[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Sonu Lakra vs State on 16 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 08.04.2026
Judgment pronounced on: -16.04.2026
+ CRL.A. 13/2018
SONU LAKRA .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Archit Upadhayay, Advocate
(DHCLSC).
versus
STATE .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Utkarsh, APP for the State
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. In this appeal filed under Section 374 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973, (the Cr.PC.), the sole accused in SC No.
27228/2016 on the file of the Additional Sessions Judge-02,
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, assail the judgment
dated 09.10.2017 and the order on sentence dated 28.10.2017 as
per which he has been convicted and sentenced for the offence
punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (the
IPC).
2. The prosecution case is that on 29.09.2012 at about
7:30 PM, in front of the house of one Babu at Pusta Gopalpur,
Delhi, the accused, along with Monu (a CCL), in furtherance of
their common intention, wrongfully restrained PW3, abused and
assaulted him, and while the CCL caught hold of PW3, the
accused with a knife stabbed him on the left side of his chest, with
such intention and under such circumstances that, had death been
caused, he would have been guilty of committing murder.
Accordingly, as per the charge-sheet/final report dated 30.11.2012,
the accused is alleged to have committed the offence punishable
under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC.
3. On the basis of Ext. PW3/A FIS/FIR of PW3 recorded
at Sushruta Trauma Centre on 29.09.2012, Crime No. 214/2012,
Timarpur Police Station, i.e., Ext. PW8/B FIR dated 29.09.2012
alleging commission of the offence punishable under Section 307
read with Section 34 IPC was registered by PW8, Head Constable.
PW10, Sub Inspector conducted investigation into the crime and
on completion of the same, filed the charge-sheet/final report dated
30.11.2012 alleging commission of the offences punishable under
the aforementioned sections.
4. The jurisdictional Magistrate after complying with the
formalities contemplated under Section 209 Cr.PC, committed the
case to the Court of Sessions concerned. After hearing both sides,
the trial court, vide order dated 08.02.2013, framed a Charge under
Section 307 read with 34 IPC which was read over and explained
to the accused to which he pleaded not guilty.
5. On behalf of the prosecution, PWs. 1 to 10 and CW1
were examined and Exhibits PW1/A-D, PW2/A-F, PW3/A,
PW4/DA, PW5/A, PW6/A, PW7/A-B, PW8/A-C, and PW9/A-B,
CW1/A, CW1/C, CW1/D and PX, were marked in support of the
prosecution case.
6. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the accused
was questioned under Section 313(1)(b) Cr.PC regarding the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him in the evidence
of the prosecution. The accused denied all those circumstances and
maintained his innocence. He stated that he has been falsely
implicated in the present case. He further alleged that PW3 and his
family members have been continuously threatening to kill him
and his family after registration of the case and during trial. The
police officials of Timarpur Police Station have also been
harassing him.
7. After questioning the accused under Section 313(1)(b)
Cr.PC, compliance of Section 232 Cr.PC was mandatory. In the
case on hand, no hearing as contemplated under Section 232 Cr.PC
is seen done by the trial court. However, non-compliance of the
said provision does not, ipso facto vitiate the proceedings, unless
omission to comply with the same is shown to have resulted in
serious and substantial prejudice to the accused (See Moidu K. vs.
State of Kerala, 2009 (3) KHC 89 : 2009 SCC OnLine Ker
2888). Here, the accused has no case that non-compliance of
Section 232 Cr.PC has caused any prejudice to him.
8. No documentary evidence was adduced in support of
the defence case.
9. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary
evidence, and after hearing both sides, the trial court, vide the
impugned judgment dated 09.10.2017, found the accused guilty of
the offence punishable under Section 307 IPC. Vide order on
sentence dated 28.10.2017, the accused has been sentenced to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of three years along
with fine of ₹50,000, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo
simple imprisonment for a period of three months. Aggrieved, the
accused has preferred the appeal.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused assailed
the impugned judgment and order on sentence as being perverse
and contrary to the evidence on record. It was contended that the
conviction is founded primarily on the sole testimony of PW3, the
injured witness, without any reliable independent corroboration,
thereby rendering the prosecution case doubtful. It was further
submitted that material witnesses have not supported the
prosecution case, inasmuch as PW4 did not witness the incident
and PW9, projected as an eye-witness, is a related witness and has
been falsely planted.
10.1. It was further urged that there are material
contradictions in the prosecution version, particularly regarding the
presence of PW9 at the spot. The learned counsel pointed out that
PW3, in his initial statement forming the basis of the FIR, did not
mention the presence of any eye-witness, whereas PW9
subsequently claimed to have witnessed the incident. This
inconsistency, it was submitted, goes to the root of the prosecution
case and creates serious doubt about its veracity.
10.2. The learned counsel further contended that the
prosecution case suffers from serious investigative lapses. It was
submitted that no scientific evidence has been collected to connect
the appellant with the alleged offence, as no fingerprints were
lifted from the alleged weapon of offence and no effort was made
to scientifically link the weapon with the appellant. It was argued
that in terms of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (the
Evidence Act), an adverse inference ought to be drawn against the
prosecution for withholding such material evidence. It was also
submitted that the recovery of the alleged weapon is doubtful and
planted, as no independent public witness was associated with the
recovery, and the prosecution has failed to establish the chain of
circumstances or prove motive beyond reasonable doubt.
11. Per Contra, it was submitted by the learned Additional
Public Prosecutor that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt and that the impugned judgment does not call for
any interference. It was contended that the nature of the weapon
used and the manner of assault clearly establish the requisite
intention and knowledge on the part of the appellant. The learned
prosecutor argued that the appellant was carrying a knife of
considerable length (approximately 30 cm), which is not a normal
circumstance, and the same was used to stab on a vital part of the
body, i.e., the left side of the chest. The dimension of the injury
(approximately 6 × 2 cm) further demonstrates the severity of the
assault, and such an act, by its very nature, is sufficient to attract
the ingredients of Section 307 IPC.
11.1. It was further submitted that the testimony of PW3, the
injured witness, is reliable and inspires confidence, and it is a
settled principle of law that conviction can be based on the sole
testimony of an injured witness. The learned prosecutor contended
that the so-called discrepancies pointed out by the defence are
minor in nature and do not go to the root of the prosecution case. It
was argued that the presence of the accused and the manner of
assault stand duly established from the evidence on record, and
that the defence has failed to discredit the core of the prosecution
version.
11.2. With regard to the absence of scientific evidence, it was
submitted that non-lifting of fingerprints or lack of forensic
examination is not fatal to the prosecution case when there is clear
and cogent ocular evidence available. It was argued that Section
114 of the Evidence Act cannot be invoked to draw an adverse
inference against the prosecution in the facts of the present case, as
the chain of direct evidence is complete. Accordingly, it was
submitted that the prosecution has successfully established the
guilt of the appellant and the conviction and sentence awarded by
the learned trial court are liable to be upheld.
12. Heard both sides and perused the records.
13. The only point that arises for consideration in the
present appeal is whether there is any infirmity in the impugned
judgement calling for an interference by this court.
14. On going through the records, it is seen that after the
appeal was filed, the sentence was suspended vide order dated
04.01.2018. Thereafter, the appellant/accused has never appeared
before this Court. As per order dated 05.11.2024, this Court took
notice of the order passed by the trial court, declaring him a
proclaimed offender. The notice, bailable and non-bailable
warrants issued by this Court, remains unexecuted till date. No
provision of law has been shown to me which enables the appeal to
be adjourned sine die. Advocate Archit Upadhayay, has already
been appointed by the Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee
to represent the appellant. The mere fact that the appellant fails to
appear before the Court does not preclude this Court from
examining the correctness of the impugned judgment on merits. It
is a settled position of law that a criminal appeal cannot be
dismissed for non-prosecution and the appellate court is duty-
bound to consider the appeal on merits on the basis of the records
available. In this regard, reference may be made to the decisions
in Bani Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 1996 SC 2439
and K.S. Panduranga v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2013 SC
2164. Accordingly, having regard to the nature of the case and the
completeness of the record, this Court proceeds to examine the
appeal on merits after hearing both sides.
15. I make a brief reference to the oral and documentary
evidence relied on by the prosecution in support of the case. The
gist of the case of PW3, the injured, in Exhibit PW3/A FIS/FIR,
recorded on 29.09.2012, is as follows:- On 29.09.2012 at about
07:20 PM, while returning home from Gopalpur village via Bypass
Pusta, he met Maria (PW4), who was known to him, and had a
brief conversation with her. Thereafter, at about 07:30 PM, when
he reached in front of the house of one Babu, the accused and his
brother Monu (the CCL) met him and questioned him as to why he
was talking to PW4. Upon his responding, an altercation ensued,
during which both of them abused and assaulted him, and
threatened him saying that they would finish him and that he
should not speak to PW4 in future. He further stated that Monu
(the CCL) caught hold of him while the accused stabbed him with
a knife near his left armpit (close to the chest). Thereafter, both of
them fled from the spot. He fell down at the place of occurrence.
He somehow managed to reach his house, where his tenant
informed the PCR, and he was taken by a CATS ambulance to the
Trauma Centre for treatment. He alleged that the accused and his
brother Monu (the CCL) had attacked him with a knife with the
intention to kill him and caused injuries, and so prayed that legal
action be taken against them in accordance with law.
15.1. PW3, when examined before the trial court, deposed
that on 29.09.2012, at about 07:20 p.m., while he was on his way
to his village via Pusta, he met PW4, an acquaintance. While he
was talking to her, the accused, along with his brother Monu (the
CCL), came and questioned him as to why he was talking to PW4.
He responded by asking, "Who are you to ask me like this?" On
hearing this, both of them started quarrelling and abusing him.
When he asked them not to abuse him, saying that they would
teach him a lesson, the accused gave him a stab injury with a knife
on his left armpit, while Monu (the CCL) caught hold of him.
After stabbing him, both of them ran away from the spot.
Thereafter, he somehow managed to reach his house, where he
asked his tenant to call the PCR. A CAT Ambulance reached his
house and took him to the Trauma Centre, where he was treated.
PW3 further deposed that the accused had stabbed him with the
intention to kill him. The police recorded his detailed statement,
which is Ex. PW3/A, bearing his signature at point A. PW3 further
identified Ext. P3 as the knife used for the assault.
15.2. PW3 stood by his case in his cross-examination. He
deposed that it took him about 2 to 3 minutes to reach his home
from the place of the incident. He remained in the hospital for
about a month. He stated that he knows PW9, who is his relative,
and that he met the latter while on the way to his house after the
incident. PW3 further added that PW9 was present at the time of
the incident itself. PW3 further deposed that the place of the
incident is a thoroughfare. He did not ask for help from anyone as
nobody was present at that time.
16. PW4 deposed that her parents were the tenants of PW3.
She was working in an NGO at Kashmere Gate and her parents
were residing on rent in the house of PW3, which was at,
Gopalpur. On her visits home, she used to meet PW3 with whom
she was on friendly terms. PW4 further deposed that she, like the
accused, was a native of Jharkhand and, therefore, she used to treat
the accused as her brother. On 29.08.2012, she had gone to Gopal
Pur to purchase some goods and, while she was returning, PW3
met her on the way and while they were talking, the accused Sonu
coming from behind, pushed her, and started quarrelling with
PW3. According to PW4, while both of them were quarrelling, she
proceeded to her house as she had to cook food. On the next day,
she came to know that the accused Sonu had stabbed PW3 and that
the latter has been admitted in the hospital. On 02.10.2012, the
mother of the accused, along with a few other ladies, came to her
and took her to Timarpur Police Station, where she was asked to
give a statement to the police. PW4 further deposed that she
questioned as to why she should give a statement when she had not
witnessed the incident of stabbing; however, despite the same, her
statement was recorded by the police. PW4, on being put a leading
question by the prosecutor, admitted the date of incident to be
29.09.2012 and the time around 07:00 PM.
16.1. PW4, in her cross-examination, denied the suggestion
that she had stated to the police that she was in love with PW3 or
that the accused objected to her talking to PW3 due to the said
reason. PW4 admitted that she did not try to meet PW3 after she
came to know about the incident. PW4 further denied the
suggestion that she was falsely implicating the accused in the case.
17. PW6, Medical Officer, Sushruta Trauma Center,
Metcalf Road, Delhi, deposed that on 29.02.2012 at about 8:10
PM, he had examined PW3, who was brought with an alleged
history of physical assault. On examination, he found a stab wound
on the lower chest in the mid-axillary region of the ribs measuring
6 × 2 cm. After primary examination, he referred the patient to the
General Surgery Department for further management. PW6
identified his signature in Ex. PW6/A MLC issued by him. PW6
further deposed that Dr. Satender used to work as Senior Resident
in the General Surgery Department, Sushruta Trauma Center in the
year 2012 and the latter had since left the services of the hospital,
and his present whereabouts are not known. PW6 deposed that he
had seen Dr. Satender writing and signing during the discharge of
his duties. PW6 further deposed that the opinion regarding the
nature of injury given by Dr. Satender has been recorded in Ext.
PW6/A MLC which at point X bears the signature of the latter at
point Y.
17.1. PW6, in his cross-examination, deposed that, the
patient was conscious and oriented at the time of admission. The
patient had a bleeding wound. He had not taken any blood samples
of the patient. He had advised the patient to undergo CECT chest
and abdomen before referring the patient to the General Surgery
Department.
17.2. PW9, deposed that PW3 is his brother-in-law (saala)
and that House No. 262, Pushta Gopalpur, Delhi, belongs to his in-
laws. On 29.09.2012, while on his way to the house of his in-laws
and at about 7:30 PM, he saw two persons quarrelling with PW3.
PW9 identified the appellant/accused in the court. PW9 further
deposed that before he could reach near them, he saw the person,
along with the accused catching hold of PW3 at which time the
accused stabbed PW3 with a knife. PW9 deposed that seeing the
incident, he got scared and ran to the house of his in-laws to
inform them regarding the incident. In the meantime, PW3 also
came running. He had handed over the blood-stained shirt and
vest of PW3 to the police and that the police prepared a pulanda of
the same, i.e., Ext. PW5/A. On 30.09.2012, he accompanied the
police from the house of his in-laws to the house of one Babu,
where the accused and his brother Monu (the CCL) used to reside.
The accused was found in the said house and was arrested vide
Ext. PW2/A arrest memo. PW9 further deposed that the disclosure
statement of the accused was recorded vide Ex. PW2/C disclosure
statement. PW9 further deposed that the accused led them to the
place of incident and thereafter led them to the bushes near the
government wall and stated that he had thrown the knife there after
the incident. The knife was recovered from the bushes at the
instance of the accused and the police prepared Ext. PW2/D sketch
of the knife. A pulanda of the knife was prepared and the same
was seized vide Ex. PW2/E seizure memo. PW9 identified the
blood stained shirt and vest of PW3 which were marked as Exts.
P1 and P2. PW9 identified the knife recovered at the instance of
the accused and the same was marked as Ex. P3.
17.3. PW9, in his cross-examination, deposed that he had
reached the house of his in-laws on 29.09.2012 at about 10:00 AM.
He had only seen the accused Sonu stabbing PW3 with the knife,
but had not seen him taking out the knife from his possession
before stabbing. The accused stabbed PW3 with his right hand. He
did not see towards which direction the accused and his associate
fled after the incident as he had run away towards the house of his
in-laws. PW9 denied the suggestion that no such incident of
stabbing had occurred or that he was not present at the spot or that
he was a planted witness or that he had signed the documents later
on at the Police Station at the instance of the Investigating Officer.
PW9 further denied the suggestion that the accused has been
falsely implicated in the present case or that nothing incriminating
had been recovered at the instance of the accused.
18. The appellant stands convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC. To bring home an offence
under Section 307 IPC, the prosecution is required to establish that
the act was done with such intention or knowledge and under such
circumstances that, if death had been caused, the act would have
amounted to murder. The intention or knowledge of the accused
has to be gathered from the nature of the weapon used, the manner
of its use, the part of the body targeted and the surrounding
circumstances attending the occurrence. In the case on hand, the
prosecution case rests primarily on the testimony of PW3, the
injured witness. It is well settled that the testimony of an injured
witness carries great evidentiary value and ordinarily, a conviction
can be based solely on such testimony if it inspires confidence and
is found to be trustworthy. The question, therefore, is whether the
testimony of PW3, read in conjunction with the medical evidence
on record, is sufficient to establish that the appellant committed the
offence of attempt to murder.
19. PW3 has categorically deposed that on the date of the
incident, the appellant, along with the CCL, accosted him and,
while the CCL caught hold of him, the appellant/accused inflicted
a stab injury with a knife on his left armpit/chest region. The
testimony of PW3 is clear and consistent on the material
particulars and nothing substantial has been elicited in the cross-
examination to discredit the same. The presence of PW3 at the
scene of occurrence is natural and undisputed, and there is no
reason as to why PW3 would falsely implicate the appellant and
allow the real assailant to go scot-free. The medical evidence
adduced through PW6 fully corroborates the ocular version. The
MLC reflects that PW3 sustained a stab wound measuring 6 × 2
cm on the chest region. The nature, dimension and location of the
injury clearly show that the blow was inflicted on a vital part of the
body. The chest being a vital region, any injury caused thereto
with a sharp-edged weapon is inherently dangerous and capable of
endangering life. The manner in which the injury was inflicted,
coupled with the fact that PW3 was restrained at the time of the
assault, leaves little room for doubt that the act was deliberate and
not accidental. The testimony of PW4, though not that of an eye-
witness to the actual act of stabbing, assumes relevance in
establishing the surrounding circumstances leading to the incident.
PW4 has deposed that the appellant used to object to PW3 talking
to her and that immediately before the incident, the appellant had
confronted PW3, which lends assurance to the prosecution version
regarding the genesis of the occurrence and the motive behind the
assault. The said testimony of PW4, therefore, reinforces the
version of PW3 with respect to the circumstances preceding the
incident. The testimony of PW9 also supports the prosecution case.
PW9 has deposed that he witnessed the appellant/accused stabbing
PW3 while the CCL restrained PW3. Merely because PW9 is
related to PW3 does not render the testimony of PW9 unreliable. It
is a settled principle that the evidence of a related witness cannot
be discarded solely on that ground if it is otherwise credible and
consistent. In the present case, nothing substantial has been elicited
in the cross-examination of PW9 to discredit the testimony of
PW9. The recovery of the weapon of offence at the instance of the
appellant, as proved by PW2, a Constable, in the team of PW10,
the Investigating Officer, and supported by PW9, further
strengthens the prosecution case and provides additional
corroboration.
20. It is also significant that the appellant was carrying a
knife of considerable length (approximately 30 cm), which is not
an article ordinarily carried by a common person in the normal
course of life. The possession of such a deadly weapon, in the
absence of any plausible explanation, itself indicates preparedness
to cause serious harm. When such a weapon is used to inflict a
blow on a vital part of the body, it furnishes a strong circumstance
to infer the requisite intention contemplated under Section 307
IPC. The contention of the appellant that only a single injury was
inflicted and that such an injury would not attract Section 307 IPC
cannot be accepted. It is a well settled position of law that even a
single blow, if inflicted with a deadly weapon on a vital part of the
body and accompanied by the requisite intention or knowledge, is
sufficient to bring the act within the ambit of Section 307 IPC. The
emphasis under Section 307 IPC is not on the number of injuries
inflicted but on the intention or knowledge with which the act is
done, as discernible from the nature of the weapon used, the part of
the body targeted and the surrounding circumstances.
21. It is equally well settled that, for sustaining a conviction
under Section 307 IPC, it is sufficient to establish the presence of
intention coupled with an overt act in furtherance thereof, and it is
not necessary that bodily injury capable of causing death must, in
fact, have been inflicted. The Section makes a distinction between
the act of the accused and its result, if any, and the Court has to see
whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the
intention or knowledge and under such circumstances as
contemplated under the provision. Therefore, an accused charged
under Section 307 IPC cannot be acquitted merely because the
injuries inflicted are simple in nature. [See State of Maharashtra
v. Balram Bama Patil and Ors., 1983 (2) SCC 28; Girija
Shanker v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2004 (3) SCC 793; and State
of Madhya Pradesh v. Saleem @ Chamaru & Anr., 2005 (5)
SCC 554. Applying the aforesaid principles, the fact that only a
single injury was inflicted or that the injury may not fall within the
category of grievous hurt does not dilute the culpability of the
appellant, once the intention and the manner of assault clearly
bring the act within the scope of Section 307 IPC.
22. The learned prosecutor submitted that the injury caused
does fall within the definition of grievous hurt under Section 320
IPC, particularly clause Eighthly. Clause Eighthly of Section 320
IPC contemplates an injury which endangers life or causes the
victim to be in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary
pursuits for a period of twenty days. In the present case, even if it
is assumed that the injury has not been conclusively proved to fall
within the strict parameters of Section 320 IPC, the same is not
determinative for the purpose of Section 307 IPC. The gravamen
of the offence under Section 307 IPC lies in the intention or
knowledge with which the act is done and not merely in the nature
or classification of the injury. The injury caused, the weapon used
and the part of the body targeted clearly indicate that the appellant
had the requisite intention or knowledge contemplated under
Section 307 IPC.
22.1. It was further contended that the recovery of the
weapon of offence is doubtful, as no independent witnesses were
joined and the recovery is supported only by police officials. It is
true that no independent witness has been associated with the
alleged recovery and no satisfactory explanation has been
furnished in that regard. However, it is equally well settled that
recovery of the weapon of offence is not sine qua non for
sustaining a conviction when there is reliable ocular evidence
available on record. In the present case, even if the evidence
regarding recovery is kept aside, the testimony of PW3, duly
corroborated by medical evidence, is sufficient to establish the
prosecution case.
22.2. The contention of the appellant regarding absence of
scientific evidence and the attempt to invoke Section 114 of the
Evidence Act also does not merit acceptance. Section 114 of the
Evidence Act enables the Court to draw presumptions, including
an adverse inference in appropriate cases. However, such a
presumption is discretionary and cannot be invoked in a routine
manner. In the present case, there is clear and cogent ocular
testimony of PW3, which stands corroborated by medical
evidence. In such circumstances, the absence of forensic evidence
or failure to lift fingerprints does not justify drawing any adverse
inference against the prosecution. The law is well settled that
lapses in investigation do not necessarily lead to the rejection of
the prosecution case when the evidence on record is otherwise
reliable and trustworthy.
23. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the
considered opinion that the prosecution has succeeded in proving
beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant inflicted a knife blow
on the chest of PW3 with such intention and under such
circumstances that, if death had been caused, the act would have
amounted to murder. Hence, I find no infirmity in the impugned
judgment warranting interference by this court.
24. Accordingly, the appeal, sans merit, is dismissed.
25. Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
APRIL 16, 2026
p'ma/mj
