Delhi High Court
Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors vs Sunil Kumar And Ors on 2 May, 2025
Author: Navin Chawla
Bench: Navin Chawla
$~24
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 02.05.2025
+ W.P.(C) 5756/2025
GOVERNMENT OF NCT OF DELHI AND ORS.
.....Petitioners
Through: Mr.Gaurav Dhingra, Adv
versus
SUNIL KUMAR AND ORS.
.....Respondents
Through: Mr.M.K. Bhardwaj, Adv
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLA
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE RENU BHATNAGAR
NAVIN CHAWLA, J. (ORAL)
CM APPL. 26283/2025 (Exemption)
1. Allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
W.P.(C) 5756/2025 & CM APPL. 26282/2025
2. This petition has been filed by the petitioners, challenging the
Order dated 05.08.2024, passed by the learned Central Administrative
Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (in short, „Tribunal‟) in O.A.
No. 1454/20217, titled Sunil Kumar, Contractual Craft Instructor
(B) & Ors. v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors., allowing the said O.A.
filed by the respondents herein with a direction to the petitioners to
release the payment of the respondents for the period between the
termination of their services by the petitioners till their reinstatement,
within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the certified
copy of the said order.
3. To give a brief background of the facts of the present case, the
respondents were working on contract basis with the petitioners as
Contractual Craft Instructors. As their services were terminated by the
petitioners vide orders dated 31.07.2014 and being aggrieved by the
same, the respondents filed an application before the learned Tribunal
challenging the order of termination. The learned Tribunal, by its
interim order dated 08.08.2014, stayed the operation of termination
notices. The petitioners challenged the same by way of a Writ Petition,
being WP(C) 7636/2014, titled Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. v.
Rakesh Kumar & Ors., wherein this Court, by an ad interim order
dated 10.11.2014, in turn, suspended the order dated 08.08.2014 of the
learned Tribunal. The Writ Petition was eventually disposed of by this
Court vide its Judgment dated 25.03.2015.
4. The learned Tribunal, thereafter, by an order dated 25.02.2016,
allowed the O.As filed by the respondents herein, by setting aside the
termination notices dated 31.07.2014; directing the petitioners to re-
engage the respondents in their services; and frame a policy for their
regularization.
5. The petitioners initiated the process of re-engagement of the
respondents, and eventually issued orders dated 04.10.2016 for the
said purpose.
6. The respondents then filed representations seeking the period of
their absence from duty to be treated as one spent on duty, along with
all consequential benefits.
7. Finally, to elicit a positive response from the petitioners, the
respondents again approach the learned Tribunal by way of the present
O.As, which has been allowed by the learned Tribunal by its
Impugned Judgment.
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in spite of
the Order dated 08.08.2024 of the learned Tribunal, coming back into
operation with the disposal of the Writ Petition of this Court on
25.03.2015, the respondents did not report back for duty till October
2016. He submits that the respondents are, therefore, not entitled to
claim any benefits for the said period when they did not work. He
places reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sushil
Kumar Tripathi v. Jagadguru Ram Bhadracharya Handicapped
University & Anr., (2022) 8 SCC 760, in support of his submission.
9. We are unable to accept the submission made by the learned
counsels for the petitioners.
10. In the present case, the respondents immediately on the issuance
of the termination notices dated 31.07.2014 had approach the learned
Tribunal, and the learned Tribunal by an order dated 08.08.2014,
stayed the operation of the termination notices. Instead of re-instating
the respondents into services, the petitioner chose to challenge the said
order by way of a Writ Petition before this Court, wherein, the
operation of the order dated 08.08.2014 was suspended by this Court
vide its order dated 10.11.2014. The Writ Petition was eventually
disposed of by this Court vide its judgment dated 25.03.2015. It is not
the case of the petitioners that the petitioners thereafter issued orders
of re-instatement or allowed the respondents to join back into services.
The O.As filed by the respondents was finally allowed by an order
dated 25.02.2016, directing the petitioners to re-engage the
respondents. It is only by an order of 04.10.2016 that the petitioners
finally issued re-engagement notices to the respondents. The
respondents, therefore, were kept away from the work by the acts of
the petitioners itself. If an employee is prevented by the employer
from performing his duties, the employee cannot be blamed for having
not worked, and the principle of "no pay no work" shall not be
applicable to such employee. Reliance in this regard is placed on State
of U.P. v. Dayanand Chakrawarty & Ors., (2013) 7 SCC 595,
whereby, the Supreme Court held as under:
"48. In view of the orders passed by this Court
in Harwindra Kumar v. Chief Engineer,
Karmik, (2005) 13 SCC 300 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 1063, Radhey Shyam Gautam [(2007)
11 SCC 507 : (2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 59] and
Jaswant Singh [U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant
Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 : (2007) 1 SCC
(L&S) 500] , it was not open to the High Court
to rely on some other decision of this Court,
ratio of which is not applicable in the present
case for determining back wages of the
respondents restricting it to be 20% of the
basic salary. We observe that the principle of
"no pay no work" is not applicable to the
employees who were guided by specific rules
like Leave Rules, etc. relating to absence
from duty. Such principle can be applied to
only those employees who were not guided by
any specific rule relating to absence from
duty. If an employee is prevented by the
employer from performing his duties, the
employee cannot be blamed for having not
worked, and the principle of "no pay no
work" shall not be applicable to such
employee."
11. In the present case, the petitioners have failed to show that the
absence from duty of the respondents was in any way attributable to
the respondents themselves, therefore, the Judgment in Dr.Sushil
Kumar Tripathi (supra), would not come to assistance of the
petitioners. We may herein also note that the learned Tribunal in the
Impugned Judgment has also placed reliance on the judgment of the
Supreme Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. M/s Hindalco
Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 85 for granting relief to the
respondents.
12. Accordingly, we find no merit in the present petition.
13. The same, along with the pending application, is disposed of.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
RENU BHATNAGAR, J
MAY 2, 2025/rv/VS
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