Delhi High Court
Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd vs Manju Devi Vishwakarma & Ors. on 23 January, 2025
$~4
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Decision: 23rd January, 2025
+ MAC.APP. 29/2025
BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE
CO. LTD .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Danish Aftab
Chowdhury, Adv. (through
VC)
versus
MANJU DEVI VISHWAKARMA
& ORS. .....Respondents
Through:
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AMIT MAHAJAN
AMIT MAHAJAN, J. (Oral)
CM APPL. 2027/2025 (exemption from filing certified, legible,
true typed copies of the relied documents)
1. Exemption allowed, subject to all just exceptions.
2. The application stands disposed of.
CM APPL. 2026/2025 (condonation of delay of 141 days in
filing the present appeal)
3. The present application is filed under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 141 days in
filing the accompanying appeal against the award dated
04.05.2024 (hereafter 'the impugned award') passed by the
learned Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tis
Hazari Courts, Delhi in MACT No. 285/2021.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant (applicant), while
making an effort to justify the delay, submits that the impugned
award passed on 04.05.2024, copy of the judgment was received
in due course. Thereafter, opinion was sought by different
counsel at Pune (the head office of the appellant company is
situated in Pune) and Delhi (counsel of the company which gave
an opinion to file the instant appeal). He submits that some time
had gone into taking an informed decision and approval by the
legal team of the appellant company. He submits that the delay
was neither intentional and nor deliberate.
5. Sans the above averments, there is nothing else stated
which is/or, for the matter, can be said to be material or of any
importance in the said application for the purposes of
adjudication thereof. In fact, the learned counsel stated that he
had to obtain instructions from the head office located in Pune.
6. At the outset, it is pertinent to note that the accident took
place on 21.06.2021. The learned Tribunal awarded
compensation in favour of the victim on 04.05.2024. It is
apparent that the appellant did not file the appeal within the
period prescribed under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 ('MV
Act').
7. The provisions of Section 173 of the MV Act which deals
with appeals may relevantly be considered, which reads as
follows :
"173. Appeals.--(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
(2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims
Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the
award, prefer an appeal to the High Court:
Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to
pay any amount in terms of such award shall be
entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited
with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. of
the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner
directed by the High Court:
Provided further that the High Court may entertain the
appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days,
if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by
sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time."
.....
8. It is clear from the proviso to Section 173 of the MV Act
that the High Court may entertain the appeal after expiry of the
period of ninety days if it is satisfied that the appellant was
prevented by 'sufficient cause' from preferring the appeal in
time. Thus, the appellant is required to prove 'sufficient cause'
for the delay.
9. The phrase 'sufficient cause' as used in Section 173 of the
MV Act and Section 5 of the Limitation Act is in pari materia
and should therefore be interpreted in the same way.
Consequently, the Hon'ble Apex Court's rulings in the context of
Section 5 of the Limitation Act are directly applicable in
interpreting the meaning of 'sufficient cause' under Section 173
of the MV Act.
10. A bare perusal of the application shows that the learned
counsel has provided only general and basic statements without
detailing the specific approvals obtained or the time frame
involved for the delay in filing the appeal. This lack of detail is
concerning because it is critical for the appellant to clearly
demonstrate and establish 'sufficient cause' that prevented them
from filing the appeal within the statutory limitation period.
Without substantive evidence to support the claim, the appellant
cannot be permitted to benefit from their own negligence or
inaction.
11. A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in ICICI Lombard
General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Rojida Khatun : 2015 SCC
OnLine Del 10646, while assessing the importance of bona
fides of the applicant seeking condonation of delay held as under:
"4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act lays down that before
the delay is condoned, the applicant must be able to show
to the court that he was prevented by 'sufficient cause'
from filing the appeal. The 'sufficient cause' has been
interpreted as a cause by the courts which is beyond
human control. While interpreting the word 'sufficient
cause', the Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy; (2013) 12
SCC 649 has observed that the length of the delay is not
material but the bona fides of the person in prosecuting
the matter are to be seen. In the instant case, details as to
when the file was taken by the associate counsel, when it
was returned, what was his name and what was the action
taken against him and such other relevant details have not
been given by the appellant. This appears to be only a
concocted story to overcome the delay. In my considered
view, the reason given by the insurance company does not
constitute 'sufficient cause' for condoning the delay of 147
days in filing the appeal, which stands unexplained.
Consequently, the delay is not condoned. Since the delay is
not condoned, therefore, the appeal of the insurance
company becomes time barred."
(emphasis supplied)
12. It is also not the case of the appellant that the concerned
officers were not aware that the appeal is required to be filed
within the period specified. Even otherwise, ignorance of law is
of no excuse.
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in a very recent case of H.
Guruswamy v. A. Krishnaiah : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 54,
observed as under:
"15. The rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the
rights of parties. They are meant to see that the parties do
not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly.
16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter
which the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or not.
From the tenor of the approach of the respondents herein, it
appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation
for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be
presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead
that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start
with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty
to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered
by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient
cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the
other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning
the delay.
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not
merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation
are based on the principles of sound public policy and
principles of equity. No court should keep the 'Sword of
Damocles' hanging over the head of a litigant for an
indefinite period of time."
(emphasis supplied)
14. Upon careful consideration, it is evident that the
application filed by the appellant seeking condonation of delay is
bereft of any such reasons disclosing any sufficient cause. The
onus lies on the appellant to establish a credible and justifiable
explanation for failing to file the appeal within the prescribed
time frame.
15. It is to be kept in mind that the compensation sought for is
under benevolent legislation to mitigate the sufferings of persons
who lose an earning member of the family in a motor accident
besides suffering other non-pecuniary losses. The lackadaisical
propensity exhibited in filing the appeal reflects a lack of
diligence and seriousness on the part of the appellant,
undermining the purpose of such welfare-oriented legislation.
16. On account of all the above observations, I find no reason
for venturing into the merits involved in the present appeal since
the averments made in the said application seeking condonation
of delay are not worthy enough to warrant any relief.
17. In view of the above, the present application is dismissed.
MAC.APP. 29/2025 & CM APPL. 2028/2025 (stay)
18. Needless to say, as necessary corollary the appeal also
stands dismissed.
19. The pending application, if any, also stand disposed of.
AMIT MAHAJAN, J
JANUARY 23, 2025
