[Cites 12, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Balwinder Singh @ Balwinder Singh Mattu vs Central Bureau Of Investigation And Anr on 16 April, 2026
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~85
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on : 16.04.2026
+ CRL.M.C. 2841/2026
BALWINDER SINGH @ BALWINDER SINGH MATTU
.....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Dhruv Dwivedi, Advocate
versus
CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND ANR
.....Respondent
Through: Mr. Mukul Katyal and Mr. Vikrant
Pachnanda, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
JUDGMENT
PRATEEK JALAN, J (ORAL)
1. The petitioner has approached this Court under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ["BNSS"] (corresponding to
Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure ["CrPC"]), seeking partial
quashing of FIR No. RC0482025S0013 dated 11.12.2025, registered
under Sections 61(2) read with Sections 143 and 318 of the Bharatiya
Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 ["BNS"]
2. The petition is predicated on a settlement between the petitioner
and respondent No.2, who was the complainant in the FIR.
3. The allegations in the FIR pertain to trafficking of certain persons
and cheating. It is alleged that respondent No. 1, the Central Bureau of
Investigation ["CBI"], received information regarding certain young
Indians being induced to migrate to the United States of America on the
promise of better employment opportunities and an improved livelihood.
It is further alleged that such individuals were induced to pay substantial
sums of money to "traffickers/travel agents" for facilitating their travel,
immigration, and employment in the USA. However, instead of lawful
migration, the victims were allegedly made to enter the United States
illegally through clandestine routes.
4. The present FIR concerns one such individual, i.e. respondent No.
2 herein, who lodged a complaint dated 24.11.2025. He stated therein that
the accused persons, including the present petitioner, induced him to pay
a sum of Rs. 25,00,000/-, on the assurance of arranging a work visa and
securing employment in the United States of America, which was paid to
the accused persons either in cash or through banking channels in January
2025.
5. The complainant was thereafter provided an air ticket from Delhi to
Cairo, Egypt, and subsequently illegally transported and shifted to
Managua in the Republic of Nicaragua. From there, he was allegedly
facilitated to enter the United States of America through illegal entry
routes, commonly referred to as "Dunki routes" [also described in the FIR
as "Donkey Routes"]. However, he was apprehended by the authorities of
the United States of America at the border and, thereafter deported to
India on 16.02.2025. It is on the basis of these allegations that the present
FIR has been registered.
6. Mr. Dhruv Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that
the petitioner has since settled the matter with respondent No. 2 -
complainant, and that a Panchayati Compromise Deed dated 28.03.2026,
duly signed by both the petitioner and respondent No. 2, has been placed
on record. It is submitted that the said compromise deed does not
contemplate any monetary settlement and merely records the
understanding that the complainant shall cooperate in seeking quashing of
the aforesaid FIR. Mr. Dwivedi further submits that there is no prima
facie material against the petitioner in the present case, and that the
petitioner was only engaged in providing legitimate travel agency
services, for which he received a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- towards ticket
expenses.
7. Mr. Mukul Katyal, learned counsel appearing for the CBI on
advance notice, opposes the request for quashing of the aforesaid FIR,
submitting that this is not a case where this Court ought to exercise its
inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the BNSS. He submits that the
allegations are of a serious nature, involving the alleged inducement of
vulnerable individuals to migrate abroad on the basis of false assurances
of employment, and disclose a broader pattern of organised activity
which necessitates a detailed and thorough investigation. Such offences,
it is contended, cannot be treated as private or commercial disputes,
amenable to quashing merely on the basis of an arrangement between the
parties. He further submits that the investigation in the present case is still
ongoing and is likely to be concluded within the next three months.
8. The power of this Court to quash criminal proceedings, even in
respect of non-compoundable offences, is well settled. In Gian Singh v.
State of Punjab & Anr.1 and Narinder Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab &
Anr.2, the Supreme Court has consistently held that the power to quash
criminal proceedings can be exercised, particularly in cases where the
dispute is predominantly private in nature and the criminal element is
merely incidental, as opposed to cases involving heinous or serious
offences having a wider societal impact.
9. The Supreme Court, in Gian Singh has held as follows:
"58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having regard
to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the victim has been
settled although the offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute between the
parties is put to an end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice
being the ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and it is not safe
to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim have settled the
dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid compensation, yet
certain crimes have been made compoundable in law, with or without the
permission of the court. In respect of serious offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental depravity under IPC or
offences of moral turpitude under special statutes, like the Prevention
of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity, the settlement between the offender and the
victim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences
which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having
arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,
particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the
wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim have
settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that
such offences have not been made compoundable, the High Court may
within the framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied that on the
face of such settlement, there is hardly any likelihood of the offender
being convicted and by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice
(2012) 10 SCC 303 [hereinafter, "Gian Singh"].
(2014) 6 SCC 466 [hereinafter, "Narinder Singh"].
shall be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list is
illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on its own facts
and no hard-and-fast category can be prescribed."
10. Further, in Narinder Singh the Supreme Court has also laid
down guidelines for High Courts while accepting settlement deeds
between parties and quashing the proceedings. The relevant observations
in the said decision read as under:
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the
following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving
adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising
its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement
and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with
direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compound the
offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section 482 of
the Code, the High Court has inherent power to quash the criminal
proceedings even in those cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves. However, this power
is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis
petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor
in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on
either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which
involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and
have a serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to
have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of
Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while
working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of
Emphasis supplied.
compromise between the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or
family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their
entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to
whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and
continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases."4
11. In Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat5, the Supreme Court
elaborated the principles in the following terms:
" 16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit
and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice,
or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information
report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and
victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of
principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court
must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.
Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be
quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled
the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in
nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
element of public interest in punishing persons for serious
offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal
cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a
civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise
Emphasis supplied.
(2017) 9 SCC 641 [hereinafter, "Parbatbhai Aahir"].
of the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the
possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the
financial and economic well-being of the State have implications
which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private
disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash
where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act
complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in
the balance.
18. The present case, as the allegations in the FIR would
demonstrate, is not merely one involving a private dispute over a
land transaction between two contesting parties. The case involves
allegations of extortion, forgery and fabrication of documents,
utilisation of fabricated documents to effectuate transfers of title
before the registering authorities and the deprivation of the
complainant of his interest in land on the basis of a fabricated
power of attorney. If the allegations in the FIR are construed as
they stand, it is evident that they implicate serious offences having
a bearing on a vital societal interest in securing the probity of titles
to or interest in land. Such offences cannot be construed to be
merely private or civil disputes but implicate the societal interest in
prosecuting serious crime. In these circumstances, the High Court
was eminently justified in declining to quash the FIR which had
been registered under Sections 384, 467, 468, 471, 120-B and
506(2) of the Penal Code."6
12. The same position has been reiterated in Dinesh Sharma v. Emgee
Cables & Communication Ltd.7, wherein the Court observed that
Emphasis supplied.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 929 [paragraph 23]
economic offences stand on a distinct footing from other offences, given
their wider ramifications on the financial and economic system of the
country. It was noted that such offences affect the economy of a country
as a whole and pose a serious threat to its financial health, and therefore,
cannot be viewed lightly, as doing so would erode public confidence and
trust.
13. Applying these yardsticks, the FIR in the present case, in my view,
does not satisfy the criteria for quashing on compromise. The allegations
of human trafficking and cheating of vulnerable youth on the promise of
better livelihood are not in the nature of private commercial disputes, but
have a wider impact on society at large. The offence alleged is a serious
one, which places vulnerable individuals in the face of physical and legal
peril, as in the case of respondent No.2 herein. With the proliferation of
such organised activity, the impact is in fact not just on the individual
concerned, but on society as a whole.
14. Mr. Dwivedi's arguments regarding the merits of the allegations,
do to persuade me to a contrary conclusion at this stage. The case is still
at the stage of investigation. It is always open to the prosecution, upon
completion of investigation, to take a view on the material before it, as to
whether to proceed against the petitioner, and if so, on what charges.
However, such a determination cannot be made at this stage by this
Court. In any event, the present petition is founded on the existence of a
settlement, rather than on any adjudication of the merits of the
allegations.
15. Mr. Dwivedi has relied upon two decision of the Supreme Court:
(a) In Nikhil Merchant v. CBI8, the proceedings arose out of a commercial
dispute between a company, of which the petitioner therein was the
former Managing Director, and a bank, which was the complainant.
The Supreme Court, having regard to the nature of the dispute and the
settlement arrived at between the parties, quashed the criminal
proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The facts of the
present case are clearly distinguishable from those in Nikhil Merchant.
In that case, the dispute arose out of a bank-borrower relationship
pertaining to a commercial credit facility, and was essentially civil and
commercial in nature, confined largely to private dealings between the
parties.
(b) In Suresh C. Singal v. State of Gujarat9, it has been held that even in
cases arising out of commercial transactions and involving serious
offences, criminal proceedings may be quashed in appropriate cases.
The said judgment, while laying down the principles governing
quashing, also takes note of the decision in Narinder Singh, inter alia
in the context of serious offences including those under Section 307 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860. I do not find the said judgment
applicable to the present case on facts, as the nature of the allegations
and offence were quite different. As emphasised by the Supreme
Court in the aforesaid decisions, the analysis has to be fact specific
and holistic.
16. Having regard to the well-settled principles governing the exercise
of inherent jurisdiction of this Court for quashing criminal proceedings on
(2008) 9 SCC 677 [hereinafter, "Nikhil Merchant"].
2025 SCC OnLine SC 788.
the basis of compromise, I am of the view that the facts and
circumstances of the present matter do not warrant exercise of the
inherent powers of this Court.
17. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.
18. Needless to state, all rights and remedies available to the parties in
accordance with law in the pending criminal proceedings shall remain
open.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
APRIL 16, 2026
SV/SD/
