Delhi High Court
Yash Dev Singh Sejwal vs State & Ors. on 20 March, 2025
$~25 & 26
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 20th March, 2025
25
+ CRL.M.C. 886/2020 & CRL.M.A. 34305/2023
YASH DEV SINGH SEJWAL .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Richa Kapoor, Mr.
Kunal Anand, Ms. Atika
Singh, Mr. Harsh Gautam
and Ms. Udipti Chopra,
Advocates along with
petitioner in person.
versus
STATE & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Kiran Bairwa, APP
for the State with Insp.
Satish Kumar and SI
Uday, PS DIU/North Dist.
Mr. Raj Kumar, Advocate
for R-2.
26
+ CRL.M.C. 910/2020 & CRL.M.A. 1982/2021, CRL.M.A.
34287/2023
YASH DEV SINGH SEJWAL .....Petitioner
Through: Ms. Richa Kapoor, Mr.
Kunal Anand, Ms. Atika
Singh, Mr. Harsh Gautam
and Ms. Udipti Chopra,
Advocates along with
petitioner in person.
versus
STATE & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Kiran Bairwa, APP
for the State with Insp.
Satish Kumar and SI
Signature Not Verified Uday, PS DIU/North Dist.
Signed By:HARMINDER
KAUR CRL.M.C. 886/2020 & CRL.M.C. 910/2020 Page 1 of 12
Signing Date:25.03.2025
18:48:36
Ms. Monika Arora, CGSC
with Mr. Subrodeep Saha
and Mr. Prabhat Kumar,
Advocates for UOI.
Mr. Raj Kumar, Advocate
for R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
1. The present petition is filed challenging the order dated
26.06.2018 (hereafter 'the impugned order') passed by the
learned Metropolitan Magistrate ('MM'), Mahila Court, Central,
Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, pursuant to which Respondent No.2
was discharged in complaint case being CC No. 14/3/2009.
2. The complaint was filed by the petitioner under Sections
417/494/495 read with Section 120 of Indian Penal Code, 1860
('IPC'), alleging that Respondent No.2 misrepresented her
marital status at the time of marriage.
3. It is alleged that the petitioner married Respondent No.2
based on a false representation by her and her family that she was
unmarried. Subsequently, the petitioner discovered that
Respondent No.2 had previously been married to one Ravi
Chaudhary and had separated from him through an agreement
without obtaining a legal divorce. Upon confronting Respondent
No.2, she allegedly threatened the petitioner and his family with
false legal cases, prompting the petitioner's father to file the
present complaint.
4. The Learned Trial Court noted that the complaint was filed
by the father of the petitioner in his capacity as power of
attorney. In his deposition, he stated that Respondent No.2 and
her relatives had approached the petitioner's family in response
to a matrimonial advertisement and misrepresented her marital
status, leading to the marriage being solemnized on 23.10.2000.
5. The petitioner allegedly discovered the previous marriage
when attending a family wedding, where an acquaintance
informed him that Respondent No.2 had been married to Ravi
Chaudhary. Upon further inquiry, the petitioner reportedly
obtained documents, including a marriage agreement and a
marriage registration certificate, allegedly proving Respondent
No.2's previous marriage. However, the petitioner's father
admitted in his deposition that the petitioner himself had
previously been married and had children from that marriage.
6. The Learned Trial Court dismissed the complaint and
discharged Respondent No.2, holding that the deposition of the
petitioner's father was hearsay regarding the claim that he
learned of Respondent No.2's previous marriage at a wedding.
Additionally, the court observed that the documents submitted as
proof of Respondent No.2's alleged prior marriage were not
legally binding and did not bear her signature. Furthermore, no
witnesses named in the documents had been examined.
7. Based on these findings, the Trial Court concluded that a
prima facie case regarding Respondent No.2's alleged first
marriage with Ravi Chaudhary was not established.
8. The complaint was filed under Sections 494/495 of the
IPC, which fall under Chapter XX of the IPC. It is relevant to
note that Section 198 of the CrPC relates to the prosecution for
offences against marriage and the same reads as under:
"198. Prosecution for offences against marriage.--(1) No
Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under
Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) except
upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the
offence:
Provided that--
(a) where such person is under the age of eighteen years,
or is an idiot or a lunatic, or is from sickness or infirmity
unable to make a complaint, or is a woman who, according
to the local customs and manners, ought not to be
compelled to appear in public, some other person may,
with the leave of the Court, make a complaint on his or her
behalf;
(b) where such person is the husband and he is serving in
any of the Armed Forces of the Union under conditions
which are certified by his Commanding Officer as
precluding him from obtaining leave of absence to enable
him to make a complaint in person, some other person
authorised by the husband in accordance with the
provisions of sub-section (4) may make a complaint on his
behalf;
(c) where the person aggrieved by an offence punishable
under 1 [section 494 or section 495] of the Indian Penal
Code (45 of 1860) is the wife, complaint may be made on
her behalf by her father, mother, brother, sister, son or
daughter or by her father's or mother's brother or sister 2
[, or, with the leave of the Court, by any other person
related to her by blood, marriage or adoption].
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), no person other
than the husband of the woman shall be deemed to be
aggrieved by any offence punishable under section 497 or
section 498 of the said Code:
Provided that in the absence of the husband, some person
who had care of the woman on his behalf at the time when
such offence was committed may, with the leave of the
Court, make a complaint on his behalf.
(3) When in any case falling under clause (a) of the proviso
to sub-section (1), the complaint is sought to be made on
behalf of a person under the age of eighteen years or of a
lunatic by a person who has not been appointed or
declared by a competent authority to be the guardian of the
person of the minor or lunatic, and the Court is satisfied
that there is a guardian so appointed or declared, the
Court shall, before granting the application for leave,
cause notice to be given to such guardian and give him a
(4) The authorisation referred to in clause (b) of the
proviso to sub-section (1), shall be in writing, shall be
signed or otherwise attested by the husband, shall contain a
statement to the effect that he has been informed of the
allegations upon which the complaint is to be founded,
shall be countersigned by his Commanding Officer, and
shall be accompanied by a certificate signed by that Officer
to the effect that leave of absence for the purpose of making
a complaint in person cannot for the time being be granted
to the husband.
(5) Any document purporting to be such an authorisation
and complying with the provisions of sub-section (4), and
any document purporting to be a certificate required by
that sub-section shall, unless the contrary is proved, be
presumed to be genuine and shall be received in evidence.
(6) No Court shall take cognizance of an offence under
section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), where
such offence consists of sexual intercourse by a man with
his own wife, the wife being under 3 [eighteen years of
age], if more than one year has elapsed from the date of the
commission of the offence.
(7) The provisions of this section apply to the abetment of,
or attempt to commit, an offence as they apply to the
offence."
9. Section 198 of the CrPC categorically provides that only
an aggrieved person can file a complaint for offences under
Chapter XX of the IPC. The provision makes an exception where
the aggrieved husband is serving in the armed forces and is
unable to file a complaint personally, in which case an authorized
person is permitted to do so on his behalf.
10. In the present case, the petitioner is not serving in the
armed forces, and it is undisputed that the complaint was filed by
the petitioner's father. Consequently, no cognizance could have
been taken of the complaint as it was not filed by a legally
recognized aggrieved person under Section 198 of the CrPC.
11. The learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the
petitioner was deceived into marriage through false
representations by Respondent No.2 and that she had
subsequently filed frivolous cases against him with the intent to
harass and extort money. The petitioner, being a non-resident of
India, claims to be unduly harassed by these complaints. He
primarily seeks an investigation into Respondent No.2's alleged
previous marriage.
12. The learned counsel submits that the petitioner only wants
the investigation to be carried out in regard to the alleged first
marriage of Respondent No.2.
13. Lastly, she contends that the FIR No. 146/2002 under
Sections 498A/420/406 IPC registered at PS Civil Lines, Delhi
has been registered at the instance of Respondent No.2 and
charges are yet to be framed in the said FIR.
14. In light of the above findings and legal provisions, it is
clear that the complaint filed by the petitioner's father was not
maintainable under Section 198 of the CrPC, and the learned
Trial Court was correct in discharging Respondent No.2. There is
no ground to interfere with the impugned order.
15. The petition stands dismissed with the aforesaid
observations.
16. The present petition is filed seeking quashing of the
chargesheet dated 25.09.2004 arising out of FIR No. 146/2002
dated 27.05.2002 registered at police station Civil Lines for
offences under Sections 498A/420/406 of the IPC.
17. The FIR was registered at the instance of Respondent
No.2, who alleged that she was married to the petitioner on
23.10.2000. She claimed that she was subjected to harassment by
the petitioner and his family members for dowry. Further, she
alleged that upon her and her father's inability to meet their
demands, the petitioner and his family members issued threats of
dire consequences.
18. The learned counsel for the petitioner claims that the
Respondent No.2 had misrepresented and concealed the fact that
she was already married at the time of her marriage with the
petitioner. She submits that this crucial fact was brought to the
attention of the Investigating Officer during the investigation but
was not recorded or made part of the charge sheet. She argues
that this omission is material and needs to be considered by the
learned Trial Court at the time of hearing arguments on charge.
19. While it is undeniable that the petitioner's arguments
pertain to his defense, at the same time, the allegations raised are
serious in nature and directly impact the veracity of the claims
made by Respondent No.2 in the FIR. Given that these
allegations go to the root of the case, they are relevant and must
be taken into account by the learned Trial Court at the
appropriate stage.
20. It is well established that this Court, in exercise of its
inherent powers under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik
Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 ('BNSS') [erstwhile Section 482 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973] can direct further
investigation when cognizance has already been taken by the
Magistrate and the charge sheet has been filed.
21. The scope of Section 528 of the BNSS has been expanded
in several judgments, establishing that the High Court can
intervene to ensure that an incomplete or flawed investigation
does not result in the miscarriage of justice. In Devendra Nath
Singh v. State of Bihar : (2023) 1 SCC 48, the Hon'ble Apex
Court summarised the precedents on the powers of the Trial
Court and the High Court to order further investigation and laid
down the following principles :
45. For what has been noticed hereinbefore, we could
reasonably cull out the principles for application to the
present case as follows:
45.1. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
is to ensure a fair trial and that would commence only
after a fair and just investigation. The ultimate aim of
every investigation and inquiry, whether by the police or
by the Magistrate, is to ensure that the actual perpetrators
of the crime are correctly booked and the innocents are
not arraigned to stand trial.
45.2. The powers of the Magistrate to ensure proper
investigation in terms of Section 156CrPC have been
recognised, which, in turn, include the power to order
further investigation in terms of Section 173(8) CrPC after
receiving the report of investigation. Whether further
investigation should or should not be ordered is within the
discretion of the Magistrate, which is to be exercised on
the facts of each case and in accordance with law.
45.3. Even when the basic power to direct further
investigation in a case where a charge-sheet has been
filed is with the Magistrate, and is to be exercised subject
to the limitations of Section 173(8)CrPC, in an
appropriate case, where the High Court feels that the
investigation is not in the proper direction and to do
complete justice where the facts of the case so demand,
the inherent powers under Section 482CrPC could be
exercised to direct further investigation or even
reinvestigation. The provisions of Section 173(8)CrPC do
not limit or affect such powers of the High Court to pass
an order under Section 482CrPC for further
investigation or reinvestigation, if the High Court is
satisfied that such a course is necessary to secure the
ends of justice.
45.4. Even when the wide powers of the High Court in
terms of Section 482CrPC are recognised for ordering
further investigation or reinvestigation, such powers are
to be exercised sparingly, with circumspection, and in
exceptional cases.
45.5. The powers under Section 482CrPC are not
unlimited or untrammelled and are essentially for the
purpose of real and substantial justice. While exercising
such powers, the High Court cannot issue directions so as
to be impinging upon the power and jurisdiction of other
authorities. For example, the High Court cannot issue
directions to the State to take advice of the State Public
Prosecutor as to under what provision of law a person is
to be charged and tried when ordering further
investigation or reinvestigation; and it cannot issue
directions to investigate the case only from a particular
angle. In exercise of such inherent powers in extraordinary
circumstances, the High Court cannot specifically direct
that as a result of further investigation or reinvestigation,
a particular person has to be prosecuted.
(emphasis supplied)
22. Further, in the case of Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v.
State of Gujarat : (2019) 17 SCC 1, it was argued before the
Hon'ble Apex Court that once cognizance had been taken, the Trial
Court lacked the authority to order further investigation, either suo
motu or upon an application by the accused. The Hon'ble Apex
Court distinguished and overruled certain earlier judgments and
rejected this argument, holding as under:
"42. There is no good reason given by the Court in these decisions
as to why a Magistrate's powers to order further investigation
would suddenly cease upon process being issued, and an accused
appearing before the Magistrate, while concomitantly, the power of
the police to further investigate the offence continues right till the
stage the trial commences. Such a view would not accord with the
earlier judgments of this Court, in particular, Sakiri [Sakiri
Vasu v. State of U.P., (2008) 2 SCC 409 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 440]
, Samaj Parivartan Samudaya [Samaj Parivartan
Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 7 SCC 407 : (2012) 3 SCC
(Cri) 365] , Vinay Tyagi [Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, (2013) 5 SCC
762 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 557] , and Hardeep Singh [Hardeep
Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri)
86] ; Hardeep Singh [Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3
Signing Date:25.03.2025
18:48:36
SCC 92 : (2014) 2 SCC (Cri) 86] having clearly held that a
criminal trial does not begin after cognizance is taken, but only
after charges are framed. What is not given any importance at all
in the recent judgments of this Court is Article 21 of the
Constitution and the fact that the Article demands no less than a
fair and just investigation. To say that a fair and just investigation
would lead to the conclusion that the police retain the power,
subject, of course, to the Magistrate's nod under Section 173(8)
to further investigate an offence till charges are framed, but that
the supervisory jurisdiction of the Magistrate suddenly ceases
midway through the pre-trial proceedings, would amount to a
travesty of justice, as certain cases may cry out for further
investigation so that an innocent person is not wrongly arraigned
as an accused or that a prima facie guilty person is not so left out.
There is no warrant for such a narrow and restrictive view of the
powers of the Magistrate, particularly when such powers are
traceable to Section 156(3) read with Section 156(1), Section 2(h)
and Section 173(8) CrPC, as has been noticed hereinabove, and
would be available at all stages of the progress of a criminal case
before the trial actually commences. It would also be in the
interest of justice that this power be exercised suo motu by the
Magistrate himself, depending on the facts of each case. Whether
further investigation should or should not be ordered is within
the discretion of the learned Magistrate who will exercise such
discretion on the facts of each case and in accordance with law.
If, for example, fresh facts come to light which would lead to
inculpating or exculpating certain persons, arriving at the truth
and doing substantial justice in a criminal case are more
important than avoiding further delay being caused in
concluding the criminal proceeding, as was held in Hasanbhai
Valibhai Qureshi [Hasanbhai Valibhai Qureshi v. State of Gujarat,
(2004) 5 SCC 347 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1603] . Therefore, to the
extent that the judgments in Amrutbhai Shambhubhai
Patel [Amrutbhai Shambhubhai Patel v. Sumanbhai Kantibhai
Patel, (2017) 4 SCC 177 : (2017) 2 SCC (Cri) 331] , Athul
Rao [Athul Rao v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 14 SCC 298 : (2019)
1 SCC (Cri) 594] and Bikash Ranjan Rout [Bikash Ranjan
Rout v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 5 SCC 542 : (2019) 2 SCC
(Cri) 613] have held to the contrary, they stand overruled.
Needless to add, Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi
Admn.) [Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1997) 1 SCC
361] and Reeta Nag v. State of W.B. [Reeta Nag v. State of W.B.,
(2009) 9 SCC 129 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1051] also stand
overruled.
(emphasis supplied)
23. In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner
has specifically alleged that Respondent No.2 misrepresented and
concealed her prior marriage, and despite bringing this fact to the
notice of the Investigating Officer, it was not considered in the
charge sheet. The omission of this crucial piece of evidence from
the investigation raises concerns about the fairness and
completeness of the investigation conducted.
24. The principles of fair trial and justice demand that the
petitioner be afforded an opportunity to present this significant
evidence before the trial progresses further. The exclusion of
relevant exculpatory evidence could lead to an unfair trial and
would be detrimental to the petitioner's defence.
25. Allowing the police to conduct further investigation will
ensure that no relevant evidence is excluded from the case, thereby
safeguarding the petitioner's right to a fair trial. Additionally, it
ensures that the trial proceeds on the basis of all relevant and
available evidence, allowing the Court to arrive at a just and
informed decision.
26. It is pointed out the trial has not proceeded as yet and the
matter is still at the stage of arguments on charge.
27. The learned counsel for the petitioner, on instructions,
submits that he would be satisfied if directions for further
investigation are given in the present case, and in that event, he
does not wish to press the prayer for quashing of the chargesheet.
28. In view of the foregoing, this Court deems it appropriate to
direct the police to conduct further investigation into the
allegations raised by the petitioner regarding Respondent No.2's
alleged prior marriage. The investigating agency is directed to
thoroughly examine this aspect, collect all relevant evidence, and
submit a supplementary charge sheet.
29. The present petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
30. A copy of this order be placed in both the matters.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
MARCH 20, 2025
DU
