Delhi High Court
Re: To Consider Suo Motu Contempt ... vs Proceedings Against The Tis ... on 28 July, 2023
#J-1 & J-2
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment Pronounced On: 28.07.2023
1
+ CONT.CAS. (CRL) 2/2006, CRL.M.A.Nos.2075/2006, CRL. M.A.
2076/2006, CRL. M.A. 2077/2006, CRL. M.A. 2078/2006, CRL.
M.A.2839/2006, CRL. M.A.2847/2006, CRL. M.A.3887/2006, CRL.
M.A.4061/2006, CRL. M.A.4062/2006, CRL. M.A. 5607/2006, CRL.
M.A.5778/2006, CRL. M.A.11461/2006 and CRL. M.A.9030/2007
RE: TO CONSIDER SUO MOTU
CONTEMPT OF COURT .... Petitioner
versus
PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE TIS HAZARI
COURT LAWYERS .... Respondents/Contemnors
AND
2
+ CONT.CAS. (CRL) 8/2006 & CRL.MA. 3515/2006
DR. H.B. MISHRA .... Petitioner
versus
STATE & ORS. .... Respondents/Contemnors
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Signature Not Verified Page 1 of 47
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioners: Mr. Sidharth Luthra, Senior Advocate as Amicus Curiae along with Ms.
Shubhangi Jain, Mr. Yash Giri, Mr. Raju and Mr. Adityaa, Advocates
For the Respondents
/Contemnors: 1) Mr. Rajiv Khosla, Contemnor/Respondent No.1 in-person.
2) Mr. Jagdeep Singh Bakshi, Senior Advocate along with Mr.
Praveen K. Sharma, Advocate with Mr. Sanjeev Nasiar,
Contemnor/Respondent No. 2 in-person.
3) Mr. N. Hariharan, Senior Advocate along with Mr. Prateek Bhalla,
Mr. Rahul Sambher, Ms. Adeeb Ahmed, Mohd. Qasim Ms. Punya
Rekha Angara, Advocates for Mr. Jaiveer Singh Chauhan
Contemnor/Respondent No.3 in-person.
4) Mr. A.K. Gupta, Contemnor/Respondent No.4 in-person.
5) Mr. Dharmavir, Contemnor/Respondent No.7 in-person.
6) Mr. Inder Singh Saroha, Contemnor/Respondent No.8 in-person.
7) Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh, Contemnor/Respondent No.9 in-person.
8) Mr. Sunil Sherawat, Contemnor/Respondent No.12 in-person.
9) Mr. Vikas Arya, Contemnor/Respondent No.17 in-person.
10) Mr. G.S. Sandhu, Contemnor/Respondent No.21 in-person.
11) Mr. Anil Kumar Chauhan, Contemnor/Respondent No.22 in-
person.
12) Mr. Madan Lal Gupta, Contemnor/Respondent No.24 in-person.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJNISH BHATNAGAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA
JUDGMENT
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL, J
1. The present criminal contempt proceeding emanates from the incident
that occurred on the 24.02.2006 at the Tis Hazari Courts, in addition to earlier
incidents stated to have taken place commencing from the 02.01.2006 at the
Tis Hazari and the Rohini Courts, where advocates went on strike, opposing
the establishment of the Rohini Court complex. On 24.02.2006, a
comprehensive report was forwarded to this Court by the then District &
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Sessions Judge, Mr. S.N. Dhingra, highlighting the need for initiating suo
motu contempt of the Court proceedings against the errant advocates, which
included numerous supporting documents, as well as reports from other
Judges and officials functioning at the Tis Hazari Courts. In view of the
shared nature of the facts and issues involved, both of these petitions were
adjudicated collectively and are being disposed of by way of this common
order.
2. A conspectus of the facts giving the background of the aforesaid
incidents relevant for the adjudication of the subject proceedings are
encapsulated herein below:
i. On the 27.02.2006, this Court, acting suo motu, took cognizance of
the alleged incident and determined that qua 25 individuals there
existed the elements of prima facie case of being liable for initiation
of criminal contempt proceedings. Consequently, Show Cause
Notices were issued to these 25 individuals, requiring them to
provide a justification as to why they should not be penalized for
committing the offense of criminal contempt of court, based on the
allegations outlined in various reports and other supporting material
submitted before this Court. Furthermore, on the same day, an
interim order was passed, imposing restrictions on the alleged
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Contemnors, prohibiting them from approaching within a distance
of 500 meters from the premises of the Court compound of Delhi
High Court or any Subordinate Courts falling under its jurisdiction,
including Courts/Tribunals under its supervisory jurisdiction.
ii. On the 29.03.2006, Respondent Nos.3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 20, 21, and 22 filed their responses to the Show Cause Notice
and some of them also requested for the relaxation of the interim
order passed on the 27.02.2006. They explicitly asserted that they
were not accountable for the acts of vandalism and provided a
solemn undertaking that they shall refrain from engaging in any acts
of vandalism, obstructing the ingress or egress of advocates
attending the court proceedings, or disrupting the functioning of
Court. Taking into account the aforementioned undertaking, this
Court, on 29.03.2006, decided to suspend the direction issued vide
order dated 27.02.2006, specifically pertaining to the
abovementioned respondents; vide order dated 18.04.2006, the
interim restraint order dated 27.02.2006 was also suspended qua
Respondent no. 23 based on the Affidavit filed by him.
iii. Subsequently, the interim restraint order dated 27.02.2006, was
modified by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India vide order dated
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
15.06.2006, passed in Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.
2914/2006. The modification stipulated that the petitioners would
be allowed to carry out their professional duties pertaining to Courts
and Tribunals, but they must refrain from engaging in any activity
that the High Court has objected to.
iv. It is noteworthy to highlight that, FIR No.74/2006, under Sections
147/149/186/353/332/427/188/120-B of the Indian Penal Code,
1860 [hereinafter referred as "IPC"] and Sections 3 and 4 of the
Prevention of Damage of Public Property Act was registered with
Police Station, Subzi Mandi on 24.02.2006 and subsequent to it the
chargesheet was filed on 25.02.2006 with respect to the alleged
incident.
v. During the period from March, 2006 to September, 2006, a total of
13 Contemnors/Respondents were either discharged or removed
from the present criminal contempt proceedings. The details of the
alleged Contemnors who have been discharged or dropped from the
present proceedings are as follows:-
Rajesh (Respondent No. 5), Date of Discharge: (11.07.2006):
"Identity not traceable";
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Girish Malhotra (Respondent No. 6), Date of Discharge:
(27.07.2006): "Except being mentioned in the report of Ld.
District & Sessions Judge dated 10.01.2006, no documentary
or other evidence connecting him to the alleged events.";
Jatan Singh (Respondent No. 10), Date of Discharge:
(27.07.2006): "No allegation or involvement in the alleged
incident";
Shubra (Respondent No. 11), Date of Discharge:
(30.05.2006): "Identity not traceable";
Dharamvir Singh Saroha (Respondent No. 13), Date of
Discharge: (16.05.2006): "On the basis of the affidavit of the
SHO, Subzi Mandi PS";
Raj Singh (Respondent No. 14), Date of Discharge:
(13.09.2006): "No definite material on the basis of which he
can be found guilty of contempt";
Yogender Singh (Respondent No. 15), Date of Discharge:
(16.05.2006): "Dropped on the basis of the affidavit filed by
him that it is a case of misplaced identity and he is not
Jogendra Singh";
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Rajender Singh Rana (Respondent No. 16), Date of
Discharge: (27.07.2006): "On the basis of the affidavit and
arguments advanced on his behalf that there are no allegations
against him";
Nitin Ahlawat (Respondent No. 18), Date of Discharge:
(27.07.2006): "No involvement in the alleged incidents";
O.P. Saini (Respondent No. 19), Date of Discharge:
(18.04.2006): "In view of report of Mr. Ranbir Singh, SHO of
PS Subzi Mandi";
Dalip Rana (Respondent No.20), Date of Discharge:
(13.09.2006): "On the basis of the affidavit dated 24.02.2006
as well as other advocates in support";
Jitender Kumar Chauhan (Respondent No.23), Date of
Discharge: (27.07.2006): "Except for statement of witness at
pg. 165A, name not reflected anywhere else nor seen in video
coverage";
Satinder Kumar Gautam (Respondent No.25), Date of
Discharge: (18.04.2006): "In view of report of Mr. Ranbir
Singh, SHO of PS Subzi Mandi";
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
vi. Further, on 10.10.2006, subsequent to the oral submissions made on
behalf of Respondents Nos. 4, 7, 8, 9, 12, 21, and 22; seeking their
discharge in the ongoing legal proceedings, the judgment was
reserved. However, due to reconstitution of the Bench, the verdict
was not pronounced and orders dated 10.10.2006 was recalled on
06.12.2006. At present, the following Respondents/Contemnors are
the noticees in the present criminal contempt proceedings:-
Respondent No.1:- Rajiv Khosla
Respondent No. 2:- Sanjiv Nasiar
Respondent No. 3:- Jaiveer Singh Chauhan
Respondent No. 4:- A.K. Gupta
Respondent No. 7:- Dharamvir
Respondent No.8:- Inder Singh Saroha
Respondent No. 9:- Sudhir Kumar Singh
Respondent No.12:- Sunil Sherawat
Respondent No.17:- Vikas Arya
Respondent No. 21:- G.S. Sandhu
Respondent No.22:- Anil Kumar Chauhan
Respondent No.24:- Madan Lal Gupta
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
3. Mr. Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel, the Amicus Curiae would
submit that:-
a) The power of the High Court to take cognizance qua its Subordinate
Court and to punish for the latter‟s contempt, emanates from Article
215 of the Constitution of India; and that the power so to do is also
prescribed under Section 15(2) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971,
(hereinafter referred to as "the said Act"). Sections 15, 17, and 18
of the said Act outline the fundamental procedure that, the High
Court must adhere to when acknowledging instances of criminal
contempt against its Subordinate Courts. As per Section 23 of the
said Act, the High Court possesses the authority to establish
regulations that align harmoniously with the provisions of the said
Act. Consequently, the High Court--as it has already
implemented--is entitled to adopt an abridged course of action
whereby the respondents, at their own volition, file affidavits
expounding their defense.
b) It is pertinent to note that contempt proceedings are sui generis and
distinct in nature, and the strict application of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 is not
necessarily applicable. In such cases, the Courts have the sole
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
responsibility to adhere to the principles of natural justice and
follow a procedure that is fair and impartial. Therefore, while
adjudicating a proceeding for criminal contempt, the High Court has
the authority to adopt a summary proceeding of its own accord, in
the interest of administering justice.
c) Mr. Luthra, learned Amicus Curiae further submitted that the array
of material and evidence presented on record against the alleged
Contemnors encompasses the following: (i) Reports authored by
Mr. S.N. Dhingra, the then District and Sessions Judge; (ii)
Complaints lodged by the Judges of the District Court, Legal
Professionals, and Journalists, who were purportedly present during
the incidents; (iii) The charge-sheet, dated 25.02.2006, filed in FIR
No. 74/2006, dated 24.02.2006, along with statements recorded
under Section 161 Cr.P.C. by the Judges, Court Personnel, and
Police Officers; and (iv) Visual recordings and compact discs
capturing the events of the said incident. These materials stand as
significant components of the evidentiary foundation against the
alleged Contemnors.
d) The learned Amicus Curiae further submitted and unequivocally
emphasized that, although the video footage does not establish a
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
direct link between the damage inflicted upon the court rooms and
the advocates or the alleged Contemnors, it is equally evident that
the advocates were engaged in protests. However, there is no clear
visual evidence to suggest that they were responsible for the
destruction of Court property. The advocates can be observed
shouting slogans against the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice
of the Delhi High Court; and certain posters displayed during the
protest appear to question the intention of the Judges in relation to
the decision to establish the Rohini Courts. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that an unidentified individual present on the stage can
be observed making allegations of corruption against a sitting
Supreme Court judge.
e) Additionally, the press release issued by the Delhi Bar Association
on 03.01.2006, also raises suspicion and influentially casts doubt on
the alleged motives underlying the establishment of the Rohini
Courts. Moreover, Respondent No.2, who is seen leading the march
and actively participating in the protest, can be heard shouting
slogans and providing a statement to the press regarding the true
intentions of the Judges in relation to the bifurcation of the Tis
Hazari Court.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
f) It was further submitted by the learned Amicus Curiae that, one of
the primary objection raised in certain affidavits on behalf of the
alleged Contemnors/Respondents; is with respect to the ongoing
parallel criminal legal proceedings underway in relation with the
alleged incident under the I.P.C in FIR No.74/2006, dated
24.02.2006, registered at Police Station Subzi Mandi; as well as
under the Contempt of Court Act, 1971 asserting that the same
cannot be sustained in view of the provision of Section 10 of the
said Act.
g) It is pertinent to highlight that the abovementioned FIR has been
lodged under Sections 147/148/186/188/353/332/427/120-B IPC as
well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Damage of Public
Property Act. These sections encompass offenses that are distinct
from the provisions contained in the said Act. Therefore, the Court
has appropriately exercised its jurisdiction in taking suo motu
cognizance of the alleged incident, as these offenses fall outside the
realm of Contempt of Court.
4. In order to buttress his exhaustive submissions, Mr. Sidharth Luthra,
learned Amicus Curiae, has placed reliance on the following decisions:-
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
(i) Sukhdev Singh vs Teja Singh reported as AIR 1954 SC
186;
(ii) C. K. Daphtary and Others Vs. O.P. Gupta and ors
reported as (1971) 1 SCC 626;
(iii) Arun Paswan v. State of Bihar reported as (2004) 5 SCC
53;
(iv) Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras reported
as (1952) 1 SCC 154;
(v) State of MP v. Revashankar reported as 1959 SCR 1367;
(vi) Emperor v. Ladli Prasad Zutshi reported as ILR 1931 All
724;
(vii) Kripashankar Mishra v. Anupsingh Bedi reported as
1953 SCC Online MP 168;
(viii) Nand Kumar Sinha v. Emperor reported as 1936 SCC
Online Pat 256;
(ix) Khatri (IV) v. State of Bihar reported as (1981) 2 SCC
493;
(x) Ravindra Nath Sharma v. Smt. Nirmal Sharma reported
as 128 DRJ 1985 (9);
(xi) Delhi Judicial Service Assn. vs State of Gujarat & Ors,
reported as (1991) 4 SCC 406;
(xii) Daroga Singh & ors. v. BK Pandey, reported as (2004) 5
SCC 26.
5. Mr. Rajiv Khosla the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.1, appeared in
person and opened his submission while asserting that there is no direct
evidence implicating him in the alleged incident and the Show Cause Notice
does not contain any specific allegations against him. Furthermore, he argued
that it was unfairly left to the alleged Contemnors to gather relevant material
from various documents and videos of the alleged incident in order to respond
to the purported allegations. It is important to note Mr. Khosla would urge
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
that, these allegations led to the registration of a serious criminal case,
including charges of damaging Court property; and has simultaneously
resulted into initiation of the present criminal contempt proceedings.
6. It was further submitted that he refutes the allegations of having
committed the purported acts, affirming a deep reverence for the judiciary and
the judicial institution. It is noteworthy to emphasize that despite the presence
of operational CCTV cameras, complete footage capturing the alleged
incident has not been placed on the record, while the clippings on record fail
to establish the alleged Contemnor‟s involvement in the alleged incident.
Further insofar as the accusations of damage of public property and
obstruction of administration of justice are concerned; the alleged Contemnor
submits that there exists no evidence, either in the form of articles or goods
confiscated by the police or any governing body; that would demonstrate any
form of damage to public property. This assertion is rooted in the fact that the
protests were conducted in a peaceful manner, and the Members of the Bar
willingly refrained from attending the proceedings of Court on the fateful day.
7. It was further submitted that the material on the record did not provide
any justification for the inability to seize the damaged articles. Moreover,
there was no evaluation of the worth of the damaged goods, nor were any
invoices or receipts presented to substantiate the claims of repairs or
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
purchases in the Charge Sheet. Subsequently, these facets also serve as an
indicator of the falsehood of the entire case and the manufacturing of evidence
in the CD/Video recording of the purported incident.
8. Lastly, it was urged that the rule of parity be considered to equate the
alleged Contemnor with other Contemnors, whose cases have either been
dismissed or discharged because all those who are similarly situated must be
afforded the same advantage. Therefore, if this Court has accepted the
veracity of the accounts of the discharged Contemnors', relying on identical
facts and circumstances, then the veracity affirmed in the affidavits of the
present alleged Contemnors and others should be treated on a similar footing.
9. Mr. Jaideep Singh Bakshi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.2, Mr. Sanjeev Nasiar, submits that the
alleged Contemnor is an esteemed and distinguished individual associated
with the Delhi Bar Association, having held positions such as Additional
Secretary (Civil) and thereafter, Hony. Secretary of the Delhi Bar Association
and that the said individual holds great reverence for the principles of justice
and the Hon‟ble Judiciary.
10. It was further submitted that there is no provision laid down by this
Hon‟ble Court under the Delhi High Court Rules, which establishes the
prescribed manner for conducting Criminal Contempt Proceedings and in the
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
absence of such a Rule, the charges against the respondents are curtailed
under the offence of Contempt of Court. It is further submitted that the
respondent, in relation to the charge of criminal contempt, has the right to
cross-examine the witnesses, in order to establish his innocence and there
should have been a clear and explicit procedure which would have
explained/informed him about his rights prior to the commencement of the
present proceedings. However, neither the alleged Contemnor nor any other
individuals accused of contempt were informed about the procedural
framework that would govern the present proceedings.
11. It is further submitted that the purported occurrences of damage and
destruction of public property, as asserted by the then District Judge, did not
in fact occur as asseverated by the latter. Moreover, it is argued that the
statements of Judges are contradictory, lacking supporting sworn affidavits,
and reliant on unreliable testimonies and hearsay evidence. In certain
instances, these accounts even appear to be inconsistent with one another
because a newspaper article dated 25.02.2006 indicates that the incident was
instigated by outsiders and litigants, and the statements of the other Judges
and Court Staff recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C made reference to a „mob‟
rather than „advocates‟.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
12. It is further submitted that the alleged Contemnor consistently
endeavoured to lead the agitation, demonstration and protest in a peaceful and
respectful manner and that the alleged Contemnor urged the Members of the
Delhi Bar Association to engage in a peaceful protests, right from the
inception of the agitation and demonstrations, which is evident from various
notices, circulars, and appeals issued periodically. It is further asserted that the
alleged Contemnor was the foremost individual to condemn the incident of
24.02.2006, and the appeal made by the alleged Contemnor is annexed to the
reply of the Show Cause Notice dated 28.03.2006.
13. Mr. N. Hariharan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the
alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.3, Mr. Jaiveer Singh, submitted that the
initiation of the present proceedings against Mr. Jaiveer Singh is unwarranted,
as the material being alleged against him, which serves as the basis for these
proceedings, is already the subject matter of FIR No.74/2006 dated
24.02.2006 registered at Police Station Subzi Mandi.
14. Furthermore, it is contended that as per the provisions of Section 10 of
the said Act, there exists a specific prohibition on the High Court while taking
cognizance in relation to a Court subordinate to it, where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the IPC. Considering that the said penal action has
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
already been initiated against the said respondent, he cannot concurrently be
proceeded against, under the provisions of the said Act.
15. It is additionally submitted that the alleged Contemnor denies any
involvement in the alleged incidents that occurred between 02.01.2006 and
24.02.2006. Moreover, the alleged Contemnor has consistently supported and
assisted in the harmonious administration of justice. He has consistently
demonstrated due respect and reverence towards the judicial officers, and no
complaints have ever been raised against his conduct by any judicial officer.
16. The other alleged Contemnors/Respondents in unison submitted that
they have great respect for the judiciary and the judicial institution and that
the alleged Contemnors were not involved in the aforesaid incident. Their
submissions briefly encapsulated are as follows:-
Mr. A.K. Gupta, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No. 4, in
his reply dated 07.03.2006 has made a preliminary submission
stating that the present criminal contempt is not maintainable
and cannot be pursued simultaneously with the parallel
proceedings under FIR No.74/2006. The alleged Contemnor
has expressed an unconditional and unquantified apology
before this Court, emphasizing that he himself was a victim of
the disruptive mob. It is further submitted that the alleged
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
incident between the alleged Contemnor and Ruchir Gupta
occurred outside the Court premises after the presiding Judge
had retired to his Chambers. Furthermore, it is argued that the
alleged Contemnor was present before the Karkardooma Court
on 24.02.2006, and court orders supporting his claim are
placed on record.
Mr. Dharamvir, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No. 7,
submits that his name only appears in relation to the incident
that occurred on 01.02.2006 and not in connection with any
other incident. Furthermore, the alleged Contemnor
emphasizes that he does not appear in any of the videos
pertaining to the alleged incident. Additionally, it is stated that
on 24.02.2006, the alleged Contemnor was present before the
Deputy Registration Officer, Ganaur, Haryana for executing a
Sale Deed in his favour. It is further submitted that there is a
Political rivalry between Delhi Bar Association and Mr. S.P.
Sharma which led to Mr. S.P. Sharma lodging a report against
Delhi Bar Association Members, including the present alleged
Contemnor.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Mr. Inder Singh Saroha, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent
No.8, submitted that his name does not appear in the subject
FIR or in any of the reports submitted by the Judicial Officers
and also that he does not appear in any of the videos pertaining
to the alleged incident. Additionally, it is stated that he was not
present in Court at the time when the alleged incident occurred
on 01.02.2006 and his name is conspicuous by its absence in
the allegations pertaining to the incident that took place on
24.02.2006. It is submitted that the case of the Respondent is
similar to that of Raj Singh and Rajender Singh Rana and the
proceedings against them have already been dropped by this
Court vide order dated 27.07.2006. The respondent submits
that there exists a political animosity between him and Mr. S.P.
Sharma and after an investigation into the complaint filed by
Mr. S.P. Sharma, the Police have not found any substance
against the alleged Contemnor.
Mr. Sudhir Kumar Singh, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent
No.9 submitted that there is no specific allegation made against
him in the report authored by the then District Judge.
Furthermore, he argued that on 01.02.2006, he was present in
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Manipur and on 24.02.2006, he was in Bhagalpur attending the
proceedings at the Bhagalpur District Court. Additionally, it
was asserted that Mr. S.P. Sharma, the former General
Secretary of the Rohini Court Bar Association, is the alleged
Contemnor‟s political rival.
Mr. Sunil Shehrawat, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.
12, submitted that the report prepared by the then District
Judge does not ascribe any role to him. It is asserted that the
respondent‟s presence in the video is only momentary and that
his name does not appear in the chargesheet. The respondent
claims that he had visited the Court to seek information
regarding a personal case, and to support this assertion, the
order dated 06.01.2006 and the Vakalatnama executed for the
same have been placed on record on his behalf.
Mr. Vikas Arya, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.17,
put forth an argument stating that he was not present on
24.02.2006, as he was in the Ghaziabad District attending a
meeting of a housing society, where he held the position of
Vice-President and the minutes of the abovementioned
meeting have been placed on record. Additionally, it is
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
contended that there is no visual evidence of the alleged
Contemnor's presence, and none of the statements made by
Advocates, Court Staff, or the Hon'ble Judges attribute any
wrongdoing to the alleged Contemnor. It is further submitted
that the alleged Contemnor's responsibilities, in his capacity as
the Treasurer of the Delhi Bar Association, were limited to
maintaining accounts and did not involve field work or
participating in any form of protest or agitation.
Mr. G.S. Sandhu, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent No.21
categorically denies any involvement in the incidents that had
occurred between 02.01.2006 and 24.02.2006. It is asserted
that there exists no substantive evidence on record to implicate
him, apart from the chargesheet filed in the subject FIR.
Furthermore, it is contended that the alleged Contemnor is
neither visible in any of the videos nor the photographs of the
alleged incident. The submission put forth is that the
respondent was preoccupied with the treatment of his ailing
father, who was suffering from mass lesions and had taken him
to one Dr. S.K. Agarwal for treatment. It is argued that the role
ascribed to him is para materia to Dalip Rana, Jitender Kumar
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
and Nitin Ahlawat, who have since been discharged from the
present contempt proceedings.
Mr. Anil Kumar Chauhan, the alleged Contemnor/Respondent
No.22 submits that he was not present in the Tis Hazari Court
Complex on 24.02.2006 and that he had taken his wife to the
doctor. It is further submitted that the alleged Contemnor was
not named by any Judicial Officer, Court Staff or Advocate.
The alleged Contemnor was solely implicated by constables
Umesh Kumar and Vijender in their statements recorded under
Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., which the Contemnor alleges to be
false and fabricated.
Mr. Madan Lal Gupta, the alleged Contemnor/respondent No.
24, submits, that the protest was peaceful and the alleged
Contemnor did not engaged in any acts of vandalism or
disturbance. Furthermore, after the convening of the General
Body meeting of the Delhi Bar Association on 24.02.2006, the
alleged Contemnor had left from Tis Hazari Court due to the ill
health of his father.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
17. We have had the benefit of hearing Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned
Amicus Curiae, as well as learned counsel appearing on behalf of the alleged
Contemnors at length and having perused the material on record. We have
also analysed the video recordings and photographs with regard to the alleged
incident, duly produced before us.
18. Legal practitioners are the vanguard safeguarding the sanctity of the
Constitution of India and more than anyone else; necessitate protection in the
capacity of whistleblowers within the Court. Contempt of Court serves to
shield the institution and prevent unwarranted interference in the
administration of justice. Diluting the dignity of the institution or undermining
the authority vested in the judiciary constitutes a crucial aspect and such
actions surpass the limits of legitimate criticism of a judicial decision and
venture into an entirely different realm. While permissible criticism of a
judgment is acceptable, there exists a boundary beyond when it transforms
into abusive, irrational, and personally targeted attacks on Judges; thereby
compromising the overall integrity of the institution. Lord Denning, the
former Master of Rolls in Britain, expressed his stance on the law of contempt
in 1968, stating:..."Let me say at once that we will never use this jurisdiction
as a means to uphold our own dignity nor we will use it to suppress those who
speak against us. We do not fear criticism, nor do we resent it. For there is
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
something far more important at stake. It is no less than freedom of speech
itself."
19. In the present day, it is acknowledged that the roots of Contempt of
Courts in India can be traced back to English law; however, India has
developed this concept independently and has a historical connection to it. In
England, the Supreme Courts of Record have long possessed the authority to
penalize those who scandalize the Courts or Judges. This authority was
initially recognized by the judicial committee of the Privy Council, which
stated that the offense of Contempt of Court and the powers of the Indian
High Courts to punish it are equivalent to those of the Supreme Court in
England. The first Indian legislation on the law of contempt, known as the
Contempt of Courts Act, was enacted in 1926. Subsequently, the Contempt of
Courts Act of 1971 came into force on 24.12.1971, with the aim of defining
and restricting the powers of certain Courts in punishing under the provisions
of Contempt of Court, as well as regulating the associated procedures. This
implies that, the jurisdiction of the Courts, in matters of contempt, serves the
purpose of upholding the dignity of the existing judicial system. The relevant
sections of the said Act are extracted herein below for the sake of facility:-
"Section 2. Definitions.--In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,--
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
(a) "contempt of court" means civil contempt or criminal
contempt;
(b) "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful
breach of an undertaking given to a court;
(c) "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether by
words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any
other act whatsoever which--
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower
the authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due
course of any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to
obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner;
(d) "High Court" means the High Court for a State or a Union
territory, and includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in
any Union territory."
"Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempt of
subordinate courts.- Every High Court shall have and exercise
the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with
the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of courts
subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of contempt of
itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt
alleged to have been committed in respect of a court subordinate
to it where such contempt is an offence punishable under the
Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860)."
Section 15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.
--
(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt
referred to in section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court
may take action on its own motion or on a motion made by--
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b)any other person, with the consent in writing to the Advocate-
General, or
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi,
such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any
other person, with the consent in writing of such Law Officer.
(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate
court, the High Court may take action on a reference made to it
by the subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate-
General or, in relation to a Union territory, by such Law Officer
as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall
specify the contempt of which the person charged is alleged to
be guilty."
Section 23. Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to
make rules.--
The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court, may
make rules, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act,
providing for any matter relating to its procedure."
20. The definition of contempt is specified in Section 2 (a) of the said Act,
which states that "Contempt of Court" refers to either civil contempt or
criminal contempt. "Civil Contempt" as per Section 2 (b), pertains to the
intentional refusal to comply with any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ,
or other legal process of a Court, or the intentional violation of an undertaking
given to the Court. On the other hand, "criminal contempt" defined under
Section 2 (c), encompasses the publication (whether through spoken or written
words, signs, visible representation, or other means) of any matter or the
commission of any act that: scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or
tends to lower the authority of any Court; prejudices, interferes with, or tends
to interfere with the proper course of any judicial proceeding; or obstructs or
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
tends to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner.
Axiomatically, any intentional refusal to comply with a Court order to
perform or abstain from performing an act is regarded as civil contempt. Civil
contempt arises when the Court‟s authority is invoked or exercised to ensure
compliance with its orders.
21. Conversely, criminal contempt is of a criminal nature. It encompasses
acts such as wilful disobedience to Judges in Court, disrespectful behaviour
towards Judges in open Court, defamation of Judges or Courts, interference
with the judicial process, or any act that has the potential to prejudice the
course of justice. A person is found guilty of criminal contempt when their
conduct tends to bring disrespect to the authority and administration of the
law or interferes with or prejudices litigants during the legal proceedings.
22. A bare perusal of Section 10 of the said Act specifically empowers the
High Courts to punish the acts of contempt in the Subordinate Courts, subject
to the proviso thereto. Similarly, Section 15(2) says even in the case of
criminal contempt of Subordinate Court, proceedings for contempt are to be
initiated by the High Court on a reference made to it by the Subordinate Court
or on a motion made by the Advocate-General (or Law officer in cases of
Union Territory). As emphasized earlier, this Court, took suo motu cognizance
of the alleged matter, upon receiving numerous complaints from legal
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
practitioners and a report dated 24.02.2006 authored by the then District &
Sessions Judge.
23. With regard to the procedural aspects concerning the cases falling
within the ambit of criminal contempt, we find ourselves in agreement with
the submissions made by the learned Amicus curiae, that the proceedings in
criminal contempt possess a distinctive nature and are not subject to strict
compliance with the Cr.P.C. and the Evidence Act. A proceeding under the
said Act primarily adheres to the principles of natural justice, thereby
allowing the Courts to establish its own procedure, provided that such
procedure remains equitable and unbiased towards all concerned parties. This
principle has also been validated by the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of
Sahdeo Vs State of U.P. and Ors. reported as 2010 (3) SCC 705. The
relevant and germane exposition of the law is extracted herein below for the
sake of facility:-
"17. The Constitution Bench of this Court in State of
Bihar v. Sonabati Kumari [AIR 1961 SC 221] , held that the
provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short "the 1971
Act") deal with the wilful defiance of the order passed by the
court. Order of punishment be not passed if the court is
satisfied that the party was, in fact, under a misapprehension
as to the scope of the order or there was an unintentional
wrong for the reason that the order was ambiguous and
reasonably capable of more than one interpretation or the
party never intended to disobey the order but conducted
himself in accordance with the interpretation of the order.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
18. In Sukhdev Singh v. Teja Singh [AIR 1954 SC 186 : 1954 Cri
LJ 460] this Court placing reliance upon the judgment of the
Privy Council in Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. Attorney
General of Trinidad and Tabago [AIR 1936 PC 141] , held
that the proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act are
quasi-criminal in nature and orders passed in those
proceedings are to be treated as orders passed in criminal
cases.
19. In S. Abdul Karim v. M.K. Prakash [(1976) 1 SCC 975 :
1976 SCC (Cri) 217 : AIR 1976 SC 859] , Chhotu
Ram v. Urvashi Gulati [(2001) 7 SCC 530 : 2001 SCC (L&S)
1196] , Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh [(2002) 4 SCC 21 :
AIR 2002 SC 1405] , Daroga Singh v. B.K. Pandey [(2004) 5
SCC 26 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1521] and All India Anna Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam v. L.K. Tripathi [(2009) 5 SCC 417 :
(2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 673 : AIR 2009 SC 1314] , this Court held
that burden and standard of proof in contempt proceedings,
being quasi-criminal in nature, is the standard of proof
required in criminal proceedings, for the reason that
contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature.
20. Similarly, in Mrityunjoy Das v. Sayed Hasibur
Rahaman [(2001) 3 SCC 739 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 296 : AIR
2001 SC 1293] this Court placing reliance upon a large
number of its earlier judgments, including V.G.
Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta [(1992) 4 SCC 697 : 1993 SCC
(L&S) 202 : (1993) 23 ATC 400 : AIR 1992 SC 2153]
and Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kumar Newatia [(2000) 2 SCC 367 :
2000 SCC (Cri) 473 : AIR 2000 SC 833] , held that jurisdiction
of contempt has been conferred on the Court to punish an
offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the
majesty of law, but in the case of quasi-criminal in nature,
charges have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and the
alleged contemnor becomes entitled to the benefit of doubt. It
would be very hazardous to impose sentence in contempt
proceedings on some probabilities
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
24. In R.K. Anand v. Delhi High Court [(2009) 8 SCC 106] this
Court while dealing with the same issue held as under : (SCC
p. 157, paras 140-41)
"140. ... Now, it is one thing to say that
the standard [Ed. : The words "standard" and
"manner" have been emphasised in original.] of proof
in a contempt proceeding is no less rigorous than a
criminal trial but it is something entirely different to
insist that the manner [Ed. : The words "standard"
and "manner" have been emphasised in original.] of
proof for the two proceedings must also be the same.
141. It is now well settled and so also the High
Court has held that the proceeding of contempt of
court is sui generis. In other words, it is not strictly
controlled by the provisions of CrPC and the
Evidence Act. What, however, applies to a proceeding
of contempt of court are the principles of natural
justice and those principles apply to the contempt
proceeding with greater rigour than any other
proceeding. This means that the court must follow a
procedure that is fair and objective; that should
cause no prejudice to the person facing the charge
of contempt of court and that should allow him/her
the fullest opportunity to defend himself/herself."
(emphasis added)
25. This Court in Vinay Chandra Mishra, In re [(1995) 2 SCC
584] has observed that a contempt amounts to an offence but
it is an offence sui generis and hence for such an offence, the
procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute
law has always been summary. The Court held that in spite of
the fact that it is a summary procedure, there must be an
opportunity to the alleged contemnor of meeting the charge.
The degree of precision with which the charge may be stated
depends upon the circumstances. So long as the gist of the
specific allegation is made clear or otherwise the contemnor is
aware of the specific allegation, it is not always necessary to
formulate the charge. So long as the contemnor's interest is
adequately safeguarded by giving him an opportunity of
being heard in his defence, even summary procedure in the
case of contempt cannot be found fault with.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
26. In Daroga Singh [(2004) 5 SCC 26 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1521]
this Court observed that in case the alleged contemnor feels
that there is a necessity to cross-examine the witnesses i.e. the
deponents of affidavits filed against him, the alleged
contemnor must be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
said witnesses provided it is so asked by him. This Court
observed that in contempt proceedings, a summary
procedure is to be adopted for the reason that the matter is to
be disposed of most expeditiously and it is for this reason that
in spite of the fact that proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, the procedure under CrPC or the Evidence Act is not
made applicable.
27. In view of the above, the law can be summarised that the
High Court has a power to initiate the contempt proceedings
suo motu for ensuring the compliance with the orders passed
by the Court. However, contempt proceedings being quasi-
criminal in nature, the same standard of proof is required in
the same manner as in other criminal cases. The alleged
contemnor is entitled to the protection of all
safeguards/rights which are provided in the criminal
jurisprudence, including the benefit of doubt. There must be a
clear-cut case of obstruction of administration of justice by a
party intentionally to bring the matter within the ambit of the
said provision. The alleged contemnor is to be informed as to
what is the charge, he has to meet. Thus, specific charge has to
be framed in precision. The alleged contemnor may ask the
Court to permit him to cross-examine the witnesses i.e. the
deponents of affidavits, who have deposed against him. In
spite of the fact that contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in
nature, provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(hereinafter called "CrPC") and the Evidence Act are not
attracted for the reason that proceedings have to be
concluded expeditiously. Thus, the trial has to be concluded
as early as possible. The case should not rest only on
surmises and conjectures. There must be clear and reliable
evidence to substantiate the allegations against the alleged
contemnor. The proceedings must be concluded giving strict
adherence to the statutory rules framed for the purpose."
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
24. The alleged Contemnors/Respondents have raised a common objection
qua the suo motu cognizance taken by this Court with respect to the alleged
incident, asserting that simultaneous criminal prosecution under provisions of
the IPC in FIR No.74/2006, dated 24.02.2006, registered at Police Station
Subzi Mandi, and the present proceedings under the said Act, are
unsustainable in light of the exception outlined in Section 10 of the said Act.
According to this provision, no High Court shall take cognizance of a
contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a Court subordinate to
it, if such contempt constitutes an offense punishable under the IPC.
25. At this outset, it is essential to highlight that the learned Amicus Curiae
has pointed out that the proceedings under the IPC are distinct from the
present contempt proceedings. Moreover, it has been urged that the
abovementioned FIR has been registered under Sections
147/149/186/353/332/427/120-B IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention
of Damage of Public Property Act, which pertains to offenses unrelated to
Contempt of Court. Consequently, this Court has appropriately exercised its
jurisdiction in initiating suo motu cognizance of the alleged incident, as these
offenses fall outside the realm of Contempt of Court.
26. It is of utmost relevance to highlight that the jurisdiction of the High
Court to acknowledge and address matters pertaining to its Subordinate Court,
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
as well as its authority to penalize for acts of contempt, is derived from Article
215 of the Constitution of India, which is hereby reproduced verbatim for
reference:
"Article 215. High Courts to be courts of record Every High
Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of
itself."
27. The Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra
Misra reported as (1981) 1 SCC 436, after due consideration of the provisions
of Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India, concerning the
jurisdiction of the High Court to take action against Contempt of Court, has
observed as follows: -
"14. Article 215 of the Constitution provides: "Every High
Court shall be a Court of record and shall have all the
powers of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself." Entry 14 of List III of the Seventh Schedule
is to this effect: "Contempt of court, but not including
contempt of the Supreme Court." A provision analogous to
Article 215 is Article 129 which preserves to the Supreme Court
all the powers of a Court of record including the power to punish
for contempt of itself. Entry 77 of List I of the Seventh Schedule
is relatable to Article 129.
15. Articles 129 and 215 preserve all the powers of the
Supreme Court and the High Court, respectively, as a Court
of record which include the power to punish the contempt of
itself. As pointed out by this Court in Mohd. Ikram
Hussain v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 1625 : (1964) 5 SCR 86 :
(1964) 2 Cri LJ 590] there are no curbs on the power of the
High Court to punish for contempt of itself except those
contained in the Contempt of Courts Act. Articles 129 and
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
215 do not define as to what constitutes contempt of court.
Parliament has, by virtue of the aforesaid entries in List I and
List III of the Seventh Schedule, power to define and limit the
powers of the courts in punishing contempt of court and to
regulate their procedure in relation thereto. Indeed, this is what is
stated in the preamble of the Act of 1971.
16. Section 2(c) of the Act defines "criminal contempt".
Section 9 emphasises that "nothing contained in this Act
shall be construed as implying that any disobedience, breach,
publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court
which would not be so punishable apart from this Act".
Section 10 runs as under:
"Every High Court shall have and exercise the same
jurisdiction, powers and authority, in accordance with the
same procedure and practice, in respect of contempts of
courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of
contempts of itself:"
Then, there is a proviso which is not material for our
purpose. The provision in Section 10 is but a replica of
Section 3 of the 1952 Act. The phrase "courts subordinate to
it" used in Section 10 is wide enough to include all courts
which are judicially subordinate to the High Court, even
though administrative control over them under Article 235 of the
Constitution does not vest in the High Court. Under Article 227
of the Constitution the High Court has the power of
superintendence over all courts and tribunals throughout the
territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. The Court
of Revenue Board, therefore, in the instant case, is a court "sub-
ordinate to the High Court" within the contemplation of Section
10 of the Act.
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
18. A comparison between the two sub-sections would show that
whereas in Sub-section (1) one of the three alternative modes
for taking cognizance, mentioned is "on its own motion", no
such mode is expressly provided in Sub-section (2). The only
two modes of taking cognizance by the High Court mentioned in
Sub-section (2) are : (i) on a reference made to it by a
subordinate court; or (ii) on a motion made by the Advocate-
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
General, or in relation to a Union Territory by the notified Law
Officer. Does the omission in Section 15(2) of the mode of
taking suo motu cognizance indicate a legislative intention to
debar the High Court from taking cognizance in that mode
of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court? If this
question is answered in the affirmative, then, such a
construction of Sub-section (2) will be inconsistent with
Section 10 which makes the powers of the High Court to
punish for contempt of a subordinate court, coextensive and
congruent with its power to punish for its own contempt, not
only in regard to quantum or pre-requisites for punishment,
but also in the matter of procedure and practice. Such a
construction which will bring Section 15(2) in conflict with
Section 10, has to be avoided, and the other interpretation
which will be in harmony with Section 10 is to be accepted.
Harmoniously construed, Sub-section (2) of Section 15 does
not deprive the High Court of the power of taking cognizance
of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, on its own
motion, also. If the intention of the Legislature was to take away
the power of the High Court to take suo motu cognizance of such
contempt, there was no difficulty in saying so in unequivocal
language, or by wording the subsection in a negative form. We
have, therefore, no hesitation in holding in agreement with
the High Court, that Sub-section (2) of Section 15, properly
construed, does not restrict the power of the High Court to
take cognizance of and punish contempt of a subordinate
court, on its own motion.
19. It is, however, to be noted that Section 15 does not specify
the basis or the source of information on which the High
Court can act on its own motion. If the High Court acts on
information derived from its own sources, such as from a
perusal of the records of a subordinate court or on reading a
report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech, without
there being any reference from the subordinate court or the
Advocate-General, it can be said to have taken cognizance on
its own motion. But if the High Court is directly moved by a
petition by a private person feeling aggrieved, not being the
Advocate-General, can the High Court refuse to entertain the
same on the ground that it has been made without the consent in
writing of the Advocate-General? It appears to us that the High
Court has, in such a situation, a discretion to refuse to entertain
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
the petition, or to take cognizance on its own motion on the basis
of the information supplied to it in that petition. If the petitioner
is a responsible member of the legal profession, it may act
suo motu, more so, if the petitioner-advocate, as in the
instant case, prays that the court should act suo motu. The
whole object of prescribing these procedural modes of taking
cognizance in Section 15 is to safeguard the valuable time of
the High Court or the Supreme Court from being wasted by
frivolous complaints of contempt of court. If the High Court
is prima facie satisfied that the information received by it
regarding the commission of contempt of a subordinate court
is not frivolous, and the contempt alleged is not merely
technical or trivial, it may, in its discretion, act suo motu and
commence the proceedings against the contemnor. However,
this mode of taking suo motu cognizance of contempt of a
subordinate court, should be resorted to sparingly where the
contempt concerned is of a grave and serious nature. Frequent
use of this suo motu power on the information furnished by an
incompetent petition, may render these procedural safeguards
provided in Subsection (2), otiose. In such cases, the High Court
may be well advised to avail of the advice and assistance of the
Advocate-General before initiating proceedings. The advice and
opinion, in this connection, expressed by the Sanyal Committee
is a pertinent reminder.
"In the case of criminal contempt, not being contempt
committed in the face of the court, we are of the opinion
that it would lighten the burden of the court, without in any
way interfering with the sanctity of the administration of
justice, if action is taken on a motion by some other
agency. Such a course of action would give considerable
assurance to the individual charged and the public at large.
Indeed, some High Courts have already made rules for the
association of the Advocate-General in some categories of
cases at least...the Advocate-General may, also, move the
Court not only on his own motion but also at the instance
of the court concerned.....
20. In the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, we do not
think that the High Court has acted improperly or illegally in
taking suo motu cognizance, on the petition of the respondent
advocate."
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
28. Further the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Daroga
Singh v. BK Pandey reported as (2004) 5 SCC 26 stated that, the proviso to
Section 10 of the Act excludes the jurisdiction of High Court only in cases
where the acts alleged to constitute contempt of a Subordinate Court are
punishable as contempt under the specific provisions of IPC, but not where
these acts merely amount to offences of other description for which
punishment has been provided for in the IPC. The relevant portion of the
judgment is extracted herein below for the sake of facility:-
"18. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants in different
appeals, apart from the merits in individual appeals, which
we shall deal with later, have raised some common points
challenging the correctness of the impugned judgment. The
same are:
(i) the alleged contempt is that of a court subordinate to
the High Court and the allegations made constitute an
offence under Section 228 IPC, and therefore the
jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of
such a case is expressly barred under the proviso to
Section 10 of the Act;
(ii) that the High Court cannot take suo motu notice of
the contempt of a court subordinate to it. The procedure
given in the High Court Rules and orders for initiation of
proceedings for contempt of a subordinate court having not
been followed, the entire proceedings are vitiated and liable
to be quashed;
(iii) the standard of proof required in the criminal
contempt is the same as in a criminal charge and
therefore the charge of criminal contempt has to be
proved by holding a trial as in a criminal case. The
appellants could not be convicted on the basis of
evidence by way of affidavits only. The witnesses should
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
have been examined in court and in any case the
appellants should have been given an opportunity to cross-
examine the persons who had deposed against them on
affidavits to verify the version of the incident as according
to them there were conflicting versions of the incident;
(iv) reasonable and adequate opportunity was not afforded
to the appellants either to defend themselves or put forward
their case; and
(v) affidavits of independent witnesses which were on
record have not been dealt with by the High Court.
19. Answer to the first point would depend upon the
interpretation to be put on Section 10 of the Act. Section 10
which deals with the power of the High Court to punish for
the contempt of subordinate courts reads:
"10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of
subordinate courts.--Every High Court shall have and
exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority, in
accordance with the same procedure and practice, in
respect of contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and
exercises in respect of contempts of itself:
Provided that no High Court shall take cognisance of a
contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
court subordinate to it where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the Penal Code, 1860."
20. According to the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, the proviso to Section 10 means that if the act by
which a party is alleged to have committed contempt of a
subordinate court constitutes offence of any description
whatsoever punishable under the Penal Code, 1860, the High
Court is precluded from taking cognisance of it. According to
them, in the present case the allegations made amount to an
offence under Section 228 of the Penal Code, 1860 and
consequently the jurisdiction of the High Court is barred.
21. We do not find any force in this submission. The point
raised is concluded against the appellants by a judgment of
the Constitution Bench of this Court in Bathina Ramakrishna
Reddy v. State of Madras [(1952) 1 SCC 154 : AIR 1952 SC
149 : 1952 SCR 425 : 1952 Cri LJ 832] . In that case, sub-
section (3) of Section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
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which is similar to the proviso to Section 10 of the Act was
under consideration. Section 2(3) of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1926 provided that no High Court shall take cognisance
of a contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
court subordinate to it where such contempt is an offence
punishable under the Penal Code, 1860. Interpreting this
section, it was held that sub-section (3) excluded the
jurisdiction of the High Court to take cognisance of a
contempt alleged to have been committed in respect of a
court subordinate to it only in cases where the acts alleged to
constitute contempt are punishable as contempt under
specific provisions of the Penal Code, 1860, but not where
these acts merely amount to offences of other description for
which punishment has been provided in the Penal Code,
1860.
22. This judgment was analysed and followed by a Bench of
three Judges of this Court in State of
M.P. v. Revashankar [AIR 1959 SC 102 : 1959 SCR 1367 :
1959 Cri LJ 251] . ............
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
23. These two judgments have been followed recently in Arun
Paswan, SI v. State of Bihar [(2003) 10 Scale 658 : (2004) 5
SCC 53] .........
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
28. The second contention raised on behalf of the appellants is
that the High Court cannot on its own motion take action for
criminal contempt of a subordinate court. According to the
learned counsel, the High Court can take cognisance of a
criminal contempt under Section 15(2) of the Act of a
subordinate court only on a reference made to it by the
subordinate court or on a motion made by the Advocate General.
Since the procedure as laid down in the High Court Rules and
orders had not been followed the very initiation of proceedings
for contempt was vitiated and therefore liable to be quashed. We
do not find any force in this submission as well. This point
also stands concluded against the appellants by a decision of
this Court in S.K. Sarkar v. Vinay Chandra Misra [(1981) 1
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
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SCC 436 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 175] . In this case an advocate filed
a petition before the High Court under the Contempt of Courts
Act alleging that the appellant therein as a member of the
Revenue Board made certain contemptuous remarks viz.
"nalayak gadhe saale ko jail bhijwa dunga; kis idiot ne advocate
bana diya hai" and acted in a manner which amounted to
criminal contempt of the Court of Revenue Board, in which he
(the advocate) was the counsel for one of the parties. The
advocate requested the High Court to take suo motu action
under the Contempt of Courts Act against the member of the
Revenue Board or pass such orders as it deemed fit. The
question for determination was whether the High Court was
competent to take cognisance of contempt of a subordinate
court when it was moved by a private petitioner and not in
accordance with either of the two motions mentioned in
Section 15(2). Analysing Section 15(2) of the Act and reading
it in harmony with Section 10 of the Act it was held: (SCC
pp. 441-43, paras 16-18)..........
xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx
29. We respectfully agree with the view taken in this
judgment and hold that the High Court could initiate
proceedings on its own motion under the Contempt of Courts
Act against the appellants. On the facts of this case apart from
the report sent by the Vth Additional District and Sessions Judge
of the incident, Young Lawyers' Association had also filed a writ
petition. The Presidents of the three Bar Associations and the
Advocate General were present and heard before initiating
the proceedings for criminal contempt. It has been noted by
the High Court that "all the three Presidents of the High Court
Associations and the Advocate General arrived at the conclusion
that a prima facie case of criminal contempt was made out
against the contemners". This shows that the Advocate
General of the State was also of the opinion that prima facie
a case for initiation of proceedings for criminal contempt was
made out and he was a consenting party to the initiation of
the proceedings."
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
29. Further, in the matter of Re: Vijay Kurle & Ors. reported as 2020 SCC
Online SC 407, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India had observed that it is
indeed permissible for any citizen of the nation to express criticism towards
judgments pronounced by any Court, including this Court. Nevertheless, it is
impermissible for any party to impute motives to a Judge, question the
integrity of the Judge, or cast doubts upon the Judge's competence. Judges
form an integral part of the mechanism for dispensing justice and Judges
exhibit reluctance to invoke contempt laws in instances of personal attacks
directed at them. However, if there is a concerted assault by Members of the
Bar, who claim affiliation with an organization that enjoys substantial support,
then the Court cannot turn a blind-eye to the slanderous and scandalous
allegations put forth.
30. At this juncture it is considered relevant to point out that recently in the
judgment of Prashant Bhushan, In re (Contempt Matter), reported as
(2021) 1 SCC 745, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India observed that in
instances of suo motu cognizance, seeking consent from any party, including
the learned Attorney General, is not a prerequisite and observed the same in
particular paragraph 18 thereof, which is extracted hereinbelow for the sake of
facility:-
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
"18. From the perusal of various judgments of this Court,
including those of the Constitution Benches, it could be seen,
that the source of power of this Court for proceeding for an
action of contempt is under Article 129. It has further been
held, that power of this Court to initiate contempt is not in
any manner limited by the provisions of the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971. It has been held, that the Court is vested
with the constitutional powers to deal with the contempt and
Section 15 is not the source of the power to issue notice for
contempt. It only provides the procedure in which such
contempt is to be initiated. It has been held, that insofar as
suo motu petitions are concerned, the Court can very well
initiate the proceedings suo motu on the basis of information
received by it. The only requirement is that the procedure as
prescribed in the judgment of P.N. Duda [P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv
Shanker, (1988) 3 SCC 167 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 589] has to be
followed. In the present case, the same has undoubtedly been
followed. It is also equally settled, that as far as the suo motu
petitions are concerned, there is no requirement for taking
consent of anybody, including the learned Attorney General
because the Court is exercising its inherent powers to issue
notice for contempt. It is equally well settled, that once the
Court takes cognizance, the matter is purely between the
Court and the contemnor. The only requirement is that, the
procedure followed is required to be just and fair and in
accordance with the principles of natural justice. In the
present case, the notice issued to the alleged contemnors clearly
mentions the tweets on the basis of which the Court is
proceeding suo motu. The alleged Contemnor 1 has also clearly
understood the basis on which the Court is proceeding against
him as is evident from the elaborate affidavit-in-reply filed by
him."
31. On a conspectus of the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of
India extracted hereinabove and on a conjoint and harmonious interpretation
of the provisions of the said Act, considered in the backdrop of the facts
antecedent and attendant hereinbefore, we are axiomatically of the considered
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
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view that this Court had appropriately exercised its suo motu jurisdiction with
respect to the occurrence of the purported incident that transpired in the
District Courts of Delhi.
32. At the outset, it is pertinent to emphasize that, since the present
proceedings are initiated against advocates, there is an additional requirement
for stringent proof that this Court must fulfil. While addressing the facts and
incidents of the present criminal contempt proceeding, and particularly
considering the evidence produced before this Court, we have meticulously
examined the reports submitted by Mr. S.N. Dhingra (the then District &
Session Judge), complaints lodged by various other Judges of the District
Court, their Court Staff, Advocates, Media Personnel, as well as the
statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., in conjunction with the
Charge-Sheet dated 25.02.2006. Furthermore, we have duly considered the
video CDs, Circulars, and press releases, including the press release issued by
the Delhi Bar Association and the comprehensive Lockout Circulars issued by
the Delhi Bar Association. This Court has exercised prudence in incorporating
all the aforementioned evidence and has appraised the same in accordance
with the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in its
catena of judgments.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
33. In the present criminal contempt proceedings, this Court has received
multiple reports of advocates staging protests at Tis Hazari Courts and Rohini
Courts. Further, the arguments put forth by the learned Amicus Curiae find
resonance with the fact that District Judges have recorded in their judicial
orders that the alleged Contemnors and other Advocates have disrupted
proceedings, including manhandling fellow advocates. It is well-established in
law that a judicial order is a public document, and its authenticity is presumed,
consequent thereto we have also examined the video footage purportedly
capturing the alleged incident. A careful perusal of the video footage affirms
that there is no evidence linking the damage caused to the court rooms with
the protest by the Advocates/alleged Contemnors. Moreover, these actions
cannot be directly attributed to the alleged Contemnors. Consequently, the
material including the subject videos fail to provide any direct evidence
connecting the damage allegedly caused to court rooms with the Advocates'
protest. Furthermore, the videos do not furnish any evidence of Advocates
manhandling their colleagues, obstructing the Administration of Justice, or
supporting any other allegations made against the alleged Contemnors in the
present proceedings. Hence, there exists no substantial evidence to establish
obstruction of justice, acts of manhandling, or destruction of property.
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
Therefore, it cannot be conclusively established that the act of protesting
interfered with the administration of justice.
34. Further it is relevant to highlight that the present contempt proceedings
are pending adjudication since 2006; and the Sword of Damocles‟ has been
hanging for the past 17 years, on the alleged Contemnor/Respondents.
Additionally, during the course of the present proceedings all the alleged
Contemnors/Respondents have also expressed their deep remorse and have
stated that they have utmost respect for the institution of judiciary and that it
was never their intention to cause any distress or to do anything that could be
construed as undermining the majesty and dignity of the Court of Law.
35. Before we part with the order, we express our deepest gratitude to Mr.
Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Advocate, for having rendered his invaluable
assistance as the Amicus Curiae before this Court in the present criminal
contempt proceedings.
36. Hence, in view of the foregoing discussion and having accorded our
thoughtful consideration to the facts and circumstances, antecedent and
attendant, as elaborated hereinbefore, we discharge the Show Cause Notices
issued to the remaining alleged Contemnors/Respondents in the present
criminal contempt proceedings. Resultantly, the notice to show cause as to
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
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By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
why criminal contempt be not drawn against the alleged
Contemnors/Respondents, are hereby discharged.
37. No further directions are called for. Both the criminal contempt
proceedings are disposed of accordingly. Pending applications, if any, also
stands disposed of.
38. A copy of this Judgment be uploaded on the website of this Court
forthwith.
SIDDHARTH MRIDUL
(JUDGE)
RAJNISH BHATNAGAR
(JUDGE)
ANOOP KUMAR MENDIRATTA
(JUDGE)
JULY 28, 2023
dn/ac/da*
CONT. CAS. (CRL) 2/2006 & CONT.CAS.(CRL) 8/2006
Digitally Signed
By:DURGESH NANDAN
Signing Date:28.07.2023
15:48:19
