[Cites 24, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Delhi Transport Corporation vs Harish Chandra on 13 April, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 10.02.2026
Date of decision: 13.04.2026
Uploaded on: 13.04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 3183/2011
DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Uday N. Tiwari, Adv.
versus
HARISH CHANDRA .....Respondent
Through: Mr. M.P. Sinha, Mr. Satyam Mishra
and Ms. VhavyaRazshree, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE SHAIL JAIN
JUDGMENT
SHAIL JAIN, J.
1. The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, Delhi
Transport Corporation, under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of
India, assailing the order dated 28.10.2009 (hereinafter referred to as the
Impugned Order) and the Award dated 02.12.2010 (hereinafter referred to as
the Impugned Award) passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour
Court, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi, in DID No. 01/2008.
BRIEF FACTS:
2. The brief factual matrix, as borne out from the record, is that the
respondent/workman, Harish Chandra (hereinafter referred to as the
Respondent), was employed as a Conductor with the petitioner, Delhi
Transport Corporation (DTC), since the year 1985 and was posted at
Shriniwaspuri Depot, bearing Badge No. 22659.
3. On 16.10.2003, while the Respondent was performing his duties as a
Conductor in Bus No. 6467 on Route No. 518/9, the bus was checked by the
checking staff of the petitioner Corporation at the Hazrat Nizamuddin
Railway Station Bus Stand at about 13:05 hours. During the inspection of
the waybill and ticket blocks, it was allegedly found that the Respondent
was in possession of certain ticket blocks of denominations of ₹5 and ₹10,
bearing specific serial numbers, which were alleged to be
counterfeit/duplicate in nature.
4. As per the checking report prepared by the checking staff, it was
alleged that the Respondent possessed:
(i) a ticket block of denomination ₹5 bearing numbers 448-82164 to
82199, which were alleged to be counterfeit, whereas genuine tickets of
the same block series 448-82161 to 82199 were also available; and
(ii) ticket blocks of denomination ₹10 bearing numbers 483-11755 to
11799 and 483-11770 to 11799, which were stated to be bogus,
whereas genuine tickets of the same series11760 to 11799 were also
found.
5. Pursuant to the said incident, the Respondent was taken to the
headquarters, and FIR No. 104/2003 was registered at Police Station Hazrat
Nizamuddin Railway Station on same day under Sections 420, 468 and 471
IPC. The Respondent remained in judicial custody from 16.10.2003 to
30.10.2003.
6. The respondent/workman was placed under suspension vide order
dated 17.10.2003, pending initiation and conclusion of disciplinary
proceedings arising out of the alleged incident.
7. Thereafter, a charge sheet dated 24.02.2005 was issued by the
petitioner/management alleging misconduct under Rule 19(b), (f), (h) and
(m) of the DTC (Conduct) Rules, primarily on the ground of possession of
forged/bogus ticket blocks causing financial loss to the Corporation. The
Respondent submitted his reply to the charge sheet denying the allegations.
Not being satisfied with the explanation furnished, the management initiated
departmental disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent.
8. The enquiry proceedings were conducted initially by Ms. Sunita
Chauhan and subsequently by Sh. Sushil Jacob on various dates between
08.04.2005 and 29.03.2006. During the course of the enquiry, the
management examined witnesses, including members of the checking staff.
The Respondent participated in the enquiry proceedings and cross-examined
the witnesses produced by the management. Upon completion of the enquiry
proceedings, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report dated 25.04.2006,
holding that the charges against the Respondent stood proved.
9. Based on the findings recorded in the enquiry report, the management
issued a show cause notice dated 13.10.2006 proposing the penalty of
removal from service. The Respondent submitted his reply to the said
notice; however, the disciplinary authority was not satisfied with the
explanation offered. Consequently, the management passed an order dated
12.12.2006, whereby the Respondent was removed from service.
10. Aggrieved thereby, the Respondent raised an industrial dispute,
registered as DID No. 01/2008 before the Labour Court, Karkardooma
Courts, Delhi.
11. During the course of the proceedings, the Labour Court first
considered the issue relating to the validity of the domestic enquiry and, by
order dated 28.10.2009, held that the enquiry conducted by the management
was not fair and proper. The management was thereafter granted an
opportunity to lead evidence before the Court to establish the alleged
misconduct on merits.
12. Upon appreciation of the evidence produced by both the parties, the
Labour Court, by the Impugned Award dated 02.12.2010, came to the
conclusion that the management had failed to prove the charges levelled
against the Respondent/workman and consequently directed his
reinstatement in service, though without back wages.
13. Aggrieved by the order dated 28.10.2009 and the Impugned Award
dated 02.12.2010, the petitioner/management has filed the present writ
petition before this Court under Article 226 & 227 of the Constitution Of
India. During the pendency of the present writ petition, the Respondent filed
an application under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
(Hereinafter, referred as ID Act,1947). By order dated 29.03.2012, this
Court directed the petitioner/management to pay the Respondent either his
last drawn wages or the minimum wages, whichever is higher, from the date
of the Impugned Award till the disposal of the present petition.
14. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
14.1 Learned counsel for the petitioner/management submitted that the
Labour Court erred in holding that the domestic enquiry was not fair and
proper. It was contended that the finding that the enquiry stood vitiated on
account of the absence of a Labour Welfare Officer and a Presenting Officer
is contrary to settled principles governing disciplinary proceedings. It was
submitted that departmental instructions regarding the presence of a Labour
Welfare Officer are directory in nature, and their non-compliance does not,
by itself, vitiate the enquiry. Reliance was placed on Ramesh Chand v.
Delhi Transport Corporation,2007 SCC OnLine Del 858.
14.2 It was further submitted that the record of the enquiry proceedings
demonstrates that the respondent/workman was offered the assistance of a
co-worker or Labour Welfare Officer, which he declined, and thereafter
participated in the proceedings, including cross-examination of witnesses. It
was contended that, in such circumstances, no prejudice was caused and the
enquiry could not have been held to be vitiated.
14.3 Learned counsel also submitted that there is no mandatory
requirement for appointment of a Presenting Officer in every departmental
enquiry, and that the absence of a Presenting Officer does not vitiate the
proceedings in the absence of demonstrated prejudice. Reliance was placed
on Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma (2018) 7 SCC 670 ; DTC v.
Hanumant Singh, W.P.(C) 717/2011 ; DTC v. Kishori Lal, 2013 SCC
OnLine Del 669, and DTC v. Rajpal &Anr, W.P.(C) 6218/2001.
14.4 On merits, it was submitted that the Labour Court erred in holding
that the misconduct was not proved despite granting the management an
opportunity to lead evidence. It was contended that the Labour Court
adopted an unduly technical approach in discarding the management's case
on the ground that the original documents were not produced, particularly
when the witness had deposed that the same were in police custody. It was
further submitted that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
proceedings before the Labour Court, and reliance could be placed on
relevant material even in the absence of formal proof. In this regard, reliance
was placed on Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation&Ors v.
JadejaGovubhaChhanubha, (2014) 16 SCC 130 and Karnataka State
Road Transport Corporation v. Lakshmidevamma (Smt) &Anr, (2001) 5
SCC 433.
14.5 Learned counsel also contended that the Labour Court erred in
discarding the testimony of MW-1 merely on the ground that he was the sole
witness, as there is no rule that the testimony of a solitary witness cannot be
relied upon if it is otherwise credible. Reliance was placed on Banaras
Electric Light & Power Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court II (1974) 3 SCC 103. It
was further submitted that the Labour Court failed to consider material
aspects of the evidence, including the alleged admission of the respondent
during the enquiry proceedings, and that the respondent did not lead any
rebuttal evidence.
14.6 On the aforesaid grounds, it was contended that the Labour Court
erred both in holding the domestic enquiry to be vitiated and in concluding
that the misconduct was not proved.
15. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT
15.1. Learned counsel for the respondent/workman submitted that the
impugned order dated 28.10.2009 and the Award dated 02.12.2010 do not
suffer from any illegality or infirmity warranting interference under Articles
226 and 227 of the Constitution of India.
15.2 It was contended that the Labour Court rightly held the domestic
enquiry to be vitiated, having regard to the non-compliance with the office
memorandum dated 13.10.1965, which required the presence of a Labour
Welfare Officer during enquiry proceedings, as well as the absence of a
Presenting Officer. Reliance was placed on DTC v. Maha Singh W.P.(C)
2228/2004 to contend that such requirements were mandatory.
15.3 On merits, it was submitted that, after granting opportunity to the
management to lead evidence, the Labour Court correctly concluded that the
misconduct was not proved. The management examined only one witness
(MW-1), and failed to produce the original documents forming the basis of
the charge or to examine other members of the checking staff. It was further
submitted that the material on record indicated the presence of another
conductor on duty, whose role was not explained, thereby creating doubt as
to the allegations. In these circumstances, the Labour Court rightly held that
the sole uncorroborated testimony of MW-1 was insufficient to establish the
charge.
15.4 Learned counsel further submitted that the respondent/workman was
acquitted in the criminal proceedings arising out of the same incident. It was
also submitted that, during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent
was paid wages under Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, in
terms of the order dated 29.03.2012, which continued till he attained the age
of superannuation. It was contended that the respondent is entitled to the
benefits flowing from the Award, subject to adjustment of the amounts
received under Section 17-B, ID Act, 1947.
16. Issues for Consideration
In light of the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and the
material placed on record, the following issues arise for consideration before
this Court:
I. Whether the Labour Court was justified in holding, vide order dated
28.10.2009, that the domestic enquiry conducted by the
petitioner/management was not fair and proper and consequently stood
vitiated?
II. Whether the Labour Court was correct in concluding, in the impugned
Award dated 02.12.2010, that the petitioner/management failed to
prove the alleged misconduct against the respondent/workman after
leading evidence before the Court?
III. Whether the impugned order dated 28.10.2009 and the Award dated
02.12.2010 passed by the Labour Court warrant interference by this
Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India?
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
17. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
placed on record, this Court proceeds to examine the present writ petition.
At the outset, it is well settled that the jurisdiction of this Court under
Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is supervisory in nature and
not appellate. This Court does not sit in appeal over the findings returned by
the Labour Court, nor does it undertake a re-appreciation of evidence or
substitute its own conclusions on facts. It is equally well settled that
interference with findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court is warranted
only where such findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or suffer from
jurisdictional error, patent illegality, or a manifest misapplication of settled
legal principles. So long as the findings recorded by the Labour Court are
based on a reasonable appreciation of evidence and are not perverse, no
interference is called for merely because another view may also be possible.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court has consistently reiterated these principles. It is
in the aforesaid limited scope of jurisdiction that the present issues are
required to be examined.
18. At the outset, it may be noted that the present writ petition arises from
two findings forming part of the same adjudicatory process. Issue No. 1,
relating to the validity of the domestic enquiry, was decided by order dated
28.10.2009, whereas Issue No. 2, concerning the merits of the charges and
legality of termination, was adjudicated in the impugned Award dated
02.12.2010. Thus, both findings, though rendered at different stages, form
part of the overall Award and are subject to examination in the present writ
petition.
19. Insofar as Issue No. 1 is concerned, the petitioner has assailed the
Impugned Order dated 28.10.2009 passed by the Labour Court, whereby the
domestic enquiry conducted by the petitioner/management was held to be
unfair and improper, primarily on the ground that the enquiry proceedings
were conducted without the presence of a Labour Welfare Officer and a
Presenting Officer. The operative portion of the said order reads as under:
"4.The office memorandum dated 13.10.1965 issued by the
AGM (Admn.) bearing No. Admi.-21(73)/64 makes it
mandatory that in charge-sheet cases where dismissal from
service is proposed, the presence of a Labour Officer or
Labour Welfare Officer should be arranged during the
course of the oral enquiry to watch the interest of the
employee.
5.Learned AR for the management submits that an offer
was made to the workman which he declined. Mere offering
by the management is not sufficient as per the circular. It is
for the management to have made such arrangements
mandatorily. It is in this context one should understand the
need of appointing a Presenting Officer. Though the rules of
DTC do not provide for appointing the Presenting Officer,
the Hon'ble High Court in DTC v. Maha Singh, W.P. No.
2228/1994 (decided on 28.04.2005) noted that non-
appointment is an irregularity.
6.In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that
the enquiry conducted by the management cannot be
treated as fair, proper and valid Thus, I pass the following
order :
ORDER
The enquiry issue is held in favour of the workman and
against the management."
20. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the Labour Court held the
enquiry to be vitiated on procedural grounds. The Labour Court proceeded
on the basis that the office memorandum dated 13.10.1965 imposed a
mandatory requirement to ensure the presence of a Labour Welfare Officer,
and further observed that the absence of a Presenting Officer affected the
fairness of the enquiry. On this reasoning, it concluded that the enquiry was
not fair, proper or valid, and accordingly decided the preliminary issue in
favour of the workman.
21. As regards Issue No. 1 decided by the impugned order dated
28.10.2009 this Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, confines its examination to the limited question as to
whether the Labour Court was justified in holding the domestic enquiry to
be vitiated on account of the aforesaid procedural grounds, namely, (i) non-
presence of a Labour Welfare Officer and (ii) non-appointment of a
Presenting Officer. It is clarified that this Court is not examining the merits
of the charges, the sufficiency of evidence, or any other aspect of the
enquiry, and the consideration herein is restricted only to the aforesaid
procedural grounds, while considering the validity of domestic enquiry.
22. The contention urged on behalf of the petitioner is that the finding of
the Labour Court is contrary to settled law, inasmuch as departmental
instructions are in the nature of guidelines and not mandatory, and that the
absence of a Presenting Officer, in the absence of any demonstrated
prejudice or denial of fair opportunity, does not vitiate the enquiry. This
contention now falls for consideration.
23. Examining the aforesaid contention, this Court is of the view that the
finding of the Labour Court that the domestic enquiry stood vitiated is
legally unsustainable. The Labour Court proceeded on the premise that the
presence of a Labour Welfare Officer and the appointment of a Presenting
Officer were mandatory, and that their absence, by itself, rendered the
enquiry defective. Such an approach is contrary to settled law, as it treats
procedural requirements as determinative without examining whether any
prejudice was caused to the workman. It is well settled that a domestic
enquiry cannot be invalidated on mere procedural irregularities unless it is
shown that such deviation has resulted in denial of a fair opportunity or has
caused real prejudice to the delinquent employee; the governing test being
whether the enquiry, viewed as a whole, was fair and in accordance with the
principles of natural justice.
24. It is well settled that a domestic enquiry need not conform to the strict
procedural framework of judicial proceedings; it is sufficient if the
principles of natural justice are observed, namely, that the workman is
informed of the charges, afforded a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself, permitted to participate in the proceedings including cross-
examination of witnesses, and that the enquiry is conducted fairly by an
impartial authority.
25. In this context, the approach of the Labour Court in treating the office
memorandum dated 13.10.1965 as imposing a mandatory requirement
cannot be sustained. The said memorandum, being an internal administrative
instruction regulating disciplinary proceedings, does not have the force of a
statutory rule. Its non-compliance, therefore, does not ipso facto vitiate the
enquiry, unless it is shown that such deviation has resulted in denial of a fair
opportunity or has caused real prejudice to the delinquent employee which
fact has neither been claimed nor proved by the workman.
26. In support of the aforesaid position, reference may be made to
Ramesh Chand v. Delhi Transport Corporation, ILR (2008) I Delhi 21:
2007 SCC OnLine Del 858, wherein this Court held that departmental
circulars are in the nature of rules of prudence and not mandatory directions,
and that their non-compliance does not, by itself, vitiate the enquiry. It was
further observed that where the workman is afforded an opportunity to take
assistance but declines the same and participates in the enquiry, including by
cross-examining witnesses, no violation of the principles of natural justice
can be made out. The Court observed as under:
"6. We have considered all the submissions in the light of
the records. So far as the first ground taken before us which
pertains to violation of the mandates of the circular dated
12.12.1973 is concerned, a similar issue was raised before
us in the LPA No. 2290/2006 titled as Dharam Pal v. Delhi
Transport Corporation. In the said case also, the aforesaid
contention was rejected. Such a contention was also a
subject matter of consideration before this Court in writ
petition being CWP No. 1420/2002 title as DTC v. Shyam
Singh &Anr., The said writ petition was disposed of by
judgment and order dated 29th September, 2004 and the
Court held as under:
"Reliance placed by the learned Tribunal on the
circular dated 12th February, 1973 is also
misplaced. The circular requires the Enquiry
Officer to ask a delinquent, on each date of the
proceedings, whether he needs the assistance of
any other workman. This circular merely
incorporate a rule of prudence and not a
mandatory direction, non- compliance of which
would invalidate an inquiry. In a case such as the
present, the respondent-workman, a literate
conductor refused to take the assistance of a co-
worker in the very first hearing. This being the
position, the Enquiry Officer cannot be expected
to ask him in every hearing whether he requires
the assistance of any other worker. "
7. Therefore, we are not inclined to accept the aforesaid
contention raised by the counsel appearing for the
appellant. Even otherwise on perusal of the records, we find
that the appellant was given the opportunity to engage a
defence assistant and the said opportunity was refused by
the appellant stating that he would himself cross-examine
the witnesses. In fact, the records indicate that he had
himself cross-examined the witnesses produced. Therefore,
the aforesaid contention raised regarding denial of
opportunity is misconceived and is rejected."
[ Emphasis supplied]
27. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident that the Labour Court erred in treating procedural aspects as
determinative without examining whether any prejudice was caused to the
workman. The record shows that the workman was informed of the charges
and afforded a full and effective opportunity to participate in the enquiry,
including cross-examining the management witnesses and presenting his
defence. He was also given an opportunity to avail the assistance of a co-
worker or Labour Welfare Officer, on each day of enquiry which he
declined. In such circumstances, where the opportunity was available but not
availed, no prejudice can be said to have been caused. The enquiry
proceedings thus reflect substantial compliance with the principles of natural
justice.
28. The Labour Court has further held the enquiry to be defective on
account of the non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, which requires
examination in light of the settled legal position. The mere non-appointment
of a Presenting Officer does not, by itself, vitiate a departmental enquiry,
particularly where no such requirement is prescribed by the applicable rules.
The validity of the enquiry is to be tested on the touchstone of fairness and
compliance with the principles of natural justice, and not on the basis of
procedural formalities in isolation.
29. In Union of India v. Ram Lakhan Sharma, (2018) 7 SCC 670, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, while dealing with the issue of non-appointment of
a Presenting Officer in departmental enquiries, held that there is no
requirement of appointing a Presenting Officer in each and every case,
whether the statutory rules provide for it or are silent. It was further
observed that the principles of natural justice are to be applied having regard
to the facts of each case, and are not to be construed in a rigid or straitjacket
manner. The Court held as under :
"34. We fully endorse the principles as enumerated above,
however, the principles have to be carefully applied in fact
situation of a particular case. There is no requirement of
appointment of Presenting Officer in each and every case,
whether statutory rules enable the authorities to make an
appointment or are silent. When the statutory rules are
silent with regard to the applicability of any facet of
principles of natural justice the applicability of principles of
natural justice which are not specifically excluded in the
statutory scheme are not prohibited. When there is no
express exclusion of particular principle of natural justice,
the said principle shall be applicable in a given case to
advance the cause of justice."
30. A similar position has been reiterated by this Court in Delhi
Transport Corporation v. Hanumant Kumar, W.P.(C) 717/2011 decided on
17.01.2013, wherein a challenge to a domestic enquiry, inter alia, on the
ground of non-appointment of a Presenting Officer and absence of a Labour
Welfare Officer, was considered. Upon examining the governing legal
principles, this Court held that the mere absence of a Presenting Officer does
not vitiate a departmental enquiry, and that the party alleging violation of the
principles of natural justice must demonstrate the prejudice caused thereby.
It was further observed that where the workman is afforded an effective
opportunity to participate in the enquiry proceedings, including cross-
examination of witnesses and presentation of his defence, no violation of
natural justice can be made out merely on account of such absence. The
Court observed as under:
"7. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that
the reason that no welfare officer was asked to participate
in the proceedings is not good because the respondent had
himself refused, when offered to avail of any defence
representative. He further submits that the admission made
by the respondent was clear, and there is no basis to
conclude that there is no clear cut admission of guilt made
and recorded in the evidence led by the respondent, or in his
cross examination. He further submits that it is not
necessary that a presenting officer should have been
appointed for the conduct of the inquiry. The same is merely
a rule of prudence and not a mandatory direction, non-
compliance of which would invalidate an inquiry.
In this regard, reliance is placed on the judgment of this
Court in Mahavir Singh Vs. DTC, 2007 (139) DLT 569. In
this case, the workmen impugned the conduct of the
departmental inquiry, inter alia, on the ground that no
presenting officer had been appointed by the department,
which vitiated the entire inquiry. Rejecting the submission,
this Court observed that there is no rule that an inquiry
cannot proceed without a Presenting Officer. The Court
further observed:
"The witness can depose before an inquiry officer
of their own, without the help of a presenting
officer. There is no violation of principles of
natural justice, if no presenting officer is
appointed or present. If a request of allowing
presenting officer or defence assistance is
declined by the inquiry officer without just cause,
a grievance can be made. The party who alleges
violation of principles of natural justice has to
show how his/her case got prejudiced by alleged
violation. Petitioner has failed to show how non
appointment of presenting officer prejudiced his
case."
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10. Similarly, the Karnataka High Court in Bharat
Electronics Ltd. vs. K. Kasi, (1987) ILR NULL 366: (1987)
IILLJ 203 Kant, took the view that there is no legal
compulsion that the Presenting Officer should be
appointed. It was observed that the mere fact that the
presenting officer was not appointed is no ground to set
aside the Inquiry. Commenting upon the role of the Inquiry
Officer, it observed that it is common ground that if the
Inquiring Authority plays the role of a Prosecutor and
cross-examines the defence witnesses or puts leading
questions to the prosecution witnesses clearly exposing a
biased state of mind, the inquiry would be opposed to
principles of natural justice. However, it is also well settled
that an Inquiring Authority is entitled to put questions to the
witnesses for clarification wherever it becomes necessary
and so long as the delinquent employee is permitted to cross
examine the witnesses after the Inquiry Authority questions
the witnesses, the inquiry proceedings cannot be impeached
as unfair."
[Emphasis supplied]
It was further observed that the mere absence of a Presenting Officer
does not vitiate the enquiry, so long as the delinquent has a fair opportunity
to deal with the material on record. It is, however, well settled that the
enquiry may stand vitiated if the Enquiry Officer assumes the role of a
prosecutor; no such circumstance is made out in the present case.
31. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident that the Labour Court erred in treating the non-appointment of a
Presenting Officer as fatal to the enquiry without examining whether any
prejudice had been caused to the workman. The record indicates that the
workman was duly informed of the charges and was afforded a full and
effective opportunity to participate in the enquiry proceedings, including
cross-examination of the management witnesses and presentation of his
defence. The enquiry proceedings thus reflect substantial compliance with
the requirements of natural justice.
32. Significantly, the Labour Court has not recorded any finding that the
alleged procedural lapses resulted in prejudice to the workman or deprived
him of a fair opportunity of defence. In the absence of such demonstrable
prejudice, the enquiry cannot be held to be vitiated.
33. The Labour Court has placed reliance on Delhi Transport
Corporation v. Maha Singh, W.P.(C) No. 2228/2004 decided on
28.04.2005 (incorrectly noted in the impugned order as W.P.(C) No.
2228/94), to hold that non-appointment of a Presenting Officer constitutes
an irregularity vitiating the enquiry. Such reliance is misplaced. The said
decision does not lay down any absolute proposition that absence of a
Presenting Officer, by itself, vitiates a departmental enquiry. On the
contrary, the legal position stands clarified by this Court in DTC v.
Hanumant Kumar (supra) wherein it was observed:
"13. In view of the aforementioned observations of the
Supreme Court as also the consistent view taken by the
Various High Courts thereafter, the observations made in
the case of DTC vs. Maha Singh, W.P.(C) No. 2228/2004
(wrongly written as W.P.(C) 2228/94 in the impugned
award) decided on 28.04.2005, appear to be per incurium.
The position that emerges from the aforesaid discussion is
that the mere absence of a presenting officer representing
the management does not vitiate the departmental
proceedings. The Inquiry Officer is appointed by the
Disciplinary Authority only to hold a fact finding inquiry in
compliance of principles of natural justice, and to make a
report on the basis of the said inquiry. He is not the
Disciplinary Authority or the Punishing Authority."
34. The aforesaid clarification squarely applies to the present case, where
the enquiry proceedings demonstrate fairness and no prejudice has been
shown to have been caused to the workman.
35. This Court is, therefore, of the considered view that the Labour Court
erred in treating the procedural deviations as determinative without
examining whether such deviations resulted in any real prejudice to the
workman or violated the principles of natural justice.
36. Accordingly, the order dated 28.10.2009 holding the enquiry to be
vitiated cannot be sustained in law.
37. Having set aside the above discussed finding, this Court now proceeds
to examine Issue No. 2, namely, whether the conclusion recorded by the
Labour Court in the impugned Award dated 02.12.2010, that the
petitioner/management failed to establish the alleged misconduct against the
respondent/workman, can be sustained in law.
38. It is not in dispute that, upon the Labour Court holding the domestic
enquiry to be vitiated, an opportunity was granted to the management to
adduce evidence to establish the charges on merits. The said course was in
consonance with the settled principles governing industrial adjudication as
applicable at that stage. However, the findings returned by the Labour Court
upon appreciation of such evidence now fall for examination by this Court
to determine whether they can be sustained in law, or whether they suffer
from perversity, misapplication of settled legal principles, or a failure to
consider material evidence on record.
39. In support of its case, the management examined MW-1, Shri
Yashpal, Assistant Traffic Inspector, who deposed that, during checking, the
respondent/workman was found in possession of ticket blocks of ₹5 and ₹10
denominations bearing identical or repeated serial numbers. He further
stated that the said tickets were seized and the original documents were
forwarded to the vigilance department, pursuant to which FIR No. 104/2003
was registered.
40. The workman, on the other hand, contended that the charge was not
established, primarily on the ground that the original documents were not
produced before the Labour Court and that the evidence led by the
management was insufficient to prove the misconduct.
41. Upon appreciation of the material on record, the Labour Court
rejected the case of the management, primarily on the following reasoning:
1. "MW-1 who deposed that the conductor possessed
duplicate/counterfeit/forged tickets of Rs.5/- and 10/-
denomination did not produce the original of those tickets
before this Court
2. The management takes umbrage under the factthat
original documents are with the police who have
investigated the matter. The same were not summoned and
proved before this Court.
3. The original reports prepared by MW1 are not tendered
nor the same have been corroborated by examining the
other checking staff who had testified to report at Ex. Ma.
Mark-Ma is further signed by other ATIs who were not
examined.
4. However, the reading of Mark-Ma shows there were two
conductors in the said bus. The badge number of first
conductor is 20629 which was found to be correct during
the checking. The badge number of the claimant conductor
is 22659. This conductor was taken by the checking staff to
the HO. The role of the other conductor is not spoken to by
the witness before this court though it is stated so in Mark
Ma. This creates a doubting cloud over the misconduct
alleged to pin point this workman.
5. The sole testimony of MW-1, bereft of documentary
evidence, to prove the misconduct. insufficient"
42. On the aforesaid reasoning, the Labour Court held that the misconduct
alleged against the workman was not proved and consequently directed
reinstatement without back wages. The operative portion reads as under:
".....10. For the aforesaid reasons, though the workman has
not led any rebuttal evidence, I am of the considered view
that the misconduct alleged against the workman is not
proved to the hilt before this Court, nor even to probabilise
the misconduct. Consequently, I hold that the workman is
entitled to reinstatement.
11.I have gone through the claim statement. The workman
has pleaded that he remained unemployed for no fault of his
and that he was unable to secure alternate employment.
However, there is no positive assertion in the claim
statement that he made efforts to find alternate employment.
Furthermore, considering the peculiar facts of the case
where the misconduct has been disbelieved for lack of
evidence, I am of the considered view that the workman is
not entitled to any back wages.
12.In the result, I find that the workman is entitled to
reinstatement without back wages. The management is
directed to reinstate the workman within 30 days after
publication of the Award. The reference is answered
accordingly. Let the requisite number of copies of this
award be sent to appropriate government for publication.
File be consigned to record room"
[Emphasis supplied]
43. The aforesaid reasoning reflects that the Labour Court proceeded to
discard the case of the management primarily on account of non-production
of original documents, absence of corroborative evidence, and reliance on a
solitary witness.
44. This Court is unable to sustain the approach adopted by the Labour
Court in setting aside the case of the management on account of non-
production of original documents, as it is unsustainable in law. The record
indicates that the management had furnished an explanation for non-
production of the original documents. It is also material to note that the
explanation furnished by the management that the original documents were
in police custody was neither disputed nor discredited in cross-examination.
In the absence of any challenge to such explanation, the Labour Court could
not have drawn an adverse inference against the management merely on
account of non-production of the original documents.
45. It is a settled position of law that strict rules of evidence, as embodied
under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, are not applicable to proceedings
before the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. Such proceedings are guided
by the principles of natural justice, and the standard of proof is that of
preponderance of probabilities. What is required is that there must be some
material on record on the basis of which the Labour Court can reasonably
arrive at a conclusion, and not that the charge must be proved in accordance
with the technical rules of admissibility applicable to civil or criminal trials.
46. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, it is
evident from the record that MW-1 had clearly deposed that the original
documents, including the ticket blocks, were in the custody of the police in
connection with the criminal proceedings arising out of the same incident. In
such circumstances, the inability of the management to produce the originals
stood duly explained. The Labour Court was, therefore, required to assess
the evidentiary value of the material available on record on its own merits,
including the oral testimony and the documents produced, instead of
rejecting the same on the ground that the originals were not produced or
formally proved.
47. It is also necessary to note that the absence of original documents, by
itself, does not render the entire evidence unreliable, particularly where the
oral testimony remains consistent, unshaken, and is supported by
surrounding circumstances. The evidentiary value of such material cannot be
disregarded solely on this ground.
48. In this regard, reference may be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation &Ors. v.
JadejaGovubhaChhanubha&Anr, (2014) 16 SCC 130, wherein it was
observed that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to proceedings
before the Labour Court, and that even a xerox copy of a document, if
admitted on record and not objected to, can be relied upon. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court held that once such material is brought on record, its
evidentiary value has to be appreciated on the touchstone of overall material
available, and cannot be discarded merely on the ground that the original
document was not produced. The relevant observations are as under:
"The Labour Court has, in the case at hand, placed reliance
upon a xerox copy of a certificate allegedly issued by an
officer of the appellant Corporation stating that the
respondent was in the employment of the appellant
Corporation as a Conductor between 3-10-1987 and 31-3-
1989. While it is true that the xerox copy may not be
evidence by itself specially when the respondent had stated
that the original was with him, but had chosen not to
produce the same yet the fact remains that the document
was allowed to be marked at the trial and signature of the
officer issuing the certificate by another officer who was
examined by the appellant. Strict rules of evidence, it is
fairly well-settled, are not applicable to the proceedings
before the Labour Court. That being so the admission of
the xerox copy of the certificate, without any objection from
the appellant Corporation, cannot be faulted at this belated
stage."
[Emphasis supplied]
49. In Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation v.
Lakshmidevamma (Smt) &Anr., (2001) 5 SCC 433, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reiterated that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to
proceedings before the Labour Court/Tribunal and that such forums are
required to act on the material brought on record in order to meet the ends of
justice, subject to observance of principles of natural justice. The relevant
observations are as under:
"45. It is consistently held and accepted that strict rules of
evidence are not applicable to the proceedings before the
Labour Court/Tribunal but essentially the rules of natural
justice are to be observed in such proceedings. Labour
Courts/Tribunals have the power to call for any evidence at
any stage of the proceedings if the facts and circumstances
of the case demand the same to meet the ends of justice in a
given situation. We reiterate that in order to avoid
unnecessary delay and multiplicity of proceedings, the
management has to seek leave of the court/tribunal in the
written statement itself to lead additional evidence to
support its action in the alternative and without prejudice to
its rights and contentions. But this should not be
understood as placing fetters on the powers of the
court/tribunal requiring or directing parties to lead
additional evidence including production of documents at
any stage of the proceedings before they are concluded if
on facts and circumstances of the case it is deemed just
and necessary in the interest of justice."
The said principle applies to the present case, where the Labour Court failed
to evaluate the material available on record on its own merits and rejected
the management's case on the ground of non-production of original
documents.Admittedly, neither the workman nor the Labour Court had
asked for production of original documents at any stage of the proceedings.
If MW-1 would have failed to produce the original documents by
summoning any witness or otherwise, then an adverse inference could be
drawn against the management, but in the absence of any such request of
the workman or direction by the Labour Court, no adverse inference could
be drawn against the management for non-production of any original
documents.
50. In view of the aforesaid settled legal position, the approach adopted
by the Labour Court in rejecting the evidence of the management on the
ground of non-production of original documents reflects a misapplication of
the principles governing appreciation of evidence in industrial adjudication.
The said reasoning is legally untenable, as it proceeds on the erroneous
assumption that production of original documents is indispensable even in
industrial adjudication. The impugned finding, therefore, cannot be
sustained.
51. This Court further finds that the Labour Court erred in holding that
the misconduct was not proved on the ground that the case of the
management rested on the sole testimony of MW-1 and was not corroborated
by other members of the checking staff. It is a settled position of law that
there is no rule of evidence which mandates that the testimony of a solitary
witness cannot be relied upon, provided the same is found to be credible.The
evidentiary value of a solitary witness depends upon its intrinsic credibility,
consistency, and absence of material contradictions, all of which stand
satisfied in the present case.
52. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Banaras Electric Light & Power Co.
Ltd. v. Labour Court II, (1974) 3 SCC 103, has held that there is no rule of
evidence which mandates that the testimony of a solitary witness cannot be
relied upon, so long as the same is found to be credible and acceptable. The
said principle applies to the present case, where the Labour Court discarded
the testimony of MW-1 solely on the ground that it was not corroborated by
other members of the checking team, despite the testimony remaining
unshaken and no rebuttal evidence having been led by the workman.
53. In the present case, the testimony of MW-1, who was part of the
checking team, clearly establishes that the respondent/workman was found
in possession of ticket blocks bearing duplicate serial numbers. The
testimony of MW-1 establishes:
(i) recovery of ticket blocks from the possession of the workman,
(ii) existence of duplicate serial numbers, and
(iii) seizure during checking.
Significantly, the cross-examination of MW-1 does not disclose any material
contradiction, nor was any suggestion put that the alleged recovery was
fabricated or that the workman was falsely implicated. The testimony thus
remains consistent and undisputed.
54. It is well settled that in industrial adjudication, the requirement is only
of 'some evidence' on the basis of which a reasonable conclusion can be
drawn, and not proof to the standard required in criminal proceedings. In
Indian Overseas Bank v. I.O.B. Staff Canteen Worker's Union &Anr
(2000) 4 SCC 245 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that findings of fact
cannot be interfered with so long as they are based on some material on
record. Similarly, in State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh, (1977) 2 SCC 491,
it has been held that strict rules of evidence do not apply in domestic and
industrial proceedings and the sufficiency of evidence is not to be
scrutinised as in a criminal trial, so long as the material has a reasonable
nexus with the charge.
55. However, the present case is not one where the Labour Court has
returned findings on appreciation of such material, but one where relevant
evidence has been discarded on legally untenable grounds.
56. In the present case, the evidence of MW-1, coupled with the
surrounding circumstances on record, clearly establishes a direct nexus with
the charge. However, the Labour Court has failed to appreciate such material
and has instead disregarded relevant evidence on legally untenable
grounds.This is not a case where the Labour Court has taken a possible view
on the basis of appreciation of evidence; rather, it is a case where relevant
evidence has been discarded on legally untenable grounds, thereby rendering
the findings perverse and amenable to interference under Article 226.
57. A perusal of the record further indicates that, in the course of the
departmental enquiry, the management witnesses were examined in detail
and subjected to cross-examination by the respondent/workman. The
proceedings thus demonstrate that full opportunity was afforded to test the
credibility of the witnesses, yet nothing material emerged to discredit their
testimony, either in the enquiry or before the Labour Court.
58. It is significant to note that, as recorded by the Labour Court itself, the
workman did not lead any rebuttal evidence. In such circumstances, the
testimony of MW-1 could not have been discarded merely on the ground that
other members of the checking team were not examined.
59. The insistence on corroboration, in the absence of any material to
discredit the testimony of the management witness, reflects a misapplication
of the settled principles governing appreciation of evidence and cannot be
sustained in law. Corroboration, it is well settled, isnot a rule of law but of
prudence.
60. The Labour Court has erred in raising a doubt on the ground that
another conductor was present in the bus. The enquiry record clearly shows
that two conductors were on duty, namely the respondent/workman bearing
Badge No. 22659 and another conductor bearing Badge No. 20629, both
identifiable by their respective badge numbers. The material on record
further indicates that the other conductor was found to be in order and was
allowed to continue with duty, whereas the respondent/workman was
specifically found in possession of the irregular ticket blocks and was taken
for further proceedings. The mere presence of another conductor does not
dilute the case against the respondent, particularly when the testimony of
MW-1 and other members of the checking staff consistently implicates him.
The Labour Court, in extending the benefit of doubt on this basis, has
proceeded on conjecture despite cogent material on record, especially when
no such question was put to the MW-1 and thus no opportunity was given to
MW-1 to explain these circumstances. Although these questions were put by
the workman to all the witnesses of the management in the enquiry, and they
have given the same cogent reply. Even the other conductor was asked the
same questions by the workman, and he explained the facts. Such an
approach is contrary to the settled principles governing appreciation of
evidence in industrial adjudication, where the matter is to be assessed on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and not by applying a standard
akin to criminal proceedings.
61. The Labour Court has thus discarded relevant evidence on untenable
grounds and misapplied the settled principles governing appreciation of
evidence in industrial adjudication, rendering its findings perverse.
62. In the backdrop of the above discussion, the evidentiary material on
record warrants a conclusion on the issue of misconduct.
63. When the aforesaid circumstances are cumulatively considered on the
touchstone of preponderance of probabilities, the material on record
leaves no manner of doubt that the misconduct alleged against the
respondent/workman stands established.
64. Once misconduct stands established on the material on record, the
consequential impact on the relationship of trust between the employer and
the employee necessarily falls for consideration. The nature of the
misconduct, involving handling of ticketing revenue and financial integrity,
strikes at the core of the fiduciary trust reposed in the workman. The
doctrine of loss of confidence, therefore, assumes particular significance in
cases where the employee is entrusted with duties involving handling of
fares and financial transactions, as in the case of a bus conductor. This
assumes greater importance where the employer is a public transport
undertaking dealing with public funds and discharging a public function,
thereby requiring a high degree of integrity and trustworthiness from its
employees. Once such confidence stands shaken on account of proved
misconduct involving financial irregularities, the employer cannot be
compelled to continue the relationship of employment.
65. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Janatha Bazar (South Kanara
Central Cooperative Wholesale Stores Ltd.) &Ors v. Secretary,
SahakariNoukarara Sangha &Ors., (2000) 7 SCC 517, has categorically
held that in cases of proved misappropriation or breach of trust, there is no
question of showing misplaced sympathy on the ground of long service or
the quantum involved, and reinstatement would be wholly unjustified.
Similarly, in Divisional Controller, KSRTC (NWKRTC) v. A.T. Mane,
(2005) 3 SCC 254, it has been held that where an employee is found guilty
of misappropriating the employer's money, the employer is justified in
losing confidence in such an employee and in imposing the punishment of
dismissal.
66. In the present case, the misconduct pertains to possession and use of
forged ticket blocks, directly impacting the financial integrity of the
petitioner/management and constituting a clear breach of trust in the
discharge of official duties. Such conduct undermines the employer's
confidence in the respondent/workman. In these circumstances, the direction
of reinstatement granted by the Labour Court cannot be sustained, as the
relationship of trust essential to such employment stands irretrievably
damaged.
67. The reliance placed by the respondent on his acquittal in the criminal
proceedings arising out of the same incident is misplaced. It is well settled
that criminal proceedings and disciplinary or industrial adjudication operate
in distinct fields, having different objectives and standards of proof. In State
of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 6 SCC 417, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held that the standard of proof, the mode of enquiry, and the rules
governing the proceedings in the two cases are entirely distinct and
different. . Further, in Nelson Motis v. Union of India, (1992) 4 SCC 711, it
has been held that an order of acquittal does not conclude departmental
proceedings. An acquittal in criminal proceeding, therefore, does not ipso
facto absolve the workman of misconduct in industrial adjudication,
particularly where such acquittal is based on insufficiency of evidence and
not an honourable exoneration.
68. For the reasons aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the
Labour Court has:
(i) applied an incorrect standard of proof,
(ii) discarded relevant evidence on legally untenable grounds, and
(iii) failed to appreciate the material on record in accordance with
settled principles governing industrial adjudication.
69. The contentions advanced on behalf of the respondent/workman,
founded on non-production of original documents, absence of corroboration,
and alleged insufficiency of evidence, do not merit acceptance.
70. The findings returned on Issue No. 2 are, therefore, perverse and
unsustainable in law.
CONCLUSION:
71. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, this Court holds that the
finding of the Labour Court holding the domestic enquiry to be vitiated
cannot be sustained. The grounds relied upon by the Labour Court, including
the alleged absence of a Labour Welfare Officer and Presenting Officer, do
not vitiate the enquiry in the facts of the present case. The said finding is,
accordingly, set aside.
72. Once the finding on the enquiry issue is set aside, and the material on
record is independently examined, the findings returned by the Labour Court
on Issue No. 2 are also unsustainable in law, as the Labour Court has
failed to appreciate the material on record in accordance with settled
principles governing industrial adjudication and has thereby returned
findings which are vitiated by perversity and cannot be sustained in law.
73. The impugned Award dated 02.12.2010 is set aside.
74. Having regard to the nature of duties entrusted to the
respondent/workman and the misconduct established, reinstatement is not
warranted.
75. Any amounts paid to the respondent/workman pursuant to orders
passed under Section 17B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 shall not be
recovered and shall be treated as final. The respondent/workman shall not be
entitled to any further monetary, service, retiral or consequential benefits
flowing from the impugned Award.
76. The writ petition stands allowed in the above terms. Pending
applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
SHAIL JAIN
JUDGE
APRIL 13, 2026
RM
