Delhi High Court
M/S Zico Environmental Solutions ... vs Siddharth Jain & Ors on 22 April, 2025
$~1
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Pronounced on: 22.04.2025
+ CS(OS) 198/2020
M/S ZICO ENVIRONMENTAL SOLUTIONS PRIVATE LIMITED
& ORS. .....Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Pradeep Dhingra, Mr. Varun
Chandiok, Mr. Pradeep Kumar, Mr.
Archit Relan and Mr. Nishant Kumar,
Advs.
versus
SIDDHARTH JAIN & ORS. .....Defendants
Through: Ms. Pratiti Rungta, Mr. Sumit Pargal
and Mr. Prashant Singh, Advs. for D-
1.
Mr. S.K. Rungta, Sr. Adv. with Mr.
Shivankur Shukla, Adv. for proposed
D-4, 5, 7 to 9.
Mr. Aseem Chaturvedi, Mr. Milind
Jain, Mr. Arpit Kumar Singh and Mr.
Aman Khan, Advs. for proposed D-6.
Mr. Rahul Sharma, Ms. Jyoti Dutt
Sharma, Ms. Praneeta Sharma, Mr.
Ayush Bhatt and Ms. Sonika Rathore,
Advs. for D-2 & D3.
Mr. Amit Tiwari, CGSC with Mr.
Ayush Tanwar and Mr. Rahul
Bhaskar, Advs. for Delhi Police.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKAS MAHAJAN
JUDGMENT
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J.
IA NO. 6186/2024 (under Order XXXIX Rule 4 read with Section 151
CPC for varying/modifying order dated 20.09.2023)
1. The present application has been filed by the proposed defendants i.e.
defendant nos. 4,5,7,8 and 9 / applicants seeking to vary / modify order
dated 20.9.2023 to the extent that ex-parte ad-interim order of injunction
passed on 10.11.2022 against the applicants is not continuing and is not in
force beyond 09.02.2023 in view of the fact that ex-parte order dated
10.11.2022 was passed only upto next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023.
2. The facts in brief giving rise to the present application are that the
plaintiff filed a Suit for Injunction, Rendition of Accounts and Recovery
against defendant nos. 1 to 3 (hereinafter also referred to as 'original
defendants'). Along with the Suit an application under Order XXXIX Rule
1 and 2 CPC seeking ad-interim injunction against the original defendants
was also filed which came up for hearing on 30.07.2020, when this Court
granted ad-interim injunction against the original defendant nos. 2 and 3 in
the following terms:
"It is directed that defendants nos. 2 and 3 shall not approach
any of the clients of the plaintiff as noted at pages 62 and 63 till
the next date of hearing."
3. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed an application under Order I Rule 10
CPC [IA No. 18233/2022], as well as application under Order VI Rule 17
CPC [IA No. 18255/2022], for impleadment of applicants/proposed
defendants and amendment of the Suit, respectively. Further, an IA No.
18234/2022 under order XXXIX Rules 1&2 CPC was also filed seeking ad-
interim injunction against the present applicants, as well as, proposed
defendant no. 6, who were proposed to be impleaded as defendants.
4. The aforesaid applications came up for hearing on 10.11.2022 and the
notices were issued in the aforesaid applications to the non-applicants.
Further ex-parte ad-interim order passed on 30.07.2020 was also extended
to the proposed defendants who were sought to be impleaded vide IA No.
18233/2022, till the next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023. Relevant part of
the order dated 10.11.2022 reads as under:
"The interim order passed by this Court on 30.07.2020 shall
also extend to the proposed defendants sought to be impleaded
through IA No. 18233/2022 till the next date of hearing."
5. It is the case of the applicants that the ex-parte ad-interim injunction
granted vide order dated 10.11.2022 passed against the applicants and the
proposed defendant no. 6 was not extended on subsequent dates, viz.,
09.02.2023, 24.02.2023 and 13.04.2023.
6. Later on, plaintiffs moved another application under Order XXVI
Rule 9 CPC seeking appointment of Local Commissioner, being IA. No.
17555/2023, to visit the offices of proposed defendant nos. 4, 7 and 9 to
execute the commission, which came up for hearing on 14.09.2023. The
said application was allowed ex-parte regard being had to the fact that vide
order dated 10.11.2022, restraint order had already been passed against the
proposed defendant nos. 4 to 9. Paragraph 4 of the order dated 14.09.2023,
which is relevant for the purpose of present application reads thus:
"Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the
plaintiffs, I find merit in the plaintiffs' plea that it would be
imperative, at this stage, to appoint Local Commissioners, as
prayed for. Furthermore, taking into account that vide order
dated 10.11.2022, restraint orders have also been passed
against the proposed defendant nos. 4 to 9, the plaintiff's prayer
for appointment of a Local Commissioner to visit the offices of
defendant nos.4, 7 and 9 also deserve to be allowed."
7. The plaintiff again moved an application being IA no. 18465/2023
seeking modification of order dated 14.09.2023 to include the visit of the
Local Commissioners to the premises of proposed defendant nos. 6, 8 and 9
as well. The said application was disposed of vide order dated 20.09.2023 by
modifying the order dated 14.09.2023 in the following terms:
"Having considered the submissions of learned counsel for the
plaintiff and taking into account that a restrained order passed
on 10.11.2022 by the Predecessor Bench in respect of all the
proposed defendants i.e. defendant nos. 4 to 9, is continuing,
the order dated 14.09.2023 deserves to be modified. It is
accordingly directed that the Local Commissioners appointed
by this Court on 14.09.2023, visiting the premises of defendants
at ION House, Dr. E. Moses Road, Mahalaxmi, Mumbai,
Maharasthra-400011 and at CB-344, Ring Road Naraina, New
Delhi 110028, who were earlier given the mandate qua
defendant no. 4, 7 and 9, will also be entitled to inspect the
computers, laptops, tablets and other hard drives of defendant
6, 8 and 9 as may be available at the aforesaid addresses.
8. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid orders dated 10.11.2022,
14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023, the applicants challenged the same by way of
FAO (OS) No. 106/2023, which came up for hearing on 04.10.2023. The
said appeal was disposed of vide order dated 04.10.2023 permitting the
applicants to withdraw the said appeals with liberty to file review
applications limited to seeking re-consideration/recall of orders in relation to
the continuance of the ex-parte ad-interim injunction.
9. Accordingly, applicants filed Review Petition No. 287/2023 seeking
review of orders dated 14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023 essentially on the ground
that the restraint order passed against the applicants on 10.11.2022 was
operative only till the next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023 and had
automatically elapsed thereafter having not been extended any further and
this Court had incorrectly recorded in the orders dated 14.09.2023 and
20.09.2023 that the restraint order passed against the proposed defendants
nos. 4 to 9 on 10.11.2022, was continuing as on 14.09.2023. The said
review petition was disposed of on 05.03.2024 by granting liberty to the
applicants/review petitioners to urge their plea before the Roster Bench.
10. It is in the above backdrop that the present application has been filed
by the applicants seeking variance/modification of order dated 20.09.2023.
11. Mr. S.K. Rungta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
applicants/proposed defendants submits that interim order dated 10.11.2022
vide which interim order passed on 30.07.2020 was extended to the
applicants was operative only till the next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023
and thereafter it was not specifically extended by this Court. Consequently,
the said interim order automatically lapsed after 09.02.2023. In support of
his contention, Mr. Rungta has placed reliance on the following decisions -
(i) Arjan Singh v. Punit Ahluwalia & Ors., (2008) 8 SCC 348 and (ii)
Ashok Kumar & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Anr., (2007) 3 SCC 470.
12. He further contends that since the applicants are only proposed
defendants and had not yet been impleaded as defendants, therefore the
proceedings against such proposed defendants could not deemed to have
been taken in terms of sub-rule (4) and (5) of Order I Rule 10 CPC. He
contends that it is a settled law that temporary or permanent injunction can
be granted only against the parties to the Suit. To buttress his contention,
Mr. Rungta has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in West Bengal Housing Board v. Pramila Sanfui and Ors., (2016) 1
SCC 743, wherein the Supreme Court in paragraph 25 has held as under:
"25. Further, in the instant case, the order of temporary
injunction dated 3-7-2006 purportedly granted by consent is also
not sustainable in law. The question of consent being given by
either the appellant Housing Board or the predecessors-in-interest
who are its vendors did not arise as they were not parties to the
said suit. It is a well-settled principle of law that either temporary
or permanent injunction can be granted only against the parties to
a suit. Further the purported consent order in terms of Order 39 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is only binding as against the parties
to the suit. In such a case, the order of the Subordinate Judge to
grant police protection against the appellant Housing Board
which is enjoying the property is erroneous in law and is liable to
be set aside.
13. Mr. Rungta has further placed reliance on Acqua Borewell Private
Limited v. Swayam Prabha and Others, (2022) 15 SCC 511 wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"6. ...... It is also not in dispute that the application/s
submitted by the original plaintiffs to implead the appellants
herein as proposed defendant nos. 20, 21, 26, 18, 19, 25, 22, 23
& 17 is/are pending. The said application/s is/are filed by the
original plaintiffs to implead the appellants as defendants to the
suit contending inter alia, that they are necessary and proper
parties.
7. Therefore, according to the plaintiffs also, the appellants
herein (proposed defendants) are necessary and proper parties.
Therefore, before granting any injunction with respect to the
properties in which the appellants herein (proposed defendants)
are claiming right, title or interest on the basis of the
development agreements or otherwise they ought to have been
given an opportunity of being heard. No injunction could have
been granted against them without impleading them as
defendants and thereafter without giving them an opportunity of
being heard.
14. Per contra, Mr. Pradeep Dhingra, learned counsel appearing on behalf
of the plaintiffs / non-applicants submits that application seeking
impleadment has already been filed seeking to implead applicants as
defendants. He submits that the plaintiffs are dominus litis, therefore, the
plaintiffs have every right to implead the applicants as defendants. He
submits that if impleadment application being IA No. 18233/2022 is allowed
and the applicants are impleaded as defendants, the present application of
the applicants shall be rendered infructuous.
15. He further submits that no application has been filed seeking vacation
of order dated 10.11.2022.
16. He submits that ad-interim relief once granted can be vacated or
affirmed only after application of mind by the concerned Court and there
cannot be automatic vacation of stay. In support of his submission, Mr.
Dhingra has placed reliance on the decision of the High Court Bar
Association, Allahabad v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2024) 6
SCC 267.
17. I have heard Mr. S.K. Rungta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the applicants as well as Mr. Pradeep Dhingra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the non-applicants/plaintiffs and have perused the
record.
18. One of the questions which arises for consideration in the present
application is that whether the restraint order passed against the applicants
on 10.11.2022 was operative only till the next date of hearing, i.e.
09.02.2023 and had automatically lapsed thereafter having not been
specifically extended any further. The modification/variance of order dated
20.09.2023 can be considered only if the answer to the above question is in
affirmative.
19. A perusal of order dated 10.11.2022 shows that the interim order
passed by this Court on 30.07.2020 was also made applicable to the
proposed defendants sought to be impleaded through IA No. 18233/2022,
only till the next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023 and was not extended
further on subsequent dates, viz., 09.02.2203, 24.02.2023 and 13.04.2023. It
is because in the latter orders the interim order was not specifically ordered
to be continued, the submission of Mr. Rungta is that the interim order
passed vide order dated 10.11.2022 stood automatically vacated thereafter.
20. The decision relied upon by Mr. Rungta in Ashok Kumar (supra) was
a case where the Civil Judge passed the interim order which was extended
thereafter from time to time by using the expression 'till then'. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the injunction was continuing
despite the same not having been extended after a particular date. The
relevant part of the decision reads thus:
"12. The term of the order of the learned Judge, in our opinion,
does not leave any manner of doubt whatsoever that the interim
order was only extended from time to time. The interim order
having been extended till a particular date, the contention
raised by the respondents herein that they were under a bona
fide belief that the injunction order would continue till it was
vacated cannot be accepted."
21. Notably, the decision in Ashok Kumar (supra) was by the two Judges
Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Likewise, the decision in Arjan Singh
(supra) was also by the two Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and in said decision it was held that if the order of injunction was operative
upto a particular date, technically the order of injunction shall not remain
operative thereafter. However, recently the Constitution Bench of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in High Court Bar Association (supra) has laid
down that ad-interim relief once granted can be vacated or affirmed only
after application of mind by the concerned Court.
22. The background in which the issue by the Constitution Bench in High
Court Bar Association (supra) came to be decided needs to noted. In Asian
Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited and Anr. v. Central Bureau
of Investigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299, a three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, while exercising powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India, had given directions in respect of stay operating
against the trial proceedings in all pending civil and criminal cases. It was,
inter-alia, directed that in all pending cases where stay against proceedings
of a civil or criminal trial was operating, the same will come to an end on
expiry of six months from the date of decision in Asian Resurfacing (supra)
unless in an exceptional case it is extended by a speaking order. It was
further held that in cases where stay is granted in future, the same will end
on expiry of six months from the date of such order unless similar extension
is granted by a speaking order. The relevant paragraphs 36 and 37 of Asian
Resurfacing (supra) reads thus:
"36. In view of the above, situation of proceedings remaining
pending for long on account of stay needs to be remedied.
Remedy is required not only for corruption cases but for all
civil and criminal cases where on account of stay, civil and
criminal proceedings are held up. At times, proceedings are
adjourned sine die on account of stay. Even after stay is
vacated, intimation is not received and proceedings are not
taken up. In an attempt to remedy this situation, we consider it
appropriate to direct that in all pending cases where stay
against proceedings of a civil or criminal trial is operating, the
same will come to an end on expiry of six months from today
unless in an exceptional case by a speaking order such stay is
extended. In cases where stay is granted in future, the same
will end on expiry of six months from the date of such order
unless similar extension is granted by a speaking order. The
speaking order must show that the case was of such exceptional
nature that continuing the stay was more important than having
the trial finalised. The trial court where order of stay of civil or
criminal proceedings is produced, may fix a date not beyond six
months of the order of stay so that on expiry of period of stay,
proceedings can commence unless order of extension of stay is
produced.
37. Thus, we declare the law to be that order framing charge is
not purely an interlocutory order nor a final order. Jurisdiction
of the High Court is not barred irrespective of the label of a
petition, be it under Sections 397 or 482 CrPC or Article 227 of
the Constitution. However, the said jurisdiction is to be
exercised consistent with the legislative policy to ensure
expeditious disposal of a trial without the same being in any
manner hampered. Thus considered, the challenge to an order
of charge should be entertained in a rarest of rare case only to
correct a patent error of jurisdiction and not to reappreciate the
matter. Even where such challenge is entertained and stay is
granted, the matter must be decided on day-to-day basis so that
stay does not operate for an unduly long period. Though no
mandatory time-limit may be fixed, the decision may not exceed
two-three months normally. If it remains pending longer,
duration of stay should not exceed six months, unless extension
is granted by a specific speaking order, as already indicated.
Mandate of speedy justice applies to the PC Act cases as well as
other cases where at trial stage proceedings are stayed by the
higher court i.e. the High Court or a court below the High
Court, as the case may be. In all pending matters before the
High Courts or other courts relating to the PC Act or all other
civil or criminal cases, where stay of proceedings in a pending
trial is operating, stay will automatically lapse after six
months from today unless extended by a speaking order on the
above parameters. Same course may also be adopted by civil
and criminal appellate/Revisional Courts under the
jurisdiction of the High Courts. The trial courts may, on
expiry of the above period, resume the proceedings without
waiting for any other intimation unless express order
extending stay is produced."
(emphasis supplied)
23. In Allahabad High Court Bar Assn v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Ors., (2024) 6 SCC 303, a Bench of three Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court
had expressed the view that a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Asian Resurfacing (supra) requires re-consideration. The Constitution
Bench was thus, called upon to decide the correctness of the view taken by
Asian Resurfacing (supra) in paragraphs 36 and 37 quoted above.
24. The Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association (supra)
observed that there cannot be automatic vacation of stay. Ad-interim relief,
once granted, can be vacated or affirmed only after application of mind by
the concerned Court. The relevant part of the observations reads thus:
"44. At the same time, we cannot ignore that once the High
Court stays a trial, it takes a very long time for the High Court
to decide the main case. To avoid any prejudice to the opposite
parties, while granting ex-parte ad-interim relief without
hearing the affected parties, the High Courts should normally
grant ad-interim relief for a limited duration. After hearing
the contesting parties, the Court may or may not confirm the
earlier ad-interim order. Ad-interim relief, once granted, can
be vacated or affirmed only after application of mind by the
concerned Court. Hence, the Courts must give necessary
priority to the hearing of the prayer for interim relief where ad-
interim relief has been granted. Though the High Court is not
expected to record detailed reasons while dealing with the
prayer for the grant of stay or interim relief, the order must give
sufficient indication of the application of mind to the relevant
factors.
45. An interim order passed after hearing the contesting parties
cannot be vacated by the High Court without giving sufficient
opportunity of being heard to the party whose prayer for
interim relief has been granted. Even if interim relief is
granted after hearing both sides, as observed earlier, the
aggrieved party is not precluded from applying for vacating
the same on the available grounds. In such a case, the High
Court must give necessary priority to the hearing of
applications for vacating the stay, if the main case cannot be
immediately taken up for hearing. Applications for vacating
interim reliefs cannot be kept pending for an inordinately long
time. The High Courts cannot take recourse to the easy option
of directing that the same should be heard along with the main
case. The same principles will apply where ad-interim relief is
granted. If an ad-interim order continues for a long time, the
affected party can always apply for vacating ad-interim relief.
The High Court is expected to take up even such applications on
a priority basis. If an application for vacating ex-parte ad
interim relief is filed on the ground of suppression of facts, the
same must be taken up at the earliest.
46. Hence, with greatest respect to the Bench which decided the
case, we are unable to concur with the directions issued in
paragraphs 36 and 37 of the decision in the case of Asian
Resurfacing. We hold that there cannot be automatic vacation
of stay granted by the High Court. We do not approve the
direction issued to decide all the cases in which an interim stay
has been granted on a day-to-day basis within a time frame. We
hold that such blanket directions cannot be issued in the
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 142 of the
Constitution of India. We answer both the questions framed in
paragraph 5 above in the negative."
(emphasis supplied)
25. No doubt the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association
(supra) was considering the correctness of the view taken in paras 36 and 37
of the Asian Resurfacing (supra) in the context of automatic vacation of
stay granted against trial proceedings in civil and criminal cases, but the
observations made by the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar
Association (supra) are of general application. Such observations leave no
manner of doubt that ad-interim relief, once granted, can be vacated or
affirmed only after application of mind by the concerned court and there
cannot be automatic vacation of stay.
26. Invariably, an ex-parte ad-interim relief is granted till the next date.
Sometimes, it may so happen that on the next date, the court is on leave or
the matter is not taken up due to paucity of time, as a result of which there is
no specific order passed for continuation of such interim relief. In such
circumstances, in view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench in
High Court Bar Association (supra), no inference can be drawn that the
interim relief having not been extended stood vacated automatically. Rather
the law exposited by the Constitution Bench is that in such a situation, the
interim relief granted will continue to operate and the recourse available to
the aggrieved party is to apply for vacation of ad interim relief.
27. The above position in law having been settled by an authoritative
pronouncement of the Constitution Bench in High Court Bar Association
(supra), the reliance placed by Mr. Rungta on the decisions in Ashok Kumar
(supra) and Arjan Singh (supra), is misplaced.
28. Insofar as the second submission of Mr. Rungta that temporary or
permanent injunction can be granted only against parties to the suit is
concerned, notably the genesis of the present application is the liberty
granted to the applicants in the Review Petition No.287/2023 filed by them
seeking review of orders dated 14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023.
29. The applicants had filed the Review Petition No. 287/2023 seeking
review of orders dated 14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023 essentially on the ground
that the restraint order passed against the applicants/proposed defendants on
10.11.2022 was operative only till the next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023
and had automatically elapsed thereafter having not been extended any
further and this Court had incorrectly recorded in the orders dated
14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023 that the restraint order passed against the
proposed defendants nos. 4 to 9 on 10.11.2022, was continuing as on
14.09.2023. The said review petition was disposed of on 05.03.2024 by
granting liberty to the applicants/ review petitioners to urge their plea before
the Roster Bench. The relevant part of the order dated 05.03.2024 reads as
under:
"2. Having heard learned senior counsel for the review
petitioners, what emerges is that the sole submission of the
review petitioner is that this Court had incorrectly recorded in
the orders dated 14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023 that the restraint
order passed against the proposed defendant nos. 4 to 9 on
10.11.2022, was continuing as on 14.09.2023. His submission
being that the said order was operative only till the next date
i.e, 09.02.2023, and had automatically lapsed thereafter, having
not been extended any further. Having perused the order dated
14.09.2023, this Court finds absolutely no reason to review the
order dated 14.09.2023 as it only records in para 4 thereof that
restraint orders had been passed against the proposed
defendant nos.4 to 9 as well on 10.11.2022. The fact that the
restraint orders were passed against the said proposed
defendants on 10.11.2022 cannot be disputed and, therefore,
there is no ground to review the order dated 14.09.2023.
3. Now coming to the review petitioners' prayer for review qua
order dated 20.09.2023. As noted hereinabove, the submission
of Mr. Rungta is that as the order dated 10.11.2022 was never
extended, the same was operative only till the next date i.e.
09.02.2023 and therefore, this Court committed a patent
illegality by recording that the restraint order dated
10.11.2022 was continuing against the proposed defendants
on 14.09.2023 and 20.09.2023.
4. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs/non-applicants vehemently
disputes this position and contends that the plea of Mr. Rungta
that the order dated 10.11.2022 stood automatically vacated on
09.02.2023 is incorrect and misplaced. In support of his plea
that an interim order would continue to bind the parties till it is
specifically vacated, he places reliance on a recent decision of
the Apex Court in High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v.
State of U.P. & Ors.[Criminal Appeal No.3589/2023]. This
contention is vehemently denied by the learned senior counsel
for the review petitioners.
5. Having given my thoughtful consideration to the rival
submissions of the parties, even though, I am prima facie not
inclined to accept the plea of learned senior counsel for the
review petitioners that there was no restraint order operating
against the defendants no. 4 to 9 as on 14.09.2023 and
20.09.2023, taking into account that Local Commission in terms
of these order stands implemented and the suit is now listed
before the learned Roster Bench, the review petition is disposed
of by granting liberty to the review petitioners to urge this plea
before the Roster Bench that the stay granted on 10.11.2022
stood automatically vacated on 09.02.2023, which plea will be
decided as per law."
(emphasis supplied)
30. It is in the above backdrop that the present application has been filed
by the applicants seeking variance/modification of order dated 20.09.2023
with the following prayers:
"A) allow the present application;
B) vary/modify order dt.20.9.2023 by clarifying/declaring that
ex-party ad interim order of injunction passed on 10.11.22
against the applicants/proposed defendants is not continuing
and is not in force beyond 9.2.2023 in view of the fact that ex-
party order dt.10.11.2022 was passed only upto next date of
hearing i.e. 9.2.2023 while considering the application U/O 1
Rule 10 for impleadment of applicants/proposed defendants and
also application U/O 6 Rule 17 for amendment of the suit and
thereafter the said order has not been extended on the
subsequent dates."
(emphasis supplied)
31. The prayer in the application is thus, confined to the plea for which
liberty was granted by the learned Single Judge while disposing of the
review petition. There was no argument made in the Review Petition to the
effect that temporary or permanent injunction can be granted only against
parties to the suit.
32. Before filing aforesaid Review Petition, the applicants had preferred
FAO (OS) No.106/2023. In the said appeal, though the order dated
10.11.2022 whereby the interim order passed by this court on 30.07.2020
against the original defendants was also made applicable against the
applicants/proposed defendants, was impugned, but during the course of
arguments, the challenge was eventually confined only to two issues i.e. i)
the order of ex-parte ad-interim injunction dated 10.11.2022 could not have
continued to remain in force beyond the order dated 09.02.2023; ii) the data
seized by the Local Commissioner appointed vide order dated 20.09.2023 be
not shared with any of the parties in view of their assertion that they have a
right to preserve the confidentiality thereof.
33. However, the appeal was disposed of vide order dated 04.10.2023
permitting the applicants to withdraw the said appeals with liberty to file
review applications limited to seeking re-consideration/recall of orders in
relation to the continuance of the ex-parte ad-interim injunction. The
relevant paras of order dated 04.10.2023 reads as under:
"2. The present appeal instituted on behalf of the
appellants, in sum and substance, assails directions issued by
the Learned Single Judge vide orders dated 14.09.2023 and
20.09.2023 in CS (OS) no. 198/2020, on two issues. Firstly,
that it has been held that the order of ex-parte ad interim
injunction dated 10.11.2022 continued to remain in force
beyond the order dated 09.02.2023; and secondly, that the data
seized by the Local Commissioner appointed vide order dated
20.09.2023 be not shared with any of the parties in view of
their assertion that they have a right to preserve the
confidentiality thereof.
3. Mr. S.K. Rungta, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellants, on instructions, seeks leave to
withdraw the present appeal with the limited relief that liberty
be granted to file appropriate applications seeking review of
the orders impugned herein before the Learned Single Judge
in accordance with law, on the two issues articulated
hereinabove.
4. Having heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
parties and with their consent, we permit the appellants to
withdraw the present appeal with liberty to file the review
applications limited to seeking reconsideration/recall of the
orders in relation to the continuance of the ex-parte ad
interim injunction as well as the disclosure of information
confidential to the appellants, if so advised, within a period of
one week from today, after serving advance copies of the same
to learned counsel appearing on behalf of the other parties.
5. Needless to state that the original plaintiff will be at liberty to
oppose the proposed review applications that may be instituted
on behalf of the appellants both on facts and in law at the time
of their hearing.
6. In the meantime, it is hoped and expected that the data
recovered by the Local Commissioner that is filed before this
Court in a sealed cover shall not be disclosed to any party, till
the disposal of the proposed I.A."
(emphasis supplied)
34. A perusal of the above quoted paragraphs shows that in appeal [FAO
(OS) No.106/2023] the applicants did not press the challenge to the order
dated 10.11.2022 nor the ground that temporary or permanent injunction can
be granted only against parties to the suit was articulated before the Division
Bench during the course of arguments.
35. Further, the review petition having been disposed of by the learned
Single Judge by granting liberty to the review petitioners/applicants to urge
limited plea before the Roster Bench that whether the stay granted on
10.11.2022 stood automatically vacated on 09.02.2023, the applicants
cannot be permitted to agitate new plea to the effect that since the applicants
are still not impleaded as parties, therefore, ad-interim injunction could not
have been extended against them, which plea was not argued in the review
petition.
36. As noted above, conspicuously, the prayer in the application is also to
vary/modify order dated 20.09.2023 by clarifying/declaring that ex parte ad
interim injunction passed on 10.11.2022 is not in force beyond 09.02.2023
in view of the fact that the ex parte order dated 10.11.2022 was passed only
up to next date of hearing i.e. 09.02.2023.
37. In view of the above discussion, the application is devoid of merit.
Accordingly, the same is dismissed.
VIKAS MAHAJAN, J
APRIL 22, 2025/jg
