Delhi High Court
Anil Shandilya vs State G.N.C.T Of Delhi on 27 September, 2024
Author: Subramonium Prasad
Bench: Subramonium Prasad
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 27th SEPTEMBER, 2024
IN THE MATTER OF:
+ CRL.M.C. 5474/2024
SHANTANU SHANDILYA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Teotia, Mr. Jayveer
Singh and Mr. Vishesh Kumar,
Advocates.
versus
STATE G.N.C.T OF DELHI AND ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Ms. Priyanka Dalal, APP for the
State.
SI Pankaj Kasana, PS Anand Vihar
+ CRL.M.C. 5501/2024
ANIL SHANDILYA .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Pradeep Teotia, Advocate.
versus
STATE G.N.C.T OF DELHI .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Tarang Srivastava, APP for the
State.
SI Pankaj Kasana, PS Anand Vihar
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD
JUDGMENT
1. Petitioners have approached this Court challenging the Order dated
03.09.2016, passed by the learned ACMM, Shahdara, Karkardooma Courts,
in Crl. Revision No.242/2016, arising out of FIR No.212/2012, registered at
Police Station Anand Vihar.
2. Since the Order under challenge in the present Petitions is common,
both the Petitions are being disposed of by this common order.
3. The facts, leading to the present Petitions, are as follows:
a) Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 5474/2024, i.e. Shantanu Shandilya, is
the son of Petitioner in CRL.M.C. 5501/2024, i.e. Anil
Shandilya.
b) The present proceedings emanate from FIR No.212/2021,
registered at Police Station Anand Vihar for offences under
Sections 323/451/427/506/509 IPC.
c) The said FIR was registered on the complaint of Respondent
No.2 herein who stated that Shops No.SG-458 & SG 48, at Plot
No.9D, Aditya Mega Mall CBD, East Shahdara, Delhi, belong
to the Complainant and are owned under the name and style of
B.K. Gupta HUF. It is stated that two separate agreements to
sale were entered into between the HUF and Anil Shandilya for
sale of the abovementioned shops. It is stated that Anil
Shandilya was not able to adhere to the terms of the agreement
and he failed to make payments before the due date and lateron
filed a civil suit before this Court, being CS (OS) 1903/2012. It
is stated in the complaint that as per the directions of this Court,
Anil was supposed to deposit Rs.51.50 lakhs before 07.08.2012
towards full and final sale consideration of shop No.SG-48 and
Rs.90 lakhs were to be deposited before 09.08.2012 towards
full and final sale consideration of shop No.SG-458. It is stated
that on 06.08.2012, when the complainant was standing in the
shop supervising the construction of a wall for division of both
the shops, Anil and Shantanu along with two other persons
came there and started abusing and threatening the
Complainant. It is stated that the complainant was pushed by
the accused persons because of which her head hit the wall and
she fell down. It is stated that the wall that was being
constructed by the Complainant was demolished. It is stated
that Anil started abusing the Complainant using filthy language
and threatened the Complainant with dire consequences.
d) After completion of investigation, charge-sheet has been filed
against the Petitioners for offences under Sections
323/352/451/427/509/506(Part l)/34 IPC.
e) Vide Order dated 03.09.2016, charges were framed against the
Petitioners for offences under Sections
323/352/451/427/509/506(Part l)/34 IPC.
f) The said Order was challenged by the Petitioners by filing a
Revision Petition. The Revisional Court vide Order dated
09.03.2017 discharged Shantanu Shandilya of all the offences
while Anil Shandilya was discharged of offences under
Sections 451/509 IPC.
g) The said Order was challenged by the Complainant by filing
CRL.M.C. 5078/2017 before this Court contending that she has
not been heard before passing the Order discharging the
Petitioners herein. This Court vide Order dated 24.07.2019 set
aside the Order passed by the Revisional Court and remanded
the matter back to the Revisional Court.
h) The Revisional Court, on fresh consideration of material on
record, dismissed the Revision Petition, meaning thereby, both
Petitioners have now been charged for offences under Section
323, 352, 451, 427, 509, 506 IPC.
i) It is this Order which is under challenge in the present Petitions.
4. Learned Counsel appearing for Shantanu Shandilya has raised a plea
of alibi. He states that Shantanu was not present at the site when the incident
in question took place as he was attending his coaching classes at Patanjali
IAS Classes. He states that the Investigating Officer has recorded the
statement of the friends of Shantanu but that same has been ignored by the
Courts below. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner draws the attention of this
Court to the charge-sheet and state that the class timings of Shantanu are
from 05:30 PM to 08:00 PM.
5. Learned Counsel appearing for Anil Shandilya states that there is no
detailed discussion in the Order framing charges or in the Order dated
passed by the Revisional Court as to how the ingredients of each of the
offences alleged against the Petitioners are made out. He also states that the
Court cannot act as a mouthpiece of the Prosecution.
6. Per contra, learned APP appearing for the State submits that while
framing charges a detailed discussion on merits need not take place and
there is nothing to disbelieve the version of the Complainant.
7. Heard the learned Counsels for the parties and perused the material on
record.
8. The law laid down by the Apex Court on the scope of inquiry while
dealing with an application under Section 227 Cr.P.C. has been succinctly
laid down by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal,
(1979) 3 SCC 4, wherein the Apex has held as under:
"10. Thus, on a consideration of the authorities
mentioned above, the following principles emerge:
(1) That the Judge while considering the question of
framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code
has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused has been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the Court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which
has not been properly explained the Court will be
fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding
with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it
is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
application. By and large however if two views are
equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the
evidence produced before him while giving rise to
some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the
accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge
the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section
227 of the Code the Judge which under the present
Code is a senior and experienced court cannot act
merely as a Post Office or a mouthpiece of the
prosecution, but has to consider the broad
probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the
Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case
and so on. This however does not mean that the
Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros
and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if
he was conducting a trial."
9. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39, the Apex Court
has held as under:
"4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the
case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to
describe the charge against the accused and state by
what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the
accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty
of the Court to consider the record of the case and the
documents submitted therewith and to hear the
submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that
behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order
either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If
"the Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge
the accused and record his reasons for so doing", as
enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, "the
Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming
that the accused has committed an offence which-- ...
(b) is exclusively triable by the Court, he shall frame in
writing a charge against the accused", as provided in
Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear
that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial
the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the
Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be
meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached
to the probable defence of the accused. It is not
obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to
consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance
whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible
with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard
of test and judgment which is to be finally applied
before recording a finding regarding the guilt or
otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at
the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or
Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not
to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction
of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his
conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the
matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take
the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the
trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong
suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is
ground for presuming that the accused has committed
an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that
there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the
accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused
which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the
sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in
France where the accused is presumed to be guilty
unless the contrary is proved. But it is only for the
purpose of deciding prima facie whether the Court
should proceed with the trial or not. It the evidence
which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the
guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is
challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the
defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused
committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient
ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list
of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to
one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor
advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the
law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the
guilt or innocence of the accused are something like
even, at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory
of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal.
But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of
making an order under Section 227 or Section 228,
then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the
order which will have to be made will be one under
Section 228 and not under Section 227."
10. In Sajjan Kumar v. CBI, (2010) 9 SCC 368, the Apex Court has
observed as under:
"21. On consideration of the authorities about the
scope of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code, the
following principles emerge:
(i) The Judge while considering the question of framing
the charges under Section 227 CrPC has the
undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the
limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima
facie case against the accused has been made out. The
test to determine prima facie case would depend upon
the facts of each case.
(ii) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has
not been properly explained, the court will be fully
justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the
trial.
(iii) The court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution but has to consider the
broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the
evidence and the documents produced before the court,
any basic infirmities, etc. However, at this stage, there
cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of
the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
(iv) If on the basis of the material on record, the court
could form an opinion that the accused might have
committed offence, it can frame the charge, though for
conviction the conclusion is required to be proved
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused has
committed the offence.
(v) At the time of framing of the charges, the probative
value of the material on record cannot be gone into but
before framing a charge the court must apply its
judicial mind on the material placed on record and
must be satisfied that the commission of offence by the
accused was possible.
(vi) At the stage of Sections 227 and 228, the court is
required to evaluate the material and documents on
record with a view to find out if the facts emerging
therefrom taken at their face value disclose the
existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged
offence. For this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it
cannot be expected even at that initial stage to accept
all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it
is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities
of the case.
(vii) If two views are possible and one of them gives
rise to suspicion only, as distinguished from grave
suspicion, the trial Judge will be empowered to
discharge the accused and at this stage, he is not to see
whether the trial will end in conviction or acquittal."
11. After relying on various judgments of the Apex Court on this point,
the Apex Court in Tarun Jit Tejpal v. State of Goa, (2020) 17 SCC 556, has
held as under:
"8.3. In Mauvin Godinho [Mauvin Godinho v. State of
Goa, (2018) 3 SCC 358 : (2018) 2 SCC (Cri) 63 :
(2018) 1 SCC (L&S) 591] this Court had an occasion
to consider how to determine prima facie case while
framing the charge under Sections 227/228 CrPC. In
the same decision this Court observed and held that
while considering the prima facie case at the stage of
framing of the charge under Section 227 CrPC there
cannot be a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of
the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was
conducting a trial.
8.4. At this stage the decision of this Court in Stree
Atyachar Virodhi Parishad [Stree Atyachar Virodhi
Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia, (1989) 1 SCC
715 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 285] is also required to be
referred to. In that aforesaid decision this Court had
an occasion to consider the scope of enquiry at the
stage of deciding the matter under Sections 227/228
CrPC. In paras 11 to 14 observations of this Court in
the aforesaid decision are as under : (SCC pp. 719-21)
"11. Section 227 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure having bearing on the contentions
urged for the parties, provides:
„227. Discharge.--If, upon consideration of the
record of the case and the documents submitted
therewith, and after hearing the submissions of
the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the
Judge considers that there is no sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused, he shall
discharge the accused and record his reasons for
so doing.‟
12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame
charge if he considers that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed the
offence. The interaction of these two sections has
already been the subject-matter of consideration
by this Court. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh
[State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39
: 1977 SCC (Cri) 533] , Untwalia, J., while
explaining the scope of the said sections observed
: [SCC pp. 41-42, para 4 : SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36 :
SCR p. 259]
„4. ... Reading the two provisions together in
juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would
be clear that at the beginning and the initial
stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect
of the evidence which the Prosecutor
proposes to adduce are not to be
meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be
attached to the probable defence of the
accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at
that stage of the trial to consider in any
detail and weigh in a sensitive balance
whether the facts, if proved, would be
incompatible with the innocence of the
accused or not. The standard of test and
judgment which is to be finally applied
before recording a finding regarding the
guilt or otherwise of the accused is not
exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding
the matter under Section 227 or Section 228
of the Code. At that stage the court is not to
see whether there is sufficient ground for
conviction of the accused or whether the trial
is sure to end in his conviction. Strong
suspicion against the accused, if the matter
remains in the region of suspicion, cannot
take the place of proof of his guilt at the
conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage
if there is a strong suspicion which leads the
court to think that there is ground for
presuming that the accused has committed
an offence then it is not open to the court to
say that there is no sufficient ground for
proceeding against the accused.‟
13. In Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal
[Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979)
3 SCC 4 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 609] , Fazal Ali, J.,
summarised some of the principles : [SCC p. 9,
para 10 : SCC (Cri) pp. 613-14 : SCR pp. 234-35]
„(1) That the Judge while considering the question
of framing the charges under Section 227 of the
Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh
the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out
whether or not a prima facie case against the
accused had been made out.
(2) Where the materials placed before the court
disclose grave suspicion against the accused
which has not been properly explained the court
will be fully justified in framing a charge and
proceeding with the trial.
(3) The test to determine a prima facie case would
naturally depend upon the facts of each case and
it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal
application. By and large however if two views
are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that
the evidence produced before him while giving
rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion
against the accused, he will be fully within his
right to discharge the accused.
(4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under
Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under
the present Code is a senior and experienced
court cannot act merely as a post office or a
mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider
the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect
of the evidence and the documents produced
before the court, any basic infirmities appearing
in the case and so on. This however does not
mean that the Judge should make a roving
enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and
weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a
trial.‟
14. These two decisions do not lay down different
principles. Prafulla Kumar case [Union of India
v. Prafulla Kumar Samal, (1979) 3 SCC 4 : 1979
SCC (Cri) 609] has only reiterated what has been
stated in Ramesh Singh case [State of Bihar v.
Ramesh Singh, (1977) 4 SCC 39 : 1977 SCC (Cri)
533] . In fact, Section 227 itself contains enough
guidelines as to the scope of enquiry for the
purpose of discharging an accused. It provides
that „the Judge shall discharge when he considers
that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding
against the accused‟. The "ground" in the context
is not a ground for conviction, but a ground for
putting the accused on trial. It is in the trial, the
guilt or the innocence of the accused will be
determined and not at the time of framing of
charge. The court, therefore, need not undertake
an elaborate enquiry in sifting and weighing the
material. Nor is it necessary to delve deep into
various aspects. All that the court has to consider
is whether the evidentiary material on record if
generally accepted, would reasonably connect the
accused with the crime. No more need be
enquired into."
8.5. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the
aforesaid decisions and considering the scope of
enquiry at the stage of framing of the charge under
Sections 227/228 CrPC, we are of the opinion that the
submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant on merits, at this stage, are not
required to be considered. Whatever submissions are
made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the appellant are on merits are required to be dealt
with and considered at an appropriate stage during the
course of the trial. Some of the submissions may be
considered to be the defence of the accused. Some of
the submissions made by the learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant on the conduct of
the victim/prosecutrix are required to be dealt with and
considered at an appropriate stage during the trial.
The same are not required to be considered at this
stage of framing of the charge. On considering the
material on record, we are of the opinion that there is
more than a prima facie case against the accused for
which he is required to be tried. There is sufficient
ample material against the accused and therefore the
learned trial court has rightly framed the charge
against the accused and the same is rightly confirmed
by the High Court. No interference of this Court is
called for."
12. Applying the law laid down by the Apex Court, this Court is of the
opinion that the defence of alibi need not be taken up at this juncture.
13. A perusal of the charge-sheet reveals that Shantanu used to attend
coaching classes at Patanjali IAS Centre. The statement does not reflect that
on the date of the incident, Shantanu was at the coaching centre. In any
event, it is the categorical case of the Complainant that Shantanu was with
Anil on the day of the incident and they both were instrumental in hitting the
Complainant causing injury to her. In any case, the plea of alibi would be
taken at the time of trial.
14. This Court is of the opinion that the Complainant, who is a lady, has
suffered injuries. The Complainant has categorically stated that she was
threatened with dire consequences. The property in question belongs to HUF
of the Complainant and the property has been trespassed by the Petitioners
herein. The wall has also been demolished by the Petitioners. In view of the
above, offences under Sections 323/352/451/427/509/506(Part l)/34 IPC are
prima facie made out against the Petitioners herein.
15. Material on record also discloses that Suits have also been filed by the
accused Anil Shandilya regarding the property in question and the directions
of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court directing the Petitioner to deposit
money has not been complied with. The Suits have been dismissed for non-
prosecution.
16. In view of the above, the case of the Complainant cannot be said to be
completely unbelievable.
17. This Court is, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the Order
impugned herein.
18. The petitions are accordingly dismissed along with pending
application(s), if any.
19. Trial Court is directed to proceed in accordance with law.
SUBRAMONIUM PRASAD, J
SEPTEMBER 27, 2024
Rahul
