Delhi High Court
Parikshit Grewal & Ors. vs Union Of India & Anr. on 27 September, 2024
Author: C. Hari Shankar
Bench: C. Hari Shankar, Sudhir Kumar Jain
$~27
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 971/2024 and CM APPL. 57044/2024, 57045/2024 and
57046/2024
PARIKSHIT GREWAL & ORS. .....Appellants
Through: Ms. Anushree Kapadia, Mr. M.
Thirupathi Reddy and Ms. Ekta Kundu,
Advocates
versus
UNION OF INDIA & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. Piyush Beriwal, SPC with
Mr. Jitender Kumar Tripathi, GP and Ms.
Ojashi, Advocates for R1
Ms. Pankhuri Shrivastava and Ms. Atreya
G.C., Advocates for R2
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE C. HARI SHANKAR
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN
JUDGMENT (ORAL)
% 27.09.2024
C. HARI SHANKAR, J.
1. It is a matter of some discomfiture to this Court that, nearly
three decades after seven Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court
clearly held, in the near-iconic decision in L. Chandra Kumar v UOI1,
that all matters which lay within the province of the Central
Administrative Tribunal2 by virtue of Section 143 of the
1 (1997) 3 SCC 261
2 "the Tribunal" hereinafter
3 14. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Central Administrative Tribunal. -
(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal
shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, all the jurisdiction, powers and authority exercisable
immediately before that day by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in relation to -
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any All-India Service or to
any civil service of the Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with
defence or in the defence services, being, in either case, a post filled by a civilian;
(b) all service matters concerning--
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Administrative Tribunals Act, 19854 would have to be agitated before
the Tribunal and that the High Court could not act as a court of first
instance in such cases, petition after petition is still preferred in the
High Court, in clear violation of the judgment. Every possible
argument in the book is pressed into service, to somehow avoid L
Chandra Kumar. Exceptions, not to be found either in Section 14 of
the AT Act or in the judgment in L Chandra Kumar, are sought to be
read into it by implication. In the process, both Article 1415 and 1446
(i) a member of any All-India Service; or
(ii) a person not being a member of an All-India Service or a person
referred to in clause (c) appointed to any civil service of the Union or any civil
post under the Union; or
(iii) a civilian not being a member of an All-India Service or a person
referred to in clause (c) appointed to any defence services or a post connected
with defence,
and pertaining to the service of such member, person or civilian, in connection with the
affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local or other authority within the territory
of India or under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation or society
owned or controlled by the Government;
(c) all service matters pertaining to service in connection with the affairs of the
Union concerning a person appointed to any service or post referred to in sub-clause (ii)
or sub-clause (iii) of clause (b), being a person whose services have been placed by a
State Government or any local or other authority or any corporation or society or other
body, at the disposal of the Central Government for such appointment.
Explanation. - For the removal of doubts, it is hereby declared that references to "Union"
in this sub-section shall be construed as including references also to a Union Territory.
(2) The Central Government may, by notification, apply with effect from such date as may be
specified in the notification the provisions of sub-section (3) to local or other authorities within the
territory of India or under the control of the Government of India and to corporations or societies
owned or controlled by Government, not being a local or other authority or corporation or society
controlled or owned by a State Government:
Provided that if the Central Government considers it expedient so to do for the purpose of
facilitating transition to the scheme as envisaged by this Act, different dates may be so specified
under this sub-section in respect of different classes of, or different categories under any class of,
local or other authorities or corporations or societies.
(3) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, the Central Administrative Tribunal
shall also exercise, on and from the date with effect from which the provisions of this sub-section
apply to any local or other authority or corporation or society, all the jurisdiction, powers and
authority exercisable immediately before that date by all courts (except the Supreme Court) in
relation to -
(a) recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment, to any service or post in
connection with the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society; and
(b) all service matters concerning a person other than a person referred to in clause
(a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1)] appointed to any service or post in connection with
the affairs of such local or other authority or corporation or society and pertaining to the
service of such person in connection with such affairs.
4 "the AT Act" hereinafter
5 141. Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts. - The law declared by the Supreme
Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
6 144. Civil and judicial authorities to act in aid of the Supreme Court. - All authorities, civil and
judicial, in the territory of India shall act in aid of the Supreme Court.
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of the Constitution of India are consigned to oblivion.
2. This is yet one other such case, in which the appellants have
sought to avoid approaching the Tribunal and have petitioned this
Court, in a matter which clearly falls within Section 14 of the AT Act.
A learned Single Judge of this Court has, in a detailed and well-
considered judgment, clearly disapproved the attempt, and has
dismissed the petition as not maintainable in view of L Chandra
Kumar. Instead of approaching the Tribunal, as they could, and
should, have, the appellants have sought to appeal against the decision
of the learned Single Judge. Of course, they are certainly entitled to
appeal; but, in the process, the chance of, perhaps, obtaining relief
from the right forum, is frittered away.
Facts
3. The appellants are candidates who undertook an examination
for recruitment to the posts of Examiner of Patents & Designs Group
A (Gazetted), in the office of the Controller General of Patents,
Designs and Trademarks7, Department for Promotion of Industry and
Internal Trade8, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. The examination
was initiated by the office of the CGPDTM, and conducting of the
examination was assigned to the National Testing Agency9, which
stands impleaded as Respondent 2 before the learned Single Judge as
well as in the present appeal.
7 "CGPDTM" hereinafter
8 "DPIIT" hereinafter
9 "the NTA", hereinafter
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4. The NTA conducted the Preliminary Examination on 21
December 2023 and Paper 1 and Paper 2 of the Mains Examination on
25 January 2024. Certain students, who would not undertake the Main
Examination, were permitted to re-attempt the Main Examination on 5
February 2024. We may note, at this juncture, the contention of Ms.
Kapadia, learned counsel for the appellants, that this additional
opportunity granted to certain students was illegal as they had been
"privately invited" to undertake the examination.
5. Be that as it may, the results of the Mains Examination were
announced on 26 March 2024. Offline interviews were conducted
between 1 April and 26 April 2024. The final score card of the
candidates was released by the NTA by a Public Notice on 15 June
2024.
6. The petitioners instituted WP (C) 6743/2024 before this Court
alleging that there were certain irregularities in the process of the
examination conducted by the NTA. Among the irregularities alleged
were irregularities and allotment of centres; absence of any clarity on
negative marking in Paper I of the Mains paper; non-disclosure of
Paper II of the Mains paper or its answer key; and non-declaration of
results and cut-offs for the examinations, interviews and merit lists,
among others. The petitioners, therefore, prayed that the result of the
Mains Examination, announced on 26 March 2024, as well as the final
score card announced on 15 June 2024 and the final result announced
on 16 June 2024, be quashed and set aside, and the respondents be
directed to reconduct the Mains Examination.
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7. Objections were raised by the respondents before the learned
Single Judge, before whom the writ petition was listed, to the
maintainability of the petition before this Court. It was contended that
the petitioners could not have approached this Court in view of
Section 14(1) of the AT Act, which conferred exclusive jurisdiction,
on the Tribunal in respect of recruitment and matters concerning
recruitment to any civil post under the Union. Reliance was also
placed on the decision in L. Chandra Kumar. Additional reliance was
placed on subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in Kendriya
Vidyalaya Sangathan v Subhas Sharma10, Rajeev Kumar v Hemraj
Singh Chauhan11 and Praveen Sharma v UPSC12.
8. The objections of the respondents found favour with the learned
Single Judge who proceeded to dismiss the writ petition on the ground
that the petitioners would have to approach the Tribunal to ventilate
their grievances.
L. Chandra Kumar, deconstructed
9. It would be appropriate, before proceeding further, to
understand what exactly the Supreme Court, in L Chandra Kumar,
held. For this, we do not intend to advert to the sequence of
proceedings which led to the matter being placed before seven
Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court. They can easily be understood
by a reading of the decision in L. Chandra Kumar itself, and the
learned Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, also referred to it
10 (2002) 4 SCC 145
11 (2010) 4 SCC 554
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in some detail. We, therefore, intend only to note what exactly has
been held in the L. Chandra Kumar decision, and the circumstances
in which the Supreme Court has done so.
10. The Supreme Court observed, at the outset, that the Tribunal
was created in terms of Article 323-A13 of the Constitution.
Thereafter, in para 49 of the report, the Supreme Court set out some
relevant provisions of the AT Act, adverted to certain decisions
rendered in the context of the said Act and distilled the submissions of
learned Counsel before it. The analysis of the issues involved, in the
judgment, commenced from para 51. The first issue addressed by the
Supreme Court was whether judicial review constitutes part of the
basic structure of the Constitution, in which case, applying the ratio in
Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala14, any law, which
compromised on the power of judicial review, would be
unconstitutional. Paras 78 and 79 of the report addressed this issue:
"78. The legitimacy of the power of courts within constitutional
democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since
the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being
alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the
higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of
the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated
provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were
very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the
judiciary. [See Chapter VII, "The Judiciary and the Social
Revolution" in Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution :
Cornerstone of a Nation, Oxford University Press, 1972; the
chapter includes exhaustive references to the relevant preparatory
works and debates in the Constituent Assembly.] These attempts
12 2007 SCC Online Del 2086
13 323-A. Administrative tribunals. -
(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals
of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or
of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government
of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government.
14 (1973) 4 SCC 225
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were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of
effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While
the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the
High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate
provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement
age of Judges as well as the mechanism for selecting Judges to the
superior courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears
to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such
provisions, the superior courts would be insulated from any
executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the making of
their decisions. The Judges of the superior courts have been
entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this
end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who
have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the
Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the
executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress
constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the
judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate
courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal
correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional
safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the
superior judiciary, are not available to the Judges of the
subordinate judiciary or to those who man tribunals created by
ordinary legislations. Consequently, Judges of the latter category
can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the
superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional
interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review
over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226
and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral
and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its
basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts
and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of
legislations can never be ousted or excluded.
79. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to
exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all courts
and tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of
the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation
where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions
apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be
avoided."
(Emphasis supplied)
Having so read the power of judicial review of legislative or executive
action vested in the High Courts and the Supreme Court to be part of
the basic structure of the Constitution, the report went on to observe,
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in para 80, that "there is no constitutional prohibition against their
(Tribunals) performing a supplemental - as opposed to a
substitutional - role in this respect". Deriving support from Article
32(3)15 of the Constitution in that regard, the Supreme Court went on,
in para 81, to hold:
"81. If the power under Article 32 of the Constitution, which has
been described as the "heart" and "soul" of the Constitution, can be
additionally conferred upon "any other court", there is no reason
why the same situation cannot subsist in respect of the jurisdiction
conferred upon the High Courts under Article 226 of the
Constitution. So long as the jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 and that of this Court under Article 32 is
retained, there is no reason why the power to test the validity of
legislations against the provisions of the Constitution cannot be
conferred upon Administrative Tribunals created under the Act or
upon Tribunals created under Article 323-B of the Constitution. It
is to be remembered that, apart from the authorisation that flows
from Articles 323-A and 323-B, both Parliament and the State
Legislatures possess legislative competence to effect changes in
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts.
This power is available to Parliament under Entries 77, 78, 79 and
95 of List I and to the State Legislatures under Entry 65 of List II;
Entry 46 of List III can also be availed of both by Parliament and
the State Legislatures for this purpose."
(Emphasis supplied)
11. From paras 81 to 89, the Supreme Court flagged the issue of the
alarming state of pendency of matters in the High Courts as one of the
reasons why it was necessary to preserve the conferment of
jurisdiction on Tribunals. Thereafter, in para 90, the report addressed
"the issue of exclusion of the power of judicial review of the High
Courts". After holding that "the jurisdiction of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded", the Supreme Court
rejected the contention that Tribunals be allowed to adjudicate only
15 (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament
may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the
powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
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on matters in which constitutional issues were not raised, and
particularly not to be allowed to adjudicate upon matters where the
vires of legislations were in question. As the Supreme Court held, "if
such a view were to be adopted, it would be open for litigants to raise
constitutional issues, many of which may be quite frivolous, to directly
approach the High Courts and thus subvert the jurisdiction of the
Tribunals". Moreover, observed the Supreme Court, even in these
special branches of law, certain provisions of the Constitution would
invariably, arise for consideration; for instance, in service matters,
Articles 14, 15 and 16 would routinely be pressed into service. Rather
than excluding such issues from the purview of the jurisdiction of
Tribunals, therefore, the better alternative was found to be subjection
of the decisions rendered by the Tribunals to judicial review by the
High Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. This, it was
observed, would "ensure that frivolous claims are filtered out through
the process of adjudication in the Tribunal". Keeping in view these
factors, and following the proposal, mooted in its earlier decision in
R.K. Jain v UOI16, that "the possibility of an appeal from the Tribunal
on questions of law to a Division Bench of a High Court within whose
territorial jurisdiction and the Tribunal falls, be pursued", the Supreme
Court went on to hold, in para 91 of the report, that "all decisions of
Tribunals, whether created pursuant to Article 323-A or Article 323-B
of the Constitution, will be subject to High Court's writ jurisdiction
under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution, before a Division Bench
of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular
Tribunal falls". This was clarified, in para 92, by further holding that
16 (1993) 4 SCC 119
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"no appeal from the decision of a Tribunal will directly lie before the
Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the
aggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court under Articles
226/227 of the Constitution and from the decision of the Division
Bench of the High Court the aggrieved party could move this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution". Para 93 of the report
proceeded to summarise the conclusions, in the judgment, on the
jurisdictional powers of Tribunals, thus:
"The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of
statutory provisions are questioned. However, in discharging this
duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the
Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional set-up, been
specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in
this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the
Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the
respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have
the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules.
However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one
important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any
question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the
settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act
cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases
alone, the High Court concerned may be approached directly. All
other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are
specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent
statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of
their respective High Courts. We may add that the Tribunals will,
however, continue to act as the only courts of first instance in
respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted.
By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly
approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the
vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the
legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by
overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. Thus, the Supreme Court clarified, in terms as unequivocal as
could be, that it would not be open to a litigant to approach the High
Court in matters relating to the areas of law in which the Tribunal
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concerned is constituted, and that the Tribunal would continue to act
as the court of first instance in all such matters, the only exception
being where the very legislation under which the Tribunal is
constituted is challenged. In other words, save and except for cases in
which the litigant challenges one or the other provision of the AT Act,
it is not open to the litigant to approach the High Court in the first
instance, in respect of matters which the Central Administrative
Tribunal is competent to adjudicate; in other words, in respect of
matters which fall within the purview of Article 14 of the
Constitution. In all such matters, the Central Administrative Tribunal
would be the only court of first instance, available to the litigant.
13. Para 99 of the report summarises the judgment, in the
proverbial nutshell, thus:
"99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause
2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the
extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the
Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution,
are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of
jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the
aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be
unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts
under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article
32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of
our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other
courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in
discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of
the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323-A and
Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence
to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules.
All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to
scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose
jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will,
nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect
of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not,
therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High
Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory
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legislations (except where the legislation which creates the
particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and
constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have
indicated."
(Emphasis supplied)
14. Thus, the position in law is clear as crystal. All matters, which
fall within the purview of Section 14 of the AT Act have first to be
agitated before the Tribunal. It is the Tribunal alone which can
entertain these matters, as a court of first instance. The litigant is
completely proscribed from approaching the High Court in such
matters, without first approaching the Tribunal. The only
circumstance in which the litigant can approach the High Court,
without first approaching the Tribunal, is where the litigation
challenges the vires of the AT Act itself, or of one or the other of its
provisions.
15. It is completely befuddling, therefore, to see petitions, which
clearly fall within the scope and ambit of Section 14 of the AT Act,
being directly filed in the High Court. Going by the number of such
petitions which are still coming up before this Court itself, the malaise
is reaching endemic proportions. Without meaning any disrespect to
High Courts which may choose to entertain such petitions, these stray
examples, if any, cannot derogate from the position in law so
unequivocally stated by seven Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court
in L. Chandra kumar.
The impugned judgment
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16. The learned Single Judge has, in the impugned judgment, traced
the entire history of the factual and legal position which led up to the
judgment in L. Chandra Kumar, including the earlier decision of the
Supreme Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar v UOI17 and other associated
decisions.
17. The judgment of the learned Single Judge may be conveniently
compartmentalized.
18. The learned Single Judge has first held that the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal is not restricted only to employees or persons who are in
Government service, as it also covers disputes relating to recruitment
and matters concerning recruitment for entry into Government service.
The submissions of the appellants - as the petitioners before the
learned Single Judge - that as they were not employees holding any
civil post as yet, they could approach this Court was, therefore,
rejected. In this context, the learned Single Judge has gone into the
definition of the expressions "selection" and "recruitment" and has
relied in that context on the judgment of the Supreme Court in A.P.
Public Service Commission, Hyderabad v B. Sarat Chandra18. The
learned Single Judge has held that "any challenge relating to any stage
of the recruitment process, post the issuance of the advertisement
would fall under 'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment'
under Section 14 of the AT Act and the remedy of the petitioners
would lie before the Tribunal as the only Court of first instance". The
relevant passage from the impugned judgment may be reproduced:
17 (1985) 4 SCC 458
18 (1990) 2 SCC 669
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"11. There is no dispute that the challenge in the present writ
petitions is to the examination conducted by NTA and it is equally
undisputed that examination was conducted for the purpose of
recruitment to the posts of Examiner of Patents & Designs. Section
14 of the 1985 Act provides that the Tribunal will exercise
jurisdiction in relation to recruitment and matters concerning
recruitment to any All-India Service or to any civil service of the
Union or a civil post under the Union or to a post connected with
defence or in the defence services being in either case, a post filled
by a civilian. The expression 'selection/recruitment' has been
subject matter of judicial scrutiny in several cases and it has been
held that issue of advertisement is the commencement point of a
recruitment/selection process. In A.P. Public Service Commission,
Hyderabad v. B. Sarat Chandra19, the Supreme Court observed
that process of selection begins with the issuance of advertisement
and ends with the preparation of select list for appointment. It
consists of various steps like inviting applications, scrutiny thereof
and rejection of defective applications and elimination of ineligible
candidates, conducting examinations, calling for interview and
preparation of list of successful candidates. Therefore, there can
be no doubt that the selection/recruitment process begins with the
issuance of advertisement and in this context, I may also refer to a
judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Ms. Shaloo
Batra v. High Court of Delhi20 and of Madhya Pradesh High
Court in Kishor v. State of M.P.21.
12. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
cases, the recruitment process began on 11.12.2023 when
CGPDTM issued Recruitment Notification and therefore, any
challenge relating to any stage of the recruitment process, post the
issuance of the advertisement would fall under 'recruitment' and
'matters concerning recruitment' under Section 14 of the 1985 Act
and the remedy of the Petitioners would lie before the Tribunal as
the only Court of first instance. Needless to state that a challenge
to an examination on the ground that there are alleged
irregularities and malpractices will be a challenge to the
recruitment process and no exception can be carved out on the
ground that there are large scale irregularities, impacting number
of candidates or that the integrity of public examination is
paramount to uphold the standards of recruitment process.
In Praveen Sharma(supra), a similar conundrum was resolved by
the Court holding that a competitive examination is a condition
precedent for appointment to an All-India Service or post or a civil
post and the examination, therefore, is a part of the process of
recruitment. Reference was made to the decision of the Division
19 (1990) 2 SCC 669
20 2013 SCC OnLine Del 1745
21 2022 SCC OnLine MP 5442
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Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Sudhanshu
Tripathi v. Union of India22, where it was held that a dispute
arising out of an examination conducted by the UPSC directly
concerned the recruitment to All-India service and could be
entertained only by the Administrative Tribunals in view of
Section 14 of the 1985 Act. Examining the issue, this Court held
that the expression used in Section 14 is not just 'recruitment' but
'recruitment and matters concerning recruitment' and therefore,
disputes concerning eligibility of candidates, etc. in relation to
examination processes will be matters within the domain of the
Administrative Tribunal as the only Court of first instance.
Reliance was also placed by the Court on the earlier decisions of
this Court in Pranay Kumar Soni v. The Chairman, U.P.S.C.23,
and Neeraj Kansal v. Union Public Service Commission24.
Relevant passages from the judgment in Praveen Sharma (supra)
are as follows:--
"19. It is apparent that the Supreme Court, while keeping
the powers conferred on the High Courts under Article
226/227 intact inasmuch as it was part of the inviolable
basic structure of the Constitution, observed that the
Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging
the powers conferred by the aforesaid Articles. The
Supreme Court also observed that the decisions of such
Tribunals would, however, be subject to scrutiny before a
Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction
the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals would,
nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in
respect of the areas of law for which they have been
constituted and that it would not be open for litigants to
directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they
question the vires of statutory legislations (except where
the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned. In this context it becomes necessary to examine
the provisions of Section 14 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 which indicates the areas of law for
which the Tribunal has been constituted.
*****
20. The expression that is relevant in the present case is
"recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment". In S.
Tripathi v. Union of India a Division Bench of the
Allahabad High Court (Lucknow Bench) held that the
22 1988 SCC OnLine All 936
23 2003 SCC OnLine Del 387
24 W.P. (C) Nos. 7824-32/2006, decided on 05.10.2006
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examination conducted by the UPSC for the purposes of
the All India Services including the Indian Administrative
Service, was part of the recruitment process. The Court
held as under:--
"7. It is not disputed that holding of competitive
examination is a condition precedent for
appointment to an All India Service for which the
petitioner had applied and appeared and was
ultimately declared not to have succeeded. It is also
not disputed that appointment to All India Services,
at least, to the Indian Administrative Service as
indicated in the petition, is made on the basis of the
result of the competitive examination held by the
Union Public Service Commission. The
examination, therefore, is a part of the process of
recruitment.
8. In view of the provisions contained in
Section 14, since the dispute raised in the present
petition directly concerns the recruitment to All
India Service, we are of the opinion that the petition
can be entertained only by the Administrative
Tribunal."
21. This finding of the Allahabad High Court has been
approved by successive learned Single Judges of this Court
in Pranay Kumar Soni (supra) and Neeraj Kansal (supra).
It is, therefore, clear that the UPSC examination is part of
the recruitment process.
22. The question that arises in the present case is
whether the issues involved herein can be regarded as
relating to the examination conducted by the UPSC. This
question emerges in the context that there is no challenge to
the examination conducted in 2006. Insofar as the 2005
examinations are concerned, that is over. And, the
petitioner does not stake any claim in respect thereof
because he could not complete that examination as a result
of circumstances beyond his control. By way of this
petition, the petitioner is seeking a direction from this Court
declaring his appearance in the 2005 examination to be
disregarded as an attempt. The issue here is not so much
with regard to the conduct of the examinations but with
regard to the petitioner's eligibility to sit in the
examination. Had it been a matter where the examination
itself was in question, it would clearly fall within the ratio
of the decisions in Pranay Kumar Soni (supra) and Neeraj
Kansal (supra), which in turn followed S. Tripathi (supra).
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Here the issue is with regard to eligibility. In my view, the
expression used in Section 14 of the Administrative
Tribunals Act, 1985 is not just "recruitment" but
"recruitment, and matters concerning recruitment". Had the
expression only been "recruitment", there could have been
some debate as to whether a condition of eligibility was a
part of recruitment. But the expression used in Section 14 is
of much wider amplitude inasmuch as it also refers to
"matters concerning recruitment". An eligibility condition
would definitely, in my view, fall within the scope of this
expression. The question in the present writ petition is
whether the petitioner was eligible or not to sit for the 2006
examinations. That is certainly a matter concerning
recruitment. Accordingly, the Central Administrative
Tribunal would, in view of the Supreme Court decision
in L. Chandra Kumar (supra), have to function like the
court of the first instance with regard to the question of
eligibility raised in the present case because this is the
precise area of law for which the Tribunal has been
constituted, as indicated by Section 14(1)(a) of
the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. It would, therefore,
not be open to the petitioner to directly approach this Court
and, therefore, it would be appropriate if the petitioner is
directed to first approach the Central Administrative
Tribunal which, indeed, has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon
the issue of eligibility raised by the petitioner herein."
13. In light of Section 14(1) of the 1985 Act and the
observations of the Courts in the aforementioned judgments, this
Court is unable to agree with the Petitioners that the disputes
arising from the examination conducted by NTA even if it relates
to alleged irregularities therein would not be disputes concerning
recruitment and matters concerning recruitment and are not
amenable to the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal."
(Emphasis supplied)
19. The second segment of the impugned judgment of the learned
Single Judge specifically adverts to the Supreme Court directive, in L.
Chandra Kumar that a person who was ventilating a cause of action
which was amenable to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal has to
necessarily approach the Tribunal in that regard and this Court could
not exercise jurisdiction as a Court of first instance in the matter. The
learned Single Judge has noted the fact that there is an express
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proscription against the Court entertaining such disputes as a court of
first instance. Paras 20 to 22 of the impugned judgment, which so
hold, read (omitting the passages from L. Chandra Kumar, the
relevant parts of which have already been reproduced supra):
"20. Having held that powers of judicial review of the High
Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot wholly be
excluded and highlighting the need to have Administrative
Tribunals for adjudication of service matters as an alternative
mechanism, the Supreme Court observed that Tribunals will
continue to act as the only Courts of first instance in respect of the
areas of law, for which they have been constituted and it will not
be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in
cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations, except
where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged. Relevant paragraphs are as follows:--
*****
21. The principles that can be broadly culled out from a reading
of these passages are:
(a) Power of judicial review of the High Courts under
Articles 226/227 cannot wholly be excluded;
(b) Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the
vires of statutory provisions and subordinate Legislations
are questioned. However, in discharging this duty, they
cannot act as substitutes for the Supreme Court and the
High Courts, which have under the Constitutional set up
specifically been entrusted with such an obligation. Their
function in this respect is only supplementary and all such
decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before
a Division Bench of the respective High Courts;
(c) Tribunal shall not entertain any question regarding
vires of the parent Statute under which it is created on the
principle that being a creature of an Act, it cannot declare
that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone,
the High Court concerned may be approached directly; and
(d) The Tribunals shall continue to act as the Courts of
first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they
had been constituted. It is not open for litigants to directly
approach the High Courts even in cases where they
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question the vires of statutory provisions and Legislations,
by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
22. From a reading of the aforementioned judgment of
the Constitution Bench, the inexorable and inevitable conclusion is
that albeit powers of the High Courts under Articles 226/227 are a
part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution and cannot
be excluded, but in 'service matters' as defined under Section 3(q)
as also matters relating to recruitment and concerning recruitment
provided under Section 14 of the 1985 Act, Tribunal is the only
Court of first instance and with respect to areas of law for which
the Tribunals are created, litigants cannot approach the High
Courts directly. All decisions of the Tribunals will, however, be
subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court,
within whose jurisdiction Tribunal concerned falls. There is no
doubt that where there is a right there is a remedy 'ubi jus ibi
remedium' and often the path to remedy is a vexed and complex
question, but in the present case, in view of the binding dictum of
the Supreme Court, the remedy of the Petitioners clearly lies before
the Administrative Tribunal."
(Emphasis supplied)
20. The next segment of the judgment of the learned Single Judge
deals with decisions where High Courts had entertained such writ
petitions dealing with recruitment and matters relating to recruitment,
despite the judgment in L. Chandra Kumar, and the Supreme Court
has specifically disapproved the approach of the High Courts. Inter
alia, in this regard, the learned Single Judge has referred to the
decisions in Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan and Rajeev Kumar. In
Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan, the Supreme Court held:
12. The Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly
held that tribunals set up under the Act shall continue to
act as the only courts of first instance "in respect of areas
of law for which they have been constituted". It was further
held that it will not be open for litigants to directly
approach the High Court even in cases where they question
the vires of statutory legislation (except where the
legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is
challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
concerned.
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13. In view of the clear pronouncement of this Court,
the High Court erred in law in directly entertaining the writ
petitions concerning service matters of the employees of
Kendriya Vidyalaya as these matters come under the
jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal. We, therefore,
hold that the High Court committed an error by declining to
transfer the writ petition to the Central Administrative
Tribunal. Consequently, we set aside the impugned orders
and direct the High Court to transfer both the writ petitions
to the Central Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench
which may, in its turn, make over the case to the Circuit
Bench in the State of Jammu and Kashmir for disposal in
accordance with law."
(Emphasis supplied)
Paras 11 and 13 of Rajeev Kumar held, in a similar vein, thus:
"11. On a proper reading of the abovequoted two sentences, it is
clear:
(a) The tribunals will function as the only court of first
instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have
been constituted.
(b) Even where any challenge is made to the vires of
legislation, excepting the legislation under which tribunal
has been set up, in such cases also, litigants will not be able
to directly approach the High Court "overlooking the
jurisdiction of the tribunal.
*****
13. In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement
by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the
High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their
service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally
sustainable. The Division Bench of the High Court, with great
respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the
High Court as a court of first instance in respect of their service
disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted."
21. In the fourth segment of her judgment, the learned Single Judge
has referred to the decisions of this Court in GNCTD v Ashok Kumar
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Rajdev25, Piyush Tyagi v Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan26, Dr. Arun
Kumar Mishra v UOI27, Vinay Brij Singh v UOI28 and Ex. Hav.
Ranjit Singh v Inspector General of Prisons29, where similar
petitions were not entertained following L. Chandra Kumar.
22. The learned Single Judge has also gone on to advert to a
judgment of another learned Single Judge of this Court in Akul
Bhargava v UPSC30 in which the Court had condescended to entertain
the writ petition on the ground that there was malice in the selection
process, observing that, if the Court found that the entire selection
mechanism was impeded, it could not turn a blind eye thereto and had
necessarily to interfere under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
This decision was upheld by the Division Bench of this Court.
However, on an appeal to the Supreme Court, the decision was
reversed and it was held that the designated forum to be approached in
such cases was the Tribunal.
23. The fifth segment of the judgment of the learned Single Judge
deals with the contention of the petitioners that the examination was
being conducted by the NTA and the NTA was outside the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal. The learned Single Judge has held that the NTA was
merely an organization to which the conducting of the examination
had been outsourced, and the examination was nonetheless an
examination held for recruitment to a civil post. The mere fact that the
25 2023 SCC Online Del 5864
26 2023 SCC Online Del 6666
27 2021 SCC Online Del 3841
28 2021 SCC Online Del 1369
29 WP (C) 2128/1997, decided on 11 March 2008
30 2020 SCC Online Del 1376
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examination was conducted under the agency of the NTA has been
held by the learned Single Judge not to be a factor which would permit
the petitioners to approach this Court in the first instance, oblivious of
the decision in L. Chandra Kumar.
24. The petitioners have, in the writ petition, taken serious
exception to this finding of the learned Single Judge, contending that
the NTA cannot be regarded as the "agency" of the respondents, and
was an independent outside body, not amenable to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal. We do not think that the submission, though facially
attractive, really entrenches on the correctness of the impugned
judgment of the learned Single Judge. The reference to the NTA as an
agency of the respondent cannot, in our view, be understood to be a
reference to the concept of agency as understood in a contract. What
is intended to be conveyed, by the learned Single Judge, in our
opinion, is the fact - which cannot be denied - that the examination is
in fact held by Respondent 1, albeit through the "agency" of the NTA.
The 2023 Recruitment Notification, inviting applications for the post
of Examiner of Patents and Designs and containing all details of the
selection process, including holding of the examination, was issued by
the office of the CGPDTM. All details of the examination, including
the mode of application, fees to be paid, relaxations available, and the
like, were contained in the Notification. The Notification went on,
pertinently, to state thus:
"CGPDTM intends to recruit Examiners of Patents and Designs,
General Central Service, Group 'A' Gazetted (Non-Ministerial) in
Level 10 in Pay Matrix (₹ 56,100 - 1,77,500) plus applicable
allowances, as admissible, in the Government of India."
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The Notification also set out the entire scheme of the Examination.
25. Clearly, therefore, the examination was being held by the
CGPDTM, and the mere fact that the NTA was recruited to conduct it
would not alter this position. There can, therefore, be no cavil with
the observation of the learned Single Judge that the NTA was, to that
extent, the agency of the CGPDTM in conducting of the examination.
26. In any event, this distinction is not of significant import, as, at
the end of the day, the examination related to recruitment to the post
of Examiner of Patents, which was a civil post under the Union within
the meaning of Section 14 of the AT Act. Any lis pertaining to the
examination, or its results or outcome, was, therefore, a "matter
concerning recruitment" within the meaning of Section 14(1)(a) and,
consequently, amenable to adjudication by the learned Tribunal.
Ergo, it could not have been urged before this Court in the first
instance.
27. The final segment of the impugned judgment again addresses
the appellants' contention that they are not employees of any
Government Department. The learned Single Judge has, in this
context, noted that the judgment of the Supreme Court in L. Chandra
Kumar in para 99 has specifically observed that it would not be open
to litigants to directly approach the High Court even in cases where
the vires of statutory legislations was under challenge. She has held
once again that as Section 14 of the AT Act also covers challenges to
recruitment and the matters relating to recruitment to civil posts under
the Union, it would also cover the cases where the person is seeking
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employment to a civil post and is not yet an employee.
28. To our mind, the impugned judgment of the learned Single
Judge is unexceptionable. We find ourselves entirely in agreement
with her.
29. We have heard Ms. Kapadia, learned counsel for the appellants,
on the challenge to the impugned judgment, at some length. Ms.
Kapadia submits that this Court should exercise jurisdiction as the
entire examination was tainted; the petitioners were not employees,
and, though a few petitioners have approached this Court, there would
be several others who are similarly circumstanced; the relief in the
petition does not seek employment to any post and only challenges a
tainted public examination, while it was still in progress; the challenge
in the petition did not pertain to conditions of service; the case would
fall within the scope of para 10 of the judgment of the Supreme Court
in T K Rangarajan v Government of Tamil Nadu31; and other such
petitions have been entertained by this Court. Para 10 of Rangarajan,
we may note, reads thus:
"10. There cannot be any doubt that the aforesaid judgment of
larger Bench is binding on this Court and we respectfully agree
with the same. However, in a case like this, if thousands of
employees are directed to approach the Administrative Tribunal,
the Tribunal would not be in a position to render justice to the
cause. Hence, as stated earlier, because of very very exceptional
circumstance that arose in the present case, there was no
justifiable reason for the High Court not to entertain the petitions
on the ground of alternative remedy provided under the statute."
(Emphasis supplied)
30. None of these contentions, in our view, compel us to find any
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fault in the impugned judgment of the learned single judge.
31. High Courts cannot read exceptions into a judgment of the
Supreme Court. Any such attempt would be an affront to Article 141
of the Constitution of India. There is nothing either in the AT Act or
in the judgment of the Supreme Court in L Chandra Kumar which
excepts the jurisdiction of the Tribunal in a case where an examination
is tainted or where there are a large number of petitioners or applicants
who have to approach the Tribunal.
32. This Court is personally aware of several cases in which
hundreds of applicants have joined together to approach the Tribunal.
In fact, Rule 4(5)32 of the Central Administrative Tribunal (Procedure)
Rules, 1987, permits more than one person to file a joint application
before the learned Tribunal, subject to leave being granted by the
learned Tribunal therefore. Applications are routinely filed before the
Tribunal for permitting such applicants to join together and ventilate a
common cause of action.
33. The AT Act has, therefore, ample provisions to deal with
situations in which a large number of persons may need to join
together to file a common application, maintaining a common cause of
action. The fact that the number of the applicants is considerable, is,
therefore, not a ground on which this Court can start entertaining
petitions under Article 226, ignoring the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.
31 (2003) 6 SCC 581
32 (5)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rules (1) to (3) the Tribunal may permit more than one
person to join together and file a single application if it is satisfied, having regard to the cause and the nature
of relief prayed for that they have a common interest in the matter.
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One need not, therefore, let one's imagination boggle merely because
of the number of candidates who may jointly be seeking judicial
redress.
34. Apart from that, it would also amount to this Court reading into
the judgment of L. Chandra Kumar an exception in a situation where
the number of applicants is considerable. We would be the last to
embark on any such misadventure.
35. It is true that where there are extenuating circumstances in
which the Court finds that the Tribunal would not be in a position to
render substantial justice, then, in a very very exceptional case (the
significance of the use of the two "very"s by the Supreme Court
cannot be overlooked) - to employ the super-superlative expression
used by the Supreme Court in para 10 of T K Rangarajan - the Court
would exercise jurisdiction. These circumstances, however, have to be
such as would indicate that the Tribunal would not be in a position to
render justice in the matter. They have also to be "very very
exceptional". In T K Rangarajan, the unprecedented decision of the
Government of Tamil Nadu to terminate the services of thousands of
employees who went on strike was found to be one such "very very
exceptional circumstance".
36. As against this, the circumstances that Ms. Kapadia has sought
to advert to are the fact that there was a discrepancy in admit cards,
with admit cards having been issued in two rounds, there was a
discrepancy in the negative marking which was followed in the Paper
I of the Mains Examination, there was no public disclosure of the
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paper, the results were not declared, resulting in candidates not being
aware of the cut-off marks and there was no public disclosure of the
candidates who were invited to appear in the second round of the
Mains Examination. None of these, in our view, are matters which the
Tribunal would be incompetent or unable to adjudicate upon.
37. When examining the aspect of whether the Tribunal would not
be able to render justice, in our view, the Court must be aware that the
Tribunal is peopled by competent and experienced officers. Every
Bench of the Tribunal consists of a judicial member and an
administrative member. The judicial member has necessarily to be a
person who is eligible to be appointed as a judge of this Court. The
administrative member normally tends, these days, to be an officer
who has retired from the rank of Secretary of the Government of
India. They are, therefore, persons of experience, who have
knowledge of the intricacies of administrative law both from the legal
and the practical stand point. Without taking names, this Court is
aware of several Administrative Members of the Tribunal in the past
who have been as judicious as judges of constitutional Courts. There
is no reason, therefore, for this Court to undermine the competence of
the members of the Tribunal, or to adopt a view that the Tribunal is in
anyway inferior or incompetent to this Court or less able to deal with
complex administrative and service issues than this Court.
38. In that view of the matter, the factors that Ms. Kapadia has
highlighted cannot be regarded as such as could convince this Court
that justice could not have been dispensed by the Tribunal.
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39. Ms. Kapadia also sought to rely on Article 323-A(1)33 of the
Constitution of India. She submits that the words "of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the Union or
of any State" as employed in Article 323-A(1) have to be read along
with both the preceding expressions "recruitment" and "conditions of
service". So read, she would suggest that only matters relating to
recruitment of persons appointed to posts in connection with the
Union would fall within the territory of the Tribunal's jurisdiction,
and not cases of persons who are yet to be appointed.
40. That, in our view would not be a proper way of reading Article
323-A(1). In our view, Article 323-A(1) empowers the Parliament to,
by law, provide for adjudication, by Administrative Tribunals, of
disputes and complaints which fall into one of the two categories
envisaged therein. The first category is disputes and complaints with
respect to recruitment and the second category is disputes and
complaints with respect to the conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of
the Union. The words "appointed to public services and posts in
connection with the affairs of the Union", in our view, would
ordinarily apply only to persons who have already been appointed. By
providing for including complaints with respect to recruitment within
the ambit of Tribunals created under Article 323-A(1), the
Constitution, in our view, clearly envisaged matters which dealt with
33 323-A. Administrative tribunals. -
(1) Parliament may, by law, provide for the adjudication or trial by administrative tribunals
of disputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of service of persons
appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or
of any local or other authority within the territory of India or under the control of the Government
of India or of any corporation owned or controlled by the Government.
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all aspects of recruitment to public services and posts in connection
with the affairs of the Union or of the States to be adjudicated by
Tribunals appointed under the said Article.
41. Besides, as the learned Single Judge has correctly noted,
Section 14 of the AT Act is clear in this regard. It empowers the
Tribunal to exercise jurisdiction, powers and authority in relation to
recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to a civil post under
the Union. Besides the fact that the words "recruitment" and "matters
concerning recruitment" are themselves compendious in their scope
and ambit, the words "in relation to" expand the reach of the
expressions till further. The Supreme Court has, in various decisions,
held that the expression "in relation to" is very wide in scope, and
would include matters which have any relationship with the matters
which are particularised thereafter. In T.N. Kalyana Mandapam
Association v UOI34, the Supreme Court held, apropos the expression
"in relation to":
"47. ... In fact, a wide range of services is included in the
definition of taxable services as far as mandap-keepers are
concerned. The said definition includes services provided "in
relation to use of mandap in any manner" and includes "the
facilities provided to the client in relation to such use" and also the
services "rendered as a caterer". The phrase "in relation to" has
been construed by this Court to be of the widest amplitude.
In Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India35, this Court
observed as under:
The expressions "pertaining to", "in relation to" and
"arising out of", used in the deeming provision, are used in
the expansive sense. The expression "arising out of" has
been used in the sense that it comprises purchase of shares
and lands from income arising out of the Kanpur
undertaking. The words "pertaining to" and "in relation to"
34 (2004) 5 SCC 632
35 (1988) 2 SCC 299
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have the same wide meaning and have been used
interchangeably for among other reasons, which may
include avoidance of repetition of the same phrase in the
same clause or sentence, a method followed in good
drafting. The word "pertain" is synonymous with the word
"relate". The term "relate" is also defined as meaning to
bring into association or connection with. The expression
"in relation to" (so also "pertaining to"), is a very broad
expression which presupposes another subject-matter.
These are words of comprehensiveness which might have
both a direct significance as well as an indirect significance
depending on the context. (SCC p. 329, paras 48-50)
48. In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v General Electric Co.36
this Court observed as under:
"25. (2) Expressions such as 'arising out of' or 'in respect
of' or 'in connection with' or 'in relation to' or 'in
consequence of' or 'concerning' or 'relating to' the contract
are of the widest amplitude and content and include even
questions as to the existence, validity and effect (scope) of
the arbitration agreement."
42. Once, therefore, Section 14(1)(a) employs both the expressions
"in relation to" and "concerning", by providing that the learned
Tribunal shall exercise all the jurisdiction, powers and authority
exercisable ... by all courts ... in relation to recruitment and matters
concerning recruitment ... to a civil post under the Union", any lis,
having any relationship to, or in any manner concerned with,
recruitment to a civil post under the Union, would be covered by the
provision, even if the relationship or concern is superficially distant.
43. The lis forming subject matter of the writ petition instituted by
the petitioners before this Court would unquestionably fall within the
peripheries of the jurisdiction of the learned Tribunal, as so
understood.
36 (1984) 4 SCC 679
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Conclusion
44. Thus viewed, we are in entire agreement with the learned Single
judge that the present petition ought to have been preferred before the
appropriate bench of the Central Administrative Tribunal.
45. We do not, therefore, find that any case exists even for issuing
notice in this appeal.
46. The appeal is accordingly dismissed
C.HARI SHANKAR, J
DR. SUDHIR KUMAR JAIN, J
SEPTEMBER 27, 2024/yg
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