[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Sh. Ajit Singh (Deceased) Through His ... vs Delhi Development Authority & Anr on 10 April, 2026
Author: Neena Bansal Krishna
Bench: Neena Bansal Krishna
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 29th January, 2026
Pronounced on: 10th April, 2026
+ RSA 22/2026, CM APPL. 6181/2026
SH. AJIT SINGH (DECEASED)
Through his LRs
A. SH. GAJINDER SINGH
S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh
B. SH. RAVINDER SINGH
S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh
C. SH. SURINDER SINGH
S/o Late Sh. Ajit Singh
D. SMT. SUSHILA DEVI
W/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh
E. SH. NARESH KUMAR
S/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh
F. SMT. USHA MEHLAWAT
W/o Sh. Sandeep Mehlawat
D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh
G. SMT. POOJA DALAL
W/o Sh. Sanjeev Dalal
D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh
H. SMT. REKHA SEHRAWAT
W/o Sh. Sanjay Sehrawat
D/o Late Sh. Narinder Singh
I. SMT. RANI
W/o Sh. Shyam
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:ANIL RSA 22/2026 Page 1 of 15
KUMAR BHATT
Signing Date:10.04.2026
17:34:56
All R/o House No.F-189,
Village & Post Office Lado Sarai,
Delhi-110030.
....Appellant
Through: Mr. V.P. Rana and Mr. Aviral Jain,
Advocates.
VERSUS
1. DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
Through Its vice Chairman
Vikas Sadan, New Delhi-110023.
2. UNION OF INDIA
Through Secretary
Ministry of Works & Urban Development
Govt. of India, New Delhi-110011.
....Respondents
Through: Mr. R. K. Dhawan( Standing Counsel
for DDA), Ms. Nisha Dhawan, Mr.
Pawan Karan Deo, Mr. V. K. Teng,
Mr. K. R. Madhar for Respondent
No. 1, DDA. Mr. Sai Manik Sud
(SPC) along with Ms. Kanchan
Semwal (GP) for Respondent No.2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA
J U D G M E N T
NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA, J.
1. Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 read with Order XLII Rule
1 and Order XLI Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(hereinafter referred to as „CPC‟) has been filed by the Appellants,
the LRs of Sh. Ajit Singh (deceased) against the impugned Judgment
and Decree dated 11.12.2025 in RCA SCJ No. 03/2023, vide which
Ld. ASCJ dismissed the Application under Order XLI Rule 3A CPC
read with Section 5 Limitation Act, 1963, filed by the Appellants,
seeking Condonation of Delay in filing the Appeal under Section 96
CPC against the Judgment and Decree dated 28.10.2021, of the
learned Civil Judge, Delhi dismissing the Suit for Permanent
Injunction of the plaintiff/Appellant, and consequently dismissed the
first Appeal.
2. The Appellant/Plaintiff had filed CS SCJ No.7081/2016, against the
respondents, for Permanent Injunction.
3. The Brief facts are that the Plaintiff/Appellant was the owner and in
exclusive possession of House No.F-189, Village Lado Sarai, Delhi
constructed on a Plot of land admeasuring 252 sq. yards (hereinafter
referred as „Suit Property‟). The house was constructed partly on
Khasra No.269 admeasuring 10 biswa and partly on the adjoining
Makbara / Hajira on the Northern side. The property was assessed to
property tax and water and electricity connection was also provided
therein.
4. The land admeasuring 3 bighas and 2 biswas was ancestral land and
by way of family arrangement amongst the co-owners, the house was
constructed more than 2 decades ago, on the land admeasuring 10
biswas out of Khasra No.269. The remaining portion of the house of
the Plaintiff which is between Khasra No.269 and Makbara, is a
courtyard which is enclosed by a boundary wall. The remaining
portion of Khasra No.269 admeasuring 2 bighas 12 biswas has been
acquired by the Govt. vide Award No.36/80-81 and possession was
taken in 1980. The area of Khasra No. 269, which was in possession
of the Plaintiff, was left out from the acquisition as it was built-up at
that time.
5. At the instance of certain co-sharers of the Plaintiff, officials of
Defendant No.1 started harassing the Plaintiff for the last some time
claiming that the property belonged to them. Hence, the suit was filed
for Permanent Injunction for restraining the Defendants from forcibly
dispossessing the Plaintiff or demolishing the structure existing
thereon.
6. Defendant No.1/DDA in its Written Statement filed on 03.01.1991
controverted all the averments made in the Plaint. It stated that land
forming part of Khasra No.269 of village Lado Sarai, admeasuring 3
bighas 2 biswas and area of 2 bighas 17 biswas, has already been
acquired vide the Award. The possession of the remaining area
admeasuring 5 biswa, was not acquired as there was a
Makbara/Hazira on the area measuring 2 bighas and there was
construction over the area of 3 biswas. The possession of an area
admeasuring 2 bighas and 12 biswas has already been taken, out of
the acquired land and the same has been placed at the disposal of
DDA, through Notification dated 29.07.1980.
7. It was stated that the House No.F-189 was found to be part of the
land which had been left out from the acquisition. Since the
Notification dated 29.07.1980 under Section 22(1) of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957, had not been challenged by the Plaintiff, the
logical corollary is that the due process for acquiring the land as
mentioned in the Notification, was followed by DDA; as such DDA
was within its right to take possession of the vacant land and in its
discretion leave built up area, to be regained in due course of time,
after following due process.
8. The DDA claimed that no Notice under Section 53B of the Delhi
Development Act, 1957, was served upon the Defendant.
9. The DDA also stated that the land adjacent to Khasra No.269 is
Khasra No.268 and the same also stands acquired and is under the
control and management of DDA, where the Plaintiff had tried to
encroach by putting a boundary wall unauthorizedly, which has been
removed. It has been further asserted that the boundary wall over the
area measuring 6 biswas forming part of Khasra No.268 village, Lado
Sarai, formed part of Khasra No.268 and it is unauthorized and the
same is liable to be removed.
10. The learned Civil Judge appointed a Local Commissioner, who
visited the Suit premises on 09.10.1990 and submitted a Report about
constructed portion with area and photographs, as shown in the Site
Plan submitted by the Plaintiff.
11. The Local Commissioner in his Report has not reported about the area
of the Suit premises.
12. The issues were framed on pleadings on 11.09.2002 as under:
(i) Whether Plaintiff is owner in possession of land partly
in Khasra No.269 measuring 10 biswa and partly upon
land adjoining the Makbara/Hazira on its Northern side
situated in Village Lado Sarai, Delhi? If so, its effect.
OPP
(ii)Whether Plaintiff is entitled for the relief of injunction,
as prayed for? OPP
(iii)Relief.
13. The Plaintiff in support of his case examined himself as PW1 and
tendered his Affidavit of Evidence Ex.PW1/X and proved the
documents in support of his case.
14. PW2 (sic) M.L. Meena Patwari produced the record pertaining to
Khasra Girdawari and Jamabandi for the year 2012-13, which were
exhibited as Ex.PW2/1 to Ex.PW2/8.
15. PW2 Naresh Kumar and PW3 Jai Kishan corroborated the testimony
of the Plaintiff/Appellant.
16. The Defendant/Respondent examined DW1 Om Prakash Patwari
who produced the original Aks Shijra of Village Lado Sarai of Khasra
No.268 and 269 Ex.DW1/1.
17. DW2 Om Prakash Patwari, LDC from Land Acquisition Branch,
LAC Office, Saket, New Delhi who produced the copy of the Award
No.36/80-81 Ex.DW2/1.
18. DW3 Jagpal Singh, Patwari produced the record pertaining to Award,
extract of Notification dated 29.07.1980 and other Government
records.
19. DW4 T. Lakra Kanoongo, Land & Building I.P Estate, Vikas Bhawan,
Delhi also produced the records pertaining to the Award and the
original Possession proceedings of Award No.36 Ex.DW4/A.
20. The learned Civil Judge considered the evidence of the witnesses
examined by the parties and concluded that from the documents
namely, the Record, Aks Shijra and the Notification and the Award it
emerged that the Plaintiff/Appellant had no right, title in the Suit
property. Furthermore, from the evidence of the witnesses as well as
the Report of the Local Commissioner, it was established that the
Plaintiff was not the owner of the Suit property and also could not
establish his Possession. Therefore, the Suit of the Plaintiff was
dismissed by learned ACJ/CCJ/ ARC vide Judgment dated
28.10.2021.
21. The Regular First Appeal RCA/SCJ/3/2023 was preferred before
the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge cum Rent Controller along
with an Application under Order 41 Rule 3A CPC, read with Section
5 Limitation Act for condonation of Delay of 437 days in filing the
Appeal.
22. The learned Appellate Court considered the explanations given by
the Plaintiff/Appellant and concluded that the Appellant was unable to
demonstrate "sufficient cause" or that the reasons given were bona
fide. He considered the exclusion of limitation period on account of
COVID Pandemic, but observed that the Appellant seriously failed to
give any sufficient cause and that in fact the grounds taken in the
Application stood completely unsubstantiated and malafide in regard
to the delay of almost six months, in getting the judgment of the
learned Trial Court.
23. The learned Senior Civil Judge also found that none of the medical
documents which had been annexed, demonstrated that he was ever
advised rest or was ever hospitalized, or that his medical condition
was such that he was not in a position to contact his counsel. Even
otherwise, the last Medical Report was of 22.12.2022, while the
Appeal before the learned Senior Civil Judge had been filed even
beyond 30 days, thereafter. The learned Senior Civil Judge further
noted that the Appeal had been filed by several LRs of the original
Plaintiff, and there was no explanation provided as to why none of the
other LRs filed the Appeal within the prescribed time, when they
were suffering from no impediment.
24. Hence, the Condonation Application was dismissed and
consequently, the Appeal was also dismissed.
25. Aggrieved by the Dismissal of the Appeal by learned Appellate Court,
the present Regular Second Appeal has been filed on behalf of the
Appellants/Plaintiffs.
26. The grounds of challenge are that the reasonable and plausible
explanations had been given, which were not considered by the First
Appellate Court, which also failed to exercise its discretionary powers
in dealing with the Application seeking condonation of delay.
27. It is established law that when substantial rights are pitted against
procedural law like limitation; the substantial law should prevail over
the procedural law, unless some special prejudice is caused to the
opposite side. In the present case, the Appellants assert that they have
a meritorious case, and therefore, some concession ought to have been
given.
28. The Appellant had explained that on account of the illness of one of
the Appellants which was supported by medical documents, has been
erroneously rejected by the learned Appellate Court by observing that
the said prescriptions neither advised complete bed rest nor suggested
that the Appellant was admitted in the Hospital. In fact, the kind of
disease from which the Appellant was suffering was respiratory which
decreases the working capacity of a person and sometimes restrict his
movement in the outfield.
29. It has not been considered that when there are more than one or
several litigants, the litigants appoint one as the main Parokar or one
of them leads the others. Shri Surender was the main Parokar who
used to brief the Counsel and when he fell ill, the delay occurred.
30. It has also not been appreciated that litigants are villagers and few of
them are semi-literate or illiterate. They were not aware of the
consequences of delay in preferring the Appeal. This factor should
have been considered by the Appellate Court, but it has not been
considered.
31. It has further not been considered that a litigant depends upon the
advice of the Counsel and sometimes the gravity and the
consequences of delay in filing the Appeal are not explained, resulting
in the litigant not being completely aware of the consequences of
delay in filing the Appeal though. However, previous counsel is not to
be blamed, but the perusal of the Application seeking condonation of
delay, shows that there was much more to be explained in the
Application which were available with the learned Counsel, but were
not mentioned in the Application.
32. The learned First Appellate Court had observed that the Application
had not been signed by Sh. Surender, who was stated to be ill. In this
regard, it is submitted that Appeal had been signed by all Appellants
and thus, even if it was not signed by one person who was ill, it would
not erase out the case of the Appellants.
33. It was next contended that the copy of the impugned Judgment dated
28.10.2021 became available only in April, 2022. The learned
Appellate Court concluded that there was nothing placed on record to
substantiate this aspect and was not considered in favour of the
Appellant.
34. In this regard, it is submitted that there was Covid period when the
system of uploading the Judgment was not working properly and the
lawyers and litigants were also not in touch regularly with the Courts.
The Application was duly supported with the Affidavit. The
Appellants could not bring additional evidence to substantiate this
aspect, as it was completely within the domain of I.T. Branch of the
Court and the Affidavit of the Appellant was sufficient on this aspect.
Access of litigants and lawyers to the Court system, was limited in
those days and therefore, Section 114 Evidence Act, could not have
been applicable.
35. Reliance is placed on Inder Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh2025,
LiveLaw (SC) 339 where it was held that liberal approach must be
adopted in condoning the delay when the merits of the case need
examination and when limitation is about to obstruct substantial
justice.
36. In the present case, the Appellants have been residing in the Suit
property since more than 50 years through their predecessors, who
had raised the construction on the Suit property. The possession is
admitted and the only aspect which needs adjudication is whether the
Suit property is part of the acquisition proceedings or not. Taking the
technical question of limitation would prejudice the right of the
Appellant especially considering their long settled possession.
37. Hence, a prayer was made that the impugned Judgment and Decree
dated 11.12.2025 of learned Senior Civil Judge who has rejected the
Appeal solely on the ground of limitation, be set aside.
Submissions heard and record perused.
38. The Appellant in his Application for condonation of Delay had stated
that there was sufficient cause for the Appellants to entitle them to
condonation of delay.
39. The first aspect, which emerges is that there was six month's delay in
getting the copy of the impugned Judgment dated 28.10.2021. It was
asserted that the status of the matter was updated on the E-courts
portal in April 2022, following which the Appellants had applied for a
certified copy of the judgment. This certified copy was provided to
the Appellants in the month of August, 2022.
40. The learned Senior Civil Judge in considering this issue has held that
in view of Section 114 Indian Evidence Act 1872, (now Section 119
of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), Illustration (e) sets out
the presumption that all judicial acts have been regularly performed.
Even otherwise, the Appellants have failed to substantiate this by any
Applications for certified copy. The learned Senior Civil Judge has
correctly held that the Appellants have failed to substantiate this claim
as no Application for certified copy of the judgment has been filed.
41. The second ground seeking condonation of delay is the exclusion of
the limitation period for filing during the Covid pandemic as extended
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in In Re: Cognizance for
Extension of Limitation, In re, (2020) 19 SCC 10 : 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 343. As per this decision, a limitation period of 90 days from
01.03.2022 was available to the Appellants for filing the appeal.
42. The learned Senior Civil Judge has found that the Appellants had
applied for the certified copy of the judgment on 04.04.2022, i.e.,
within the prescribed period, however, a copy was only received on
03.08.2022. Thus, the said period ought to be excluded.
43. This court finds no infirmity in this finding. However, the explanation
given that the Judgment did not get uploaded in time, was not
substantiated and was thus, rightly rejected by the Ld. SCJ.
44. The third ground taken was the medical condition of Shri Surender
Singh who was extremely sick in the month of June 2022 with
respiratory and cardiac illness and was forced to undergo prolonged
treatment. However, his one medical prescription of June, 2022
related to respiratory issue and second dated 25.11.2022 is for fever
and cough. None of these documents reflected his medical condition
of a kind that totally incapacitated him.
45. In the present case, there was not one Appellant, but were eight legal
heirs of Ajit Singh in addition to Surender Singh who were required
to file the Appeal. The medical condition that too, which is not shown
to be absolutely incapacitating from medical records, could not have
been a reason for other Appellants to pursue the matter. While one of
the parties may have been taken leave, there was nothing which
prevented the other Appellants from pursuing the matter and in
getting the Appeal filed in time.
46. The explanation that he was the Parokar or leading the litigation,
cannot be accepted for in a condition when Shri Surender Singh was
unable to pursue the matter, there was nothing which prevented all
other Appellants from taking charge to agitate their rights.
47. Moreover, the Application for Condonation of Delay was not even
signed by Shri Surender Singh whose medical condition was
projected and was signed by the other Appellants. The Affidavit filed
along with the Application for condonation of Delay was also not
supported with the Affidavit of Surender Singh. Furthermore, absence
of his signatures establish that he was not the one who pursued the
case or got the Appeal filed.
48. Evidently, the affidavit accompanying the Application for
condonation of delay has been signed by Shri Gajinder Singh, while
the affidavit accompanying the appeal has been signed by one Ms.
Rani. Neither of these has been signed by Sh. Surinder Singh and
thus, the Appellants have failed to prove that Sh. Surinder Singh was
the Parokhar, or the lead litigant, as has been claimed in the present
appeal, or even substantiated their claim on the basis of his medical
records.
49. It was rightly held that the condonation cannot be a matter of routine;
rather must be based upon some reasoning. It is intended to cater to
genuine cases and must not be extended to a person oblivious to his
rights and entitlements.
50. The Apex Court in the case of Basawaraj vs. Land Acquisition Officer
(2013) 14 SCC 81 and Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. 1961 SCC
OnLine SC 39 had concluded that it is well settled that sufficient
cause "must be inferred liberally as to ensure that substantive justice
is done but only to the extent where inaction, negligence or lack of
bona fide cannot be imputed to the party seeking condonation of
delay".
51. Yet, on the other hand in H. Guruswamy & Ors. Vs. Krishnaiah (since
deceased) through LRs (2025 SCC OnLine SC 54), Order dated
08.01.2025 of Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No.317 of
2025 observed that the concepts such as liberal approach, justice
oriented approach substantial justice should not be employed to
frustrate or jettison the substantial law of limitation, yet the length of
delay is definitely a relevant factor which must be taken into
consideration while considering whether the delay should be
condoned or not.
52. Moreover, while considering the reasons for condonation of delay the
Court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The Court
owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fide of the explanation offered
by the parties seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
aside by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the Court may bring into it the merits of the matter for
the purpose of condonation of delay.
53. The learned Appellate Court has rightly considered all the grounds
agitated in the Application and has rightly exercised the discretion of
dismissing the Condonation Application. The impugned Order is well
reasoned and there is no arbitrariness or capriciousness evident in the
discretion exercised by the learned Appellate Court in not accepting
the reasons given for condonation of delay, which has been rightly
rejected.
54. It may also be observed that there is no Substantial question of Law
which has been raised in the present Appeal. The challenge is only to
the facts, which is beyond the scope of a Second Regular Appeal.
55. There is no merit in the present Appeal, which is hereby dismissed.
The pending Applications if any stands disposed of, accordingly.
(NEENA BANSAL KRISHNA)
JUDGE
APRIL 10, 2026
va
