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Delhi High Court
Aditya Kumar vs State Of N.C.T. Of Delhi on 15 April, 2026
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of reserving: 07th April, 2026
Date of Decision: 15th April, 2026
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.A. 822/2003
ADITYA KUMAR .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Lalit Kumar and Ms. Akansha
Lal, Advs. with Appellant-in-person.
versus
STATE (NCT OF DELHI) .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Satinder Singh Bawa, APP for
State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIMAL KUMAR YADAV
JUDGMENT
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J.
1. In order to keep check on the untoward activities in the area and
maintain law and order, police patrol normally moves in their jurisdiction.
On 19.08.1994, one such patrolling party consisting of Inspector Inspector
Rajinder Singh examined as PW-6, HC Zile Singh examined as PW-4,
Const. Shambhu Singh, Const. Prem Chandan and Const. Mehfooz Alam,
ASI Ram Singh who, while in the area of Police Station Janakpuri, noticed a
TSR with defective Registration Number Plate, which aroused suspicion in
the mind of the police personnel(s) and the suspicion further grew strong
when it was noticed that the TSR was moving in a particular area frequently.
In the meantime, at about 7:45 PM, the SHO, PS Janakpuri Inspector O.P.
Yadav examined as PW-3 alongwith his driver and the operator Const. Raj
Kumar and Const. Chander Pal respectively, arrived there. The matter was
reported to him, which led to lay a trap (Nakabandi) by the police officials.
Two teams were formed, one was headed by the SHO and the second team
was led by HC Raj Kumar, consisting of Const. Chander Pal and Const.
Prem, whereas the remaining persons, as mentioned hereinbefore, formed
part of the team headed by the SHO. The former police team headed by HC
Raj Kumar went towards Mother Dairy/Milk Booth, whereas the latter
headed by SHO Inspector O.P. Yadav (PW-3), stationed itself near the gate
of C-3A, Janakpuri. At about 8:05 PM, the same TSR with defective number
plate i.e. on one side it was DL IR 6239, whereas, on one side, only 239,
was spotted coming from the side of Pankha Road via Mall Road and
slowed down near Mother Dairy Booth. Inspector Rajinder Singh (PW-6)
told SHO that it is the same TSR, which was taking rounds in the area in a
suspicious manner. The SHO tried to stop the TSR, but instead of stopping,
the TSR sped away. The TSR was then followed by the police team in the
vehicle of the SHO and on being asked to stop, one of the occupants i.e.
Appellant Aditya Kumar fired a gunshot on the police party. Thus, the
Police Gypsy was brought in front of the TSR forcing it to stop. Police team
also took out their weapons. The attempt by the occupants of the TSR to
escape was foiled and the police team overpowered them.
2. A country made pistol was recovered from the possession of
Appellant Aditya Kumar and his search further revealed that he was having
a live cartridge as well in his right side pocket of the pant, whereas the
empty shell of the bullet fired was still there in the country made pistol.
Thereafter, the requisites of the seizure of the country made pistol (Ex. P1),
live cartridge (Ex. P-3), its sketch (Ex. PW-3/2), site plan (Ex. PW-6/A), etc.
were carried out and based upon the rukka sent by the SHO (Ex. PW-3/3), a
case was registered under Sections 307/353/186/34 Indian Penal Code, 1860
(„IPC‟) and 25/27 of Arms Act against the occupants of the TSR and the
driver as well, namely Aditya Kumar, Ashwani Kumar, Jasvir Singh and Raj
Pal. Ashwani Kumar and Jasvir Singh were found carrying button actuated
knives. All these were seized and deposited in the Malkhana after duly
sealing them. The TSR was also seized. The other requisites of the
investigation were completed and thereafter, the chargesheet was filed
against all the four accused persons. All four were charged under Sections
186/307/34 IPC. Accused Aditya Kumar was additionally charged under
Section 27 of the Arms Act.
3. In order to bring home its case, the prosecution examined eight
witnesses and thereafter, on conclusion of the trial, Statements of Accused
persons under Section 313 Cr.P.C. were recorded and ultimately, the
Appellant Aditya Kumar was held guilty and sentenced vide impugned
judgment dated 14.08.2003, whereas accused Ashwani Kumar and Jasvir
Singh were acquitted of the charges under Section 307 and 186 IPC and due
to absence of requisite sanction under Section 39 of the Arms Act, the
charge under Section 27 of Arms Act could not be brought home by the
prosecution.
4. Appellant Aditya Kumar was sentenced to undergo Rigorous
Imprisonment (RI) for a period of 04 years under Section 307 IPC and to
pay a fine of Rs. 1000/- and in default of payment of fine, he was to further
undergo Simple Imprisonment (SI) for six months. He was further sentenced
to undergo RI for a period of two months for the offence punishable under
Section 186 IPC.
5. Against the backdrop of aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
Appellate jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked and Appellant
preferred the instant appeal assailing the impugned judgment and order on
sentence on various counts.
6. Learned counsel for the Appellant has at the outset submitted that the
requisite ingredients of Section 307 Indian Penal Code are amiss and the
learned Trial Court has still decided against the Appellant and held him
guilty under Section 307 IPC. For ready reference section 307 IPC is
reproduced herein:-
"307 IPC - Attempt to Murder: Whoever does any act with
such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances
that, if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of
murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years and
shall be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by
such act, the offender shall be liable either to [imprisonment
for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore
mentioned."
Attempts by life convicts: [When any person offending under
this Section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he
may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death]."
7. In an offence under Section 307 IPC, it is the intention, knowledge
and circumstances under which the act has been committed are the most
vital factors to infer as what exactly was the object of the assailant. Bodily
injury is not necessarily to be there to constitute an offence under Section
307 IPC. This can be inferred from the bare reading of Section 307 IPC,
where enhanced punishment of life imprisonment has been provided in case
hurt has been caused, and where there is no hurt caused by the acts of the
assailant(s), the punishment has been confined to 10 years only. It is, thus,
evident that the victim getting hurt is not the deciding factor, rather the
intention/knowledge in doing an act directed towards the victim holds the
key. Although, the nature of injury actually caused may often give
considerable assistance in coming to a conclusion qua the intention of the
accused, which may be deduced from both pre and post incident
circumstances too apart from the incident itself. The deciding factor,
however, remains the intention or knowledge and the circumstances in
which the particular act done gives reasons to conclude that murder was the
intention or ultimate object, but the act fell short of murder, that is why
Section 307 IPC comes into play.
8. In Hari Kishan/State of Haryana vs. Sukhbir Singh, AIR 1988 SC
2127, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court discussed as to what all is required to
bring case under Section 307 IPC, in the following words:-
"Under Section 307 IPC what the court has to see is,
whether the act irrespective of its result, was done with the
intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned
in that section. The intention or knowledge of the accused
must be such as is necessary to constitute murder. Without
this ingredient being established, there can be no offence of
"attempt to murder". Under Section 307 the intention
precedes the act attributed to accused. Therefore, the
intention is to be gathered from all circumstances, and not
merely from the consequences that ensue. The nature of the
weapon used, manner in which it is used, motive for the
crime, severity of the blow, the part of the body where the
injury is inflicted are some of the factors that may be taken
into consideration to determine the intention."
9. The intention or knowledge can be inferred from the utterances, the
acts, a combination of utterances and conduct or from the overall
circumstances, the relationship of parties involved, previous enmity or
hostility and motive etc. Thus, factual position, the acts/omissions, the
words/utterances accompanied by the acts or otherwise, and the
circumstances/situations are relevant factors together with attending
circumstances to infer intention, albeit this is not exhaustive, conclusive and
complete. The question of intention or knowledge of the accused must be
such as is necessary to constitute murder, as was observed in the case titled
as Hari Kishan's case (supra).
10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kesar Singh v. State of Haryana,
(2008) 15 SCC 753, proceeded to draw the distinction as:
"30. It can thus be seen that the "knowledge" as contrasted with
"intention" signifies a state of mental realisation with the bare state
of conscious awareness of certain facts in which human mind
remains supine or inactive. On the other hand, "intention" is a
conscious state in which mental faculties are aroused into activity
and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived
end. It means shaping of one's conduct so as to bring about a certain
event. Therefore, in the case of "intention" mental faculties are
projected in a set direction. Intention need not necessarily involve
premeditation. Whether there is such an intention or not is a
question of fact."
11. In Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Admn.) (1991) 2 SCC 32, it was
elucidated that knowledge is bare awareness and not something equivalent
to intention, for the latter requires something more than a mere foresight of
the consequences namely, the purposeful doing of a thing to achieve a
particular end. Knowledge has to be factually implied from the
circumstances, and it may not be necessary that the accused must exactly
know what will happen. It is not necessary that the accused should have
intended what had actually happened. It is sufficient and adequate that the
accused deliberately or voluntarily takes the "risk" that the crime/offence
might be committed, even when he hopes that the risk would not lead to any
damage or harm.
12. It has been observed that the question of intention to kill or
knowledge of death in terms of Section 307 IPC is a question of fact and not
one of law as it would depend on the facts of a given case. Reference can be
made to the judgment in Vasant Virthu Jadhav's case (Supra). Thus, the
facts narrated and gathered during investigation becomes deciding factors
together with the overall evidence. Reference in his context can also be
made to the judgment titled as Ansarudin v. State of Madhya Pradesh,
(1997) 2 Crimes 157 (MP).
13. It is the intention which is of paramount importance and if such an
intent coupled with some overt act in execution of that particular intention is
there, then it is sufficient to hold a person responsible for an offence under
Section 307 IPC as contemplated in section itself.
14. Incidentally, it is not mandatory that there should be a physical harm
or bodily injury to the victim as in that eventuality a punishment goes up to
the life imprisonment as can be seen in part 2 of Section 307 IPC.
15. Therefore, what is important is that the assailant should have the
intention or the knowledge that the act which is being done by him has
potential to cause death or it may likely cause death of the victim.
16. Intention is an abstract phenomenon and cannot be deciphered or
inferred by anyone regarding the mindset of the other. What is going in the
mind of a person is nearly impossible to ascertain or cull out. However,
intention manifests itself in the act utterances, omissions, use of weapon,
targeted body, part number of attempts or injuries caused, so on and so forth.
17. When the evidence on record is juxtaposed to the requirement of law
then it apparently attracts section 307 IPC. What has come in evidence is
that the TSR was being chased by the police personnel and the Appellant
fired a gunshot from the back window of the TSR aiming towards the
police party. There is evidence to the effect that gunshot was fired as the
spent cartridge found stuck in the barrel was recovered in the weapon of
offence i.e. a country made pistol. The Central Forensic Science Laboratory
(CFSL) report is there, which corroborates the requisite aspect in this
context. This evidentiary finding, coupled with the fact that a country made
pistol is a lethal weapon having the potential to cause death if the bullet hits
the victim, removes any doubt in establishing intention under Section 307
IPC.
18. The contention on behalf of the counsel for the Appellant that there
was no intention to cause death as the gunshot, even if it is presumed to
have been fired, was fired to scare away the police team hot on the heels of
the Appellant and his Associates. However, this contention seems to be
hollow enough to be believed inasmuch as the gunshot was fired aiming at
the police team from the back window. In case the Appellant wanted to
scare away and escape from the scene then the gunshot would have been
fired in the air from the side openings of the TSR. As such this contention
of the Appellant is brushed aside.
19. Apart from the aforesaid submissions it is further argued that the
case of the prosecution is full of contradictory circumstances and therefore,
does not inspire confidence, so much so as to hold the Appellant guilty of
any offence.
20. Variation of contradictions are bound to occur in the narrative on
account of the limitation of the human memory and narration skills. A slip
in narration of facts here or there is not unusual rather natural. What is
important is that the soul of the narrative has been kept inact. As long as
the material aspects remain intact and unalloyed, the discrepancies or
variations do not affect the core issue. Reference in this context can be
made to the following judgment where various judgments were taken into
account to give a kind of detailed guideline.
Balu Sudam Khalde v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 13 SCC 365:
"25. The appreciation of ocular evidence is a hard task. There is no
fixed or strait jacket formula for appreciation of the ocular evidence.
The judicially evolved principles for appreciation of ocular evidence
in a criminal case can be enumerated as under:
I. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the
approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read
as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that
impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the
Court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping
in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed
out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find
out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence
given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of
the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief.
II. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had
the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor
of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which
had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the
appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there
are reasons weighty and formidable it would not be proper
to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or
infirmities in the matter of trivial details.
III. When eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. But courts
should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in
the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the
credibility of his version that the court is justified in
jettisoning his evidence.
IV. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the
core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking
sentences torn out of context here or there from the
evidence, attaching importance to some technical error
committed by the investigating officer not going to the root
of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the
evidence as a whole.
V. Too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations
falling in the narration of an incident (either as between
the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements
of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial
scrutiny.
VI. By and large a witness cannot be expected to possess a
photographic memory and to recall the details of an
incident. It is not as if a video tape is replayed on the
mental screen.
VII. Ordinarily it so happens that a witness is overtaken by
events. The witness could not have anticipated the
occurrence which so often has an element of surprise. The
mental faculties therefore cannot be expected to be attuned
to absorb the details.
VIII. The powers of observation differ from person to
person. What one may notice, another may not. An object
or movement might emboss its image on one person's mind
whereas it might go unnoticed on the part of another.
IX. By and large people cannot accurately recall a
conversation and reproduce the very words used by them
or heard by them. They can only recall the main purport of
the conversation. It is unrealistic to expect a witness to be
a human tape recorder.
X. In regard to exact time of an incident, or the time
duration of an occurrence, usually, people make their
estimates by guesswork on the spur of the moment at the
time of interrogation. And one cannot expect people to
make very precise or reliable estimates in such matters.
Again, it depends on the time-sense of individuals which
varies from person to person.
XI. Ordinarily a witness cannot be expected to recall
accurately the sequence of events which take place in rapid
succession or in a short time span. A witness is liable to
get confused, or mixed up when interrogated later on.
XII. A witness, though wholly truthful, is liable to be
overawed by the court atmosphere and the piercing cross-
examination by counsel and out of nervousness mix up
facts, get confused regarding sequence of events, or fill up
details from imagination on the spur of the moment. The
subconscious mind of the witness sometimes so operates on
account of the fear of looking foolish or being disbelieved
though the witness is giving a truthful and honest account
of the occurrence witnessed by him.
XIII. A former statement though seemingly inconsistent
with the evidence need not necessarily be sufficient to
amount to contradiction. Unless the former statement has
the potency to discredit the later statement, even if the later
statement is at variance with the former to some extent it
would not be helpful to contradict that witness."
Reference can also be made to Narayan Chetanram
Chaudhary v. state of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 547,
State of rajasthan v smt. Kalki &anr 1981 SCC(@) 752,
Sunil kumarsambhudayalgupta (Dr.) V. State of
Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657, Raj kumarsingh alias
raju alias batya v. state of rajasthan (2013) 5 SCC 722."
21. It has also been put forth by learned counsel that there is no direct
and cogent evidence as to who exactly fired the gunshot. Therefore,
holding the Appellant Aditya Kumar responsible for the offence under
Section 307 IPC is not appropriate. Learned Trial Court has held him
responsible only on the basis of surmises and conjectures. However, the
witnesses have deposed about the gunshot being fired aimed at the police
team and recovery of the fire arm from the possession of the Appellant i.e.
country made pistol and a live cartridge from his pocket, unequivocally
tells that it was he who had the audacity and temerity to fire a gunshot
aiming at the police team. None of the other occupants of the TSR were
carrying any fire arm, rather two of them were having button actuated
knives. In such circumstances, the only inference which can be drawn and
has been drawn is the complicity of the Appellant and rightly so.
22. The other contention that lead of the bullet was not recovered nor
any imprint or impact has been found on the police vehicle indicates that it
was not fired towards police team therefore, the aim was not the policemen.
The Appellant therefore cannot be attributed with the intention or
knowledge as required under Section 307 IPC and as such cannot be held
responsible, even if it is presumed that gunshot was fired.
23. This again is not a convincing argument in view of the fact that lead
may not have hit the police vehicle as aim was not the vehicle but the
policemen and as the bullet was fired from a moving vehicle towards
another moving vehicle, therefore, it is not necessary that it had to hit the
vehicle, though it did not hit any policemen either. But, this does not in any
manner diminishes or takes away the guilty intention of the Appellant.
24. Investigation has also been questioned by the Appellant and it is
asserted that it is inappropriate and defective by pointing out that the site
plan (Ex. PW-6/A) does not reflect the position of the personnels of the two
teams formed and that the TSR having the defective number plate was not
seized by the police.
25. It is not that the site plan Ex PW-6/A is not there and does not reflect
anything material, apart from showing that a "milk booth" was there
instead of "Mother Dairy Milk Booth". Therefore, the investigation cannot
be said to be incomplete or defective merely because the site plan is not
according to the expectations of the Appellant. Had there been no Milk
Booth at all there the position would have required some explanation as
Milk Booth is being referred in the testimony as a kind of landmark too.
Milk Booth and Mother Dairy Milk Booth are interchangeably and
frequently used. So no adverse inference can be drawn against the
prosecution.
26. So far as the seizure of the TSR is concerned the contention is
contrary to the record and unfounded inasmuch as the TSR was seized, as
can be seen from the Malkhana register, and was later on released on
Superdari of Rs. 40,000/- to the driver, namely Ashwani Kumar as
reflected in Ex. PW5/A 1-8, at entry number 2552 in the Malkhana
Register. Therefore, the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is bald
having no substance.
27. It is submitted that the incident took place in a crowded residential
area but the policemen did not bother to join any independent public
witness and for that matter no effort was made either, that too despite the
fact that independent public persons were available at the spot. It has been
deposed by the witnesses that requests were made to the public persons, but
none agreed, therefore, no such witness was available. However, there is no
requirement of law to include so called independent public witness, which
may be termed as mandatory or indispensable. What is required is the
evidence and the law does not make any distinction between a public
witness or an official witness. The need of the independent public witness
is only felt where something like possession in itself is an offence, but even
that is not mandatory rather a precautionary measure. In addition to that, it
is a matter of common knowledge that nobody from the general public
wants to get entangled into any proceedings, which has some relation with
police or the Court on account of the perceived harassment due to the
procedural formalities. Therefore, in such circumstances, having an
independent public witness is neither required nor fatal to the case.
28. The learned counsel for the Appellant has further argued that no
reason has been assigned as to why a „nakabandi‟ was put in place
inasmuch as there was no information, secret otherwise with the policemen
about the Appellant and the other occupants of the TSR that some or the
other offence is being contemplated by them. In such circumstances, the
case is nothing but a high-handed approach on the part of the policemen
who have falsely implicated the Appellant in the instant case.
29. The genesis of the case is in the defective Registration Number Plate
of the TSR, as has been noticed by Inspector Rajinder Singh (PW-6) and
police team along with him. That the TSR was having incomplete number
on one side i.e. 239, whereas the complete number was DL1R6239. This
was sufficient to ignite the suspicion in the mind of the policemen and the
suspicion grew further and stronger when the TSR was seen hovering
around in that particular area. The police team, as such, has sufficient
reasons to become suspicious about the intentions of the occupants of the
TSR.
30. The apprehension and the suspicion turned out to be correct when
the police team signaled the TSR to stop, but instead of stopping, the TSR
sped away, which was chased and neutralized by putting the police vehicle
in front of the TSR, but before that a gunshot was already fired on the
police team.
31. The Policemen are responsible for maintaining law and order and
check the crime. Patrolling in the jurisdiction of the police station is one of
the methods used by the policemen in order to keep a watch on the
activities on the street and during one such patrol, the TSR was spotted
displaying defective number plate and when it took round after round in
that particular area, which gave reason to the policemen to doubt the
intentions of the occupants of the TSR. In such circumstances, if a
„nakabandi‟ or the trap was laid or the TSR was asked to stop and chased
when the accused tried to escape in it, there was nothing unusual for the
police, which was done by the police. As such the contention in this context
has no substance and thus, is brushed aside.
32. Ultimately, it turned out to be a case where the occupants were
armed with the illegal weapons and a gunshot was fired, thus, the
contention raised on behalf of the Appellant gets a drubbing and loses its
strength and sheen and bound to fail, being unable to carve out a case in
favour of the Appellant.
33. The antecedents of the Appellant are questionable as his involvement
has been reported in a number of cases by learned APP whereas the learned
counsel did not come forward with his details nor has he countered the
contentions of learned APP and as, all cases in question are reportedly of
violent nature, therefore, no mitigating circumstance qua the sentence is
there to reconsider the sentence awarded. Therefore, in such circumstances,
the Appellant does not deserve any indulgence on the aspect of sentence
either.
34. As a result the appeal stands dismissed. He is to surrender to undergo
the remaining sentence.
35. A copy of the judgment be transmitted to the prison authorities and
the Court concerned.
VIMAL KUMAR YADAV, J
APRIL 15, 2026/akc/hk/ij
