[Cites 57, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Harmeet Singh vs State Of Gnct Delhi And Anr on 16 April, 2026
Author: Anup Jairam Bhambhani
Bench: Anup Jairam Bhambhani
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: 16.04.2026
+ W.P.(CRL) 1985/2025
HARMEET SINGH .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Lokesh Kumar Mishra with Mr.
Abhishek Kaushik, Mr. Nadeem
Ahmed, Advocates and petitioner in
court.
versus
STATE OF GNCT DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Anand V Khatri, ASC for the
State with SI Pinki Rana, P.S.:
Malviya Nagar.
R-2 in court.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI
J U D G M E N T
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.
The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience.
- Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
The present case is a compelling instance that brings into focus
the prescient words of Justice Holmes, since it exposes the disconnect
between a rigid legal construct and the human lives it seeks to govern.
2. By way of this petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India read with section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita
2023 („BNSS‟), the petitioner (accused), who is the husband of
respondent No.2 (prosecutrix), seeks quashing of case FIR
No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under section 64(1) of the
Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 („BNS‟) and section 6 of the Protection
of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 („POCSO Act‟) at P.S.:
Malviya Nagar, South Delhi.
3. The petition is premised on the „consent‟ of the complainant, who is
arrayed as respondent No.2 in the petition. It is not disputed that at the
time of commission of the alleged offences, respondent No.2 was
„minor‟ i.e., below the age of 18 years, for which reason an offence
under section 6 of the POCSO Act has also been alleged against the
petitioner.
4. Though otherwise, the matter is based on the consent of the parties, the
factual matrix of the matter that presents certain legal challenges is the
following:
4.1. The offences alleged are stated to have been committed by the
petitioner against respondent No.2 in or about September 2024.
Since the petitioner‟s date of birth is 03.07.2002; and the date of
birth of respondent No.2 is 30.06.2007, admittedly, at the time of
commission of the alleged offences, the petitioner was about 22
years of age, while the prosecutrix was about 17 years old.
4.2. On her own, respondent No.2 has made no complaint against the
petitioner; and the subject FIR came to be registered at the
instance of the doctors at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, where
the prosecutrix had gone for delivering her baby; and the
attending doctors discovered that she was minor. This led the
doctors at Safdarjung Hospital to inform the police, in
compliance with their legal obligation under section 21 of the
POCSO Act.
4.3. In the petition, the petitioner and respondent No.2 state that they
got married according to Sikh rites and rituals at Ambala,
Haryana on 04.09.2024; and at that time, the petitioner was
about 22 years of age; and the prosecutrix was about 17 years
old. It is further stated that on 12.06.2025 a male child was born
from the wedlock. A copy of Marriage Certificate dated
18.06.2025 has been appended as Annexure-P4 to the petition.
4.4. The petitioner and respondent No.2 are stated to be residing as
spouses alongwith their child, with the petitioner‟s family.
4.5. In the present proceedings, respondent No.2 - the prosecutrix -
has filed an affidavit, stating that she has no grievance against
the petitioner; that she has married him of her own volition; and
is residing happily and peacefully in her matrimonial home. She
has further stated, that their child is born from the wedlock; that
she does not wish to pursue any further proceedings in the
subject FIR; and that she has no objection if the subject FIR and
all proceedings arising therefrom are quashed. Statements to the
above effect have also been recorded before the learned Joint-
Registrar of this court.
4.6. In performance of their duties, upon registration of the subject
FIR, the police have investigated the matter. However, no
chargesheet has been filed in the case, at least as of the date of
the filing of the present petition.
4.7. Yet again, in the course of her interaction with the court in the
present proceedings on 02.02.2026, respondent No.2 has
reiterated her unequivocal support for the quashing of the subject
FIR and of all proceedings arising therefrom, categorically
stating that not doing so would have disastrous consequences on
her, since the young family that she and the petitioner have
started alongwith their infant would be destroyed if the petitioner
is prosecuted and sentenced to imprisonment. She has said that
the petitioner has committed no offence against her; that she was
a willing participant in the physical relationship with the
petitioner; and if the petitioner is sentenced, it would leave the
prosecutrix and her child bereft of any support and sustenance
alongwith all consequential results.
5. In the above backdrop, the court must deal with the following complex
legal dilemmas:
5.1. Can there be an „offence‟ if no loss or injury has been claimed to
have been suffered by a „victim‟, as statutorily defined?
5.2. Should a penal provision be so applied that it results in grave
consequences on the de-juré victim?
6. It would be instructive to begin with the Statement of Objects and
Reasons of the POCSO Act, which reads as follows:
STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS: Article 15 of
the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon the State powers to make
special provision for children. Further, article 39, inter alia,
provides that the State shall in particular direct its policy towards
securing that the tender age of children are not abused and their
childhood and youth are protected against exploitation and they are
given facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions of
freedom and dignity.
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children,
ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the State Parties
to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral
measures to prevent
(a) the inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any
unlawful sexual activity;
(b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or other
unlawful sexual practices; and
(c) the exploitative use of children in pornographic
performances and materials.
3. The data collected by the National Crime Records Bureau
shows that there has been increase in cases of sexual offences
against children. This is corroborated by the „Study on Child Abuse:
India 2007‟ conducted by the Ministry of Women and Child
Development. Moreover, sexual offences against children are not
adequately addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such
offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they
adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as a victim as
well as a witness, need to be protected. It is felt that offences
against children need to be defined explicitly and countered
through commensurate penalties as an effective deterrence.
4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained
comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for protection of
children from the offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment and
pornography with due regard for safeguarding the interest and
well being of the child at every stage of the judicial process,
incorporating child-friendly procedures for reporting, recording of
evidence, investigation and trial of offences and provision for
establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such offences.
5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of all
children to safety, security and protection from sexual abuse and
exploitation.
6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various
provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.
(emphasis supplied)
7. A child as a „victim‟ is therefore at the centre of the scheme and
purpose of the POCSO Act. However, the POCSO Act does not define
a „victim‟ in the statute. Instead it relies upon definitions contained in
other statutes. Section 2(2) of the POCSO Act reads as follows:
2. Definitions.--(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise
requires, --
(2) The words and expressions used herein and not defined
but defined in the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Juvenile Justice (Care
and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (2 of 2016) and the
Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) shall have the
meanings respectively assigned to them in the said Codes or the
Acts.
8. In light of the residual definition clause referred to above, it would be
relevant to refer to the definition of a "victim" under section 2(wa) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 („Cr.P.C.‟). The Cr.P.C. defines
"victim" as follows:
2. Definitions.--In this Code, unless the context otherwise
requires,--
(wa) "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or
injury caused by reason of the act or omission for which the
accused person has been charged and the expression "victim"
includes his or her guardian or legal heir;
(emphasis supplied)
9. For completeness, it may be noted that section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS
defines "victim" in almost exactly the same words as section 2(wa) of
the Cr.P.C. Section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS reads thus:
2. .Definitions.-- (1) In this Sanhita, unless the context
otherwise requires,--
(y) "victim" means a person who has suffered any loss or
injury caused by reason of the act or omission of the accused
person and includes the guardian or legal heir of such victim;
(emphasis supplied)
10. From the above definitions, it is evident that for there to be a „victim‟, a
person must have suffered loss or injury by reason of an act or
omission of another, namely the offender.
11. Equally, it is the indisputable position that the consent of a minor
victim is of no legal value; and since a minor cannot give consent,
perhaps it also requires a longer debate to examine if a victim who
subsequently turns major, can condone an act that was done when the
victim was a minor. This court would therefore not delve into the issues
of consent or of ex-post-facto condonation of an act or omission by a
minor.
12. The question that this court would venture to answer in the present case
is as to what would be the correct course of action when a minor who
the law declares to be a victim - who we may call a de-juré victim -
disclaims that she has suffered " ... ... any loss or injury caused by
reason of the act or omission of the accused person ... ..." as required
by the statutory definition of a victim.
13. The essence of the consideration is that there may be cases, where there
is a de-juré victim but no de-facto victim, since no one has complained
that they suffered any injury or loss at the hands of another.
14. In the 4th Volume of his scholarly work titled "The Moral Limits of The
Criminal Law," Joel Feinberg, a social philosopher and professor of
law at the University of Arizona (now deceased) has analysed
situations of „harmless wrongdoing‟ and „victimless crimes‟. Situations
involving consensual adolescent relationships under the POCSO
framework produce what may be described, in Feinberg‟s terms, as a
"crime without a victim." Even where neither party experiences harm in
any ordinary sense, and no complaint is forthcoming, the legal
framework operates on a normative assumption that harm inheres in
the act by reason of minority. Feinberg‟s distinction is useful here: not
all wrongs are harms, and not all harms are wrongs, since a harm in the
strict sense requires both a setback to interests of the person wronged
and a violation of their rights. In consensual adolescent relationships,
the lived experience of the parties, that is the absence of felt injury or
grievance, suggests the absence of harm inasmuch as there is no
setback to interests. However, the law treats the minor‟s consent as
legally irrelevant, thereby converting what may be a non-harmful
experience for the minor into a wrong by construing it as a violation of
the minor‟s legally protected rights.
15. This produces a conceptual dissonance: the minor girl is constructed as
a victim not because of any demonstrable harm that she may have
endured, but because the statutory framework denies her capacity for
valid consent. A strict textual approach to the law, when deployed in
cases such as the present one, in effect, prioritises a protective, statute-
based understanding of harm over lived reality, thereby collapsing the
distinction between actual victimhood and presumed vulnerability. The
result is a peculiar scenario where the victim neither claims nor
experiences harm, yet the legal framework insists on her victimhood,
and the offender-status of the accused.
16. The other consideration that would weigh with this court is whether a
court should press-on with pedantic enforcement of the law, with no
heed to the consequences that would befall a victim by such
enforcement. What should the court do if it finds that enforcing the
letter of the law, would in fact, result in serious re-victimisation of the
de-juré victim, despite the fact that the victim says that she has suffered
no loss or injury at the hands of the accused.
17. On examining their decisions, the view taken by the Supreme Court
and the various High Courts across the country, may be summarised as
follows1 :
Supreme
S.No. Case Title Circumstances & Result
Court/Date
Parties married during the
K. Kirubakaran vs.
pendency of appeal against
State of T.N.
1. 28.10.2025 conviction in the high court;
2025 SCC OnLine SC
parties cohabiting; one child;
conviction set aside
Mahesh Mukund Patel
Parties married subsequent to
vs. State of U.P.
2. 28.02.2025 FIR; parties cohabiting; one
2025 SCC OnLine SC
child; quashed
High
S.No. Case Title Circumstances & Result
Court/Date
Complainant was
Akash vs. State of U.P. Allahabad prosecutrix‟s father;
1. 2026 SCC OnLine All HC prosecutrix voluntarily left her
1619 01.04.2026 house and married the
accused; one child; quashed
Cases have been set-out in reverse chronology
Complainant was
Aalgiya Sandipbhai
prosecutrix‟s mother; parties
Chandubhai vs. State of Gujarat HC
2. married subsequent to FIR
Gujarat 01.04.2026
(prosecutrix then major);
CR.MA- 4402/2026
parties cohabiting; quashed
FIR lodged at the instance of
Abhishek vs. State of hospital authorities when the
Himachal
H.P prosecutrix went for a medical
3. Pradesh HC
2026 SCC OnLine HP check-up; parties were
25.03.2026
2332. married; two children;
quashed
Munna Harendra Gupta
vs. State of Gujarat & Gujarat HC Parties married and
Anr. 23.03.2026 cohabiting; quashed
CR.MA- 5953/2026
Sanju Singh Narwariya
Madhya Complainant was the mother
vs. State of M.P.
5. Pradesh HC of the prosecutrix; parties
2026 SCC OnLine MP
13.03.2026 married; cohabiting; quashed
FIR lodged at the instance of
Kundan Lal vs. State of hospital authorities where the
Himachal
H.P. prosecutrix delivered her child
6. Pradesh HC
2026 SCC OnLine HP one year after her marriage
12.03.2026
1743 with the accused; parties
cohabiting; quashed
Meghalaya
Shalenbor Wahlang vs. Complainant was the
HC
State of Meghalaya grandmother of the
7. (Division
2026 SCC OnLine prosecutrix; parties were
Bench)
Megh 152 married; one child; quashed
12.03.2026
Neelesh vs. State of
M.P. Madhya
Parties have married;
8. 2026 SCC OnLine MP Pradesh HC
cohabiting; quashed
3826 26.02.2026
Ravikumar vs. State of
Kerala Kerala HC Parties married; cohabiting as
2026 SCC OnLine Ker 25.02.2026 husband and wife; quashed
Mohammad Parwej vs. Complainant was the mother
State (NCT Of Delhi) Delhi HC of the prosecutrix; parties
2026 SCC OnLine Del 25.02.2026 married and cohabiting; three
1030 children; quashed
Chethan Melinamani vs. Complainant was the sister of
Karnataka
State of Karnataka the prosecutrix; parties
11. HC
2026 SCC OnLine Kar married and cohabiting;
25.02.2026
952 quashed
Akash Yadav vs. State of
Madhya
M.P. Parties married and
12. Pradesh HC
2026 SCC OnLine MP cohabiting; quashed
19.02.2026
Golu Kumar Bharti vs. Complainant was the brother
Allahabad
State of U.P. of the prosecutrix; parties
13. HC
2026 SCC OnLine All married and cohabiting;
06.02.2026
278 quashed
Anil Pal vs. State of M.P Madhya Parties married and
14. 2026 SCC OnLine MP Pradesh HC cohabiting; two children;
640. 02.02.2026 quashed
Prince Raja vs. State of Complainant as the father of
Allahabad
U.P. the prosecutrix; parties
15. HC
2026 SCC OnLine All married and cohabiting;
02.02.2026
210 quashed
Complainant was the father of
Shadab vs. State of U.P. Allahabad
the prosecutrix; parties
16. 2026 SCC OnLine All HC
married and have children;
119 29.01.2026
quashed
Valister vs. State of H.P. Himachal
Parties voluntarily married
17. 2026 SCC OnLine HP Pradesh HC
and cohabiting; quashed
233 01.01.2026
Complainant was the father of
Saivan vs. State (NCT of the prosecutrix; parties
Delhi) Delhi HC married; prosecutrix was 13
2025 SCC OnLine Del 12.12.2025 years of age at the time of the
9942 FIR/marriage; NOT
QUASHED
Saurabh vs. State (NCT
Parties married and did so
of Delhi) Delhi HC
19. voluntarily; fruitless
2025 SCC OnLine Del 26.11.2025
proceedings; quashed
Prasanjeet Mandal Parties married subsequent to
Alias Denchu vs. State Delhi HC FIR; prosecutrix gave birth
NCT of Delhi & Anr 17.11.2025 when she was 16-17 years of
CRL.M.C. 8123/2025 age; NOT QUASHED
Aman Gupta vs. State Parties married subsequent to
Govt. Of NCT of Delhi Delhi HC complaint; prosecutrix gave
& Anr. 28.11.2025 birth to her child at 17 years
CRL. M.C. 1469/2025 of age; NOT QUASHED
Wasiullah vs. State of Complainant was the mother
Allahabad
U.P. of the prosecutrix; parties
22. HC
2025 SCC OnLine All married and cohabiting; one
20.11.2025
7649 child; quashed
FIR came to be lodged upon
Prince Kumar Sharma receiving intimation on
& Ors. vs. State NCT of domestic violence helpline;
Delhi HC
23. Delhi, parties were married and
14.11.2025
2025 SCC OnLine Del cohabiting; prosecutrix found
8426 to be minor upon inquiry;
NOT QUASHED
Manikandan vs. State
Madras HC parties married and have a
24. 2025 SCC OnLine Mad
09.09.2025 child; quashed
16179
Complainant was the father of
J vs. State (NCT of
the prosecutrix; parties
Delhi) Delhi HC
25. married subsequently; parties
2024 SCC OnLine Del 14.10.2024
cohabiting for nine years; one
child; quashed
Ranjeet Kumar vs. State
Himachal Parties married subsequent to
of H.P.
26. Pradesh HC complaint; parties cohabiting;
2023 SCC OnLine HP
08.12.2023 quashed
Rihan vs. State (Govt. of
Parties married and
NCT Delhi) & Anr. Delhi HC
27. cohabiting; two children;
2023 SCC OnLine Del 25.07.2023
quashed
Complaint was lodged at the
instance of the mother of the
Erickson Lyngdoh vs.
Meghalaya prosecutrix who found out the
State of Meghalaya
28. HC pregnancy of the prosecutrix
2022 SCC OnLine
05.12.2022 upon medical examination;
Megh 648
parties married subsequently;
one child; quashed
Complainant was the maternal
Rajiv Kumar vs. State of
Allahabad uncle of the prosecutrix;
U.P.
29. HC parties voluntarily married
2022 SCC OnLine All
21.09.2022 and cohabiting; one child;
quashed
18. The predominant view of High Courts across the country therefore
appears to be to quash proceedings where the de-juré victim disclaims
that she has suffered any loss or injury, especially in cases where the
parties have subsequently married and have children, inter-alia to
preserve the future of the parties and of the children borne by them.
The common refrain of the courts across various jurisdictions has been,
that continuing with trial in such cases would be an exercise in futility.
19. The few discordant notes against the view favouring quashing of such
criminal proceedings, arise from the perspective that quashing
proceedings under the POCSO Act by consent of parties would amount
to condoning crimes against minors; premised on the principle that the
consent of a minor is legally irrelevant and the principle that the court
cannot carve-out an exception based on consensual physical
relationship with a minor, since offences under the POCSO Act are
heinous offences of moral depravity and are crimes against the society.
The view against quashing is also supported by the reasoning that a
crime cannot be retrospectively legalised by settlement or marriage;
and on the basis that judicial endorsement of the under-age marriage
cannot be permitted.
20. But the overwhelming majority of decisions have gone with the view
that overarching considerations of substantial justice must override
didactic enforcement of the statute.
21. Our own High Court has, in at least four cases, refused to quash
proceedings under the POCSO Act based on consent and marriage of
the parties with the following essential reasoning:
21.1. In Saivan vs. State (NCT of Delhi)2 the Co-ordinate Bench has
said:
"7. This is precisely the kind of matter in which the
statutory framework of the POCSO Act sits uneasily with
lived reality and the tension between the two is stark. The
material placed on record suggests a purported marriage of
the victim at the age of about 13 years and the sexual
relationship between petitioner and respondent started when
she was certainly a child. It is pertinent to note that the
contention of the petitioner that the prosecutrix was a major
at the time of offence is a matter to be determined during the
trial.
*****
"9. Quashing in such case, where there are specific
allegations of rape of minor on the basis of the settlement,
are not desirable. Further, as per the settled law which has
2025 SCC OnLine Del 9942
been consistently held by the Apex Court as well as this
Court in several occasions, the consent of minor is no
consent. Thus, even if respondent no.2 affirms to marriage
with petitioner, it would be deemed as no consent.
"10. This Court has, in unambiguous terms and on
multiple occasions, held that the power under
Section 482 Cr. P.C. cannot be exercised to quash criminal
proceedings on the basis of compromise where the offence is
heinous, not private in nature, and has a serious impact on
society, relying upon the Supreme Court and this Court's
decisions in Laxmi Narayan v. Govt Of Nct, Delhi CRL.
M.C. 3653/2015, RE: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, 2024
INSC 614, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3/2023, and State
of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. These
precedents clearly emphasize that offences involving heinous
and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. transcend the realm of private
disputes and affect the societal conscience at large.
Therefore, when an incident of such nature and gravity is
alleged, it cannot be characterized as a purely private
offence having no serious impact on society.
*****
"14. If the Respondent no.2 has made a false
allegation, then such complainant should be dealt with in
accordance with law.
"15. An order quashing the prosecution in such
circumstances would almost inevitably be perceived as
judicial endorsement of the notion that underage marriages
can be insulated from legal consequences merely because
the parties later present themselves as a settled family.
Courts cannot overlook the real possibility that what
appears to be apparent consent by a 13-year-old may in fact
be the result of familial pressure or entrenched community
expectations. Snuffing out the prosecution at the threshold
would risk conveying the message that child marriages and
sexual relationships with minors can be retrospectively
legitimized by arranging a ceremony and continuing
cohabitation. Such an approach would run squarely
contrary to the legislative intent underlying both the POCSO
Act and child marriage laws, which are designed to deter
early marriage and prevent sexual exploitation of children."
21.2. Also, in Prasanjeet Mandal Alias Denchu vs. State NCT of
Delhi & Anr.3 a learned Single Judge has taken the view:
"7.Prima facie, the fact that the victim gave birth
when she was 16-17 years of age is sufficient to make out the
alleged offence under POCSO Act. High Court while
exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, or even writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
cannot legalise the serious crime of sexual intercourse with
a minor on account of "consent".
"8. It is well-settled that the consent of a minor holds
no relevance as the law itself deems minors as being
incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse. POCSO Act is
helmed on the object of protecting children from being
victimised. When the law itself does not provide for any
exception based on consent, endorsement of underage
pregnancies or marriages will frustrate the very purpose of
the Act. This Court thus cannot lend legitimacy to such
relations by quashing the FIR."
21.3. Again in Prince Kumar Sharma and Ors. vs. State (NCT of
Delhi) & Anr. 4 a learned Single Judge has very eloquently
articulated his views as follows:
"7. Seeing the victim with her infant child brings
home that these proceedings are tied to the stability of a
young family. At the same time, this is precisely the kind of
matter in which the statutory framework of the POCSO
Act sits uneasily with lived reality and the tension between
the two is stark.
Order dated 17.11.2025 in CRL.M.C. No.8123/2025
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8426
"8. The material on record suggests a purported
marriage of the victim at the age of about 16 years and 5
months, and that the sexual relationship between her and
Petitioner No. 1 also commenced when she was certainly a
child. She became pregnant; the paternity of the child is not
in dispute; and the parties are now living together with their
baby as a family unit. On a purely human plane, therefore,
the instinctive response is to ask : if the relationship has
stabilised into a family, the child has been born, and the
victim herself does not seek to criminalise the man, why not
quash the FIR?
"9. The difficulty is that the legal position is not
ambivalent. At the time of the incident, the victim was
indisputably a child as per the definition under the POCSO
Act. The statutory scheme of the Act proceeds on a clear and
deliberate premise. Section 2(1)(d) defines a „child‟ as any
person below the age of 18 years. The offence-creating
provisions, such as Sections 3 and 7, criminalise specified
sexual acts „with a child‟. Unlike Section 375 of the IPC,
these provisions do not employ expressions such as „without
her consent‟ or „against her will‟ as ingredients of the
offence. Once it is shown that the victim was below 18 years
of age on the date of the occurrence and that the physical
acts described in the charge fall within the contours of
Sections 3 or 7, the offence is, in principle, complete.
"10. In other words, the Act does not treat absence of
consent as a constituent element when the victim is a child.
The law proceeds on the footing that a child lacks the legal
capacity to consent to sexual activity, and that any such
activity with a person below 18 is inherently exploitative.
The apparent willingness of the child, howsoever genuine it
may appear on facts, does not carry exculpatory value in
determining guilt. The concept of „age of consent‟ is thus
built into the definition of „child‟ itself; by fixing the age at
18, the Parliament has consciously removed the space for a
defence founded on so-called consensual participation by a
minor.
"11. This approach is reinforced by the presumptions
engrafted in Sections 29 and 30. Where the prosecution
establishes the foundational facts that the accused committed
the acts charged under the relevant provisions with a person
who is a „child‟, the court is required to presume that the
accused has committed the offence and that the requisite
culpable mental state was present, unless the contrary is
proved. The child‟s statement that he or she „went of his/her
own accord‟ or was in a relationship with the accused may
have a bearing on issues such as bail, sentencing, or the
exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction in rare and hard cases,
but it does not negate the ingredients of the offence under
the POCSO Act.
"12. The Supreme Court, while examining allied
questions under the IPC and POCSO, has consistently
recognised that consent of a person below the statutory age
has no legal efficacy in the context of sexual offences. The
philosophy that underlines POCSO is that of heightened
protection, not neutrality, in respect of adolescent sexuality.
Courts may, therefore, be slow to use the language of
„consensual sex‟ where one party is a child in terms of the
statute. The proper inquiry in such cases is not whether the
minor consented, but whether the prosecution has
established the child‟s age and the occurrence of the
proscribed act; once those elements stand proved, the
supposed consent of the minor cannot be invoked as a
defence to criminal liability.
"13. The present case is not a borderline matter of
age determination, nor is there any genuine doubt on this
aspect emerging from the record. The pregnancy of the
victim, as a result of sexual intercourse with Petitioner No.1,
leaves no real dispute about the occurrence of the sexual act.
Once it is accepted that she was below 18 years of age at the
relevant time, the case falls squarely within the ambit of
the POCSO Act. Under the POCSO Act, read with the then
prevailing provisions of the IPC, any sexual act with a
person under 18 is criminalised per se, without importing
"consent" as a constituent element once the victim is a child.
Since the Parliament has fixed 18 as the age below which
the law refuses to recognise sexual consent, this Court,
exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution, cannot, in the guise of doing equity, write
in a judge-made exception for "near-majority, consensual
relationships". To do so would be to cross the line from
interpretation into legislation. Subsequent developments in
the relationship, however compelling in equity, the couple
living together, the birth of a child, the victim's present
stance, cannot retrospectively legalise conduct which the
law, at the time it occurred, treated as an offence. At this
pre-trial stage, where the essential ingredients of the offence
are disclosed and there is no patent abuse of process, there
is no room for quashing the proceedings.
"14. There is, moreover, a wider institutional
concern. The present case does not involve only two young
persons who chose to live together; the parents of both sides
stand arraigned under the Prohibition of Child Marriage
Act, 2006 on the allegation that they facilitated or condoned
a marriage involving a minor girl. An order quashing the
prosecution in such circumstances would almost inevitably
be perceived as judicial endorsement of the notion that
underage marriages can be insulated from legal
consequences, so long as the parties subsequently present
themselves as a settled family. Courts cannot ignore the
possibility that what appears, on the surface, as voluntary
acquiescence by a 16-year-old may, in fact, be the product of
familial pressure or community expectations, especially once
pregnancy has occurred. To snuff out the prosecution at the
threshold would risk sending a message that child
marriages and sexual relationships with minors can be
retrospectively sanitised by arranging a ceremony and
continuing cohabitation. That would sit squarely at odds
with the legislative purpose of both POCSO and the child
marriage law, which is to deter early marriage and sexual
exploitation of children.
"15. The Court is not indifferent to the victim's wish
to protect her family. In fact, this Court is moved by the
circumstances, but it is bound by the statute. This is,
therefore, one of those hard cases where the pull of equity
is strong, but the command of the statute is stronger. This
Court, for securing the ends of justice, cannot carve out an
exception to the statute merely because the victim describes
the relationship as consensual."
(emphasis supplied)
21.4. In Aman Gupta vs. State (NCT of Delhi) 5 the Co-ordinate
Bench has said:
"5. In the considered view of this Court, offences of
the nature alleged particularly those involving sexual
offences involving children cannot be nullified merely on the
basis of settlements between the parties. Such offences, in the
true sense, cannot be regarded as offences in personam and
the same constitutes a crime against the society at large.
Offences of such nature cannot be extinguished only at the
convenience of the parties or because the victim, at a
subsequent stage, decides to marry the culprit. Any such
compromise or marriage does not ipso facto efface the
gravity of the offence or wipe out the seriousness of the
allegations.
"6. Prima facie, the fact that the victim gave birth
when she was around 17 years of age is sufficient to make
out the alleged offence under POCSO Act. ... ...
"7. While this Court is sympathetic to the plight of
the parties, in the opinion of this Court, such acts cannot
be legitimised or condoned by exercise of inherent
jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 528 of
the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023."
(emphasis supplied)
21.5. Most importantly, in Ramji Lal Bairwa and Ors. vs. State of
Rajasthan & Ors.,6 the Supreme Court has also rejected a prayer
for quashing of a POCSO offence based on compromise, with
the following significant observations:
2025 SCC OnLine Del 8632
(2025) 5 SCC 117
"9. Considering the conspectus of facts and taking
note of the rival contentions, the following twin questions of
relevance arise for consideration in this appeal:
9.1. (I) Whether a third party to a criminal
proceeding got locus standi to challenge the order
quashing the FIR concerned and all further
proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise
arrived at by the parties, in a special leave petition
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India?
9.2. (II) Whether the power to quash criminal
proceedings or complaint or FIR in regard to
heinous and serious offences having serious impact
on society, is exercisable merely because the offender
and victim or parent(s) of the victim arrived at a
compromise, relying on the dictum laid down by this
Court in Gian Singh case [Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S)
988] ?
*****
"11. The learned Amicus Curiae relied on various
decisions of this Court to drive home the point that when
criminal proceedings are abruptly terminated based on
compromise between the offender and the victim or on behalf
of the victim by the parent(s), despite the alleged offence
being one having an impact on the society and of heinous
and serious in nature and still, the State did not take up the
matter further in accordance with law, ignoring the fact that
such quashment of the proceedings was done disregarding
the opposition of the Public Prosecutor, a public-spirited
person should be having the locus standi to challenge such
an order in the interest of justice. It is furthermore submitted
that in such circumstances if a public-spirited person is non-
suited on the ground of locus standi it would only help the
offender to escape even without facing the trial. Such
situations may result in recurrence of commission of such
offences detrimental to the interests of the society.
*****
"17. The Objects and Reasons for the enactment of
the POCSO Act, as extracted above, would undoubtedly show
that quashment of proceeding initiated under the POCSO Act
abruptly by invoking the power under Section 482 CrPC
without permitting it to mature into a trial, except on
extremely compelling reasons ex facie mala fide initiated
or initiated solely to settle the score, etc. would go against
the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment. As
noted earlier, it is the inadequacy of the existing laws to
address certain issues relating to sexual offences against the
children that made the legislature to come up with the
aforesaid legislation with a view to protect and respect the
privacy and confidentiality of children and to ensure their
physical, emotional, intellectual and social development.
"18. The POCSO Act also addressed the lack of
provisions defining various offences against the children and
also adequate penal provisions therefor. A careful scanning
of the various provisions under the POCSO Act would reveal
that with a view to achieve the aforesaid objects and
purposes various offences against the children are
specifically defined and provisions for adequate penalisation
are also inserted in the Act. Obviously, rubbing the breast of
a child would constitute an offence of "sexual assault"
under Section 7 of the POCSO Act, punishable with
imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not
be less than three years and may extend to five years and
also fine. They would reveal that the commission of such
offences against the children should be viewed as heinous
and serious. Needless to say, that commission of such
offences cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature
and in fact, such offences are bound to be taken as offences
against the society.
*****
"37. A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 4-2-
2022 [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC
OnLine Raj 3564] would reveal that the High Court has
erred in not bestowing proper consideration to the law laid
down in Gian Singh case [Gian Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1
SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 988] while rendering
the same. The impugned order [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State
of Rajasthan, 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 3564] would reveal that
the allegations contained in the subject FIR were not at all
even adverted to, before quashing the same......."
(emphasis supplied)
*****
"44. In view of the very object and purpose of
enacting the POCSO Act, we find no reason to disagree with
the conclusions in SCC OnLine Del para 12 extracted above
in the given Sunil Raikwar case [Sunil Raikwar v. State,
2021 SCC OnLine Del 258]. It is more so, when the
extracted portion from the complaint that was annexed to
the FIR and extracted hereinbefore would reveal that the
accused was making pressure on him not to lodge any
report. Despite giving such statement in the complaint,
within a couple of weeks, the accused managed to
compromise the case with the 4th respondent and his wife.
"45. In the decision relied on by the High Court to
quash the proceedings viz. Gian Singh case [Gian
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 : (2012) 4 SCC
(Civ) 1188 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S)
988] and the decision in Laxmi Narayan case [State of
M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Cri) 706] in unambiguous terms this Court held that the
power under Section 482 CrPC could not be used to quash
proceedings based on compromise if it is in respect of
heinous offence which are not private in nature and have a
serious impact on the society. When an incident of the
aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred in a higher
secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be
simply described as an offence which is purely private in
nature and has no serious impact on the society.
"46. In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the
light of the decisions referred supra, the impugned order
dated 4-2-2022 of the High Court in Vimal Kumar
Gupta v. State of Rajasthan [Vimal Kumar Gupta v. State of
Rajasthan, 2022 SCC OnLine Raj 3564], quashing FIR No.
6/2022 dated 8-1-2022 and all further proceedings pursuant
thereto solely on the ground that the accused and the
complainant had settled the matter, invites interference. We
have no hesitation to hold that in cases of this nature, the
fact that in view of compromise entered into between the
parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and bleak also
cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation,
by quashing FIR and all further proceedings pursuant
thereto, by invoking the power under Section 482 CrPC."
(emphasis supplied)
It is extremely important to note that Ramji Lal Bairwa was not a
case of a purported compromise of an offence under the POCSO Act
based on the parties subsequently getting married and settling down as
a family with a young child in the picture, as is the case at hand. The
attendant facts and circumstances in Ramji Lal Bairwa were that a
school teacher had assaulted a student; and was then pressuring a
compromise in the matter, which is what led the Supreme Court to hold
against quashing of the offence under the POCSO Act in that case.
22. However, from a close reading of the rulings with similar factual
circumstances as the present case, it can be gathered that the essential
reasoning on which the courts have declined to quash proceedings
involving offences under the POCSO Act are variously: that the
consent of a minor is of no value in law; that an offence once
committed cannot be condoned ex-post-facto; that the Legislature has
left no room for condoning or compromising an offence under the
POCSO Act; and that a High Court cannot, even in exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction or constitutional powers, nullify the legislative
intent behind the POCSO Act.
23. In fact, in Prince Kumar Sharma the learned Single Judge has lamented
the consequences of being unable to quash proceedings under the
POCSO Act, observing however, that the court is constrained by the
dictate of the statute.
24. In none of these cases, however, has the court considered the aspect as
to whether there was a de-facto victim in the picture, who wanted the
offender to be prosecuted. The jurisprudential basis for the State being
the prosecuting agency in criminal offences is to prevent a criminal
prosecution from descending into an exercise in vengeance, where the
victim goes baying-for-the-blood of the offender; and to maintain
objectivity, neutrality, fairness and a sense of proportion in prosecution
of an offender. On that very premise, the State should also not adopt a
retributive line of action, when the de-juré victim says that she has
suffered no loss or injury and does not seek to proceed against the
offender.
25. To be absolutely sure, this court is not entering upon the realm of
consent of a minor in relation to a POCSO offence; nor into any ex-post
facto condonation of such offence. Though a crime can be reported at
the instance of any complainant, who may not necessarily be the victim
of the offence, in the opinion of this court it is yet central to a
prosecution that there be a de-facto victim in the picture. This court is
of the view that prosecuting a person on the shoulders only of a de-juré
victim would not be the prudent approach; muchless so, when the
consequences of such prosecution would befall the de-juré victim
herself.
26. The long-deserved primacy to be accorded to a victim in the scheme of
a criminal prosecution, was addressed by the Supreme Court in its
verdict in Jagjeet Singh & Ors. vs. Ashish Mishra @ Monu & Anr.,7
in the following words :
"22. It cannot be gainsaid that the rights of a victim under
the amended CrPC are substantive, enforceable, and are another
facet of human rights. The victim‟s right, therefore, cannot be
termed or construed restrictively like a brutum fulmen [Ed. : The
literal translation from the Latin approximates to "meaningless
thunderbolt or lightning", and is used to convey the idea of an
"empty threat" or something which is ineffective.] We reiterate that
these rights are totally independent, incomparable, and are not
accessory or auxiliary to those of the State under the CrPC. The
presence of "State" in the proceedings, therefore, does not
tantamount to according a hearing to a "victim" of the crime.
"23. A "victim" within the meaning of CrPC cannot be
asked to await the commencement of trial for asserting his/her
right to participate in the proceedings. He/She has a legally vested
right to be heard at every step post the occurrence of an offence.
Such a "victim" has unbridled participatory rights from the stage
of investigation till the culmination of the proceedings in an
appeal or revision. We may hasten to clarify that "victim" and
"complainant/informant" are two distinct connotations in criminal
jurisprudence. It is not always necessary that the
complainant/informant is also a "victim", for even a stranger to the
act of crime can be an "informant", and similarly, a "victim" need
not be the complainant or informant of a felony."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Taking cue from the observations of the Supreme Court in Jagjeet
Singh, this court is of the opinion that where there is no de-facto victim,
the commission of a crime remains a mere jurisprudential construct.
This is especially true where a victim herself denies having suffered
(2022) 9 SCC 321
any loss or injury as required under section 2(wa) of the Cr.P.C. or
section 2(1)(y) of the BNSS.
28. In its very recent decision in Ayyub Malik & Anr. vs. State of
Uttarakhand & Anr., 8 the Supreme Court was dealing with a case
where the High Court of Uttarakhand had dismissed a petition seeking
quashing of criminal proceedings where the accused was charged with
offences under sections 363/368/376(2)(d) of the Indian Penal Code
1860, as well as sections 5(8) and 6 of the POCSO Act. The case arose
when the complainant‟s daughter, about 17 years of age, accompanied
the accused and subsequently married him; and the allegation was that
the daughter was minor at the time of the alleged incident. It was the
contention of the parties that on the date of the marriage both were
major, though at the time when the girl had accompanied the boy, she
was minor.
29. In this broad backdrop, the Supreme Court overturned the order of the
Uttarakhand High Court, with the following observations :
"5.2 A faint attempt was made by learned counsel for the
respondent to try and submit that at the time of incident when the
appellant ran away with appellant No.2, appellant No.2 was a
minor and was not of marriageable age. On the other hand, it is
claimed that the boy and girl had attained marriageable age when
they entered into matrimonial relationship. Whether appellant No.2
was minor of the age little less than the marriageable, whether
appellant No.1 lured appellant No.2 and made her eloped with him
and whether the conduct on the part of appellant No.1 was in the
nature of offence alleged against him or not, are the questions
which all pale into insignificance.
2026 INSC 331
"5.3 The situation is obtained that now the parties
voluntarily got married and started residing and living together to
lead their married life without any complaint. It is noticeable that
when the FIR was filed by the father of appellant No.2 on
01.06.2020, both the appellants had already married according to
their own will and choice. Presently, both are major and almost six
years have elapsed since they are in matrimonial relationship with
each other.
"6. It may be true that fleeing with a girl who is not of
marriageable age and who is minor is an offence under law,
however, the subsequent development of marriage between the two
lovers and the fact that they have been merrily living would
outweigh the need to take the alleged offence or the criminal
proceedings to their logical end. In the fact situation like one
obtained in the present one, continuation of criminal proceedings
against appellant No.1 would become harassing and stand as an
abuse of process of law.
"6.1 Any litigation brings a kind of botheration for
the parties. The uncertainty of the outcome of the litigation
always looms large. When it is a criminal case, its pendency
becomes burdensome and worrisome. For appellant No.1 as
well as appellant No.2, negotiating the criminal
proceedings in a court of law, notwithstanding that both
are now husband and wife living together, would operate
as painful interference in their happy life. The High Court
would have done justice to the parties only by quashing the
criminal proceedings against appellant No.1 initiated by
the complainant-father of appellant No.2.
"7. In K. Kirubakaran v. State of Tamil Nadu [2025 SCC
OnLine SC 2307], where the facts were similar and akin to the
present one, this Court, while quashing the criminal proceedings
against the appellant therein including the conviction and sentence,
quoted Benjamin N. Cardozo, Former Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of United States, "The final cause of law is the
welfare of society.""
(emphasis supplied)
30. The essence of the Supreme Court judgment in Ayyub Malik is that
criminal proceedings in the said case ought to have been quashed by
the High Court if the High Court was to "have done justice to the
parties." The essence of the judgment also is that though on a technical
view of the law, fleeing with a minor girl would be an offence, the
subsequent development of the parties having married and living
together peacefully "outweigh the need to take the alleged offence or
the criminal proceedings to their logical end." Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has observed that in situations such as the one obtaining
in that case "continuation of criminal proceedings ...... would become
harassing and stand as an abuse of process of law." This court is in
respectful agreement with the articulation of the law by the Supreme
Court in Ayyub Malik. The same was the view of the Supreme Court in
its short order in Mahesh Mukund Patel.
31. This court would only add that pressing-on with a criminal prosecution
when there is no de-facto victim would not only be an exercise in
futility but also an exercise leading to absurdity.
32. In a case such as the present one, the absence of a de-facto victim
effaces the need to take the criminal proceedings forward, since that
would be an exercise to the detriment of the de-juré victim herself.
33. This court would lay special emphasis to point-out that the principal
duty of a court is to do justice; and if unleashing the letter of the law
leads to manifest injustice, a court cannot look the other way. The court
cannot lose sight of the enormity of the consequences that would befall
a victim in a case like the present one. The court cannot ignore the fact
that two lives i.e., of the de-juré victim and her minor child, would be
completely destroyed if the criminal proceedings against the petitioner
are not quashed.
34. It may also be mentioned that despite repeated remonstrations by the
courts, including by the Supreme Court, the Legislature has not applied
itself to ameliorating the rank injustice that is perpetrated by reason of
innocent actions on the part of young persons in the present context.
Attention may be drawn to the following observations of the Supreme
Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Anurudh & Anr.:9
"Society also must match institutional reform with moral
awakening. The intent and object of these legislations must be at the
forefront when a person wishes to lodge a complaint thereunder.
The misuse of these laws is a mirror to the opportunistic and self-
centered view that pervades the application of law. It is only
through discipline, integrity and courage that these problems can be
remedied and rooted out. Any legislative amendment or judicial
direction will remain lack-luster without this deeper change.We
have referred to certain instances of the High Courts noting the
misuse/misapplication of the POCSO Act, somewhat in line with the
indices appended to the impugned judgment as also its progenitors.
Considering the fact that repeated judicial notice has been
taken of the misuse of these laws, let a copy of this judgment be
circulated to the Secretary, Law, Government of India, to consider
initiation of steps as may be possible to curb this menace inter alia,
the introduction of a Romeo - Juliet clause exempting genuine
adolescent relationships from the stronghold of this law; enacting
a mechanism enabling the prosecution of those persons who, by
the use of these laws seeks to settle scores etc."
(emphasis supplied)
35. That being said, this court would also caution against wanton misuse of
„compromise‟ quashing of criminal proceedings by unscrupulous
2026 SCC OnLine SC 40; para 19
offenders against gullible or vulnerable victims. The courts must be
vigilant against offenders who use deceit, stratagem or dishonest
device, to obtain quashing of criminal proceedings in their favour. In
particular, it is necessary to instal strong guardrails and parameters for
consent quashing of criminal proceedings concerning offences under
the POCSO Act.
36. This court is of the view, that though quashing of criminal proceedings
under the POCSO Act is not anathema to the law, such quashing
demands careful and sensitive consideration of the fact situation. When
examining a plea for quashing of an offence under the POCSO Act
based on the consent of a de-juré victim, the court must carefully
evaluate the reasons as to why the victim disclaims any loss or injury to
her and must record its satisfaction inter-alia on the following aspects :
36.1. Based on the circumstances of a given case, the court must be
satisfied that in granting a „no-objection‟ to the quashing of
criminal proceedings, the de-juré victim is genuinely acting on
her own free will and volition and has not been misled,
pressurised or deceived into offering such no-objection;
36.2. Whether the de-juré victim has taken a consistent stand in favour
of closing the case from the inception of the criminal
proceedings, and has disclaimed that she has suffered any loss or
injury at the hands of the offender;
36.3. Whether the circumstances of the case justify an inference that
the acts or omissions that the parties have indulged in, were
volitional on the part of the de-juré victim;
36.4. Whether the marriage or other arrangement, based on which the
offender and the de-juré victim are seeking closure of criminal
proceedings, evokes confidence on the part of the court; or does
it appear to be a ruse or stratagem of the offender to evade
conviction and punishment;
36.5. Whether the parties have been living together as a family for a
length of time; and whether children are born to the parties,
whose future would also be impacted by a decision not to quash
the criminal proceedings;
36.6. Whether the offender is alleged to have committed any violence
or brutality on the de-juré victim; or has committed any other act
or omission that points to the absence of genuine volition on the
part of the de-juré victim; and if so, is there any medical and
other forensic evidence to show such conduct on the offender‟s
part;
36.7. What was the respective age of the offender and the de-juré
victim at the relevant time; whether both were minor; and what
are the ramifications of the relative age difference and minority;
36.8. This court would hasten to add, that the aforementioned
considerations are only suggestive and far from exhaustive; and
before quashing any criminal proceedings under the POCSO
Act, the court must interact with the parties and arrive at a
subjective satisfaction that the quashing of the case is warranted
on larger considerations of justice and to prevent abuse of the
process of law, as discussed above; and
36.9. Ultimately, the decision to quash criminal proceedings under the
POCSO Act must be founded on the best interests of the de-juré
victim and the children, if any, born from the union of the
parties.
37. This court would be remiss if it did not answer as to how the view
taken above falls within the ambit of the Supreme Court rulings in the
celebrated cases of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab 10 and Narinder
Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab & Anr.11 While in the said two
verdicts, the Supreme Court has cautioned against the quashing of
criminal proceedings relating to heinous offences regardless of any
settlement between the victim or victim‟s family and the offender, at
the same time, the Supreme Court, has also emphasized the following :
"61.... ... Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no
statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of
justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what
cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled
their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each
case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise
of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental
depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be
fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute.... ... In other words, the High
Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the
interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or
continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse
of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the
victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the
(2012) 10 SCC 303
(2014) 6 SCC 466
answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."
(emphasis supplied)
38. The same sentiment has also been echoed by the Supreme Court in
Narinder Singh.
39. Applying the aforesaid consideration to the facts of the present case,
the following aspects weigh with the court:
39.1. At the time of the alleged commission of the offence,
respondent No.2 was about 17 years and 02 months of age and
the petitioner was about 22 years old ;
39.2. Respondent No.2 never made any complaint to the police
authorities herself and the subject FIR was registered at the
instance of the doctors attending to her at the hospital where
respondent No.2 had gone to deliver the child she had had with
the petitioner;
39.3. From the outset, respondent No.2 has never pressed any charges
against the petitioner; she married him on 04.09.2024,
whereupon they had a child on 12.06.2025; and on the very next
date after the birth of the child, i.e., on 13.06.2025, the subject
FIR came to be registered;
39.4. There is not the remotest allegation that the petitioner was guilty
of any violence, much less any brutality against respondent
No.2;
39.5. In the course of hearing before this court, and during the
interaction with respondent No.2, she has expressed unequivocal
support for quashing of the criminal proceedings against the
petitioner; she has said that the relationship was the result of her
full consent and concurrence; that parties now need to take care
of their 08-month old baby; and that their young family would be
destroyed if the petitioner is prosecuted in the subject FIR.
40. Upon a conspectus of the foregoing facts and circumstances, and in
particular keeping in mind the enormous consequences that would
befall not only respondent No.2 but also her infant, both of whom
would be left completely bereft of any support and sustenance if the
petitioner were to be imprisoned, this court is persuaded to allow the
present petition.
41. In view of the foregoing discussion, in the opinion of this court, the
right course of action to secure the ends of justice and especially to
prevent re-victimisation of the de-juré victim, would be to quash the
criminal proceedings.
42. Mr. Anand V Khatri, learned ASC (Criminal) confirms that the State
has no objection to the subject FIR being quashed.
43. In the circumstances, this court is of the view that in light of the
consistent, unequivocal and volitional stand taken by respondent No.2,
continuing with the subject FIR and all subsequent proceedings would
not be conducive to the welfare and interests of respondent No.2 and
her infant.
44. Accordingly, case FIR No.279/2025 dated 13.06.2025 registered under
section 64(1) of the BNS and section 6 of the POCSO Act at P.S.:
Malviya Nagar, South Delhi is quashed. All proceedings arising therefrom
also stand closed.
45. Petition stands disposed-of.
46. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed-of.
ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.
APRIL 16, 2026
V.Rawat/ds
