State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr vs Dinesh Kumar Jain & Anr
2025 Latest Caselaw 5971 Del

Delhi High Court

State Of Nct Of Delhi & Anr vs Dinesh Kumar Jain & Anr on 28 November, 2025

                          *      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                          %                     Judgment Reserved on: 14th November, 2025
                                               Judgment pronounced on: 28th November, 2025
                          +      FAO 53/2023 & CM APPL 11451/2023
                                 STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.               .....Appellants
                                                Through:   Mr. Anshuman, SPC with Mr.
                                                           Vaibhav Sood, Advocates.

                                                versus

                                 DINESH KUMAR JAIN & ANR.                   .....Respondents
                                                Through:   Mr. Tushar Sannu, Adv.(GNCTD)
                                                           with Mr. Utkarsh Singh, Advocate.
                                                           Mr. Jittin Dua, Advocate.
                                                           Mr. Vinay Gupta, Mr. Ram Manohar
                                                           Singh,     Ms.    Chandni    Singh,
                                                           Advocates.


                          CORAM:
                          HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
                                                JUDGMENT

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.

1. The present appeal under Section 104 read with Order

XLIII Rule 1(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (the CPC)

impugns the order dated 30.01.2023 passed by the learned

District Judge, East District, Karkardooma Courts, in Misc. DJ

No. 21/2022 in O.S. 2738/2016, whereby the

appellants'/defendants' application under Order IX Rule 13

CPC for setting aside the ex-parte judgment and decree dated

11.02.2020 was dismissed on the dual grounds

of limitation and absence of sufficient cause.

2. The respondent/plaintiff instituted a suit for declaration of

title, possession, and consequential reliefs, originally registered

as CS No. 158/2012 on the file of this Court. The

appellants/defendants appeared through counsel and filed

their written statement contesting the respondent's/plaintiff's

claim.

3. Consequent upon enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction,

the suit stood transferred to the District Court pursuant to

Notification dated 24.11.2015, and the record was made

returnable to the Court of the learned District Judge vide order

dated 27.04.2016.

4. According to the appellants/defendants, they obtained

knowledge of the ex-parte decree only when they received notice

in Execution Petition No. 113/2020, pursuant to which they

immediately took steps to file application for setting aside the ex-

parte decree which application was taken on record on 14.01.2022

along with an application for condonation of delay.

5. The respondent/plaintiff filed objection contending that

no reasons have been made out for condonation of the long delay

and that the appellants/defendants were well aware of the

pendency of the suit and the decree that was passed thereafter as

repeated notice had been given by the trial court. As no reasons

are made out, the respondents/plaintiffs canvassed for a dismissal

of the application.

6. The trial court after hearing both sides, vide the impugned

order dated 30.01.2023 dismissed the application primarily on the

grounds that the application was grossly time-barred; that no valid

or complete application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963 (the Act) was filed; and that even assuming limitation could

be condoned, the appellants/defendants had failed to show

sufficient cause for non-appearance, given the earlier appearances

of police officials and the "long and unexplained silence"

thereafter. Aggrieved, they appellants/defendants have come up in

appeal.

7. The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants

submitted that the trial court erred in dismissing Misc. DJ No.

21/2022 on the ground that there was no application filed for

condonation of delay, when in fact along with the application

under Order IX Rule 13 CPC, the appellants/defendants had filed

a separate application under Section 5 of the Act for condonation

of delay.

7.1 The learned counsel would also vehemently contend that

the appellants/defendants became aware of the ex-parte judgment

and decree dated 11.02.2020 only when process was received in

Execution Petition No. 113/2020 on or about 06.09.2021 and

again on 15.12.2021, and that the recall application was filed

promptly on 27.01.2022. It was further emphasised that the

appellants/ defendants acted with diligence once knowledge of the

decree was acquired and that there was no deliberate default.

7.2 The learned counsel would further augment his

contention by explaining that the non-appearance before the trial

court after transfer from the High Court resulted from a

breakdown in communication. The counsel engaged for the

proceedings in the High Court was not appointed for the District

Court; the internal mechanism for transmission of briefs did not

function effectively; and that the occasional appearances by the

police officials were merely administrative and that the matter had

not been conveyed to the litigation branch.

7.3 To support the plea that "sufficient cause" existed, the

learned counsel for the appellants/defendants places reliance

upon the dictums in G.P. Srivastava v. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3

SCC 54 and Deputy Commissioner of Police v. Neelam Rani,

MANU/DE/4033/2022. It is contended that these authorities

establish that courts must adopt a liberal approach while assessing

sufficient cause, particularly where departmental

miscommunication following transfer of the case, has led to the

absence and where the litigant has acted promptly upon gaining

knowledge.

7.4 The learned counsel for the appellants/defendants in

order to fortify his contention, would further submit that the

factual matrix of the present case is closely comparable to that

considered by this Court in Neelam Rani (Supra), wherein

departmental lapses in transmission of the brief and disruption in

representation resulted in the defendants being proceeded ex-

parte. The counsel argued that, as in Neelam Rani (Supra), the

appellants/defendants herein also suffered an ex-parte decree

owing to administrative breakdown in communication after

transfer of the matter, coupled with the mistaken belief that the

counsel continued to represent them. It is thus urged that applying

the principle laid down in Neelam Rani (Supra)--that such lapses

constitute "sufficient cause" when the litigant acts promptly upon

acquiring knowledge--the present appeal ought likewise to be

allowed and the matter restored for hearing on merits.

7.5 The learned counsel also relied upon the dictum in

Surendra Trading Company v. Juggilal Kamlapat Jute Mills

Company Ltd., MANU/SC/1248/2017, to submit that procedural

rules are intended to facilitate justice and not to defeat

adjudication on merits.

8. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the

respondent/plaintiff submitted that the appellants/defendants were

repeatedly served with summons/notice and had several

opportunities to contest the suit. The learned counsel highlights

that both the counsel and police officials appeared on multiple

dates before the trial court, yet the appellants/defendants thereafter

deliberately failed to pursue the matter. It is urged that the

explanation now offered is an afterthought and reflects wilful

negligence rather than excusable omission. The

appellants/defendants have not furnished any particulars of delay

on a day-to-day basis, and so the trial court correctly found that no

proper or sufficient condonation application was before it.

8.1 Relying on Sudarshan Sareen v. NSIC, Parimal v.

Veena, and Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd.,

(2012) 3 SCC 563, it was submited that government departments

cannot seek lenient treatment on the ground of systemic

inefficiencies, and that a liberal approach to limitation cannot be

extended where the record demonstrates prolonged and

unexplained inaction.

9. Heard both sides and also examined the materials on

record.

10. The following essential facts are not in dispute. The

appellants/ defendants had filed their written statement when the

suit was pending before this Court. Upon enhancement of

pecuniary jurisdiction, the suit stood transferred to the District

Courts, and thereafter the appearance of the appellants/defendants

became irregular. Police officials appeared on a few dates, but no

counsel continued on their behalf, and ultimately, on 19.08.2017,

the defendants were proceeded ex-parte. The respondent/plaintiff

led unrebutted evidence, including the deposition of PW-3

(Patwari) and PW-5, together with revenue records such as the

jamabandi and khasra-girdawari, culminating in the ex-parte

judgment and decree dated 11.02.2020.

11. It is also not disputed that the appellants/defendants did

not move any application before the trial court between the date of

being proceeded ex-parte and the passing of the ex-parte decree.

The application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC was filed only on

27.01.2022. The first question is whether the appellants/

defendants had placed on record a proper application for

condonation of delay. On going through the records, I find that the

appellants/defendants did file an application for condonation of

delay, which application is seen at page 141, that is, Annexure J

(colly). But the delay is stated to be only 15 days, to which aspect,

I shall come to shortly. Hence, the finding of the trial court that no

application for condonation of delay has been filed, is incorrect.

12. Now, coming to the question whether sufficient reasons

have been shown for the condonation of delay. In the application

under Order IX Rule 13 CPC the allegations are that :

"4. That as the matter was initially filed by the plaintiff before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court i.e. CS (OS) No. 158/2012 and the Applicant/ Defendants filed there Written Statements before the Hon'ble Delhi High Court stating all the correct averments

and explaining as to how the property in question was allotted to the Applicants/ Defendants, and as the present case was transferred from the Hon'ble Delhi High Court to Karkardooma Court the Police officers who were appearing were under impression that that reply has already been filed and they need not todo any other task in the matter, due to which the Applicant/ Defendants were proceeded ex-parte despite the fact that they were appearing on each and every dates.

5. That it is also pertinent to mention herein that the plaintiff was very well aware that as the Defendants have been proceeded ex parte, the plaintiff succeeded in his plan of getting the favorable Judgment by concealing the very fact from the Hon'ble Court, that the Suit Property in question is very well allotted to Applicant/Defendants. (Copy of Letters and Documents with List of Documents attached with this application for the kind perusal of the Hon'ble Court)

6. That the Applicant/ Defendants came to know about the ex-parte Judgment/Decree upon receiving the Summons of the Hon'ble Court in Execution Petition No. 113/2020 and thereafter the Applicant/ Defendants contacted the litigation department and sought assistance of Government Counsel.

7. That the applicant/ defendants took opinion of the Ld. Standing Counsel of the GNCTD for appropriate remedies and the Applicant/ Defendants thereafter took all the necessary steps.

8. That the applicant/ Defendants, immediately thereafter contacted the Legal Cell of Delhi Police and who in turn immediately requested the Government Counsel to appear before the Hon'ble Court in the Execution Petition no. 113.2020 on the date of hearing and the Ld. Government Counsel also appeared on the date of hearings before the Hon'ble Court and filed its objections. The Hon'ble Court on14.01.2022 was pleased to take the objections on record and directed the DH to reply to objections......"

(Emphasis supplied)

13. The averments in the application will make it obvious

that the contention of the appellants/defendants that they came to

know of the decree only on receipt of notice in the execution is

absolutely false. They themselves admit that they were aware of

the fact that the case had been transferred to the Court at

Karkardooma, but they were under the impression that as a reply

had been filed, they need not do anything further in the matter.

The affidavit accompanying the application for condonation of

delay is seen affirmed by the SHO, Gandhi Nagar Police Station.

The said officer cannot be heard to advance such an argument. He

is not an illiterate or rustic person. I will still assume for a moment

that this contention is also true and that the appellants/defendants

were under the bona fide impression that they need not do

anything after the filing of the written statement. Now, the

question is whether the said assertion is true or probable. I am

afraid that I will have to answer the same in the negative because

the trial court in the impugned order says that initially the

appellants/defendants and the counsels were appearing. On

completion of pleadings, necessary issues were framed in the

presence of the counsel for the appellants/defendants. On

05.07.2014, they had also partially cross-examined PW-1, the

plaintiff. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 09.11.2016 and

05.04.2017 to enable the appellants/defendants to complete the

cross-examination of PW-1. The trial court also issued notice to

the defendants vide order dated 16.02.2017. Pursuant to the notice

being served, on 05.07.2017 ASI Rajinder Singh and Sub-

Inspector Nishant on behalf of the first defendant appeared before

the trial court. On 14.07.2017, Sub-Inspector Manish Tyagi

appeared on behalf of the second defendant. However, from the

next date of hearing onwards, none appeared on behalf of the

appellants/defendants and they failed to cross examine the

plaintiff and his witnesses. Thereafter, vide order dated

02.08.2018, the trial court again issued notice to the second

defendant, i.e., the SHO Gandhi Nagar Police Station. On

11.10.2018, Sub-Inspector Manish Tyagi appeared before the trial

court on behalf of the SHO Gandhi Nagar police station. After the

passing of the judgment and decree in the year 2020, the

respondent/plaintiff filed a caveat petition before this Court. A

copy of the said petition, containing the details of the judgment

was served on the appellants/defendants. These facts are not

disputed by the appellants/defendants. Therefore, it is apparent

that they were well aware of the proceeding or the pendency of

the suit, the fact that the trial had started in the case as well as the

decree that was passed on 11.02.2020. That being the position, the

argument that the appellants/defendants came to know of the

decree only when notice in the execution petition was served on

them is apparently false. Likewise, the allegation in the

application for condonation of delay that there is only 15 days'

delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC is also

wrong as the decree is dated 11.02.2020, whereas the application

for setting aside the decree was filed only in the month of January

2022, that is, after a delay of about 2 years.

14. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the

appellants/defendants that serious prejudice would be caused if

the ex parte judgment and decree are not set aside as the Gandhi

Nagar police station is situated in the disputed property and

therefore, the consequences of the decree not being set aside

would be quite disastrous. The matter is indeed serious. The

appellants/defendants must also have been aware/conscious of the

same. It is beyond my comprehension as to why the

appellants/defendants did not contest the case despite receipt of

summons and in fact, initially taking part in the trial by partly

cross-examining the plaintiff. What reasons prompted the

appellants/defendants from not appearing before the trial court is

known only to them. This is a fit case in which the officers

concerned who were in-charge or responsible for the conduct of

the case be proceeded against. The government is the biggest

litigant and they lose most of the cases only because of such

failures/omissions deliberate or otherwise on the part of its

officials. The conduct of the officers in initially appearing in the

case and taking part in the litigation and then suddenly

disappearing from the scene without absolutely any reason(s)

being shown, constrains this Court to even doubt whether the non-

appearance was deliberate/intentional. Were the officials in fact,

colluding with the plaintiff and helping him by not appearing

before the trial court? The circumstances and materials on record

constrain me in thinking so.

15. It is true that the expression "sufficient cause" must

receive a liberal construction, as held in G.P. Srivastava (Supra)

and Surendra Trading Company (Supra). However, these

authorities do not dispense with the requirement of bona fide

conduct. Liberal interpretation does not extend to situations where

the record shows complete inaction and indifference. The

defendant/appellants' conduct does not satisfy even the basic

threshold necessary for invoking the discretion under Order IX

Rule 13 CPC.

16. The learned counsel for the defendant/appellants heavily

relied upon the dictum in Neelam Rani (Supra), contending that

the present case stands on a similar footing. This submission is

misconceived. In Neelam Rani (Supra), the defendants had taken

timely and concrete steps to appoint Government counsel by

issuing a Brief Transmission Form (BTF), and the non-appearance

occurred only because the counsel did not receive the BTF. The

Court found that the defendants had acted diligently prior to being

proceeded ex-parte and that no negligence could be imputed. The

facts here are fundamentally different. The records disclose years

of complete inaction. The factual matrix in Neelam Rani (Supra)

thus offers no support to the defendant/appellants; if anything, the

contrast highlights their lack of diligence.

17. The judgments relied upon by the respondent/plaintiff,

including Sudarshan Sareen (Supra), Parimal (Supra), and

Postmaster General (Supra), reiterate the principle that

departmental lapses and systemic inefficiencies cannot form a

basis for condoning prolonged negligence.

18. Further, in P.K. Ramachandran v, State of Kerala &

Anr., AIR 1998 SC 2276, the Apex Court while considering a

case of condonation of delay of 565 days, wherein no explanation

much less a reasonable or satisfactory explanation for condonation

of delay had been given, held that law of limitation may harshly

affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour

when the statute so prescribes and the Courts are not to extend the

period of limitation on equitable grounds.

19. In Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer Jalgaon

(2008) 17 SCC 448, it was observed that the Courts cannot

inquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity.

Delay defeats equity. Courts help those who arc vigilant and do

not slumber over their rights. In Majii Sannemma @ Sanyasi

Rao v, Reddy Sri Devi and Others (DOD : 16.12.2021), it was

observed that the law of limitation has to be applied with all its

rigour, when the statute so prescribes and Courts cannot extend

the same on equitable grounds.

20. On a cumulative assessment, the appellants/defendants

have failed to discharge the burden of showing either satisfactory

explanation for delay or sufficient cause(s) for their absence. The

trial court's reasoning is based on a correct appraisal of the

materials on record and does not suffer from any illegality,

perversity, or misdirection.

21. For these reasons, the appeal sans merit, is accordingly

dismissed. No order as to costs. Application(s), if any, pending,

shall stand closed.

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA (JUDGE)

NOVEMBER 28, 2025 Rs/rn