Indian Institute Of Technology, Delhi vs Jitender Kumar
2025 Latest Caselaw 6361 Del

Delhi High Court

Indian Institute Of Technology, Delhi vs Jitender Kumar on 15 December, 2025

                          *      IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
                          %                               Judgment Reserved on: 10.12.2025
                                                          Judgment pronounced on: 15.12.2025

                          +      W.P.(C) 10078/2019, CM APPL. 65656/2025, CM APPL.
                                 66239/2025 & CM APPL. 66240/2025

                                 INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, DELHI .....Petitioner
                                                 Through:      Mr. T. Singhdev, Ms. Ramanpreet
                                                               Kaur, Ms. Tanishq Srivastava, Mr.
                                                               Abhijit Chakravarty, Mr. Sourabh,
                                                               Mr. Vedant and Ms. Yamini Singh,
                                                               Advocates.


                                                 versus

                                 JITENDER KUMAR                                .....Respondent
                                              Through:         Mr. Vinay Kumar Ojha, Advocate.


                          CORAM:
                          HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA
                                                 JUDGMENT

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA, J.

1. The present writ petition under Article 226 and Article 227

of the Constitution of India (the Constitution), has been filed by

the respondent/management (the Indian Institute of Technology,

Delhi) in ID No. 79/2015 on the file of the Central Government

Industrial Tribunal cum Labour Court-I, Dwaraka Courts, Delhi,

(the tribunal) aggrieved by the Award dated 05.03.2019, by which

the claimant/workman has been held entitled to reinstatement of

service on the same post, with 50% back wages.

2. In this writ petition, unless otherwise specified, the parties

shall be referred to as described in the original claim petition.

3. In the statement of claim, it is alleged thus: The

claimant/workman, is the son of late Shri Kesari Nandan, a

permanent employee of the respondent/management, who while in

service expired on 07.07.2007. Pursuant to the death of his father,

his mother sought appointment for him on compassionate grounds

and vide communication dated 23.01.2008, she was informed that

he had been appointed under the Board of Hostel Management

(BHM). The claimant/workman was issued an appointment letter

dated 08.01.2008, placing him as Masalchi in Jwalamukhi Hostel

on a purely temporary and contractual basis for a period from

08.01.2008 to 07.07.2008.

3.1. The claimant/workman asserted that his engagement in

the respondent/management as Masalchi was extended repeatedly

from time to time through fresh appointment letters issued between

2008 to 2012 and that he continuously served the

respondent/management until 28.02.2013. It was alleged that

despite his uninterrupted and diligent services, the

respondent/management neither regularised his services nor issued

any further extension after 28.02.2013, effectively bringing his

employment to an end without notice, reason or any sort of

compliance with statutory requirements and that the non-renewal

of his contract after 28.02.2013 amounted to illegal termination.

Hence, the claimant/workman issued a legal notice dated

28.08.2013 seeking reinstatement, to which no response was

received from the respondent/management. Subsequently, he

raised an industrial dispute (ID No. 79/2015), leading to

conciliation proceedings, which eventually failed, following which

the matter was referred for adjudication. The claimant/workman

also alleged that he has remained unemployed since the cessation

of his service and sought reinstatement with back wages.

4. The respondent/management, in their written statement,

inter alia, denied that the claimant/workman was ever appointed

on compassionate grounds. It was contended that although the

request for appointment on compassionate grounds was

considered, the competent authority did not approve the same and

consequently the claimant/workman applied independently for

contractual engagement and he was engaged as Masalchi under the

BHM. It was further contended that the claimant/workman's

engagement involved breaks and that the repeated extensions were

only granted on need basis; and that he worked intermittently,

including as a daily wager between May 2011 and September

2011. The last contractual term, which expired on 28.02.2013, was

not extended because of his irresponsible work behaviour, for

which warning letters were issued. According to the

respondent/management, since the contract itself expired, there

was no termination and consequently provisions of Section 25F of

the ID Act are not attracted, rather it attracts Section 2(oo)(bb) of

the ID Act.

5. On completion of pleadings, necessary issues were raised.

The parties went to trial on the basis of the aforesaid pleadings.

The claimant/workman was examined as WW-1 and Exhibits

WW-1/1 to WW-1/9 were marked. The respondent/management

examined its Assistant Registrar as MW-1 and Exhibits MW-1/W1

and MW-1/W2 were marked.

6. Upon considering the evidence led by both the parties and

after hearing both sides, the Tribunal found that the

claimant/workman had been engaged to perform duties of

perennial nature and that the series of extensions reflected

continuous employment. It concluded that the cessation of his

service on 28.02.2013 amounted to illegal termination, particularly

in the absence of any termination letter or compliance of Section

25F of the ID Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal directed

reinstatement with 50% back wages.

7. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent/management has

invoked the writ jurisdiction.

8. The learned counsel for the respondent/management

submitted that the there is a complete misapplication of the

concept of "retrenchment" in the impugned Award. It is urged that

the claimant/workman's initial engagement on 08.01.2008, and all

subsequent engagements, were purely temporary, fixed-term

contractual appointments under the BHM, each expressly

stipulating that the engagement would automatically expire on the

last date of the contract and that no claim for regularization or

continuity would arise therefrom. The contract was extended from

time to time only as per requirement, ending finally on 28.02.2013,

after the Warden's Committee in its meeting dated 04.01.2013

recorded that the claimant/workman's performance was

unsatisfactory and recommended that no further extension be

granted. Relying on the decision in Arjan Singh v. State of

Punjab, 2014 SCC OnLine P&H 17991, it was argued that non-

renewal of a contract on its expiry is not "retrenchment" and

therefore does not attract the mandatory conditions under Section

25-F of the ID Act.

8.1. It was further submitted by the learned counsel of the

respondent/management that the claimant/workman had, on

several occasions, remained absent without leave, beginning in

December 2010, for which successive memoranda dated

27/31.01.2011, 10.02.2011 and 08.04.2011 were issued. The

learned counsel submitted that persistent unauthorized absence is a

valid ground for non-continuance of employment, and reliance was

placed in the dictum of State of Rajasthan v. Mohd. Ayub Naz,

(2006) 1 SCC 589, where it was held that habitual absenteeism

may justify termination and further in the dictum of Dattaprasad

Narayan Kulkarni v. Auchtel Products Ltd., 2023 SCC OnLine

Bom 2519, which affirms that such absenteeism constitutes

misconduct warranting discontinuation.

8.2. The learned counsel for the respondent/management

submitted that the relevant materials/documents produced along

with the writ petition would substantiate their contention that

service of the claimant/workman was never satisfactory and that

repeated warning had been issued, which was also a reason for not

extending the contract. It was urged that the

respondent/management is entitled to rely on these documents in

the present writ proceedings by invoking Order XLI Rule 27(aa) of

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (the CPC), which permits

production of additional evidence where the party establishing due

diligence satisfies that such evidence was not within its knowledge

or could not, after exercising due diligence, be produced at the

time when the decree or order appealed against was passed. The

learned counsel submits that several crucial documents--including

the Warden's Committee minutes dated 04.01.2013, the internal

correspondence relating to performance evaluation, and certain

extension/appointment letters (Annexures P-2 to P-16), were not

before the Tribunal, and though such documents existed in the

institutional records, they were not traced or produced during the

proceedings before the Tribunal despite due diligence. It is

therefore urged that the respondent/management be permitted to

rely upon these documents in this writ, and that this Court ought to

consider them while examining the legality of the Award.

8.3. The learned counsel further submitted that once the

additional documents are taken on record under Order XLI Rule

27(aa) CPC, it would be apparent that the nature of engagement

was contractual and for a fixed-term. These documents, it was

argued, clearly demonstrate that the claimant/workman was

engaged through successive contractual letters containing explicit

stipulations that (i) the engagement was temporary, (ii) no right to

regularisation would accrue, and (iii) the engagement would

automatically expire at the end of the contractual period. It was

submitted that the final cessation on 28.02.2013 was a direct

consequence of the expiry of the last contractual term, and not a

termination. Therefore, the statutory exclusion under Section

2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act squarely applies, and that the Tribunal

erred in not considering this material, which--according to the

respondent/management--now stands duly brought before this

Court under the mechanism of Order XLI Rule 27(aa) CPC.

8.4. It was further submitted that the claimant/workman

cannot claim, nor could the Tribunal confer, any right to regular

employment from a succession of temporary appointments by

relying on the dictum in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Uma

Devi, (2006) 4 SCC 1, wherein it was held that contractual or ad-

hoc employees do not acquire a vested right to regularization by

length of service. Further, reference was also made to Resmi R.S.

v. Government of India, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 2649, and Renu

Dalal v. GNCTD, 2023 SCC OnLine Del 8228, reiterating that

courts cannot direct regularization contrary to the recruitment

framework, nor can temporary engagements ripen into substantive

rights. It was contended that judicial review does not permit

substitution of disciplinary or administrative satisfaction with the

court's own view by placing reliance on the dictum of B.C.

Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 and V.

Ramana v. A.P. SRTC, (2005) 7 SCC 338, which affirm that a

court cannot sit in appeal over the employer's assessment unless

findings are perverse or unsupported by material.

8.5. Lastly, the learned counsel would contend that even

assuming, without admitting, that Section 25-F was attracted, the

Tribunal erred in granting 50% back wages as a matter of course

by citing the judgement of the Apex Court in General Manager,

Haryana Roadways v. Rudhan Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 591,

wherein it was held that there is no rule of thumb mandating full or

substantial back wages upon finding a violation of Section 25-F.

9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the claimant/workman

supported the impugned award and submitted that the findings

returned by the Tribunal are based entirely on the material placed

before it and warrant no interference in writ jurisdiction. It was

urged that the claimant/workman was appointed on compassionate

grounds following the demise of his father, an IIT Delhi employee,

which is evident from the letter dated 23.01.2008 (Ex. WW1/3)

and further corroborated by the respondent/management's own

communication dated 26.02.2008, (Annexure P-4). The learned

counsel submitted that, this is not a case of a casual or volunteer

applicant, but one where compassionate engagement was in fact

extended and acted upon. It is contended that thereafter, from

08.01.2008 until 28.02.2013, the claimant/workman continuously

discharged duties of a perennial and regular nature, including those

of Masalchi, Multi-Tasking Employee, and subsequently Junior

Assistant/Storekeeper.

9.1. It was also urged by the learned counsel that an official

accommodation was allotted to the claimant/workman within the

IIT Campus, and under Rule 8(f)(i) of the House Allotment Rules,

such accommodation could have been allotted only to an employee

appointed on compassionate grounds.

9.2. The plea of fixed-term contractual engagement relied

upon by the respondent/management in the present proceedings

was never substantiated before the Tribunal. The

respondent/management produced only two documents--Ex.

MW1/1 (appointment letter dated 08.01.2008) and Ex. MW1/2

(reply to legal notice)--and did not file the various extension

letters or Warden-Committee minutes (Annexures P-2 to P-16 of

the writ petition) before the Tribunal. The learned counsel would

specifically draw the attention of this Court to Para 9 of the

impugned Award, wherein it was noted that the

respondent/management had failed to produce the extension letters

said to contain the contractual terms. The belated reliance on new

documents at the writ stage cannot be permitted to defeat findings

based on the record actually before the Tribunal, goes the

argument.

9.3. It was further urged that the claimant/workman had

completed more than 240 days of service in each year, which the

respondent/management has never disputed, and that it is an

admitted position that the requirements of Section 25-F of the ID

Act were not complied with. The respondent/management's

attempt to shelter itself under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act is

wholly misconceived. Strong reliance is placed on the judgment of

the Apex Court in Bhuvnesh Kumar Dwivedi v. Hindalco

Industries Ltd., (2014) 11 SCC 85, wherein it was held that

repeated appointments with artificial breaks for several years

constitute unfair labour practice under Section 2(ra) of the ID Act

read with Entry 10 of the Fifth Schedule, and that Section

2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act cannot be invoked where the contract

system itself is a device to avoid conferring permanent status.

Reliance was also placed on the dictum of Haryana State

Electronics Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mamni, AIR

2006 SC 2427, wherein it was held that repeated short-term

appointments with artificial breaks cannot be brought under

Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. The learned counsel would also

place reliance on the dictum of Haryana State Federation of

Consumer's Cooperative Wholesale Store Ltd. v. Presiding

Officer, wherein it was held that once a workman has completed

240 days and the employer continues to engage him with artificial

breaks, the case attracts Section 25-F of the ID Act, and the

employer's conduct amounts to unfair labour practice. Further

reliance was placed on the dictum of Anoop Sharma v. Executive

Engineer, Public Health Division No.1, Panipat, (2010) 5 SCC

497, wherein it was held that termination of a workman who has

completed one year of continuous service, without compliance

with Section 25-F of the ID Act, renders the action ab initio void,

irrespective of the terminology used by the employer. Similar

stand was taken in the decisions of Hospital Mazdoor Sabha

(AIR 1960 SC 610), Sundara Money (1976) 1 SCC 822, Mohan

Lal (1981) 3 SCC 225, Robert D'Souza (1982) 1 SCC 645,

and Gammon India (1984) 1 SCC 509, all of which affirm that

non-compliance with Section 25-F nullifies the termination

altogether.

9.4. It was also urged that the Tribunal's finding that the

claimant/workman was performing duties of a perennial nature is a

pure finding of fact, immune from interference under Article 226

and Article 227 of the Constitution. He relies on the decision of

Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477,

wherein the Apex Court held that a writ court cannot re-appreciate

evidence or disturb findings of fact merely because another view

may be possible. He also referred to the recent reiteration by the

Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Brajrajnagar Coal

Mines Workers' Union, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 270, that findings

of fact recorded by a Tribunal are unassailable unless they disclose

perversity.

9.5. Lastly, the learned counsel for the claimant/workman

would contend that similarly situated persons, namely Rohit

Kumar, Dinesh Kumar, Mohit Kumar, and Sudesh Rani, were all

granted compassionate engagement after the claimant/workman,

yet have been regularized by the respondent/management, while he

alone was denied continuity.

10. Heard both sides and perused the records.

11. The principal issues that falls for consideration before

this Court are as follows:

(i) Whether, on the record that was before the Tribunal,

the respondent/management proved the existence of valid

fixed-term contracts and their operative terms so as to invoke

the exclusion under Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act;

(ii) Whether the findings recorded by the Tribunal on

continuity, artificial breaks and perennial character of the work

are perverse or legally vulnerable so as to permit interference in

writ jurisdiction under Article 226 and Article 227 of the

Constitution

(iii) Whether the respondent/management is entitled in this

writ petition to have recourse to Order XLI Rule 27(aa) CPC to

place additional documents on record and, if so, whether those

documents would alter the conclusion reached by the Tribunal.

12. Before I proceed further, it is necessary briefly to take

note of the testimony of the witnesses and the documentary

position on which the Tribunal proceeded. The claimant/workman

testified as WW-1 and produced Exhibits WW-1/1 to WW-1/9.

WW-1 testified that he had worked continuously in the hostel

establishments and that there was no termination letter or

compliance with Section 25-F at the time of cessation. The

respondent/management examined Sh. Mukesh Chand (MW-1),

Assistant Registrar, who produced two documents marked Ex.

MW-1/1 (the appointment letter dated 08.01.2008) and Ex. MW-

1/2 (reply to the legal notice). MW-1 admitted that the

respondent/management had not placed the series of extension

letters and other internal records (which are now relied upon in

these writ proceedings).

13. It is true that Annexures P-2 to P-16 were never produced

before the Tribunal and they have been produced for the first time

in this writ even without an application to receive it. These

documents are relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent/

management to point out that the services of the

claimant/workman was not satisfactory and that he had been issued

several warnings by the respondent/management and, therefore, it

is not an appropriate case in which reinstatement could have been

ordered. There is no reason stated as to why these documents were

not produced before the Tribunal. On going through the cross-

examination of the management's witness, i.e. MW-1, it is seen

that he refers to the warning letters etc. that were issued to the

claimant/workman. Despite that, the same were never produced

before the Court. The learned counsel for the respondent/

management relies on Order XLI Rule 27(aa) CPC for reception of

additional evidence in this proceedings. However, as per the said

provision, it will have to be established by the party seeking to

produce additional evidence that notwithstanding the exercise of

due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or

could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him

at the time when the decree appealed against was passed. No such

ground has been made out by the respondent/management in this

case and hence, I will proceed to consider the matter on the basis

of the materials already on record.

14. Going by the pleadings in the statement of claim, it

is the specific case of the claimant/workman himself that he had

been appointed purely on contractual basis w.e.f. 08.01.2008 to

07.07.2008 on a consolidated salary of ₹4,000/- per month, which

was thereafter extended several times. I refer to the specific

pleadings in the statement of claim which reads thus:-

"3. That it is worthwhile to state herein that one Sh. Kesari Nandan was a permanent employee under the employment of management on the post of Junior Technical Superintendent at the

pay scale of Rs. 9300-34800/- vide Employee Code No. 70116, who died on 07/07/2007 during the tenure of his service. After his sudden demise, his wife Smt. Urmila Devi prayed for appointing their son Sh. Jitender Kumar permanently under the employment of management on compassionate grounds.

4. That the Asst. Registrar of the management had informed the mother of the workman, vide letter dt.23/01/2008, that her son (Workman) has already got an appointment in BHM, IIT Delhi.

5. That after rigorous follow-up by Smt. Urmila Devi as well as the workman, a letter dt.08/01/2008 vide reference no. IITD/SAS/66/2008/ISTA-35 was issued by the Asst. Registrar (SA), to the workman thereby Informed to him that he have been appointed at the post of Masalchi in Students Affairs Section in Jwalamukhi Hostel, IIT, New Delhi on purely temporary and contractual basis w.e.f. 08/01/2008 to 07/07/2008 at the consolidated salary of Rs.4000/- per month.

6. That vide letters dt. 21/07/2008, 05/02/2009, 20/01/2010, 06/05/2011, 13/10/2011, 18/10/2011, 09/02/2012, 01/05/2012 and 04/05/2012, the appointment of the workman was extended to different posts by issuing fresh letters. It is pertinent to mention herein that instead of confirming the services of the workman as permanent employee; the management used to plot an escape route not only to prevent the workman from being a permanent employee but also undermined the law of natural justice. The management adopted a path of these breakages in the service of

the workman caused by the issuance of fresh letters of appointment on temporary basis in order to avoid the permanent employment of the workman under the management.

7. That it is worthwhile to mention herein that the workman was given the job of Junior Assistant/ Store Keeper vide letter Ref. no. IITD/SAS/66/2O12/ISTA-502. Further, the workman was given the job on temporary basis vide letter Ref. no. IITD/SAS/66/2012/ISTA-1408 dated 24/12/2012 the workman worked till 28/02/2013."

(Emphasis Supplied)

15. Though the claimant/workman has a case that he

was engaged/employed on compassionate grounds, no materials

whatsoever have been produced to substantiate the same. It is

quite interesting to note that the claimant/workman has not even

produced his appointment letters. The only documents that are

seen to be produced along with the statement of claim are: a copy

of the appointment letter of his father; a copy of office memo dated

07.09.2007 again relating to his late father; copy of the sanction

order giving the benefits accrued to the family on the death of his

father; a letter dated 21.03.2008 addressed to his mother by the

Assistant Registrar of the Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi by

which she is informed that her request dated 14.01.2008 regarding

appointment of her son on compassionate grounds was considered

and that her son Jitender Kumar, i.e. the claimant/workman had

already been appointed in BHM, IIT, Delhi; copy of the registered

notice dated 22.02.2014 sent by the claimant/workman to the

respondent/management seeking reinstatement and back wages.

None of the appointment letters that are referred to in his statement

of claim have been produced before this Court. The

claimant/workman has no case that they were misplaced or that it

was irrecoverably lost or that for some reason, he was unable to

produce the same.

16. It is well settled that foundational facts like employer-

employee relationship, the terms of employment etc., will have to

be established by the claimant/ workman and only then the onus

would shift to the respondent/ management to disprove or discredit

the same. However, none of the appointment letters stated to have

been issued by the respondent/management has been produced.

Even in the absence of the same, the pleadings in the statement of

claim of the claimant/workman itself make it clear that he was

engaged on a temporary basis/contract for fixed periods. Here, I

refer to the documents produced by the respondent/management.

Exhibit MW-1/W1 dated 19.10.2007 is a letter written by

Executive Engineer (C-I), Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi,

Hauz Khas, New Delhi-16 by which the mother of the

claimant/workman was informed that her request dated 25.07.2007

for appointment of her son Jitender Kumar (the

claimant/workman) on compassionate grounds had been

considered by the competent authority, but the same had not been

acceded to. Exhibit MW-1/1 is the first contractual appointment

letter dated 08.01.2008 issued to the claimant/workman herein.

The said letter reads thus:-

"Mr. Jitender Kumar C/o Warden, Jwalamukhi Hostel Sir, I am directed to offer you a contractual appointment as Masalchi under the Board of Hostel Management and posted in the Jwalamukhi Hostel on the following terms and conditions:-

1. Nature of appointment The appointment will be purely : temporary on contractual basis w.e.f. 08.01.2008 to 07.07.2008

2. Salary : Consolidated salary of Rs. 4,000/-

(Rupees four thousand only).

3. Leave : Maximum of 15 days leave during the above period which will be credited in your leave account @ 21/2 days per month.

4. Duty : You will be required to work during the time schedule as per needs of the Hostel/BHM.

5. Job Requirement : As assigned by the Hostel/BHM.

6. Termination of Service : Your services shall be liable for termination by giving one month notice in writing on either side.

7. General : All other terms and conditions of

services and rules of discipline and conduct as contained in BHM Rules and Regulations framed thereunder shall be applicable.

Yours Faithfully (Nanak Chand) Asst. Registrar (SA)"

(Emphasis Supplied)

16.1 This apparently is the first order of appointment issued

to the claimant/workman, which fact is not disputed by him. The

letter itself makes it clear that it was a contractual appointment for

a period which was thereafter renewed from time to time.

16.2. I refer to Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act which reads:-

"Section 2. Definitions--

xxxxxx (oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, but does not include--

(a) voluntary retirement of the workman; or

(b) retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the

employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf; or (bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or

(c) termination of the service of a workman on the ground of continued ill-health;

(Emphasis supplied)

16.3. Termination of the services of a workman as a

result of non-renewal of the contract of employment on its expiry

or termination of such contract of appointment under a stipulation

in that behalf contained therein, would not attract the definition of

the term retrenchment as contemplated under Section 2(oo) of the

ID Act. [Municipal Council, Samrala v. Sukhwinder Kaur,

(2006) 6 SCC 516; Bhogpur Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. v.

Harmesh Kumar, (2006) 13 SCC 28; Municipal Council,

Samrala v. Raj Kumar, (2006) 3 SCC 81; Express Publication

(Madurai) Ltd. v. K. Daglas and Anr., (2010) 2 KHC 733;

Punjab SEB v. Sudesh Kumar Puri, (2007) 2 SCC 428; Kishore

Chandra Samal v. Orissa State Cashew Development Corpn.

Ltd., (2006) 1 SCC 253; Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga

Canteen, Ambala Cantt., (2001) 5 SCC 540; State of Rajasthan

v. Rameshwar Lal Gahlot, (1996) 1 SCC 595]. In all the

aforesaid decisions, it has been held that when employment is for a

specific period, the case would squarely be covered by Section

2(oo) of the ID Act and in such cases, Section 25(f) of the ID Act

would not be applicable.

17. As noticed earlier, even going by the pleadings in the

statement of claim, the employment was purely temporary and on

a contract basis. The first appointment letter itself refers to the

period for which he had been engaged on contractual basis. The

allegation that he was appointed on compassionate grounds is

disproved by the letter that has been produced by the

respondent/management. No materials have been produced by the

claimant/workman to show that he had in fact been appointed on

compassionate grounds. As this is a case that clearly comes under

Section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act, the Tribunal went wrong in

finding that the claimant/ workman is entitled to retrenchment and

back wages.

18. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned

order is set aside. Application(s), if any, pending, shall stand

closed.

CHANDRASEKHARAN SUDHA (JUDGE)

DECEMBER 15, 2025/kd