[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Mr Anuj Guglani vs Mr Hiralal C Guglani & Ors on 15 January, 2026
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 15th JANUARY, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CS(OS) 3398/2015
MR ANUJ GUGLANI .....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sanjiv Bahl and Mr. Amish
Tiwari, Advocates
versus
MR HIRALAL C GUGLANI & ORS .....Defendants
Through: Mr. Gyanendra Kumar, Senior
Advocate, Mr. Soumya Dasgupta,
Ms. Shambhawi Dwivedi and Ms.
Sugandh Virmani, Advocates for LRs
of D-1 & 2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1. This is an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) of the CPC
filed by Defendant No.2 for rejection of the plaint on the ground that the
plaint fails to disclose a cause of action and is barred by law.
2. The present suit has been filed by the Plaintiff seeking a decree of
partition, rendition of accounts and perpetual injunction against Defendants
No.1, 12 and 13 in respect of immoveable property bearing No.F-4/16,
Model Town, Delhi-110009 (hereinafter referred to as the ‗Suit Property'),
claiming that he is a coparcener in the H.C. Guglani HUF.
3. Before dwelling into the factual background of the case, it is
imperative to understand the genealogy of the Guglani family. The Family
Tree of the Guglani Family, as given in the Plaint, is as under:
4. The other Defendants are siblings, legal heirs, or descendants of the
above family members, arrayed on account of their lineage and claimed
interests in the Suit Property.
5. Facts, in brief, leading to the present Suit, are as under:
a. Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani, the grandfather of the Plaintiff,
migrated to Delhi along with his Joint Hindu Family at the time
of Partition. It is stated that at that time, the family consisted of
Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani, his wife Late Smt. Ganesh Devi
Guglani, and their children--sons Hiralal C. Guglani, Late Wg.
Cdr. Shyam Sunder Guglani, Gopal Guglani, and Jay Guglani,
and daughters Dr. Laaj Virmani and Late Smt. Santosh Sushil.
It is stated that the family lived jointly, constituting a traditional
Hindu joint family.
b. It is stated that during his lifetime, Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani
was engaged in professional work, including homeopathic
medical practice, and also assisted in family business activities.
It is stated that Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani supported his eldest
son, Defendant No.1 Hiralal C. Guglani, in securing
employment and business opportunities in Delhi and Mumbai.
The family resided in official accommodations allotted to Late
Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani for several years. It is stated that Late
Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani invested a substantial sum in a film
distribution venture through Defendant No.1, which resulted in
losses, following which the family finally settled in Delhi.
c. It is stated that on 26.03.1957, a vacant plot bearing No. F-4/16,
Model Town, Delhi was purchased by Defendant No.1 Hiralal
C. Guglani in his own name by a registered sale deed. It is
stated that the sale consideration of Rs.3,936.04/- was collected
using the joint family funds by Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani and his
wife by selling family jewellery and other assets. It is stated that
the property, though registered in the name of Defendant No.1,
is alleged to have been held by him in a fiduciary capacity for
the benefit of the joint family and its coparceners. It is further
stated that at the time when the abovementioned property was
purchased, Defendant No.1 had just begun his professional
career and was financially dependent on his father.
d. It is stated that construction on the property commenced in
1957-1958, with the ground floor being built first. It is stated
that the entire family resided together in the premises as a joint
family. It is further stated that Defendant No.1 got married in
1960, and subsequently, in 1964, the first and second floors
were constructed to accommodate the growing family. It is
stated that the constructions were funded jointly by Late Dr.
Chuni Lal Guglani, Smt. Ganesh Devi Guglani, Defendant
No.1, and Late Wg. Cdr. Shyam Sunder Guglani, who, even
during his Air Force service, allegedly remitted a significant
portion of his earnings for the family home.
e. It is stated that in August 1964, a formal Hindu Undivided
Family (HUF) was constituted under the name ―H.C. Guglani
HUF‖, with Defendant No.1 acting as its Karta. It is stated that
the said HUF included Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani, Smt. Ganesh
Devi Guglani, their sons and daughters, and the Suit property
was thrown into the common hotchpotch of the HUF.
f. It is stated that Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani passed away in 1973 at
the suit property. His wife, Smt. Ganesh Devi Guglani,
continued to live there until her death on 02.08.1984.
Thereafter, Smt. Santosh Sushil passed away on 30.07.2003 and
Late Wg. Cdr. Shyam Sunder Guglani passed away on
14.09.2007. It is stated that despite changes in residence due to
employment exigencies, all sons of Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani
remained in joint, constructive, and symbolic possession of the
Suit property.
g. It is stated that between 1980 and 1981, a partnership firm,
namely, M/s Elmech Systems was constituted by Defendant
No.1 and Defendant No.10 (Jay Guglani), and it functioned
from the Suit Property. It is stated that the Official records of
the Sales Tax Department described the Suit Property as
belonging to H.C. Guglani HUF, and no rent was charged by
the HUF for the operations of M/s Elmech Systems from the
Suit Property. It is the case of the Plaintiff that this act
reinforces the HUF character of the property even after the
death of Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani.
h. It is stated that the Plaintiff, Anuj Guglani, was born on
26.03.1976 in the Suit Property. The Plaintiff claims to have
become a coparcener in the HUF by birth. It is stated in the
Plaint that no partition by metes and bounds ever took place and
that Defendant No.1 repeatedly assured other family members
of their respective shares in the Suit Property.
i. It is stated that the dispute crystallised in March-May 2014,
when Defendant No.1 allegedly applied for sanction of building
plans and razed the existing structure of the Suit Property
without the consent of other coparceners. It is stated that
Defendant No.1 acted in collusion with his daughters
(Defendants No.2 and 3) and builders Defendants No.12 and
13, and commenced construction of a multi-storey building,
thereby altering the character of the HUF property.
j. It is stated that a legal notice dated 22.08.2014 was issued by
the Plaintiff demanding partition and rendition of accounts. In
reply dated 09.09.2014, Defendant No.1 denied the existence of
any HUF and asserted exclusive ownership over the Suit
Property, which, according to the Plaint, marked a clear denial
of the plaintiff's rights.
k. Accordingly, the present Suit was filed seeking partition,
rendition of accounts, and perpetual injunction in respect of the
suit property
6. Summons were issued on 27.11.2015. Written Statements have been
filed. Issues have been framed and trial has commenced and the Suit is at the
stage of Plaintiff's evidence.
7. The present application has been filed by Defendant No. 2 under
Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, seeking rejection of the plaint on the ground that, even if
the averments made by the Plaintiff are assumed to be correct, the suit is not
maintainable in law.
8. It is the case of Defendant No.2 that Suit Property ceased to be a joint
family or coparcenary property upon the death of Late Dr. Chuni Lal
Guglani in the year 1973. Defendant No.2 has relied on Sections 6, 8 and 19
of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as applicable after the 2005 amendment,
to contend that the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary
property devolves by succession and not by survivorship, and that a notional
partition is deemed to have taken place immediately prior to the death of
Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani. It is further stated that after the death Late Dr.
Chuni Lal Guglani, the property would have devolved upon the heirs as
tenants in common and would no longer retain the character of joint family
property and, therefore, no Suit for partition, as pleaded by the Plaintiff, is
maintainable.
9. The second ground taken by the Defendant No.2 is that the Plaint is
inconsistent and legally untenable inasmuch as the Plaintiff himself has
pleaded that no HUF ever existed in the name of Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani
as the HUF constituted in the year 1964 was in the name of Defendant No. 1
as ―H.C. Guglani HUF‖, with Defendant No. 1 as its Karta. Defendant No. 2
further contends that, on the Plaintiff's own admission, the HUF is that of
Defendant No. 1 and not of the common ancestor, and that an ascendant
cannot be a member of an HUF created in the name of his son. It is therefore
stated that the Plaintiff could never have been a coparcener in such an HUF
and, as a result, no enforceable right or cause of action accrues to him.
10. The third ground urged by the Defendant No.2 is that the Plaint fails
to disclose material particulars necessary to constitute a cause of action, as
required under Order VI Rule 4 CPC. It is contended that after the
enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, there is no presumption of the
existence of an HUF, and specific and detailed pleadings are mandatory. It is
stated that the Plaint contains only bald assertions that the Plaintiff's
grandparents possessed properties in Pakistan and sold jewellery and other
assets to fund the purchase of the Suit Property. It is stated that without
disclosing any particulars of such properties, compensation claims, or
supporting documents, the claim of the Plaintiff is vague, speculative, and
devoid of the factual foundation required to disclose a right to sue.
11. The fourth ground taken by the Defendant No.2 is that the suit is ex
facie barred by limitation. Relying upon the plaintiff's own pleadings,
Defendant No. 2 contends that a clear separation occurred on 03.10.1990,
when the plaintiff's father admittedly moved out of the suit property along
with his family and, therefore, the pleas of joint, constructive, and symbolic
possession are illusory, and such admitted separation constitutes a clear
starting point for limitation under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. It is
stated that since the Suit was filed only in the year 2015, the Plaint is
hopelessly barred by limitation and, therefore, liable to be rejected under
Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
12. Reply to the present Application has been filed by the Plaintiff
wherein it is contended that the questions raised by Defendant No. 2 in the
present application have already been considered by this Court and have
been crystallised vide order dated 11.09.2018, wherein this Court has framed
the issued with the consent of parties. It is stated that the issues include the
issue of limitation, the nature and character of the Suit Property, the source
of consideration, the alleged fiduciary capacity of Defendant No. 1, the
existence and constitution of the H.C. Guglani HUF in August 1964, and the
Plaintiff's entitlement to partition and other reliefs. It is stated that once
these issues have been framed for trial, the same questions cannot be
reagitated at an interlocutory stage through an application under Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, and must necessarily be adjudicated only after evidence is led.
13. The Plaintiff further objects to the contention raised by the Defendant
No.2 that the alleged HUF is the HUF of Defendant No. 1 alone. According
to the Plaintiff, in August 1964, as per the wishes and intention of Late Dr.
Chuni Lal Guglani and Late Smt. Ganesh Devi Guglani, an HUF under the
name and style of ―H.C. Guglani HUF‖ was constituted with Defendant No.
1 as Karta, but with all the children of Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani and the parents
themselves as members. The Plaintiff asserts that the formation of this HUF,
the pooling of the Suit Property into the common hotchpotch, and the
continued treatment of the property as joint family property are all matters
of fact which stand squarely covered by Issue No. 4 framed by this Court
and cannot be adjudicated without trial.
14. The Plaintiff also refutes the plea of absence of material particulars,
asserting that the Plaint contains sufficient factual averments to disclose a
cause of action and that, at the stage of deciding an application under Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC, the Court must proceed on the assumption that the
pleadings are true. The Plaintiff has also objected to the plea of limitation
raised by the Defendant No.2. It is stated that there was no ouster or
separation in 1990 and that the Plaintiff continued in joint, constructive, and
symbolic possession of the Suit Property. It is further stated that limitation is
a mixed question of law and fact and has already been framed as an issue.
The plaintiff therefore submits that the present application is premature,
vexatious, and an abuse of process, and prays that the same be dismsissed,
leaving all issues to be decided at trial.
15. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
16. For the adjudication of the present application, it is pertinent to
reproduce the Order dated 11.09.2018, passed by this Court, farming issues
in the present matter. Order dated 11.09.2018 is reproduced in its entirety
and the same reads as under:
―1. Whether the present suit is barred by limitation?
OPD
2. Whether the property bearing No.F-4/16, Model
Town, Delhi was purchased for the benefit of the
Joint Hindu Family with the entire financial
contribution of Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani & Smt.
Ganesh Devi Guglani? OPP
3. Whether the property bearing No. F-4/16, Model
Town, Delhi was held by Defendant No.1 in fiduciary
capacity for the benefit of the coparceners & other
members of Joint Hindu Family of Dr. Chuni Lal
Guglani? OPP
4. Whether as per the desire and wishes of Dr. Chuni
Lal Guglani & Smt. Ganesh Devi Guglani an HUF
was formed under the name and style of H.C.
Guglani HUF with defendant no.1 as its Karta in
August 1964 with all the children of Dr. Chuni Lal
Guglani as its members? OPP
5. Whether the family property bearing F-4/16, Model
Town, Delhi was put in the pool of H.C. Guglani
HUF in the year 1964? OPP
6. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
partition of the suit property bearing No.F-4/16, Model
Town, Delhi-110009? OPP
7. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
rendition of accounts directing the Defendant No.1 to
render true and correct accounts with respect to the
―H.C. Guglani HUF‖ and also in his personal name?
OPP
8. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree of
perpetual injunction against the Defendants No.1, 12
and 13 restraining them, their agents, representatives,
assigns, employees, successors-in-interest etc from
encumbering, alienating, transferring or creating third
party interest in respect of the suit property bearing
No.F-4/16, Model Town, Delhi - 110009? OPP
9. Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to costs ? OPP
10. Relief?
Parties are directed to file their list of witnesses within
a period of four weeks.
The plaintiff is directed to file his evidence by way of
affidavits within a further period of four weeks.‖
(emphasis supplied)
17. It is also pertinent to refer to Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, which
reads as under:
―11. Rejection of plaint.
The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases-
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;
(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the
plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct
the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court,
fails to do so;
(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the
plaint is returned upon paper insufficiently
stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the
Court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a
time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the
plaint to be barred by any law:
Provided that the time fixed by the Court for the
correction of the valuation or supplying of the requisite
stamp-paper shall not be extended unless the Court, for
reasons to be recorded, is satisfied that the plaintiff
was prevented by any cause of an exceptional nature
form correcting the valuation or supplying the
requisite stamp-paper, as the case may be, within the
time fixed by the Court and that refusal to extend such
time would cause grave injustice to the plaintiff.‖
18. The law relating to rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is
crystallized through various judgments of the Apex Court. The Apex Court
in Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn., (2005) 7
SCC 510, has held as under:
―13. Before dealing with the factual scenario, the
spectrum of Order 7 Rule 11 in the legal ambit needs
to be noted.
14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1
SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule
11 of the Code that the relevant facts which need to be
looked into for deciding an application thereunder are
the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise
the power at any stage of the suit -- before registering
the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at
any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a)
and (d) of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, the averments
in the plaint are the germane; the pleas taken by the
defendant in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage.
15. In I.T.C. Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal
[(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question
to be decided while dealing with an application filed
under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real
cause of action has been set out in the plaint or
something purely illusory has been stated with a view
to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.
16. The trial court must remember that if on a
meaningful and not formal reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not
disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise the
power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code taking care
to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
action, it has to be nipped in the bud at the first
hearing by examining the party searchingly under
Order 10 of the Code. (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V.
Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467] .)
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be
considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As
was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v.
Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487] only a part
of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of
action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be
rejected.
18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property
[(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments
in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out
whether clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7 was
applicable.
19. There cannot be any compartmentalisation,
dissection, segregation and inversions of the language
of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is
adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of
interpretation according to which a pleading has to be
read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not
permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to
read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the
substance and not merely the form that has to be
looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it
stands without addition or subtraction of words or
change of its apparent grammatical sense. The
intention of the party concerned is to be gathered
primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings
taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne
in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted
to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.
20. Keeping in view the aforesaid principles the reliefs
sought for in the suit as quoted supra have to be
considered. The real object of Order 7 Rule 11 of the
Code is to keep out of courts irresponsible law suits.
Therefore, Order 10 of the Code is a tool in the hands
of the courts by resorting to which and by searching
examination of the party in case the court is prima
facie of the view that the suit is an abuse of the process
of the court in the sense that it is a bogus and
irresponsible litigation, the jurisdiction under Order 7
Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised.‖
19. A perusal of the above judgment makes it clear that the remedy under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC is an extraordinary and special jurisdiction enabling
the Court to summarily terminate a suit at the threshold only if the plaint, on
a meaningful reading, fails to disclose a cause of action, is barred by law, is
undervalued and not corrected despite direction, or is insufficiently stamped.
20. The Court, at this stage, is confined strictly to the averments in the
Plaint and is prohibited from examining the defence, disputed questions of
fact, or materials produced by the Defendants. The Plaint must be read as a
whole, without culling out isolated sentences, and if upon such reading a
cause of action is disclosed, the plaint cannot be rejected. It is equally settled
that disputed questions, issues requiring evidence, or matters forming part of
the Defendant's challenge cannot furnish a ground for rejection under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC.
21. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court is of the
considered view that the present application does not satisfy the statutory
threshold required for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) or (d)
CPC. A meaningful reading of the Plaint, as a whole, clearly discloses a
cause of action and raises substantial triable issues which cannot be
adjudicated at the threshold without evidence.
22. The first contention of Defendant No. 2 that the Suit Property ceased
to be joint family or coparcenary property upon the death of Late Dr. Chuni
Lal Guglani in 1973 is founded upon an interpretation of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, which necessarily requires examination of
foundational facts, including the nature of the property, the source of funds,
the existence and constitution of the alleged HUF, and the manner in which
the property was treated by the family members. It is the case of the Plaintiff
that the HUF was constituted under the name and style of ―H.C. Guglani
HUF‖. Whether the HUF continued or not or was there any separation, are
all disputed facts and that is why issue No.4 was framed by this Court on
11.09.2018. Further, it has also been argued by the learned Counsel for the
Defendant No.2 that the Suit Property ceased to be a joint family or
coparcenary property upon the death of Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani in the
year 1973 and that in accordance with Sections 6, 8 and 19 of the Hindu
Succession Act, 1956, as applicable after the 2005 amendment, the interest
of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property devolves by succession
and not by survivorship, and that a notional partition is deemed to have
taken place immediately prior to the death of Late Dr. Chuni Lal Guglani. It
is the case of the Plaintiff that the HUF was constituted under the name and
style of ―H.C. Guglani HUF‖. The Plaintiff, therefore, is not claiming the
Suit Property as a coparcener but as a member of the HUF. Whether HUF
existed or not, whether the Plainitff is claiming the property as a coparcener
or as a member of the HUF, are all issues which are to be considered on the
basis of evidence and not on the basis of the stand of the Defendant No.2. As
stated above, while considering an Application under Order VII Rule 11 of
the CPC, the Court is confined to the averments in the Plaint and should not
examine the defence taken up by the Defendants or the mixed questions of
law and fact.
23. The plea that the alleged HUF was that of Defendant No. 1 alone and
not of the common ancestor also cannot be accepted at this stage. The Plaint
contains categorical averments that the HUF styled as ―H.C. Guglani HUF‖
was constituted in August 1964 in accordance with the wishes of Late Dr.
Chuni Lal Guglani and Late Smt. Ganesh Devi Guglani, with Defendant No.
1 acting as Karta, but with all children of the common ancestor as its
members, and that the Suit Property was thrown into the common
hotchpotch. Whether such an HUF was validly constituted, who were its
members, and whether the Suit Property acquired the character of HUF
property are all factual issues which require evidence. The Defendant's
contention proceeds on a disputed interpretation of the Plaint and cannot be
used to non-suit the Plaintiff at the threshold.
24. The submission that the Plaint lacks material particulars and therefore
discloses no cause of action is equally untenable. The Plaint sets out, in
detail, the circumstances of migration of the family at the time of Partition,
the alleged contribution of joint family funds for purchase of the suit
property, the construction and enjoyment thereof, the constitution of the
HUF, the fiduciary role allegedly played by Defendant No. 1, and the
subsequent denial of the Plaintiff's rights in 2014. At the stage of Order VII
Rule 11 CPC, the Court is required to proceed on the assumption that the
averments in the plaint are correct. Whether the Plaintiff is ultimately able to
prove these averments is a matter for trial and cannot be prejudged at this
stage.
25. The plea of limitation raised by Defendant No. 2 also cannot be
adjudicated under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC. Though reliance has been
placed on the alleged separation of the Plaintiff's father from the Suit
property in 1990, the Plaint specifically pleads continued joint, constructive,
and symbolic possession and denies any ouster or partition. Limitation, in
the facts of the present case, is clearly a mixed question of law and fact, and
has already been framed as Issue No. 1 with the onus to prove on the
Defendants. It is well settled that where determination of limitation depends
upon disputed facts, the Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11
CPC.
26. This Court also finds merit in the submission of the Plaintiff that the
issues sought to be raised in the present application were crystallised by this
Court vide order dated 11.09.2018, with the consent of parties, and the suit
has since progressed to the stage of Plaintiff's evidence. Permitting the
Defendants to reagitate the same issues through an application under Order
VII Rule 11 CPC at this advanced stage would defeat the very object of
orderly trial and would amount to permitting a collateral challenge to the
framing of issues.
27. The Apex Court has time and again held that the jurisdiction under
Order VII Rule 11 CPC is to be exercised sparingly and only in clear cases
where the Plaint is manifestly vexatious, meritless, or barred by law on the
face of it. The present Plaint does not fall within any of these categories. On
the contrary, it raises serious and substantive disputes which can only be
resolved after parties are afforded an opportunity to lead evidence.
28. In view of the above, this Court is of the considered opinion that the
Plaint discloses a cause of action, does not appear to be barred by any law
on the face of it, and raises triable issues already framed for adjudication
and, therefore, the present application is devoid of merit.
29. Accordingly, the Application is dismissed.
30. It is made clear that this Court has made no observations on the merits
off the case and all the contentions of the parties on merits are left open to
be adjudicated at trial.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
JANUARY 15, 2026
Rahul
