Delhi High Court
Harshpal Singh Negi vs St Marys School Safdarjung Enclave And ... on 22 January, 2025
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar
$~77
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 49/2025 and CM APPLs. 3933-3935/2025
HARSHPAL SINGH NEGI .....Appellant
Through: Mr. Khagesh B Jha, Ms. Shikha
Sharma Bagga, Mr. Ankit Mann, Mr. Naman
Jain and Ms. Jyoti Shokeen, Advocates
versus
ST MARYS SCHOOL SAFDARJUNG
ENCLAVE AND ORS .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Romy Chacko, Sr.
Advocate with Mr. Sachin Singh Dalal, Mr.
Ashwin Romy, Mr. Joe Sabastian and Mr.
Akshat Singh, Advocates
Mr. Piyush Gupta, CGSC with Mr.
Sudhanshu Sharma, Mr. Rohit Goyal and
Ms. Deepanshi Gupta, Adv. for R4
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJAY DIGPAUL
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 22.01.2025
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against judgment dated
16 December 2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WP (C)
16578/20241.
2. In the view that we are taking, it is not necessary for us to detail
1 Harshpal Singh Negi v St. Mary's School, Safdarjung Enclave
the trajectory of the litigation, or advert to all the issues in
controversy. Suffice it to state that the services of the appellant, who
was a Trained Graduate Teacher (Physical Education)2 in the
Respondent 1 School3 was terminated on 3 September 2024. WP (C)
16578/2024 against which the present appeal emanates, challenged the
said order of termination and also sought to question the minority
status of the School. The learned single Judge has held that the writ
petition was not maintainable on either challenge.
3. In so far as the aspect of challenge to the termination is
concerned, the learned Single Judge, relying on a judgment of the
Supreme Court in Shashi Gaur v NCT of Delhi4, has held that the
appropriate authority which was required to be approached by the
appellant was the Delhi School Tribunal5. Though this appeal assails
the judgment of the learned Single Judge qua both the challenges
raised in the writ petition, Mr. Jha, learned counsel for the appellant,
fairly states that he would be amenable to approach the DST with
respect to the challenge to the termination of his client, but prays that
the DST may also be directed to consider the appellant's prayer for
interim relief, if any such prayer is raised.
4. Qua the challenge to the termination of the appellant, therefore,
the appellant would be at liberty to approach the DST in accordance
with law. If any interim relief is sought, the appellant is at liberty to
make a prayer to the said effect. The DST would consider the said
2 "TGT", hereinafter
3 "the School" hereinafter
4 (2001) 10 SCC 445
5 "the DST", hereinafter
prayer on its own merits in accordance with law.
5. In so far as the challenge to the minority status of the
respondent is concerned, the basis of the appellant's challenge was
that the School had not been established for minorities but for
imparting secular education to all communities.
6. The learned Single Judge has not adverted to the merits of the
said challenge, as she has held the challenge not to be maintainable in
view of Section 12-C6 of the National Commission for Minority
Educational Institutions Act, 20047.
7. We find ourselves unable to subscribe to the decision of the
learned Single Judge that the challenge, by the appellant, to the
minority status of the School, could be raised before the NCMEI
under Section 12-C of the NCMEI Act.
8. Section 12-C, quite clearly, empowers the NCMEI to cancel the
minority status of an minority educational institution only in one of
the two situations envisaged by the Section. The first is if the
constitution, aims and objects of the educational institution had
subsequently been amended in such a way that it no longer reflects the
6 12-C. Power to cancel. - The Commission may, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to a
Minority Educational Institution to which minority status has been granted by an authority or Commission, as
the case may be, cancel such status under the following circumstances, namely:--
(a) if the constitution, aims and objects of the educational institution, which has enabled it to
obtain minority status has subsequently been amended in such a way that it no longer reflects the
purpose or character of a Minority Educational Institution;
(b) if, on verification of the records during the inspection or investigation, it is found that the
Minority Educational Institution has failed to admit students belonging to the minority community
in the institution as per rules and prescribed percentage governing admissions during any academic
year.
7 "the NCMEI Act", hereinafter
purpose of character of a minority educational institution. The second
is if, on verification of records, it is found that the minority
educational institution has failed to admit students belonging to the
minority community in the institution, as per the rules and prescribed
percentage.
9. It is only, therefore, if the challenge to the continuing minority
status of the Respondent 1 school was predicated on one of these two
criteria, envisaged in clauses (a) and (b) of Section 12-C of the
NCMEI Act, that the appellant could have been relegated to the
NCMEI.
10. The challenge of the appellant to the minority status of
Respondent 1 school is not predicated on either of the considerations
envisaged by clauses (a) or (b) of Section 12C of the NCMEI Act.
11. The appellant's case was that the respondent was not entitled to
be treated as a minority educational institution as it was imparting
secular education.
12. We do not express any view of whether there is any substance
in the appellant's challenge.
13. Mr. Chacko, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent 1
school also seeks to contend that, as the NCMEI Act envisages
cancellation of the minority educational status of the institution only
on the considerations contemplated by clauses (a) and (b) of Section
12C, no legitimate challenge of the minority educational status of the
institution, on any other ground, would lie.
14. On this contention, too, we refrain from expressing any opinion
either way.
15. We deem it appropriate to remit the challenge, by the appellant,
to the minority status of the School, to the learned Single Judge, for
consideration de novo. We do so only because, in our view, as the
ground of challenge was not one of the two envisaged by Section 12-C
of the NCMEI Act, the writ petition could not have been held not to
be maintainable on the ground that an alternate equally efficacious
remedy existed.
16. As to whether such a challenge would lie on the ground urged
by the appellant, and, if it does, as to whether the School is rightfully
entitled to be regarded as a minority educational institution, remain
open to agitation before the learned Single Judge.
17. In that view of the matter, this appeal is partly allowed in the
following terms:
(i) The decision of the learned Single Judge that the writ
petition is not maintainable qua the challenge to the grant of
minority status to the Respondent 1 school on account of
availability of an equally efficacious alternate remedy under
Section 12-C of the NCMEI Act, is quashed and set aside.
(ii) The challenge raised by the appellant to the minority
status of the Respondent 1 school is remitted for reconsideration
to the learned Single Judge in the light of the observations made
above.
(iii) The challenge to the termination of the appellant would,
however, have to be agitated before the DST. The appellant
would be entitled to seek interim relief before the DST and, if
interim relief is sought, the DST would take a decision thereon.
We do not express any opinion regarding the merits of the
challenge, by the appellant, to the termination of his services.
The DST is requested to take up the prayer for interim relief, if
made by the appellant before it, as expeditiously as possible.
18. The LPA stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms.
19. In order to expedite matters, both sides are directed to appear
before the learned Single Judge on 7 February 2025.
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
AJAY DIGPAUL, J.
JANUARY 22, 2025/yg
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