[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Delhi High Court
Ie Online Media Services Private ... vs Nitin Bhatnagar & Ors on 18 December, 2025
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 15.12.2025
Judgment pronounced on: 18.12.2025
+ FAO 346/2025, CM APPLs. 78829/2025 & 78831/2025
IE ONLINE MEDIA SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED.....Appellant
Through: Mr. Nachiket Joshi and Ms. Chanan
Parwani, Advocates.
versus
NITIN BHATNAGAR & ORS. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Trideep P., Sr. Advocate with
Ms. S. Singh, Ms. Sakshi Jain, Mr.
Nitesh Kumar Jha, Mr. Akshit Mago
and Ms. E. Kashyap, Advocates for
R-1.
Ms. Apar Gupta, Ms. Avanti
Deshpande, Mr. Naman Kumar and
Ms. Indumugi C., Advocates for R-
11.
Ms. Mamta Rani Jha, Ms. Shruttima
Ehersa, Mr. Rohan Ahuja, Ms.
Aishwarya Debadarshini, Ms. Jahanvi
Agarwal, Advocates for R-10.
Mr. Manu Seth, Advocate for R-5 and
R-6.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
JUDGMENT
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.
1. The present appeal under Order XLIII rule 1(r) of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 (the CPC), has been filed by defendant no. 2
in C.S. No. 510/2025 on the file of the learned Principal District
and Sessions Judge, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi, aggrieved
by the order dated 10.11.2025 by which the trial court allowed the
application under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC filed by the
plaintiff/respondent no. 1 herein.
2. In this appeal, the parties herein shall be referred to as
described in the plaint.
3. Brief facts necessary for adjudicating the present appeal
are: The plaintiff instituted the aforesaid suit seeking permanent
and mandatory injunctions along with damages, inter alia, alleging
that he is a professional banker with an unblemished career
spanning over seventeen years, having worked with reputed
international banking institutions, and that he enjoys a high
standing and reputation in the society. In August 2023, the plaintiff
was arrested by the Directorate of Enforcement (the ED) in
connection with proceedings arising out of alleged irregularities
relating to M/s Moser Baer India Limited, pursuant to which
several news reports were published by various media houses and
digital platforms, including the defendants, reporting his arrest and
associating his name with the alleged offence.
3.1. According to the plaintiff, although the impugned news
reports were published at different points of time, they continued
to remain accessible on digital platforms and search engines,
thereby perpetuating an impression of guilt against him. The
jurisdictional court discharged the plaintiff by finding that no
prima facie case had been made out and that there was no legally
admissible evidence linking the plaintiff to the alleged offence vide
order dated 17.08.2024. However, despite such discharge, the
impugned articles and reports continue to be hosted, indexed and
circulated rendering them misleading and defamatory and causing
harm to his reputation, dignity and professional prospects. Hence,
the plaintiff sought interim relief restraining the defendants from
further publication or circulation of such content and directions of
de-indexing and de-referencing of the impugned articles and URLs
pendente lite.
3.2. The defendants on the other hand contended that there
was no malice or intent to defame the plaintiff and that the right to
freedom of speech and expression, as well as the public's right to
be informed, could not be curtailed by an order of prior restraint.
The defendants also contended that in respect of certain
publications, updates reflecting the plaintiff's discharge had
already been incorporated, thereby adequately balancing the
reputational concerns. However, the plaintiff has approached the
court by suppressing material facts and that no case of grant of
interim injunction was made out, particularly in a defamation case,
as the tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and
irreparable injury were not satisfied.
4. The trial court, vide the impugned order, granted interim
relief to the plaintiff by taking note of the plaintiff's discharge in
the criminal proceedings and concluded that the continuous
availability and circulation of the impugned
publications/articles/reports would cause irreparable harm to the
plaintiff's reputation. The trial court also noted that the plaintiff
had established a prima facie case and that the balance of
convenience lay in his favour because the injury to the reputation
cannot be adequately compensated by damages.
5. Aggrieved, defendant no. 2 has preferred the present
appeal.
6. The learned counsel for defendant no. 2/appellant
submitted that the suit is barred by limitation under Article 75 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 (the Limitation Act), which prescribes a
period of one year from the date of publication for an action in
libel. The learned counsel would submit that the first and second
news reports were published on 27.10.2023 and 19.08.2024
respectively. However, the suit was filed only on 06.10.2025,
which is beyond the prescribed limitation period. The learned
counsel contended that mere continued availability of the archived
content does not give rise to continuing cause of action, and
subsequent updates reporting the plaintiff's discharge, being
favourable to him, could not constitute a fresh publication so as to
revive a time-barred claim.
6.1. It was submitted by the learned counsel that the
impugned news reports constituted fair, accurate and bona fide
reporting of judicial proceedings and actions of law enforcement
authorities, based on official press releases and court orders and
were protected by qualified privilege. It was submitted that every
factual assertion in the reports was demonstrably true, including
the plaintiff's arrest, prosecution, and subsequent discharge, and
that truth is a complete defence to an action for defamation. The
second defendant in exercise of their fundamental right under
Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution had published the articles. The
freedom of press is the freedom of the public to be informed about
matters relating to public interest.
6.2. It was also pointed out that though the plaintiff alleges
that the articles are defamatory, the plaint does not specify the
actual part or the specific words which are alleged to be
defamatory. Further, the alleged offending articles/materials are
now stale and archival content and hence cannot be accessed by
ordinary readers. The same is available or is accessible only to
premium subscribers. It was further urged that the plaintiff's
invocation of the 'right to be forgotten' is misplaced as the said
right is not absolute and must yield to public interest in
maintaining accurate historical records. The right to be forgotten'
cannot be exercised in a manner which would amount to rewriting
of history or creating a false narrative.
6.3. It was lastly contended by the learned counsel for
defendant no. 2 that the trial court fundamentally erred in its
approach to the question of balance of convenience by treating it
as a contest between the inconvenience of the plaintiff and that of
the defendants. It was urged that such a formulation is flawed in
law, as defendant no. 2 is a member of the press discharging its
constitutional role of informing the public about the functioning of
statutory authorities and judicial proceedings. The learned counsel
would further urge that any restraint on publication directly
prejudices the readers' right to know and the larger public interest,
and that the balance of convenience, when viewed from this
perspective, lies decisively against the grant of interim injunction.
7. Respondents no. 2, 5, 6 and 11 adopted the arguments of
the appellant/second defendant.
8. Per contra, it was submitted by the learned senior counsel
for the plaintiff by supporting the impugned order that the
challenge raised by defendant no. 2 proceeds on an incorrect
understanding of the reliefs sought in the suit. It was submitted that
the plaint contains two distinct and independent sets of prayers,
one founded on defamation and the other on the plaintiff's right to
privacy, dignity, and the right to be forgotten. The learned counsel
contended that the prayers premised on the right to be forgotten are
not governed by the traditional limitation applicable to actions in
libel, and are, at best, subject to the doctrine of laches. It was urged
that the prayers pertaining to "right to be forgotten" do not depend
upon a prior adjudication of defamation, and that the plaintiff is
entitled to maintain such reliefs independently once the criminal
proceedings against him have culminated in exoneration.
8.1. The learned counsel emphasised that this is not a case
where the plaintiff was discharged on a technical ground, but one
where the entire criminal proceedings against the plaintiff were
found to be baseless and stood dismissed. It was submitted further
that the plaintiff was discharged on 17.08.2024 and, thereafter, the
entire case was dismissed on 24.07.2025, and neither order has
been stayed nor set aside by any court. C.S. No. 510/2025 was
instituted on 06.10.2025, shortly thereafter. It was urged that the
plaintiff has acted with due diligence and vigilance, and therefore
neither limitation nor laches can be invoked to defeat the reliefs
sought on the grounds of right to be forgotten. The continued
online availability of the impugned articles after such exoneration
perpetuates a stigma and violates the plaintiff's right to live with
dignity under Article 21 of the Constitution of India (the
Constitution).
8.2. To augment the contention of the right to be forgotten,
the learned counsel placed reliance on the dictum of the
Constitution Bench judgment of the Apex Court in K.S.
Puttaswamy&Anr. v. Union of India & Ors., (2017) 10 SCC 1,
to submit that the right to privacy is a fundamental right
encompassing an individual's control over dissemination of
personal data, including on the internet. It was urged that while
such right is not absolute and must be balanced against freedom of
expression, once criminal proceedings have ended in exoneration,
continued digital dissemination of content associating an
individual with criminal allegations ceases to serve any legitimate
public interest and must yield to the individual's right to dignity.
The learned counsel submitted that this balancing exercise has also
been authoritatively articulated by the High Court of Kerala in
Dejo Kappan v. Deccan Herald, (2024) 6 KLT 279, wherein it
was held that in a conflict between the media's right under Article
19(1) (a) of the Constitution and an individual's dignity and
reputation traceable to Article 21 of the Constitution, the former
stands correspondingly delimited and, in appropriate cases, must
yield to the latter.
8.3. The learned counsel further relied on the decision of this
Court in Jorawer Singh Mundy v. Union of India & Ors.,
W.P.(C) 3918/2021, order dated 12.04.2021, to submit that even
at an interim stage, courts have granted protection to individuals
who stand acquitted, in order to prevent irreparable prejudice to
their social life and career prospects caused by continued online
availability of adverse material. Reliance was also placed on
Rakesh Jagdish Kalra v. India Today Group, 2024 SCC
OnLine Del 5113, wherein it was observed that once an accused
has been discharged or honourably acquitted, the shadow of
criminal accusation cannot be permitted to follow him for life, as it
would offend the right to live with dignity under Article 21 of the
Constitution.
8.4. It was further contended that the mere addition of a
small/short "update" or clarification does not undo the reputational
harm caused by the dominant narrative of the impugned
publications. The headlines, body of the articles, and repeated
association of the plaintiff with serious allegations continue to
stigmatise him, notwithstanding such updates. It was urged that the
plaintiff was neither a principal accused nor named in the
complaint and was referred to only in the context of his arrest, nor
therefore the continued prominence of such reportage is
disproportionate and unjustified.
8.5. On the question of balance of convenience, the learned
counsel submitted that the prejudice caused to the plaintiff by
continued online availability of the impugned articles far
outweighs any inconvenience to defendant no. 2. It was urged that
the relief sought pertains only to a limited number of articles
concerning individuals who stand exonerated and does not amount
to a blanket restraint on press freedom. Reliance was placed on the
dictum of Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. v. Natco
Pharma Ltd., 2014 SCC OnLine Del3373, to submit that even if
pleadings are not artfully worded, substantive rights expressly
housed in the plaint ought not to be defeated on technical grounds,
particularly when denial of relief would cause greater prejudice to
one party.
8.6. The learned counsel lastly submitted that the scope of
interference under Order XLIII Rule 1(r) CPC is limited, and an
appellate court ought not to substitute its own discretion for that of
the trial court unless the impugned order is shown to be arbitrary,
capricious, or perverse. Reliance was placed on Wander Ltd. v.
Antox India Pvt. Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, to contend that the
trial court exercised its discretion in a judicial manner after
weighing the competing rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 21 of
the Constitution. It was urged that the impugned order does not
suffer from perversity and calls for no interference.
9. Heard both sides.
10. On perusal of records, it is apparent that it is not in
dispute that the plaintiff was arrested by the ED in August 2023
and that the impugned news reports were published
contemporaneously reporting such arrest of the plaintiff. It is also
undisputed that the plaintiff was discharged vide order dated
17.08.2024. The ED is stated to have preferred appeal against the
same on 24.09.2024. The entire complaint stands dismissed by the
trial court on 24.07.2024. However, the publication, circulation
and indexing of the impugned articles continued even after the
plaintiff was discharged from the said criminal proceedings.
11. The principal issues that fall for determination before this
Court are:
(a) Whether the reliefs sought by the plaintiff, insofar
as they are premised on the right to be forgotten, are liable
to be defeated at the threshold on the ground of limitation;
and
(b) Whether the discretion exercised by the trial court
in balancing the competing rights under Articles 19(1)(a)
and 21 of the Constitution warrants interference by this
Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Order XLIII Rule
1(r) CPC.
12. According to defendant no.2, the present suit has been
filed after the expiry of more than a year of the publication of the
alleged defamatory articles, which obviously is beyond the period
prescribed under Article 75 of the Limitation Act and hence the
suit is liable to be dismissed in limine.
12.1. On going through the plaint, I find it contains distinct
prayers, including the plaintiff's right to privacy, dignity and right
to be forgotten, apart from the claim for damages for
defamation/libel. Defendant no.2 has no case that the other reliefs
sought for in the plaint are also barred by limitation, though they
have a case that the plaintiff is not entitled to the same. The
question whether the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs sought is an
entirely different question, which can be decided based on the
materials produced by the parties during the trial of the case. It is
evident from the records that the plaintiff has approached the civil
court shortly after the culmination of the criminal proceedings in
his favour. In such circumstances this Court is unable to accept the
contention of defendant no. 2 that the suit is barred by limitation as
per Article 75 of the Limitation Act.
13. As far as the second issue is concerned, the decision of a
Larger Bench of the High Court of Kerala in Dejo Kappan (supra)
(of which Bench I was also a member) has squarely addressed the
conflict between the freedom of press and right to dignity. It has
been held in unequivocal terms that while the media enjoys
freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution, such right is not absolute and stands correspondingly
delimited by the right of an individual to dignity and reputation
traceable to Article 21 of the Constitution. It has been observed
that in appropriate cases, particularly where continued
dissemination of content results in disproportionate harm to an
individual, the right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution must
yield to the right under Article 21 of the Constitution.
14. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case, this
Court finds that the trial court has not imposed any blanket or pre-
emptive restraint on journalistic activity. The impugned order is
narrowly tailored and confined to the continued availability and
circulation of specific articles relating to the plaintiff, after the
criminal proceedings against him have culminated in exoneration.
While reporting of arrests and investigations may serve public
interest at the relevant time, the perpetual digital availability of
such materials, even after the factual foundation has ceased to
exist, raises serious concerns of enduring reputational harm and
stigma.
15. The submission by the learned counsel for defendant no.
2 that the incorporation of updates reflecting the plaintiff's
discharge sufficiently balances reputational concerns cannot be
accepted at this stage. As noticed by the trial court, the mere
addition of a brief/short clarification at the bottom of the alleged
offending articles does not necessarily neutralise the dominant
narrative or the continuing impact of the original publication.
16. On the question of balance of convenience, this Court is
in agreement with the approach adopted by the trial court. The
balancing exercise is not to be reduced to a comparison of
inconvenience between the litigating parties alone, but must be
viewed through the prism of constitutional proportionality. The
inconvenience, if any, to defendant no. 2 is limited and reversible,
whereas the prejudice to the plaintiff's dignity, reputation and
professional life is immediate and irreparable. As has been held by
this court in its earlier decisions relying on the dictum in K.S.
Puttuswamy (supra), 'the right to be forgotten' and the 'right to be
left alone' are inherent aspects of a person's right to privacy. Even
going by the case of defendant no. 2 -"Content uploaded on the
websiteindianexpress.com marked "ARCHIVAL" is stale content,
and if marked PREMIUM is not accessible to any ordinary reader.
It is behind a paywall." If that be so, the interim relief granted,
will in no way affect their interest. The relief granted is interim in
nature and subject to final adjudication of rights, thereby
preserving the media's freedom while containing ongoing harm.
17. For the foregoing reasons, this court finds no infirmity in
the impugned order that had been passed by the trial court calling
for an interference by this Court.
18. In the result, the appeal sans merit is, thus, dismissed.
Applications, if any, pending, shall stand closed.
CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
(JUDGE)
DECEMBER 18, 2025/RN
