[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
M/S Food Inn Now Known As Ms Hotel ... vs Alcott Town Planners Private Limited ... on 19 February, 2026
$~10
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 19.02.2026
+ O.M.P. (T) (COMM.) 27/2025 & I.A. 8783/2025 (Ex. From
filing translated copies of annexures)
M/S FOOD INN NOW KNOWN AS MS HOTEL
SIGNATURE INN .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Shakul R. Ghatole,
Advocate.
versus
ALCOTT TOWN PLANNERS PRIVATE LIMITED NOW
KNOWN AS OYO HOTELS AND HOMES PRIVATE
LIMITED & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Harsh Kaushik and Ms.
Adrija Mishra, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE HARISH VAIDYANATHAN
SHANKAR
% JUDGEMENT (ORAL)
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
1. The present petition has been filed under Sections 14 and 15 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 19961 seeking the appointment
of a substituted Arbitrator.
2. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondents would
strongly object to the same, placing reliance upon the judgment of the
learned Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Raj Chawla and Co. Stock
and Share Brokers v. Nine Media and Information Services Ltd. and
The Act
Another2 and in particular Paragraphs 14 and 16 thereof, which reads
as follows:
"14. The recordal of facts above would indubitably establish that
the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal was never extended within the
period prescribed in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 29 A. The
parties have also not petitioned the court for extension of the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal even thereafter and in accordance
with Section 29 A(4). Viewed in light of the above, it is manifest
that the question of a substitute arbitrator being appointed really
does not arise. This since not only had the mandate of the Arbitral
Tribunal come to an end, in the fitness of things, the proceedings
should have been terminated in accordance with the mandatory
provisions of the Act.
*****
16. It must at the outset be noted that Section 29A originally
came to be inserted in the statue in 2016 itself and thus evidently
prior to the order of reference made by the Court. In any case,
regard must be had to the fact that, even when the said provision
was originally introduced by Act 3 of 2016, it was ordained to
operate retrospectively with effect from 23 October 2015.
Undisputedly, the reference to the Arbitral Tribunal in the present
case came to be made thereafter. Consequently, and when viewed
from either angle, the Court finds itself unable to countenance the
mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal subsisting today. The Court also
bears in mind that Section 25(3) in any case existed on the statute
book since inception."
3. He also submits that, against Raj Chawla (supra) a Special
Leave Petition came to be preferred, which was rejected by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. He further places reliance upon paragraph 14
of the aforestated judgment and contends that in the absence of any
extension having been sought or granted in terms of Section 29A of
the Act, the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal stood terminated and the
proceedings ought to have been brought to an end in accordance with
the provisions of the Act.
4. In view of Paragraph 16 of Raj Chawla (supra), it is urged that
there is, as on date, no subsisting Arbitral Tribunal and, consequently,
2023 SCC Online Del 520
no arbitral proceedings in existence. In such circumstances, it is
contended that a petition under Section 15 of the Act seeking
substitution of an Arbitrator would not be maintainable.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
Petitioner would rely upon the judgment passed by learned Single
Judge of this Court titled EMCO Limited v. Delhi Transco Limited3
to contend that mere delay in filing the statement of claim does not
ipso facto result in termination of the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
and that the Court ought to adopt a pro-arbitration approach.
6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner further seeks to controvert
the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the Respondents by
submitting that, in terms of Section 23(1) of the Act, there ought to
have been a determination by the learned Arbitrator of the timeline for
filing of the statement of claim. He submits that no such direction
fixing the time period for filing of the statement of claim was passed
by the learned Arbitrator, which, according to him, is the reason the
statement of claim was not filed for over a period of two years.
7. He further submits that the mandate of the Arbitral Tribunal
has not terminated, as the present situation does not fall within the
ambit of Section 32 of the Act. In the absence of any such termination
in terms of the said provision, the proceedings cannot be said to have
come to an end.
8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner also submits that the certain
provisions of the Act were not considered by the learned Single Judge
of this Court while passing Judgment in Raj Chawla (supra).
9. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties and is of
2024 SCC OnLine Del 6306
the considered view that the judgment of the learned Co-ordinate
Bench of this Court squarely applies to the facts of the present case
and operates in full force in the present proceedings.
10. As a result, there is no substance in the present petition, and
prayer as sought for by the Petitioner cannot be granted.
11. Accordingly, the present petition, along with pending
application(s), if any, stands dismissed.
HARISH VAIDYANATHAN SHANKAR, J.
FEBRUARY 19, 2026/tk/her
