Delhi High Court
The Lt Governor Of Delhi And Ors vs Delhi Tamil Education Association ... on 22 July, 2024
Author: Tushar Rao Gedela
Bench: Tushar Rao Gedela
$~50
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ LPA 642/2024 & C.M. APPL. 40071-72/2024, C.M. 40784/2024
THE LT GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS. ....Appellants
Through: Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, Standing
Counsel for GNCTD (Services)
along with Mr. Nitesh Kumar
Singh, Ms. Laavanya Kaushik,
Ms. Aliza Alam and Mr.
Mohnish Sehrawat, Advocates.
versus
DELHI TAMIL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION (RETD)
THROUGH ITS SECRETARY .....Respondent
Through: Mr. Romy Chacko with Mr.
Mayank Bhargava, Mr.
Kartikeye Dang, Mr. Varun
Mugdal and Mr. Adityaa Raju,
Advocates.
% Date of Decision: 22nd July, 2024.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE TUSHAR RAO GEDELA
JUDGMENT
MANMOHAN, ACJ : (ORAL)
1. Present appeal has been preferred under Clause X of the Letters
Patent Act, 1866, assailing the judgment dated 28th May, 2024, passed
by the learned Single Judge of this Court allowing the W.P.(C)
15276/2023 titled "Delhi Tamil Education Association vs. Director of
Education & Ors." filed by the respondent/Society holding that the
respondent/Society is entitled to make appointments against the vacant
posts of Principals and teachers in the schools run by it without prior
approval of the DoE.
2. Ms. Avnish Ahlawat, learned standing counsel (GNCTD-
Services) appears for the appellants. She submits that the learned Single
Judge has completely overlooked the ratio laid down by the Supreme
Court in SK. Mohd. Rafique Vs. Managing Committee, Conti
Rahamania High Madrasah & Ors., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 4 whereby
after a detailed consideration of the judgments of the Supreme Court in
the matters of minority aided institution including In Re. Kerala
Education Bill, 1957, AIR 1958 SC 956; Rev. Sidhrajbhai Sabhai vs.
State of Bombay, 1963 (3) SCR 837 and constitutional judgment in the
case of T.M.A. Pai Foundation vs. State of Karnataka, (2002) 8 SCC
481 held that the rights of the minority institution under Article 30 (1)
of the Constitution of India, are not unfettered. She submits that the
right of minority institutions in selecting teachers is not absolute and
cannot be above the law. She further submits that the State is enjoined
to formulate regulations to regulate the procedure of selection of
teachers. According to her, the learned Single Judge erred in not
considering the judgment in Rafique (supra).
3. On facts, Ms. Ahlawat submits that as per their Circular dated
24th November, 2004, the Manager of the Management Committee of a
school is to be a graduate. She submits that vide letters dated 12th
September, 2000 and 19th October, 2000, the appellants had directed the
seven schools of the respondent/Society to submit their individual
Schemes of Management. According to her, despite such
communication, the respondent/Society till date has not submitted its
individual Schemes of Management. She submits that contrary to the
rules, the respondent/Society has appointed its Secretary as a Manager
of all its seven schools. She submits that this is in violation of Rule
59(2)(r) of the Delhi Schools Education Rules, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as "DSE Rules, 1973"). She invites attention of this Court to
the Memorandum of Association and Rules of the respondent/Society,
particularly to Rule 14. As per the learned counsel, Rule 14 of the said
Rules stipulates the constitution of a Management Committee of each
school run by the respondent/Society. She submits that the said
constitution is in alignment with the Scheme of Management as per
Rule 59 of the DSE Rules, 1973. She submits that once the
respondent/Society is aware of the Scheme of Management according
to Rule 59 of DSE Rules, 1973 as also its own Rule 14, there is no
reason why the Scheme of Management was not submitted by the
individual schools. According to her, without the mandatory
constitution of the Management Committee of each school, the request
to proceed with filling up of vacancies to the post of Principal, Teachers
and other staff cannot be acceded to by the appellants. This, according
to Ms. Ahlawat, was fundamentally overlooked by the learned Single
Judge while passing the impugned judgement.
4. Ms. Ahlawat also contends that the letter of request for filling up
of the vacant posts was received from the respondent/Society through
the Honorary Secretary conferring upon himself the post of Manager of
the Schools which is also contrary to Rule 59(2)(r) of DSE Rules, 1973.
She submits that Rule 59(2)(r) of DSE Rules, 1973, categorically
prohibits the Manager of one school to also be designated as Manager
of another school. She submits that the request letter dated 10th March,
2023, has been received from one Mr. Raju who claims to be the
Manager of all the schools of the respondent/Society. This, according to
her, admittedly is a violation of the Rules resulting in the appellants
rejecting the request of the respondent/Society vide its
letter/communication dated 1st December, 2023.
5. She next refers to the letter dated 12th September, 2023, issued by
the appellants citing anomaly in the functioning of one of the schools of
the respondent/Society at Laxmi Bai Nagar, Delhi. She submits that in
the said communication, it was categorically mentioned that no Scheme
of Management in respect of the said school was made available.
Simultaneously, attention of the said school was also invited to Rule 14
of the Rules of the association which required a Management
Committee to run the school. It was also pointed out that Mr. Raju
could not be the Manager of all the schools at the same time. She
submits that though the said school was granted sufficient time to
remove the anomalies pointed out, yet the said school failed in taking
appropriate steps. She submits that it was this failure on the part of all
the schools of the respondent/Society that culminated into the
letter/communication dated 1st December, 2023.
6. Per contra, Mr. Romy Chacko, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/Society on advance notice straightaway invites our attention
to the rejoinder filed by the association before the learned Single Judge.
In particular, he draws attention to pages 969-976 of the present paper
book, to demonstrate that contrary to the submissions made on behalf
of the appellants, the constitution of the Management Committee by
way of a resolution was clearly delineated from the year 2021 through
till the year 2024. He submits that when the said document was already
placed on record, such submissions would be irrelevant and of no
consequence. That apart, he invites our attention to various paragraphs
of the impugned judgment to substantiate the contention that all the
relevant documents proving existence of Managing Committee of the
schools run by the respondent/Society were actually taken note of by
the learned Single Judge before rendering his opinion in favour of the
respondent/Society.
7. Learned counsel for the respondent/Society submits that the
schools run by the respondent/Society are under stipulation not to make
selections except in accordance with the Rule 96 (3) of the DSE Rules,
1973.
8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned order and records available.
9. Though Ms. Ahlawat, learned standing counsel for the appellants
has argued on various aspects of the matter including questioning the
judgment of the learned Single Judge on the anvil of purported
violation of ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in Rafique (supra),
we note that the actual controversy lies in a narrow compass. In that,
the only issue which needs consideration is the letter/communication
dated 1st December, 2023. In order to appreciate the controversy before
us, it would be apposite to extract the letter/communication dated 1st
December, 2023, hereunder:-
"GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI
DIRECTORATE OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTIOR OF EDUCATION
DISTRICT-SOUTH WEST-A, C-4, VASANT VIHAR,
NEW DELHI
FNo.DE/DDE/SW-A/Z-19/2023/1018-1019 Dated: 01.12.2023
Sub: Regarding recruitment of Principal/teaching staff/other
staff in DTEA schools regarding.
It is to inform you that proposal for filling up of 52 vacant
posts through direct recruitment in DTEA schools has been
rejected by the Director of Education as there is no managing
committee in the schools of DTEA.
Sd/-
(Dr. Sanjay Chaturvedi)
DDE (SW-A)
To
The Secretary
Delhi Tamil Education Association (Regd.)
Lodhi Estate, New Delhi-110003
FNo. DE/DDE/SW-A/Z-19/2023 Dated:
Copy to:
1. DDE (ASB), Directorate of Education, Old Sectt.
Delhi - 110054
Sd/-
(Dr. Sanjay Chaturvedi)
DDE (SW-A)"
(emphasis supplied)
10. A plain reading of the contents of the aforesaid
letter/communication makes it apparent that the proposal of the
respondent/Society for filling up 52 vacant posts through direct
recruitment in its schools was rejected on the ground of the schools not
having a Management Committee. Other than that, there is no other
ground or reason discernible from the reading of the said
communication. It is trite that State cannot be permitted to enlarge or
enhance the scope, import or purport of its order/communication
subsequently by any other means. This principle has been crystallized
by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs.
Gordhandas Bhanji, AIR 1952 SC 16, which was also followed in
Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC
405. The relevant paragraph of Mohinder Singh Gill (supra) is
extracted hereunder:-
"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory
functionary makes· an order based on certain grounds, its
validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot
be supplemented by fresh • reasons in the shape of affidavit or
otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the
time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated
by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw
attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Commr. of Police,
Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji:
"Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory
authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations
subsequently given by the officer making the order of what
he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended
to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant
to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings
and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and
must be construed objectively with reference to the
language used in the order itself."
Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow
older."
11. This principle has consistently been followed by the Supreme
Court in various judgements uptill United Air Travel Services vs.
Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 141. It is thus a well settled principle of
law and forms doctrine of Stare Decisis. Thus, other than the issue of
absence of a Management Committee in the schools run by the
respondent/Society, this Court need not delve upon the
issues/submissions made by learned counsel for the appellants.
12. Since we have already opined that the appellants are bound by
their ground raised in the letter/communication dated 1st December,
2023 whereby the proposal of the respondent/Society for filling up
vacant posts was rejected, we would now examine as to whether the
conclusions drawn by the learned Single Judge on this aspect were on
the basis of documents on record.
13. We find that alongwith the rejoinder, the respondent/Society had
filed the resolutions constituting the Management Committee of various
branches of the schools run by the respondent/Society. We also find
that the appellants had not objected to such documents which are on
record. Infact, we find that the learned Single Judge in para no. 49.4.3
has not only taken note of the fact that each of the respondent's schools
has an independent Management Committee but also noted that the
appellants had not disputed the said position. In such an admitted
situation, we are unable to appreciate the contentions and submissions
raised on this ground by the appellants. It is apparent that there are
documents establishing that each of the schools of the
respondent/Society does have its Management Committee. Thus, the
arguments of the appellants on this aspect are rejected.
14. So far as the submission of the appellants that there cannot be
one person playing the role of a Manager in more than one Managing
Committee is concerned, it is apparent that the same could be termed to
be a procedural irregularity at best. This contention too has been
carefully examined by the learned Single Judge in para no. 49.4.5 of the
impugned judgement. We also note that the learned Single Judge has
given liberty to the appellants to take appropriate action in accordance
with law and the prescribed procedure. We concur with the reasoning
rendered by the learned Single Judge in this regard.
15. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we too hold that the letter/
communication dated 1st December, 2023, is unsustainable. However,
we bind the respondent/Society to the statement made by Mr. Romy
Chacko, learned counsel on the issue of strictly following the
provisions of Rule 96 (3) of DSE Rules, 1973. We also reiterate the
directions passed by the learned Single Judge in para no. 50 of the
impugned judgement.
16. In view of the aforesaid analysis and findings, we find no reason,
much less any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment
passed by the learned Single Judge. Resultantly, the present appeal is
dismissed without any order as to costs.
17. Pending applications also stand disposed of.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
TUSHAR RAO GEDELA, J.
JULY 22, 2024/ms/rl
