[Cites 11, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
M/S Charms Cards Pvt Ltd vs Vinod Kanwar & Ors on 28 November, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 17.11.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 28.11.2025
+ FAO 112/2016
M/S CHARMS CARDS PVT LTD .....Appellant
Through: Ms. Shraddha Bhargava, Advocate.
versus
VINOD KANWAR & ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. R.K. Nain, Ms.Pratima N. Lakra
and Mr. Chandan Prajapati,
Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. This appeal under Section 30 of the Employee's
Compensation Act, 1923 (the EC Act), has been filed by the
respondent in Claim no. WCD/CD/4/08-6649, before the court of
the Commissioner, EC Act, Central District, Puria, New Delhi
whereby the claim for compensation of the claimants was allowed.
The parties in this appeal will be referred to as described in the
original proceedings.
2. The brief facts leading to the present appeal are as follows:
The claimants, being the widow, minor children, parents and
brother of deceased Sultan Singh, filed an application under the
EC Act before the learned Commissioner. It was their case that the
deceased was engaged as a mason (raj mistri) for construction
work in a godown stated to be associated with the respondent.
They alleged that on 13.05.2005, at about 7:00 PM, while the
deceased was carrying out plastering work on the second floor, the
wooden platform on which he was standing collapsed, resulting in
his fall and causing grevious injuries. He was taken to LNJP
Hospital, where he was declared "brought dead". The body, was
thereafter, taken to the native village of the deceased for
cremation.
2.1 Based on these assertions, the claimants sought
compensation from the respondent/the employer on the ground that
death had occurred during and in the course of employment.
2.2 The respondent, however, contended that no construction
activity whatsoever had been undertaken at her premises in the
year 2005; that the deceased was never employed by the
respondent; and that no accident had occurred at the site and that
the claim petition had been instituted after an inordinate delay of
the alleged date of the incident and that no notice under Section 10
of the EC Act had ever been served upon the appellant.
2.3 On completion of pleadings, necessary issues were raised
and the parties went to trial. The claimants examined PW-1 widow
of the deceased; PW-2 brother of the deceased; and PW-3 an
alleged co-worker. The respondent produced documentary
evidence, including the balance sheet for the financial year 2005-
06 (Ex. MW1/A).
3. On consideration of the oral documentary evidence and
after hearing both sides, the learned commissioner vide the
impugned order held that the accident occurred during the course
of employment and awarded compensation of ₹3,53,476/- with
interest @12% per annum. Aggrieved, the respondent has
preferred the present appeal.
4. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the
claim was liable to be rejected at the threshold, as it was bereft of
even the most rudimentary evidence. It is contended that no First
Information Report (FIR), accident report, Daily Diary (DD) entry,
Medico-Legal Case (MLC), hospital record, post-mortem report,
or death certificate was produced to establish that any accident had
occurred at all, let alone one arising out of and during the course of
employment. In the absence of such foundational materials, the
Commissioner could not have proceeded merely on
uncorroborated oral assertions. It is argued that even in a beneficial
statute, the core ingredients--employment, accident, and causal
nexus--must be proved by credible evidence.
4.1 It is further contended that the respondent consistently
denied having ever engaged the deceased in any kind of
construction project. To augment this contention, the Company's
balance sheet for the year 2005-06 (Ex. MW1/A) was produced,
demonstrating that no construction activity had been undertaken
during the relevant period. This document, which strikes at the
very core of the claim narrative, was completely overlooked by the
learned Commissioner. The appellant asserts that such non-
consideration of material evidence renders the impugned order
perverse.
4.2 The learned counsel for the respondent places strong
reliance on the testimony of PW-2 the brother of the deceased,
who, during his cross-examination, conceded that the deceased
was working independently and was not employed under any
management. More critically, he admitted that no accident had
taken place involving his brother, and hence no FIR, hospital
record, or post-mortem report existed. These categorical
admissions, according to the respondent, destroy the very
substratum of the claim. It is submitted that once the witness of the
claimants themselves denied the employment and the accident, the
entire edifice of the claim will collapse.
4.3 It is further urged that the direction to pay interest at 12%
per annum from June 2005 is wholly unsustainable. The claim
petition was admittedly instituted on 20.02.2008 after a delay of
nearly three years, and thereafter remained pending before the
Commissioner for more than seven years. In such circumstances,
fastening the liability of interest from a date preceding even the
institution of the claim is contrary to the statutory scheme and
unsupportable in law.
5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimants submitted
that though PW-1 to PW-3 were extensively cross-examined,
nothing was brought out to discredit their testimony. Their
testimonies, viewed as a whole, established both the employment
of the deceased and the occurrence of the accident. It is urged that
absence of formal documentation such as FIR or MLC cannot, by
itself, defeat a claim under a beneficial legislation.
5.1 The learned counsel for the claimants would place reliance
on Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ibrahim
Mahmmod Issak, 1969 ACJ 422 (SC), to contend that strict proof
is not required and that oral testimony--if credible--can suffice to
establish the accident. The claimants rely on the principle that a
liberal and non-technical approach is mandated in cases involving
unorganised labour.
5.2 Further, reliance was placed on the decision of the Apex
Court in Mackinnon Mackenzie & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Ritta
Fernandes, 1969 ACJ 419 (SC), and Section 10A(3) of the E&C
Act to argue that when records relating to employment lie within
the special knowledge of an employer, failure to produce such
evidence would result in an adverse inference. It is contended that
the respondent's denial of construction work cannot defeat a claim,
when no employment records were produced, and the employer
was in a position to produce such records.
5.3 Further, the learned counsel relies on the dictum in
Shriram General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Babu & Anr., FAO
361/2013 (Delhi High Court), wherein this Court held that
insistence on FIR or MLC in claims relating to unorganised labour
can defeat the very purpose of the EC Act, and that the
Commissioner may rely upon oral evidence, if consistent and
credible.
5.4 The claimants further place reliance on the dictum in
Maghar Singh v. Jaswant Singh, 1997 ACJ 517 (SC), Tebha
Bai & Ors. v. Rajkumar Keshwani, (2018) 7 SCC 705,
and Parameshwaran v. M.K. Parameshwaran Nair, 1991 (1)
TAC 416, to contend that the EC Act is a welfare legislation and
technical or procedural deficiencies should not come in the way of
granting relief, particularly where the dependants of a deceased
workman come from a weaker socio economic background.
5.5 Reliance is further placed on the dictum Chiman Surakhia
Vasva v. Ahmed Musa Ustad, 1987 ACJ 161 (Gujarat High
Court), for the proposition that provisions of the CPC and
Evidence Act do not strictly apply to proceedings before the
Commissioner, and that the inquiry is intended to be summary and
guided by the overarching objective of ensuring compensation in
genuine cases of employment injury or death.
5.6 The learned counsel for the claimants further argued that
workers in the unorganised sector typically do not receive
appointment letters, wage slips, or formal documentation of
employment. The family members of the deceased, being simple
rural labourers, were in a state of shock at the time of his death and
were unaware of the need to lodge an FIR, insist upon a post-
mortem, or preserve hospital documentation.
5.7 Lastly, the learned counsel also submitted that the present
appeal does not raise any substantial question of law and is
therefore not maintainable by relying on North East Karnataka
Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha, 2018 SCC OnLine SC
2296, wherein the distinction between a substantial question of law
and a mere question of fact was elaborated.
6. Heard both sides.
7. The incident took place on 13.05.2005. The claim petition
was filed on 20.02.2008, i.e., nearly three years after the alleged
occurrence. As per Section 10(1) of the EC Act, in case of death
the claim should be filed within two years from the date of death.
The last proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 10 of the EC Act
says that the Commissioner may entertain and decide any claim
even if preferred beyond the due time as provided in the sub-
section, if he is satisfied that the failure was due to sufficient
cause. In the counter filed before the Commissioner, no objection
regarding delay was taken up and hence no issue is seen raised
regarding the same. As no issue was raised, the Commissioner had
no occasion to consider the same. Hence, such a contention cannot
be taken up for the first time in appeal. Therefore, the argument
that the claim was barred by limitation is liable to be rejected.
8. An argument was also raised that no notice as contemplated
under Section 10(1) of the EC Act had been given. The case of the
claimants is that the incident took place in the premises of the
respondent. In the light of clause (a) to the 4th proviso to sub-
section (1) of Section 10 of the EC Act, the argument also cannot
hold good.
9. The impugned award proceeds on the premise that the
deceased was engaged as a mason by the respondent and that the
accident in question arose out of and during the course of such
employment. The burden to establish the foundational facts like
employment, occurrence of the accident, and the nexus between
the accident and the employment lay upon the claimant. In the
present matter, the claim is founded exclusively on the oral
testimony of the witnesses. Admittedly, there is no FIR, DD entry,
MLC, hospital record, post-mortem report, or even a death
certificate--to support the alleged incident of 13.05.2005.
Therefore, I will consider whether the oral evidence on record is
sufficient to prove the claim.
10. The testimony of PW-2, the brother of the deceased and a
claimant himself, is of decisive significance. In his cross-
examination, he unequivocally stated that the deceased was
working independently and was not employed under any
management. The relevant portion of his testimony reads thus-
"My brother Mr. Sultan was not an employee with any
management; he was working independently as mistri.I do
not have any contract for documents to establish that my
brother was working for Charms Card Pvt. Ltd. It is
incorrect to suggest that my deceased brother was not
performing construction work with the respondent."
PW-2 further admitted:
"It is incorrect to suggest that no accident was occurred with
the respondent (Vol.) I was present at the time of accident
and is a witness for the same. It is correct that no FIR was
lodged for the accident stated in the present case. I do not
have any record to establish the fact that my deceased
brother was taken to the hospital; after the accident. It is
correct that as no accident took place with :my brother and
because Of the same no FIR no Post Mortem Record and
Hospital Record are present with me." Court Question :
Whether you understand the previous question asked by the
respondent management ANS: 'Yes'.'
(Emphasis supplied)
11. A reading of the above cross-examination shows that
PW-2 has made two mutually destructive statements in the same
breath. While he initially attempted to assert that an accident had
occurred, he immediately admits that no accident took place with
his brother and that for this reason no FIR, hospital record or post-
mortem report exists. This is not a mistake or inadvertent
statement, as the Court specifically asked him whether he
understood the question, and he categorically responded in the
affirmative. This affirmation renders the admission conscious,
voluntary and unequivocal. The testimony of PW-2, therefore, not
only fails to establish the occurrence of the accident but, in fact,
directly negates it. Once the claimant's own principal witness
asserts that no accident occurred and that the deceased was not
employed under any management, the very foundation of the claim
stands demolished. This categorical admission demolishes the very
occurrence of the alleged accident and renders the claim
fundamentally untenable.
12. PW-3, the alleged co-worker, in his chief examination
has stated that Pukhraj (PW-3) and other workers hired a vehicle
and took Sultan Singh to his village as he had already expired. He
has no case that Sultan Singh had been taken to the hospital and
that during the course of the journey, the latter had breathed his
last. The testimony of PW-3 is inconsistent with the case set up in
the claim petition and by PW-2 as per which immediately after the
accident, Sultan had been taken to the LNJP Hospital where he
was declared 'brought dead'. But if PW-3 is to be believed, Sultan
was taken in a vehicle directly to his village. These aspects
coupled with the absence of any records like post mortem
certificate, FIR, etc., raise doubts regarding the case.
13. Now what remains is the testimony of PW-1, the widow,
admittedly had no personal knowledge of the incident.
14. On the other hand, the respondent produced documentary
evidence, including the balance sheet for the year 2005-06 (Ex.
MW1/A), showing that no construction activity was undertaken
during the relevant period.
15. In aforesaid circumstances, the conclusion that the
testimony of the witnesses was unimpeached and that it proves that
the accident occurred during the course of employment of the
deceased is plainly perverse. The evidence does not merely fall
short--it affirmatively negates the case set up by the
respondent/claimants. Findings returned in disregard of material
admissions and documentary evidence, and unsupported by any
contemporaneous record, cannot be sustained in law.
16. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered
view that the learned Commissioner erred in accepting the claim
and awarding compensation. The award dated 30.10.2015 is liable
to be set aside.
17. The appeal is accordingly allowed. The impugned order
dated 30.10.2015 passed in Claim No. WCD/CD/4/08-6649 is set
aside and so the claim petition shall stand dismissed.
18. There shall be no order as to costs.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
NOVEMBER 28, 2025
