[Cites 21, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Govind Singh Mauni vs Tej Bhan & Ors on 9 February, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on : 17th January 2026
Pronounced on : 09th February 2026
Uploaded on : 10th February 2026
+ MAC.APP. 1113/2013
GOVIND SINGH MAUNI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Manish Maini, Ms. Anjali
Singh, Advocates.
versus
TEJ BHAN & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath, Mr. Anant
Dev and Mr. Harshit Singh,
Advocates for R-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANISH DAYAL
JUDGMENT
ANISH DAYAL, J.
1. This appeal has been filed under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles
Act, 1988 ['MV Act'] by the claimant, seeking enhancement of
compensation awarded by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohini
Courts, Delhi ['MACT/Tribunal'] in MACT No.721/08/10.
2. Appellant, who suffered 75% permanent disability, claims that the
Tribunal ought to have granted compensation under "loss of earning
capacity" by adopting a proper multiplier method on the increased
income, and seeks enhanced compensation towards future conveyance,
attendant charges and pain and suffering.
Incident
3. On 4th November 2008, after attending his office at Panchkuian
Road, Rohini, New Delhi and alighting from the Metro Train at Rohini
West Metro Station, appellant was driving his motorcycle bearing
Registration No. DL-8SR-8914 and proceeding towards his residence at
Sector 13, Rohini. At about 07:40 P.M., when he reached the main road,
a bus bearing Registration No. DL-1PA-5192 ["offending vehicle"],
driven by driver Sh. Tej Bhan [respondent no.1 herein], allegedly at high
speed, in a rash and negligent manner, came from the front and hit the
motorcycle of claimant/appellant by coming on the wrong side of the
road.
4. Appellant sustained grievous injuries and FIR No.852/2008 under
Sections 279/338 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 [IPC] was registered at
Police Station Prashant Vihar, Delhi.
Impugned Award
5. Assessing the issue relating to causation, the Tribunal concluded
that the accident had taken place due to rash and negligent driving of the
offending vehicle, due to which the appellant suffered grievous injuries,
and that there was no contributory negligence on his part.
6. At the time of the incident, appellant was 50 years of age, doing
service as 'Cashier' in Nainital Bank, Panchkuian Road, Service
Branch, New Delhi, earning a salary of Rs.25,000/-. As per the Medico-
Legal Certificate ("MLC") report, the injured/appellant sustained
"compound supracondylar fracture right femur, intercondylar extension
fracture to right tibia, fracture in tibia right, brachial lexus injury right,
right tibial plating (MIPPO) with K Wire fixation of femoral condyle,
ORIF with LCP of supracondylar fracture with ORIF with LP fracture
clavicle, fracture S/C femur treated with plating, Skelton traction
applied, profusely bleeding, abrasions and blunt injuries" all over body.
7. After the accident, he was shifted to Bhagwati Hospital, Rohini
and then referred to Jaipur Golden Hospital for further treatment. The
entire treatment record was presented by PW-2 [PRO at Bhagwati
Hospital], PW-3 [Record In-charge of Jaipur Golden Hospital] and
PW-4 [Report Clerk at Jaipur Golden Hospital].
8. Salary certificate for the month of October, 2008, was placed on
record by the claimant/appellant as Exhibit PW-5/5 and certificate of
leave as Exhibit PW-6/A. PW-6 [Rajesh Pandey, CTO, Nainital Bank]
deposed that claimant had taken '238' medical leaves, '102' privileged
leaves, '289' leaves without pay, '1' casual leave and '26' days sick
leaves. In total, he had taken '656 leaves' from service for medical
treatment of the injuries. His revised salary for the month of October,
2008 was mentioned as Rs.25,711/- per month (net payable salary), as
per Exhibit PW-6/X.
9. The disability certificate issued by the All India Institute of
Medical Sciences [AIIMS], Exhibit PX, records that he had suffered
"75% permanent physical impairment" in relation to his right upper limb
and right lower limb.
Compensation Awarded
10. Benchmark income was taken as Rs.25,711/- and loss of income
for '656' days was awarded at Rs.5,62,213/-. Future prospects were
denied on the ground that his income was increasing on the date of
accident and it was held that there was no financial loss.
11. Towards medical expenses, Rs.5,05,643/- was awarded, a lump
sum amount of Rs.1,50,000/- towards future medical expenses; attendant
charges of Rs.25,000/-; special diet at Rs.20,000/-; and conveyance
charges at Rs.30,000/- were awarded.
12. As regards non-pecuniary damages, Rs.50,000/- was awarded
towards pain and suffering, inconvenience and mental shock,
Rs.1,50,000/- for loss of amenities.
13. A total of Rs.14,82,856/- was awarded along with interest at the
rate of 9% till the date payment is made.
14. The final compensation awarded by the Tribunal is summarized as
under:
S.NO HEADS AWARD BY MACT
1. Loss of Income Rs.5,62,213/-
2. Loss of Future Prospects/Earning Nil
Capacity
3. Medical Expenses Rs.5,05,643/-
4. Future Medical Expenses Rs.1,50,000/-
5. Special Diet Rs.20,000/-
6. Conveyance Rs.20,000/-
7. Attendant Charges Rs.25,000/-
8. Pain & Suffering Rs.50,000/-
9. Loss of Amenities & Shortening of Rs.1,50,000/-
Life
TOTAL Rs.14,82,856/-
INTEREST 9%
Submissions by both parties
15. Mr. Manish Maini, counsel for appellant, has placed the following
issues in support of appeal:
i) First, that the salary taken as Rs.25,711/-, ought to have been at
Rs.29,614/- without deduction of Provident Fund, Insurance and
Housing Loan;
ii) Second, he relied upon Desh Raj Singh Gautam v. Sunil Kumar
& Ors. 2016 DHC 4159, particularly paragraph 4, to contend that
even if the appellant was a regular employee in public sector
organisation, it would not mean that he would not have loss of
income till the age of retirement and, therefore, the multiplier had
to be adopted based on the age of retirement with the multiplier of
'9', or otherwise from the age on the date of accident.
Mr. Maini relied on Rajbir Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
& Ors. 2024 DHC 9034, where a multiplier of '9' was taken
keeping in account the retirement age of 60 years. He contends
that this was done by the Courts on a rationale that permanent
disability results in reduced earning capacity and impacts career
progression for which an injured needs to be compensated. There
may also be limitations in securing employment post-retirement
or in seeking alternate employment.
He further relied on a decision of the High Court of Punjab &
Haryana in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors.
2012 ACJ 1826, where principle enunciated in Ball v. William
Hunts and Sons Ltd. (1912) A.C 496, was applied, holding that a
workman suffers 'incapacity for work' when a physical defect,
renders his labour 'unsaleable' in any reasonably accessible
market, even if he continues earning the same wages.
Accordingly, loss of earning capacity was computed by applying
the appropriate multiplier based on age of the injured at the date
of the accident.
Reliance was also placed on the Supreme Court's order dated 13th
October 2022 passed in Civil Appeal No.7262-7263/2022 titled as
"Hari Om Const. v. National Insurance Company Ltd.", where
on grounds of loss in employment, the High Court had reduced
the compensation by applying multiplier of '9', whereas the
Tribunal had awarded a multiplier of '16'. Injured was 32 years
of age in that case. The Supreme Court held that the High Court's
reasoning was wrong and his efficiency and employability in job
will definitely get reduced.
iii) Third, that the aspect of functional disability was ignored by the
Tribunal, while computing the loss of future earnings.
16. Mr. Tarkeshwar Nath, counsel for respondent, relied upon the
Tribunal's determination in not granting future prospects or applying the
multiplier. He submitted that issue relating to modification of income, as
contended by appellant's counsel may be correct, to which he has no
quarrel. However, the question of awarding future prospects and using a
multiplier would not arise considering that appellant continued in service
and there was some evidence of increase of income after the accident.
Analysis
17. Having considered the submissions, this Court is of the view that
the Tribunal was amiss in not providing future prospects of post-
retirement just because the appellant was employed as a 'Cashier' in
Nainital Bank and his income has increased. In view of the principles
laid down in the decisions cited, such reasoning is untenable.
18. The essential principle follows from the House of Lords' decision
in Ball v. William Hunts and Sons (supra) which is highlighted in the
following extract in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rajbir Singh & Ors
(supra):
"There is also an opinion of the House of lords that may
be relevant to understand this concept. Ball v. William
Hunts and Sons Limited, (1912) AC 496, was the case
of a workman, who was blinded in one eye. The defect
was not visible and he was to have appearance as two-
eyed man. He had come to such a disability status when
he had sustained an employment injury in which the
defective eye had to be removed with the consequences
that he could not get employment though physically he
was as well as before. The House of Lords held that the
incapacity of work included inability to work, or in other
words, there is incapacity for work when a man has
physical defect which makes his working unsaleable in
any market reasonably accessible to him. Applying the
same logic, a person who has suffered an injury may not
come by immediate loss if he is retained in the same
employment and does not lose his job, but in his own
saleability elsewhere as a fresh recruit to a new
employer, he may come by a serious handicap. That
shall come by a serious handicap. That shall be a
justification enough to provide for compensation in such
types of cases."
(emphasis added)
19. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in National Insurance Co.
Ltd. v. Rajbir Singh (supra), therefore, did not accept the plea that
retention in government service, despite an injury would have any
bearing for denying the claimant the compensation worked out on loss of
earning capacity. Relevant extract is as under:
"He was a police constable and trained to be a
commando and the evidence was that after his injury, he
has been put on light duty. There was a sure prospect of
increase in salary for him which I would take as being
the resultant loss on account of his serious injury and it
requires no evidence to even make an appropriate
inference that his career as a commando could have
been completely shattered. I would therefore provide for
a 50 per cent increase of his salary and apply 70 per
cent of the same as the resultant loss of earning capacity
and apply multiplier of 17 to take the loss of earning
capacity at Rs.5,99,760."
20. This Court in Desh Raj Singh Gautam v. Sunil Kumar (supra)
also noted as under:
"4. It is noted that the tribunal awarded lumpsum
amount of ₹2 Lakh on account of loss of future income
due to disability. This was not a correct approach.
Admittedly, the claimant was a regular employee of
MTNL. It is conceded by the counsel representing him
that he would continue in service till he attains the age
of 60 years and, thus, there would be no loss of income
till that stage. However, the loss of income post-
retirement will have to be appropriately computed.
Since the retirement would occur at the age of 60 years,
it had to be calculated with the multiplier of 9.
Computed thus, the loss of future earnings on account of
disability to the extent of 25% would come to (₹19,000 x
25/100 x 12 x 9) ₹5,13,000/-. Since the tribunal had
awarded only lupmsum of ₹2 Lakh, the award deserves
to be enhanced by ₹3,13,000/-. Ordered accordingly.
Needless to say, it shall carry interest as levied by the
tribunal."
(emphasis added)
21. More recently in 2024, the coordinate Bench of this Court in
Rajbir Singh v. National Insurance Company Ltd & Ors..,
2024:DHC:9034, analysed this well and referred to previous decisions
and stated as under:
"12. However, the main question is whether he is
entitled to Loss of future earning Capacity on account of
Permanent Disability of 40% of right lower limb
suffered by him. There is no denying that any Permanent
Disability suffered by an injured, results in his reduced
earning capacity or impacts his career progression, and
he needs to be compensated. The pertinent aspect is
whether this Court can take note of his limitation in
getting a job post his retirement, as has been claimed by
the Appellant. He has placed reliance on TATA AIG
General Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Dipanjan Ghosh & Ors.
MAC.APP.44/2014 decided by this Court on
02.03.2016; United India Insurance Company Limited
vs. Zile Singh & Ors. MAC.APPEAL No.861/2010
decided by this Court on 27.09.2017; Desh Raj Singh
Gautam vs. Sunil Kumar and Ors. MAC.APP.632/2007
decided by this Court on 20.05.2016; Kale Ram vs. Ajay
& Ors. MAC.APP.615/2013 decided by this Court on
18.11.2022 and Anita A. Pathak vs. Raj Bahadur & Ors.
MAC. APP.466/2010 along with MAC.APP.451/2010,
MAC.APP.459/2010, MAC.APP.454/2010,
MAC.APP.455/2010, MAC.APP.456/2010 and
MAC.APP.464/2010 decided on 15.02.2012, wherein
this Court has considered that any Permanent Disability
suffered by the injured may not impact his financial
capacity immediately, but would definitely have an
impact post his retirement and he may not be able to
take up a job after post- retirement.
13. In the judgments relied upon by the Appellant, while
being cognizant that the injured was in the employment
and had not suffered any salary loss, but it was
considered that he may suffer some impediment in
getting a job in future post his retirement which is
generally at the age of 60 years, 30% enhancement of
the current salary was then taken to calculate the
compensation.
14. In the present case, though the injured has not
adduced any evidence about the age till which he would
continue in service in DAV School or that his disability
would prevent him from taking up any job in future, but
on the basis of the legal precedents, it is held that on his
retirement, which is normally at the age of 60 years, he
may not be able to take up a job post retirement.
15. The income of the Appellant has been shown as
Rs.17,899/- which is rounded off to Rs.18,000/- and 30%
is added to his salary towards his future increase in his
salary. Multiplier of 9 is taken in accordance with the
retirement age of 60 Years."
(emphasis added)
22. The Supreme Court's decision in Hari Om Const. v. National
Insurance Company Ltd (supra) rejecting the High Court's reduction in
applying the multiplier of '9' and reverting it back to a multiplier of '16'
for a thirty-two-year-old injured, who had suffered multiple fractures and
a permanent disability to the extent of 45% is also apposite. Relevant
paragraphs are extracted as under:
"The appellant has suffered multiple fracture and
dislocation of the left elbow, nailing of right tibia and
femur bone. The appellant undergone several surgical
procedures including reconstruction of right elbow. The
Board of Doctors assessed the permanent disability to
the extent of 45%. The Tribunal while taking into
consideration the emoluments of the appellant as
Rs.18,941/- per month applied the multiplier of 16
keeping in view the age of the appellant as 32 years.
Thus, the total compensation of Rs.21,94,082/- was
awarded including the expenses towards physiotherapy,
1 special diet and conveyance, loss of earnings and
Rs.16,000/- towards future medical expenses,
Rs.18,18,336/- was on account of loss of future income
due to disability. The High Court in an appeal filed by
the Insurance Company reduced the amount of
compensation by applying the multiplier of 9 for the
reason that there is no loss of employment.
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find
that the High Court has erred in law in reducing the
amount of compensation. The appellant though
continuous to be in service but his efficiency as a
constable has been seriously compromised. Therefore,
the amount of compensation awarded by the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunal as Rs.21,94,082/- was just
and proper keeping in view the injuries and its long-
term effect on the person of the appellant."
(emphasis added)
23. This Court is of the opinion that the appellant, having suffered
75% permanently disabled in both the right upper and lower limbs and
multiple fractures, as recorded in the MLC report suffered severe
impairment. For ease of reference, details of impairment are extracted as
under:
"the injured sustained compound supracondylar fracture
right femur, intercondylar extension fracture to right
tibia, fracture in tibia right, brachial lexus injury right,
right tibial plating (MIPPO) with K Wire fixation of
femoral condyle, ORIF with LCP of supracondylar
fracture with ORIF with LP fracture clavicle, Fracture
S/C femur treated with plating, Skelton traction applied,
profusely bleeding, abrasions and blunt injuries all over
body."
24. The employability and marketability of the appellant stand
severely prejudiced; therefore, the Tribunal was amiss in not awarding
the loss of future earnings. A Cashier's job at Nainital Bank cannot
guarantee him income for all times to come, and would make him
vulnerable and exposed to the uncertainty of continued employment,
since he had no compensation to fall back upon.
25. It is well settled that loss of earning capacity is a concept distinct
from immediate loss of wages or continuity of employment. The
Supreme Court has consistently held that the task of the Tribunal or the
Court is to assess the functional impact of the injury on the earning
capacity of the claimant, having regard to the nature of disability, the
avocation of the injured, age, and future employability. In Raj Kumar v.
Ajay Kumar, (2011) 1 SCC 343, the Supreme Court clarified that
medical or physical disability expressed as a percentage cannot be
mechanically equated with loss of earning capacity; what must be
evaluated is the extent to which the disability affects the ability of the
claimant to earn a livelihood in the future. This principle has been
reiterated in Hari Om Construction v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.
(supra), wherein the Supreme Court held that mere continuation in
service does not negate the existence of loss of future earning capacity.
26. The emphasis on functional disability stems from recognition that
an injury may not cause immediate loss of income, but may significantly
impair the injured person's competitiveness and acceptability in the open
labour market. An employee who continues in service with the same
employer may still face serious disadvantages if required to seek
alternative employment, compete with able-bodied candidates, or secure
post-retirement engagement. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that
compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act must account for this latent
and prospective economic disadvantage, and not merely for demonstrable
present loss.
27. In the present case, the factual record clearly establishes such
latent loss of earning capacity. The claimant sustained multiple fractures
involving both the right upper and lower limbs, including supracondylar
femur fracture, intercondylar tibia fracture, tibial plating, clavicle
fracture and brachial plexus injury, culminating in 75% permanent
disability assessed by AIIMS. The treatment records proved through
PW-2, PW-3 and PW-4 show repeated hospitalisations, multiple
operative interventions and prolonged rehabilitation from 2008 to 2011,
reflecting deep functional impairment. PW-6 has proved that the
claimant was compelled to take '656' days of leave, including medical
leave and leave-without-pay periods, demonstrating sustained incapacity.
His duties as a Cashier in Nainital Bank require continuous bilateral
hand-use, precision in cash-handling, standing and mobility functions
directly compromised by his bilateral limb disability. At the age of 50 at
the time of the accident, his competitiveness in the labour market stands
significantly diminished, and his prospects of any post-retirement
employment are virtually extinguished. These cumulative factors
conclusively show that the claimant's labour has become less
marketable, thereby attracting the doctrine of diminished earning
capacity recognised in Ball v. William Hunt & Sons Ltd. (supra) and
consistently affirmed by Indian courts.
28. In Ball v. William Hunt & Sons Ltd. (supra), the focus was placed
on 'marketability of labour' rather than mere wage continuity. This
reasoning was expressly approved by the United States Supreme Court in
New York Central Railroad Co. v. Bianc; American Knife Co. v.
Sweeting, 1919 SCC OnLine US SC 210, while upholding the validity of
compensation for serious disfigurement under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Law. The U.S. Supreme Court observed that serious
physical disfigurement may reasonably and adversely affect a person's
ability to obtain or retain employment, and relied upon the reasoning in
Ball v. William Hunt & Sons Ltd., (supra), to underscore that
diminished employability constitutes a legitimate basis for compensation,
independent of immediate loss of earning power.
29. Although Ball v. William Hunt & Sons Ltd. (supra), and the
American Knife Co. (supra) decision arose in the context of workmen's
compensation statutes, the underlying principle is fully consonant with
Indian Supreme Court jurisprudence under the Motor Vehicles Act. The
Act mandates the award of "just compensation" under Section 168,
which, as emphasised in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi,
(2017) 16 SCC 680 and Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, must
be fair, realistic and proximate to the actual loss suffered. Once
functional disability affecting earning capacity is established,
compensation must be assessed using the multiplier method, irrespective
of the fact that the claimant may have continued in service or received
increments post-accident.
30. The denial of compensation for loss of future earning capacity
solely on the ground that the claimant continues in employment or has
not suffered immediate wage loss would be inconsistent with settled
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The law recognises that economic
vulnerability, reduced employability, and diminished labour-market
acceptability and inability to secure employment are real and
compensable consequences of permanent disability. Comparative
jurisprudence, including Ball v. William Hunt & Sons Ltd. (supra) as
approved by the U.S. Supreme Court, reinforces this understanding and
supports a principled, forward-looking assessment of loss of earning
capacity in motor accident claims.
31. The essence of compensation is to give reparation to an injured
who has suffered great impairment in his functionality due to the
negligence of the offending vehicle and the respondents. It would be,
therefore, imperative that just and reasonable compensation is provided.
32. The Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court in National
Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 emphasised that
"just compensation" under Section 168 of MV Act must rest on fairness,
reasonableness and equity, avoiding both windfall gains and inadequate
awards. The assessment must be grounded in proven age and income,
followed by application of the appropriate multiplier as standardised in
Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 and affirmed in Reshma
Kumari v. Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65. The Court stressed
pragmatic and uniform computation, including future prospects, to
ensure proximity to real loss. Relevant paragraph is extracted as under:
"55. Section 168 of the Act deals with the concept of
"just compensation" and the same has to be
determined on the foundation of fairness,
reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal
standard because such determination can never be in
arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The
aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to
arithmetical precision on the basis of materials
brought on record in an individual case. The
conception of "just compensation" has to be viewed
through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-
violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of
death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a
windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted
cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a
pittance. Though the discretion vested in the tribunal is
quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the
tribunal to be guided by the expression, that is, "just
compensation". The determination has to be on the
foundation of evidence brought on record as regards
the age and income of the deceased and thereafter the
apposite multiplier to be applied. The formula relating
to multiplier has been clearly stated in Sarla Verma
[Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2
SCC (Civ) 770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002] and it has
been approved in Reshma Kumari [Reshma Kumari v.
Madan Mohan, (2013) 9 SCC 65 : (2013) 4 SCC (Civ)
191 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 826] . The age and income,
as stated earlier, have to be established by adducing
evidence. The tribunal and the courts have to bear in
mind that the basic principle lies in pragmatic
computation which is in proximity to reality. It is a
well-accepted norm that money cannot substitute a life
lost but an effort has to be made for grant of just
compensation having uniformity of approach. There
has to be a balance between the two extremes, that is, a
windfall and the pittance, a bonanza and the modicum.
In such an adjudication, the duty of the tribunal and
the courts is difficult and hence, an endeavour has
been made by this Court for standardisation which in
its ambit includes addition of future prospects on the
proven income at present. As far as future prospects
are concerned, there has been standardisation keeping
in view the principle of certainty, stability and
consistency. We approve the principle of
"standardisation" so that a specific and certain
multiplicand is determined for applying the multiplier
on the basis of age."
(emphasis added)
33. In Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, the Supreme Court
underscored that "just compensation" must be fair, equitable and
consistent, and cannot vary arbitrarily merely because different tribunals
perceive different amounts as just. It emphasised that compensation must
be objectively assessed, guided by uniform principles to avoid
unpredictability and disparity. The Court reiterated that similar facts
must yield awards within a consistent range. Relevant paragraphs are
extracted as under:
"16. Compensation awarded does not become "just
compensation" merely because the Tribunal considers
it to be just. For example, if on the same or similar
facts (say the deceased aged 40 years having annual
income of Rs 45,000 leaving his surviving wife and
child), one Tribunal awards Rs 10,00,000 another
awards Rs 5,00,000, and yet another awards Rs
1,00,000, all believing that the amount is just, it cannot
be said that what is awarded in the first case and the
last case is just compensation. "Just compensation" is
adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on
the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good
the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as
money can do so, by applying the well-settled
principles relating to award of compensation. It is not
intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit.
17. Assessment of compensation though involving
certain hypothetical considerations, should
nevertheless be objective. Justice and justness emanate
from equality in treatment, consistency and
thoroughness in adjudication, and fairness and
uniformity in the decision-making process and the
decisions. While it may not be possible to have
mathematical precision or identical awards in
assessing compensation, same or similar facts should
lead to awards in the same range. When the
factors/inputs are the same, and the formula/legal
principles are the same, consistency and uniformity,
and not divergence and freakiness, should be the result
of adjudication to arrive at just compensation.
In Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2 SCC 176 : 1994 SCC
(Cri) 335] , this Court stated: (SCC p. 185, para 16)
"16. ... The proper method of computation is
the multiplier method. Any departure, except
in exceptional and extraordinary cases, would
introduce inconsistency of principle, lack of
uniformity and an element of unpredictability,
for the assessment of compensation.""
(emphasis added)
34. Applying the core mantra of aligning 'proximity to reality' in
assessment of just compensation, in this Court's opinion, the
compensation in the present case needs to be reworked. If, therefore, the
income is taken as Rs.29,519/-, considering that it is admitted by
counsels for the parties that the same ought to have been the net income,
applying a 30% increase for future prospects would be the appropriate
approach. This would suitably accommodate future prospects post-
retirement and career progression through better employment.
35. As regards the multiplier, considering he was 50 years of age and
would have retired at the age of 60 years, the principal applied in Desh
Raj Singh Gautam v. Sunil Kumar & Ors. (supra) and Rajbir Singh v.
National Insurance Company Ltd., (supra) can be suitably adopted.
Therefore, as per National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi
& Ors. (supra) and Sarla Verma (Smt.) & Ors. v. Delhi Transport
Corporation & Anr. (supra), the multiplier of '9' would be applicable.
36. As regards functional disability, there is no substantial evidence
placed on record to show the extent to which functionality was reduced.
However, considering that the appellant was engaged in a desk job as a
Cashier and would have continued in a similar occupation, which would
naturally require the use of his right upper limb, the impairment thereof
would affect his working at his avocation. Therefore, the functional
disability should be assessed at 75% in the present case. Such assessment
accords with the principle that functional disability must reflect the
actual loss of earning capacity having regard to the nature of work
performed, and not merely the percentage of medical disability,
particularly where the impairment hampers the essential functions of the
claimant's avocation.
37. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar, (supra), the Supreme Court
clarified that the percentage of disability noted in relation to a limb
cannot be mechanically applied for determining loss of earning capacity,
and that the Tribunal must independently assess the impact of the
injuries on the claimant's ability to work. The Court further observed
that functional disability may, in a given case, be higher or lower than
the medical disability, and where specific evidence is absent, a
reasonable estimation is required to be made upon consideration of the
nature of injuries and the vocation of the claimant. Relevant paragraphs
are extracted as under:
"11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the
effect of the permanent disability on the earning
capacity of the injured; and after assessing the loss of
earning capacity in terms of a percentage of the
income, it has to be quantified in terms of money, to
arrive at the future loss of earnings (by applying the
standard multiplier method used to determine loss of
dependency). We may however note that in some cases,
on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the
Tribunal may find that the percentage of loss of
earning capacity as a result of the permanent
disability, is approximately the same as the percentage
of permanent disability in which case, of course, the
Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for
determination of compensation. (See for example, the
decisions of this Court in Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New
India Assurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010)
3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010) 10 Scale 298] and Yadava
Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC
341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010) 8 Scale 567] )
12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether
there is any permanent disability and, if so, the extent
of such permanent disability. This means that the
Tribunal should consider and decide with reference to
the evidence:
(i) whether the disablement is permanent or
temporary;
(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it is
permanent total disablement or permanent partial
disablement;
(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed with
reference to any specific limb, then the effect of such
disablement of the limb on the functioning of the
entire body, that is, the permanent disability suffered
by the person.
If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent
disability then there is no question of proceeding
further and determining the loss of future earning
capacity. But if the Tribunal concludes that there is
permanent disability then it will proceed to ascertain
its extent. After the Tribunal ascertains the actual
extent of permanent disability of the claimant based on
the medical evidence, it has to determine whether such
permanent disability has affected or will affect his
earning capacity.
13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent
disability on the actual earning capacity involves three
steps. The Tribunal has to first ascertain what activities
the claimant could carry on in spite of the permanent
disability and what he could not do as a result of the
permanent disability (this is also relevant for awarding
compensation under the head of loss of amenities of
life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation,
profession and nature of work before the accident, as
also his age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the
claimant is totally disabled from earning any kind of
livelihood, or (ii) whether in spite of the permanent
disability, the claimant could still effectively carry on
the activities and functions, which he was earlier
carrying on, or (iii) whether he was prevented or
restricted from discharging his previous activities and
functions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale
of activities and functions so that he continues to earn
or can continue to earn his livelihood."
(emphasis added)
38. As regards the components of conveyance, attendant charges,
pain and suffering and loss of amenities, the amounts awarded by the
Tribunal do not appear commensurate with the nature and extent of
injuries suffered by the appellant. The record reflects multiple fractures,
prolonged hospitalisation, repeated surgical interventions and a
permanent disability of 75% in relation to both the right upper and lower
limbs. Appellant remained under treatment for an extended duration and
was incapacitated from performing basic activities independently,
necessarily requiring continuous assistance for mobility, hospital visits
and daily tasks.
39. In such circumstances, enhancement under these heads is
warranted. The conveyance charges and attendant expenses assessed by
the Tribunal are on the lower side and require upward revision.
Likewise, the compensation awarded towards pain and suffering and loss
of amenities does not adequately reflect the severity of trauma,
prolonged deprivation of normal functioning, and the lasting impact on
the appellant's quality of life. The principle of "just compensation", as
emphasised in Pranay Sethi (supra) and Sarla Verma (supra), mandates
a realistic assessment, and accordingly, the amounts under these heads
deserve enhancement.
40. Accordingly, the impugned award stands modified and the
compensation recalculated is as under:
SR. HEADS AWARDED BY AWARDED BY THIS
NO. THE TRIBUNAL COURT
PECUNIARY LOSS
1. Loss of income Rs.5,62,213 /- Rs. 6,45,482/-
(Rs.25,711/30) x 656 (Rs.29,519/30) x 656 days
days
2. Loss of Future NIL Rs. 31,08,350/-
prospects/Earning
Capacity (Rs.29,519+ 30% incr.) x
12 x 9 (multiplier) x 75%
3. Medical Expenses Rs. 5,05,643/- Rs. 5,05,643/-
4. Future Medical Rs. 1,50,000/- Rs.1,50,000 /-
Expenses
5. Special Diet Rs. 20,000/- Rs.20,000 /-
6. Conveyance Rs. 20,000/- Rs. 50,000/-
Charges
(Future Conveyance)
7. Attendant Charges Rs. 25,000/- Rs. 50,000/-
NON-PECUNIARY LOSS
8. Pain and suffering Rs. 50,000/- Rs. 1,00,000/-
(I)
9. Loss of amenities of Rs. 1,50,000/- Rs. 1,50,000/-
life (J)
Total compensation Rs. 14,82,856/- Rs. 47,79,475/-
Interest awarded 9% 9%
Conclusion
41. For the aforesaid reasons, the award of the Tribunal is enhanced
by Rs.32,96,619/-. Said amount shall be deposited by the Insurance
Company along with accrued interest at the rate of 9% per annum, within
eight weeks from today, before the Tribunal.
42. Compensation to be disbursed to the claimant as per the directions
passed by the Tribunal.
43. List before Tribunal on 11th March 2026.
44. Accordingly, the Appeal stands allowed and disposed of.
45. Pending applications (if any) are rendered as infructuous.
46. Statutory deposit, if any, be refunded to appellant.
47. Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court.
ANISH DAYAL
(JUDGE)
FEBRUARY 09, 2026/ak/tk
