDER KAUR
BHATIA
Signing Date:03.02.2026
17:42:57
between the parties.
19. Accordingly, the present petition, along with all pending
application(s), if any, is disposed of.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
JANUARY 28, 2026/ rk/her/sg
