[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
K.P.Singh Iii vs Uoi & Ors on 9 April, 2026
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* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment reserved on: 12.02.2026
Judgment pronounced on: 09.04.2026
+ W.P.(C) 2758/2006
K.P.SINGH III .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. S.S.Tiwari, Advocate.
versus
UOI & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Ripudaman Bhardwaj
CGSC with Mr. Kushagra
Kumar Advocate. ASP
Abhishek Rastogi, HQ
Bulandsaher Division.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KSHETARPAL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
1. The present petition has been filed against the order dated
03.03.2005 (hereafter 'impugned order') passed by the learned
Central Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A.
No. 500/2004 as well as the Order dated 10.05.2005 passed by the
learned Tribunal in R.A. No. 100/2005 in O.A. No. 500/2004,
whereby the learned Tribunal dismissed both, the O.A. as well as the
Review Application filed by the Petitioner herein.
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2. Succinctly put, the relevant facts germane to the adjudication of
the present petition are as follows:
2.1. The Petitioner was working as a Public Relations Inspector
(Postal) Bulandshahar. The Petitioner was proceeded against under
Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 by Respondent No. 4 vide Memo
No. B-4/K-25 dated 04.08.2000. The charge against the Petitioner was
that on 28.02.2000, when one Shri Ram Gopal, Postmaster,
Bulandshahar was talking to one Shri Jagdish Singh, ASPOs in
connection with the shortage of Postal Assistants, the Petitioner
entered the Divisional Office and started hurling offensive words to
Shri Ram Gopal. It is alleged that when the said Shri Ram Gopal
objected to such behaviour, the Petitioner inflicted beatings on him
with his 'chappal.' At that time, Shri Jagdish Singh (ASPOs), Shri B.
Arya (SDI), Shri J.R. Meena (CI) and Shri Veer Singh (OA), who
were present at the spot, came to the rescue of Shri Ram Gopal.
2.2. Consequently, a departmental inquiry was conducted against
the Petitioner. The inquiry was conducted on the following days:
28.08.2000, 11.09.2000, 29.09.2000, 16.10.2000 and 20.10.2000. By
inquiry report dated 14.11.2000, the inquiry officer concluded that the
charges against the Petitioner stood proved. The copy of the inquiry
report dated 14.11.2000 was sent to the Petitioner and was delivered
to him on 18.11.2000. The Petitioner was thereafter requested to
submit his defence representation, if any, within a period of 15 days.
No defence representation was sent by the Petitioner within the
stipulated time and no extension was sought by him for submission of
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his defence representation. Consequently, in view of evidences
presented during the course of inquiry and the available material on
record, the Petitioner was found guilty of the alleged misconduct and
vide Punishment Order dated 05.12.2000, the Petitioner was dismissed
from service with immediate effect by the concerned authority.
2.3. Thereafter, the appeal preferred by the Petitioner against the
Punishment Order dated 05.12.2000 was also dismissed by the
Appellate Authority vide order dated 05.11.2001. It was noted that
ample opportunity was provided to the Petitioner to defend his case. It
was also noted that there were five witnesses to the incident all of
whom had confirmed the occurrence of the alleged incident.
Consequently, the appeal preferred by the Petitioner against the
Punishment Order also came to be dismissed and the Punishment of
dismissal from service was upheld by the Appellate Authority.
2.4. Thereafter, in the revision petition preferred by the Petitioner,
vide order dated 04.03.2002, the penalty of dismissal from service
imposed on the Petitioner was reduced to compulsory Retirement. It
was however noted that the reduction in penalty did not in any way
affect the gravity of the established charges of
misconduct/misbehaviour against the Petitioner.
2.5. Subsequently, the Review Petition preferred by the Petitioner
was also dismissed by order dated 24.12.2002.
2.6. In this backdrop, the Petitioner filed the subject O.A. No.
500/2004 before the learned Tribunal challenging the Punishment
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Order dated 05.12.2000, Appellate Order dated 05.11.2001, Revision
Order dated 04.03.2002, and Review Order 24.12.2002 which also
came to be dismissed by the impugned order. The learned Tribunal, by
the impugned order, noted that the issues raised by the Petitioner were
dealt extensively by the Disciplinary/Appellate and Reviewing
Authorities. It was noted that no cogent ground was raised by the
Petitioner to highlight any infirmity in the orders passed by the
concerned authorities. One ground was raised by the Petitioner
contending that during the course of the inquiry proceedings, the
Petitioner sought to examine one D.K. Vashishtha, Accountant
Bulandshahar, however, since the said witness expressed his
unwillingness to testify, the inquiry proceedings were closed. It was
the contention of the Petitioner that the action ought to have been
taken by the inquiry officer against the said witness. In that regard, the
learned Tribunal noted that since the Petitioner did not dispute that the
said D.K. Vashishtha expressed his refusal to testify, the sole reason
that no action was initiated by the inquiry officer, cannot be a ground
to conclude that the inquiry proceedings stood vitiated. Consequently,
the subject O.A. was dismissed. The review application against the
dismissal of the original application being R.A. No. 100/2005 was
also dismissed.
3. Before this Court, the learned counsel for the Petitioner has
raised a singular ground to urge that the inquiry proceedings stood
vitiated. It was argued that in the inquiry proceedings, the Petitioner
sought to examine Sh. D.K. Vashishtha, Accountant Bulandshahar, as
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a defence witness. He argued that for the said purpose, the inquiry
proceedings were adjourned from 20.10.2000 to 30.10.2000. He
submitted that the inquiry proceedings were closed by the inquiry
officer by stating that Sh. D.K. Vashishtha had shown his
unwillingness to attend the inquiry.
4. He placed reliance Section 5 of the Departmental Inquiries
(Enforcement of Attendance of Witnesses and Production of
Documents) Act, 1972 (hereafter 'the Act'), and submitted that the
Inquiry Officer was authorised and was, in fact, under a duty to
summon and enforce the attendance of the witness. It was argued that
since the same was not done, the entire inquiry stood vitiated.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel representing the Respondents
drew the attention of the Court to paragraph 16(m) of the counter
affidavit and submitted that upon the refusal of Sh. D.K. Vashishtha to
participate in the inquiry, a Memo No. I.O./ASR-HO/2000 dated
21.10.2000 was sent to the Petitioner along with the comments of Sh.
D.K. Vashishtha. It was contended that in response, the Petitioner sent
his written brief on 14.11.2000, considering which, the inquiry was
concluded on same date. It was consequently contended that no
ground to warrant interference by this Court was made out.
6. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the scope of judicial
review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is well settled.
This Court in exercise of power under Article 226 does not sit in
appeal over the findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority and
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assume the role of an Appellate authority. It would be improper for
this Court to interfere with the findings recorded during the course of
departmental inquiry by the Disciplinary Authority or the inquiry
officer as a matter of routine. Reappreciation of evidence and arrival
of findings of facts is thus impermissible unless the findings are
shown to be perverse or patently illegal.
7. Before adverting to deal with the contention made on behalf of
the Petitioner, it is pertinent to note that this Court, by order dated
01.12.2025 had directed the Respondents to produce before this Court
the file containing the inquiry proceedings. On the next date of
hearing, that is, on 12.02.2026, the learned counsel representing the
Respondents submitted that the original file was not traceable in the
office. This Court thus is saddled to deal with the contention of the
Petitioner without the benefit of original file.
8. Before resorting to do so, it is pertinent to note that the
Petitioner has not denied that Sh. D. K. Vashishtha had refused to take
part in the enquiry or that a memo in that regard was given to him.
The sole edifice of the Petitioner's grievance is that as per Section 5 of
the Act, the inquiry officer was authorised and was, in fact, under a
duty to summon and enforce the attendance of the witness failing
which the inquiry proceedings stood vitiated. No other ground has
been highlighted by the Petitioner to point towards any infirmity in the
inquiry proceedings.
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9. For this purpose, in order to deal with the limited ground raised
by the Petitioner, this Court deems it apposite to take note of the true
import of Section 5 of the Act which reads as under:
'5. Power of authorised inquiring authority to enforce attendance
of witnesses and production of documents.--
(1) Every inquiring authority authorised under section 4 (hereafter
referred to as the "authorised inquiring authority") shall have the
same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), while trying a suit, in respect of the
following matters, namely:--
(a) the summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness
and examining him on oath;
(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document or
other material which is producible as evidence;
(c) the requisitioning of any public record from any court or office.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the
authorised inquiring authority shall not compel the Reserve Bank
of India, the State Bank of India, any subsidiary bank as defined in
clause (k) of section 2 of the State Bank of India (Subsidiary
Banks) Act, 1959 (38 of 1959), or any corresponding new bank
constituted under section 3 of the Banking Companies (Acquisition
and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970),--
(a) to produce any books of account or other documents which the
Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India, the subsidiary bank
or the corresponding new bank claims to be of a confidential
nature, or
(b) to make any such books or documents a part of the record of
the proceedings of the departmental inquiry, or
(c) to give inspection of any such books or documents, if produced,
to any party before it or to any other person.
(3) Every process issued by an authorised inquiring authority for
the attendance of any witness or for the production of any
document shall be served and executed through the District Judge
within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the witness or other
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person, on whom the process is to be served or executed,
voluntarily resides or carries on business or personally works for
gain, and, for the purpose of taking any action for the disobedience
of any such process, every such process shall be deemed to be a
process issued by the District Judge.
(4) Every authorised inquiring authority making any departmental
inquiry under this Act shall be deemed to be a civil court for the
purposes of sections 480 and 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1898 (5 of 1898).'
10. From a reading of Section 5 of the Act as reproduced supra, it
is apparent that the authorised inquiring authority has the same power
as vested in a Civil Court under the provisions of CPC in respect of
summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witness and
examining him on oath. While Section 5 of the Act vests an amplitude
of power on the authorised inquiring authority, the same cannot be
construed to be a binding provision thereby casting a duty on the
inquiry officer to compel and enforce the attendance of a witness in
every case but merely an enabling provision thereby equipping the
inquiring authority with the requisite procedural tools. Even Section
32 of the CPC which provides the penalty for default lays down that
the Court 'may' compel the attendance of any person to whom
summons have been issued under Section 30 and for that purpose, the
Court may resort to the steps as follows:
"32. Penalty for default.--The Court may compel the attendance of
any person to whom a summons has been issued under Section 30
and for that purpose may--
(a) issue a warrant for his arrest;
(b) attach and sell his property;
(c) impose a fine upon him [not exceeding five thousand rupees];
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(d) order him to furnish security for his appearance and in default
commit him to the civil prison."
11. This Court thus does not find itself in agreement with the
contention raised by the Petitioner that merely because the inquiry
officer was equipped with powers akin to those of a Civil Court as per
Section 5 of the Act, the same translated into a rigid obligation on the
inquiry officer to compel the attendance of the said witness failing
which the inquiry proceedings stood vitiated. The inquiry officer is
required to exercise the authority as provided under Section 5 of the
Act judiciously and not mechanically. The argument of the Petitioner
thus, in the opinion of this Court, though pressed with significant
emphasis, is untenable.
12. Even otherwise, even if this Court were to take the case of the
Petitioner at the highest, the Petitioner has not demonstrated any
prejudice that was caused to him. The enquiry report highlights that
there were five witnesses to the alleged incident namely - Jagdish
Singh, B. Arya, S.K. Gupta, J. Ram Meena, and Veer Singh. All the
said witnesses, in their prior statements as well as the evidence
recorded during the course of the inquiry proceedings, deposed that
the Petitioner had hit the complainant with a chappal. The said
witnesses also confirmed the presence of other witnesses on the spot
at the time when the incident took place. On the contrary, the defence
witnesses - M.S. Dagur and Radhey Shyam failed to highlight
anything to point towards the innocence of the Petitioner. Sh. M.S.
Dagur stated that only an altercation took place between the parties
and Sh. Radhey Shyam Rajput deposed that a quarrel had taken place
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whereafter the Petitioner and the complainant had entered into a
compromise. The standard of proof in departmental proceedings is not
one beyond reasonable doubt but of preponderance of probabilities
which in the present case has been met.
13. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, this Court does not find
any infirmity in the impugned order so as to warrant interference by
this Court and the same cannot be faulted with.
14. The present petition is accordingly dismissed.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J.
ANIL KSHETARPAL, J.
09 APRIL, 2026
DU
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