Delhi High Court
M/S Ktc India Pvt. Ltd. vs Randhir Brar & Ors. on 16 July, 2024
Author: Prateek Jalan
Bench: Prateek Jalan
$~36
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 16th July, 2024
+ ARB.P. 286/2023
M/S KTC INDIA PVT. LTD. ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Amit Gupta, Mr. Shiv Verma, Ms.
Muskan Nagpal, Advocates.
versus
RANDHIR BRAR & ORS. ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Amit Agrawal, Mr. Rahul Kukreja,
Ms. Sana Jain, Ms. Reaa Mehta,
Advocates for R-1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN
PRATEEK JALAN, J. (ORAL)
1. By way of this petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 ["the Act"], the petitioner seeks appointment of an
arbitrator to adjudicate disputes between the parties under a
"Shareholders Agreement" dated 20.07.2018 ["the Agreement"].
2. A preliminary question arises as to whether the petition is
maintainable in this Court, in view of the fact that one of the parties to the
Agreement - Mr. Nicholas Valladares (arrayed as respondent No. 5 in the
petition), is admittedly not a national or habitual resident of India. The
question depends upon whether the proposed arbitration would constitute
an "international commercial arbitration" within the meaning of Section
2(1)(f) of the Act, in which case, the power to appoint an arbitrator under
Section 11(9) of the Act would lie with the Chief Justice of India or his
nominee, and not with this Court.
3. There are fifteen parties to the Agreement. The petitioner is
described as the "Initial Shareholder" and thirteen individuals are
collectively referred to as "Subsequent Shareholders". A company by the
name of Destinos India Gurus Private Limited ["Destinos"] is also a party
to the Agreement, but has not been impleaded in this petition. The
purpose of the Agreement is to reorganize the shareholding of Destinos so
that the petitioner and the respondents hold shares in the ratio of 30:70
respectively.
4. The Agreement contains an arbitration clause [Clause 26], which
provides as follows:
"26. GOVERNING LAW AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION
26.1 This Agreement shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the laws of India. Subject to arbitration provisions
provided herein below, the courts in New Delhi shall have jurisdiction
in respect of any and all disputes or differences arising out of or in
connection with this Agreement.
26.2 If any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever arises between
the Parties in connection with or arising out of this Agreement (and
whether before or after the termination or breach of this Agreement),
the Parties shall promptly and in good faith negotiate with a view to its
amicable resolution and settlement by negotiation for 60 days. In the
event no amicable settlement is reached within a period of 60 days
from the date on which the dispute or difference arose, such dispute or
difference shall be referred to a mutually accepted sole arbitrator.
26.3 In the event that the Parties fail to agree to the appointment of a
sole arbitrator within 15 days, then the Parties shall jointly apply to
the Court for appointment of an independent arbitrator who shall be a
retired judge of a High Court. The arbitration shall be held in
accordance with the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 or any
statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in
force.
26.4 The arbitration proceedings shall be held in New Delhi and
shall be conducted in the English language.
26.5 Nothing contained in this Clause shall prevent any Party from
applying to any court of competent jurisdiction for temporary or
permanent injunctive relief or to enforce any of its right as under this
Agreement."
5. Disputes having arisen between the parties, learned counsel for the
petitioner addressed a letter dated 30.01.2023 to each of the thirteen
respondents, invoking arbitration and proposing the name of a former
judge of this Court as the sole arbitrator. As the parties have failed to
agree upon the appointment of an arbitrator, the petitioner has approached
this Court under Section 11 of the Act.
6. It is not disputed that the jurisdiction to appoint an arbitrator in
cases of international commercial arbitration, rests with the Chief Justice
of India or his nominee, and not with this Court. The point urged by Mr.
Amit Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, was that the
proposed arbitration, in the facts of this case, does not fall within the
definition of "international commercial arbitration" in terms of Section
2(1)(f) of the Act.
7. Section 2(1)(f) of the Act reads as follows:
"2. Definitions.--
(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires,--
(f) "international commercial arbitration" means an arbitration
relating to disputes arising out of legal relationships, whether
contractual or not, considered as commercial under the law in
force in India and where at least one of the parties is--
(i) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident
in, any country other than India; or
(ii) a body corporate which is incorporated in any country
other than India; or
(iii) an association or a body of individuals whose central
management and control is exercised in any country other
than India; or
(iv) the Government of a foreign country;"1
8. Mr. Gupta submitted that all the thirteen individuals described as
"Subsequent Shareholders" in the Agreement, have entered into a
common enterprise to subscribe to the shares of Destinos, as set out in the
Agreement, and thus constitute "an association or a body of individuals",
within the meaning of Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act. He contended that
the central management and control of this association or body of
individuals is exercised in India and the arbitration, therefore, does not
satisfy the definition of "international commercial arbitration". Mr. Gupta
relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Larsen & Toubro
SCOMI Engineering BHD v. Mumbai Metropolitan Region Development
Authority2 to submit that, where a group of individuals can appropriately
be classified as "an association or a body of individuals", the question to
be answered is whether the central management and control of the
association or body of individuals rests in India. If so, the fact that one of
the said individuals is a body corporate incorporated outside India, or an
individual who is not a citizen or habitual resident of India, would not
bring the arbitration within the definition provided in Section 2(1)(f) of
the Act. Mr. Gupta also cited the judgments of the Supreme Court in
Perkins Eastman Architects DPC v. HSCC (India) Ltd.3 and Amway
(India) Enterprises (P) Ltd. v. Ravindranath Rao Sindhia4, and the
Emphasis supplied.
(2019) 2 SCC 271.
(2020) 20 SCC 760.
(2021) 8 SCC 465.
judgment of this Court in SAIL v. Tata Projects Ltd.5 in support of his
contentions. Reference has also been made to Meera and Co. v. CIT6,
Ramanlal Bhailal Patel v. State of Gujarat7, and Mansarovar Commercial
(P) Ltd. v. CIT8.
9. Mr. Amit Agarwal, learned counsel for the respondents, on the
other hand, submitted that the thirteen individuals were each,
independently, parties to the Agreement in their individual capacity, and
there is no material on record to suggest that they form part of a single
"association or a body of individuals", so as to justify the application of
Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act. Mr. Agarwal argued that Section 2(1)(f)(i)
of the Act, which refers to the nationality or habitual residence of
individuals, is squarely applicable to the present case.
10. Turning first to the judgments cited by Mr. Gupta, in Larsen &
Toubro9, the contracting parties were a consortium comprising of an
Indian company and a Malaysian company, on the one hand, and Mumbai
Metropolitan Region Development Authority ["MMRDA"], on the other
hand. The Indian company was designated as the "lead partner" of the
consortium. The consortium filed a petition under Section 11 of the Act
before the Supreme Court on the ground that one of the parties to the
Agreement was a body corporate incorporated in Malaysia. The Supreme
Court was taken through the agreement between the consortium and
MMRDA, as well as the consortium agreement between the two
constituents thereof. An order of the Bombay High Court dated
2021 SCC OnLine Del 4170.
(1997) 4 SCC 677.
(2008) 5 SCC 449.
2023 SCC OnLine SC 386.
20.10.2016 was also cited in support of the argument that the claims
sought to be agitated could be made only by the consortium, and not by
its constituent entities individually. The Supreme Court found that the
aforesaid order of the Bombay High Court was conclusive as to the status
of the consortium as the only contracting party, leaving its individual
constituents without locus to agitate any claims independently. In these
circumstances, the Court came to the conclusion that the consortium was
an unincorporated association, of which the Indian company was the lead
partner and had the determining voice, i.e., that the central management
and control of the consortium was exercised in India. The Supreme Court
therefore dismissed the petition under Section 11 of the Act filed before
it, with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate Court.
11. Perkins10 is also a case where one of the contracting parties was a
consortium, comprising of a foreign entity (incorporated in New York)
and an Indian entity. Disputes arose under the contract between the
consortium and the respondent, HSCC India Ltd. The consortium
approached the Supreme Court for appointment of an arbitrator. The
maintainability of the petition was contested on the ground that the
arbitration proceedings was not an international commercial arbitration at
all. The Supreme Court allowed the petition, holding that the lead
member of the consortium was a foreign entity (unlike in Larsen &
Toubro11), and the requirements of Section 2(1)(f) of the Act were
therefore satisfied.
Supra (note 2).
Supra (note 3).
Supra (note 2).
12. In contrast to the aforesaid two cases, Amway12 concerned
individuals who were nationals and habitual residents of the United States
of America, who approached this Court for appointment of an arbitrator.
This Court relied upon the judgment in Larsen & Toubro13, to hold that
the two individuals (who were husband and wife) had entered into a
single agreement for operation of a distributorship, as a single entity. This
Court found that the individuals constituted an "association or a body of
individuals" with its central management in India, and therefore
proceeded to exercise jurisdiction under Section 11 of the Act. The
Supreme Court reversed the decision, observing that the judgment in
Larsen & Toubro14 turned upon a final and binding judgment between the
parties, which made it clear that the constituents of the consortium could
not rely upon their status as independent entities while dealing with
MMRDA.
13. In SAIL15, the judgment of a coordinate Bench of this Court was
rendered under Section 34 of the Act. One of the contracting parties was a
consortium comprising of a foreign entity and an Indian entity. This Court
found that the agreement contemplated separate rights and obligations of
the members of the consortium, and the agreement would therefore
constitute an international commercial arbitration.
14. In Meera & Co.16, the Court was concerned with the interpretation
of the term "association of persons or a body of individuals" under the
Supra (note 4).
Supra (note 2).
Ibid.
Supra (note 5).
Supra (note 6).
Income Tax Act, 1961. It is in this context that the Court has held as
follows:
"29. In this definition, in clause (v), both "association of persons" and
"body of individuals" have been included with the added words
"whether incorporated or not". Another thing to note is that clause (v)
speaks of "an association of persons or a body of individuals". This
implies that an "association of persons" is not something distinct and
separate from a "body of individuals". It has been added to obviate
any controversy as to whether only combination of human beings are
to be treated as a unit of assessment. The intention clearly is to hit
combinations of individuals and individuals, combinations of
individuals and non-individuals and also combinations of non-
individuals with other non-individuals who are engaged together in
some joint enterprise when such joint enterprise does not fall within
any of the other categories enumerated in sub-section (31) of Section 2
of the Act."
15. In Ramanlal17, the Court examined the definition of "association of
persons or body of individuals" in the context of Bombay General
Clauses Act, 1904 and the Gujarat Agricultural Lands Ceiling Act, 1960,
and held as follows:
"28. The terms "association of persons" and "body of individuals"
(which are interchangeable) have a legal connotation and refer to an
entity having rights and duties. They are not to be understood literally.
For example, if half a dozen people are travelling in a car or a boat, or
standing in a bus-stop, they may be a group of persons or a "body of
individuals" in the literal sense. But they are not an association of
persons/body of individuals in the legal sense. When a calamity occurs
or a disaster strikes, and a band of volunteers or doctors meet at the
site and associate or cooperate with each other for providing relief to
victims, and not doing anything for their own benefit, they may literally
be an association of persons, but they are not "an association of
persons/body of individuals" in the legal sense. A mere combination of
persons or coming together of persons without anything more, without
any intention to have a joint venture or carry on some common activity
with a common understanding and purpose will not convert two or
more persons into a body of individuals/association of persons. An
"association of persons/body of individuals" is one in which two or
more persons join in a common purpose and common action to achieve
Supra (note 7).
some common benefit. Where there is a combination of individuals by
volition of the parties, engaged together in some joint enterprise or
venture, it is known as "association of persons/body of individuals".
The common object will have some relevance to determine whether a
group or set of persons is an association of persons or body of
individuals with reference to a particular statute. For example, when
the said terms "association of persons" or "body of individuals" occur
in a section which imposes a tax on income, the association must be
one the object of which is to produce income, profit or gain
(vide CIT v. Indira Balkrishna [AIR 1960 SC 1172] , Mohd.
Noorulla v. CIT [AIR 1961 SC 1043] , N.V. Shanmugam and
Co. v. CIT [(1970) 2 SCC 139] and Meera and Co. v. CIT [(1997) 4
SCC 677] ). But the object need not always be to carry on commercial
or business activity. For example, when the word "person" occurs in a
statute relating to agriculture or ceiling on landholding, the term
"association of persons/body of individuals" may refer to a
combination of individuals who join together to acquire and own land
as co-owners and carry on agricultural operations as a joint
enterprise.
29. Normally, where a group of persons have not become co-owners by
their own volition with a common purpose, they cannot be considered
as a "person". When the children of the owner of a property succeed
to his property by testamentary succession or inherit by operation of
law, they become co-owners, but the co-ownership is not by volition of
parties nor do they have any common purpose. Each can act in regard
to his/her share, on his/her own, without any right or obligation
towards the other owners. The legal heirs though co-owners, do not
automatically become an "association of persons/body of individuals".
When different persons buy undivided shares in a plot of land and
engage a common developer to construct an apartment building, with
individual ownership in regard to respective apartment and joint
ownership of common areas, the co-owners of the plot of land, do not
become an "association of persons/body of individuals", in the
absence of a deeming provision in a statute or an agreement. Similarly,
when two or more persons merely purchase a property, under a
common sale deed, without any agreement to have a common or joint
venture, they will not become an "association of persons/body of
individuals". Mere purchase under a common deed without anything
more, will not convert a co-ownership into a joint enterprise. Thus
when there are ten co-owners of a property, they are ten persons and
not a "body of individuals" to be treated as a "single person". But if
the co-owners proceed further and enter into an arrangement or
agreement to have a joint enterprise or venture to produce a common
result for their benefit, then the co-owners may answer the definition of
a "person"."
16. It is evident from these authorities that the question of whether a
particular group of individuals or entities fall within the scope of an
"association or a body of individuals", is dependent upon the particular
facts and circumstances of the case. In the present case, on consideration
of the terms of the Agreement, I am of the view that the respondents
herein cannot be held to constitute an "association or a body of
individuals", so as to fall within Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act.
17. The Agreement contains no such indication, other than collective
reference to the thirteen individuals (the respondents herein) as
"Subsequent Shareholders". Mr. Gupta relied upon this factor to submit
that they were to be treated as a single entity. However, I am not inclined
to accept this submission merely on the basis that they are referenced
collectively. This is not a case of a consortium or partnership of any sort.
The thirteen individuals are separately listed in the Agreement, and their
individual addresses are also stated. In fact, Clause 2.1(d) of the
Agreement, set out below, also indicates that the reference to this group
of "Subsequent Shareholders" is only for convenience of collective
reference, and does not diminish their status as independent and
individual contracting parties:
"2. INTERPRETATIONS
2.1 In this Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires:
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(d) References to the singular number shall include references to the
plural number and vice versa. In other words reference to any group
of shareholder (Initial or Subsequent Shareholders) shall, unless the
context otherwise require, include and be binding upon all the
constituents/ members of that group;"18
18. Some of the other clauses of the Agreement also indicate that
individual constituents of each group of shareholders have the capacity to
take independent decisions under the Agreement. Consequently, and
significantly for the present purposes, the arbitration clause in the
Agreement also refers to each "party" and not to "Subsequent
Shareholders" as a group. Examples of such clauses are as follows:
"6.2 Additional funding after Initial Committed Funds:
(a) If after the expiry of Initial Shareholder's Lock-in
Period the debt (including the Initial Committed Funds)
extended by the Initial Shareholder or its Affiliates under or
pursuant to this Agreement remains outstanding and the
Company requires additional funding for the operations of
the Company as per the relevant Business Plan agreed
between the Parties, the Parties agree that such funding
shall be financed in the manner as follows:
xxxx xxxx xxxx
(iii) In the event any Shareholder group or the
constituents thereof decline the first right to
subscribe to the Fresh Issue, then, the Fresh
Issue will be offered to the other Shareholders
group and to third parties in that order. It is
agreed by the Shareholders that offer of Fresh
Issue made to any third party or parties will be
subject to prior approval of all existing
Shareholders. It is also agreed by the
Shareholders that offer of Fresh Issue made to
any third parties will never be on terms which
are more favorable than those offered to the
Shareholders.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
9.5 Any Party may, from time to time and at any time, if it thinks fit,
present to the Board for approval any amendment or modification of,
or addition or addendum to the Business Plan. Any such amendment or
Emphasis supplied.
modification of, or addition or addendum to the Business Plan shall, if
approved by the Board as aforesaid, continue in effect for so long as
the relevant Business Plan continues in effect.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
10.2 Lock-in Period for Subsequent Shareholders:
(a) Except as otherwise stated in the Agreement, the
members of the group of Subsequent Shareholders
shall not be entitled to transfer or encumber or
otherwise dispose of or assign their shares in the
Company for a minimum period of 8 (eight) years from
the Effective Date ("Subsequent Shareholders Lock-in
Period"):
Provided that if any constituent of the Subsequent
Shareholders transfer, encumber, assign or otherwise
dispose of their shares before the expiry of the
Subsequent Shareholders Lock-in Period, then he/ she
shall be liable to pay a sum equivalent to the value
calculated in the manner given in sub-clause (i) or sub-
clause (ii) below, whichever is higher, as penalty to the
Company:
(i) value of his/her shareholding in the Company
computed @ Rs. 15 crores; or
(ii) value of his/her shareholding in the Company
computed @ 1.25 times of the turnover of the
Company in the last Financial Year.
The provision of this clause 10.2 (a) is without prejudice
to any other provision of this Agreement and shall
survive the termination of this Agreement.
(b) Nothing in clause 10.2 (a) above shall restrict the
exit of any member of the group of the Subsequent
Shareholders in the situation of his / her prolonged
illness (as certified by a qualified medical practitioner)
or incapacitation or otherwise specifically approved by
the Initial Shareholder and the Board. It is, however,
agreed that no transfer of shares by way of sale or
otherwise shall take place except in accordance with the
terms of this Agreement.
(c) After the expiry of Subsequent Shareholders Lock-in
Period, if any constituent of the Subsequent
Shareholders proposes to transfer his/her shares, then
they shall be permitted to do so in accordance with the
provisions as laid down under this Agreement.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
20.1 (a) After the expiry of the Lock-in Period (as applicable to the
Initial Shareholder and Subsequent Shareholders under Clause 10.1
and Clause 10.2, respectively), if any constituent of the Shareholders
is intending to sell or transfer his / her own shares in the Company,
the remaining Shareholders would jointly and severally retain the right
to acquire the said shares, as detailed below, at a price no less than
the Fair Value determined by the independent reputed chartered
accountancy firm appointed by the Company.
(b) If the seller is a constituent of the Subsequent Shareholders, the
offer would first be made to the other constituents of the Subsequent
Shareholders (to be exercised in 21 days) and then to the Initial
Shareholder (to be exercised in 21 days). It is agreed by the
Shareholders that any such sale or transfer of shares between existing
Shareholders i.e. Initial or Subsequent Shareholders will be subject to
prior approval of all Shareholders.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
23.2 Each of the Subsequent Shareholders hereby represents and
warrants to the Company and the Initial Shareholder, at the
execution date that:
(a) they are not, either on its own or through any
Person, engaged in any business competitive to the
business of the Company; and
(b) they are not bound by any non-compete clause or
provision under any employment contract or other
agreement with their previous employers which restricts
them to associate with or engage in the business of the
Company or any other similar business.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
26.2 If any dispute or difference of any kind whatsoever arises
between the Parties in connection with or arising out of this
Agreement (and whether before or after the termination or breach of
this Agreement), the Parties shall promptly and in good faith negotiate
with a view to its amicable resolution and settlement by negotiation for
60 days. In the event no amicable settlement is reached within a period
of 60 days from the date on which the dispute or difference arose, such
dispute or difference shall be referred to a mutually accepted sole
arbitrator.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
27. EXECUTION, VALIDITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE
AGREEMENT
27.1 It is clarified that the members of the group of Subsequent
Shareholders will be subscribing to the share capital of the Company
in proportion / ratio as set forth under Schedule II hereto at different
stages/ dates and any one or more members representing the
Subsequent Shareholders group will be signing/ executing this
Agreement on behalf of all other members of the Subsequent
Shareholders group. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, this
Agreement shall become binding and valid against all the members of
the Subsequent Shareholders group from the Effective Date.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
29.3 Notice: Any notice or other communication under this
Agreement shall be given in writing and shall be deemed to be duly
given if sent by registered mail / courier (with acknowledgement due)
to the respective addresses of the Parties as set out at the beginning
of this Agreement (or at such other address as may hereafter be
specified for such purpose by the relevant addressee) or sent by telefax
or facsimile to such number as is from time to time specified by the
relevant addressee and shall be deemed to be duly received within 3
(three) days of being sent by registered post or courier and if sent by
facsimile, when the recipient's answer back appears at the beginning
and end of the facsimile.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
29.5 Relationship: Nothing in this Agreement shall constitute or be
deemed to constitute a partnership between the Parties or confer on
any Party any authority to bind the other or to contract in the name
of the other or to incur any liability or obligation on behalf of the
other or shall be deemed to be the agent of the other in any way.
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
SCHEDULE II
xxxx xxxx xxxx
xxxx xxxx xxxx
Annexure B
List of Subsequent shareholders having voting rights
14. Mr. Ramesh Punjabi
15. Mr. Chander Ahuja
16. Mr. Sanjay Malhotra
17. Mr. Randhir Brar
18. Mr. Nicholas Valladares
List of Subsequent shareholders not having voting rights
1. Mr. Vijay Srinivasan
2. Mr. Navin Mishra
3. Mr. Pankaj Hingorani
4. Mr. Kshitij Kapoor
5. Mr. Vikas Sharma
6. Mr. Om Prakash Pant
7. Mr. Bhoop Singh Bhan
8. Mr. Ranjan Kumar Jha".19
19. Upon a consideration of all these terms, I am of the view that the
"Subsequent Shareholders" in the Agreement did not constitute a single
Emphasis supplied.
entity, so as to attract the applicability of Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act.
Each of such shareholders was to subscribe to a defined quantity of
shares, had the right to exit the company individually on the conditions
set forth in the Agreement, and undertook individual rights and
obligations. The status of the individuals with regard to voting rights also
vary as specified in "Annexure B" to the Agreement. The Agreement
specifically requires notices to be sent to each of the individual parties (as
was done in the present case), and permits any of them to invoke
arbitration. There is no prior arrangement or agreement on record
between the "Subsequent Shareholders" inter se to support Mr. Gupta's
submission, nor any indication as to the joint management and control of
the combined entity.
20. The situation, in my view, is not one of a simple association or
body of individuals engaging in a common enterprise, but of several
individuals involved in the common enterprise, each in their individual
capacity. To treat such individuals as a common "association or a body of
individuals", within the meaning of Section 2(1)(f)(iii) of the Act, would
be virtually indistinguishable from a case of several shareholders in a
company, each holding their individual shares, but being engaged in the
common enterprise of the company, simply by virtue of their
shareholding. Such a consequence appears to me far-fetched.
21. The judgment of Mansarovar Commercial20, cited by Mr. Gupta,
deals with the question of locating the management and control of joint
enterprises. As I have come to the conclusion that there is no joint
enterprise in the present case, which constitutes the individuals into an
"association or a body of individuals" for the purpose of the Act, it is not
necessary to enter into this question.
22. The inevitable consequence of the above discussion is that the
undisputed status of respondent No. 5 as a national and habitual resident
of a country other than India, renders the proposed arbitration an
"international commercial arbitration" within the meaning of Section
2(1)(f)(i) of the Act. This Court, therefore, has no jurisdiction to entertain
the petition.
23. The petition is therefore dismissed, with liberty to the petitioner to
take the remedies available to it in law.
PRATEEK JALAN, J
July 16, 2024
"Bhupi"/
Supra (note 8).
