Delhi High Court
Randhir Singh vs Lt. Governor Of Delhi on 2 September, 2022
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Pronounced on: 2nd September, 2022
+ W.P.(CRL) 985/2021 & CRL.M.A. 7347/2021 (stay)
RANDHIR SINGH ..... Petitioner
Represented by: Mr. Mir Akhtar Hussain, Adv.
versus
LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS. ..... Respondent
Represented by: Ms. Kamna Vohra, ASC for State.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
1. By this petition the petitioner challenges the orders passed by the Lt.
Governor of Delhi and the Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police
whereby vide order dated 23rd March, 2021 the petitioner was directed to
remove himself beyond the limits of NCT of Delhi for a period of one year
with effect from 30th March, 2021 and during the period of externment
period was directed not to enter or return to the limits of NCT of Delhi
without prior permission except for attending the Court hearings on all
dates, which order of the Additional DCP West District was upheld by the
Lt. Governor vide the impugned order dated 19th April, 2021.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that at the time of
issuance of the show cause notice by the Additional Deputy Commissioner
of Police only one case was registered against the petitioner in the last three
years preceding the show cause notice dated 25th July, 2019 and hence the
finding of the two adjudicating authorities that the petitioner was a habitual
offender is contrary to the explanation to Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act
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(in short DP Act). As regards 26 involvements of the petitioner the same
were from 1993 to 2007 whereafter the petitioner was involved in only three
cases of Excise Act out of which in two he has been acquitted and one case
of 2016 was pending trial besides the case of 2019 which was also pending
trial. The petitioner having been acquitted in these cases, the same could not
have been taken into consideration.
3. Before the Lt. Governor the petitioner raised 8 grounds and none of
the said grounds were considered by the Appellate Authority. The Appellate
Authority held that the petitioner was involved in 28 cases which is an error
apparent on record as the said cases were too remote in time and out of them
the petitioner had been acquitted in 7 cases. Thus, at the time of issuance of
the notice only one case under Section 33/38 Delhi Excise Act was pending
prior and one case was under investigation and hence it cannot be said that
the criminal activities of the petitioner were a great menace and that he was
so desperate and dangerous as to render his being large in NCT of Delhi or
hazardous to the community; contrary to the law laid down by the Division
Bench of this Court in the decision reported as 25 (1984) DLT 285 Ravi
Kumar Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Police, West District. The cases in
which the petitioner has been acquitted have also been utilized for passing
the externment order. While deciding an appeal under Section 51 of the DP
Act, Rule 25(2) of the Delhi Police Punishment and Appeal Rule was
required to be followed, which has not been followed. The Externing
Authority and the Appellate Authority both have taken into consideration
even cases under the Gambling Act and breach of peace under Section
107/150 Cr.P.C. contrary to the law. It is contended that the Appellate
Authority is required to pass a reasoned order in the absence whereof the
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right granted to the petitioner is illusionary. Reliance is placed on the
decision reported as AIR 1981 SC 613 Prem Chand Vs. Union of India &
Ors. and of this Court reported as 1986 (29) DLT 437 Mohd. Aslam Vs.
Delhi Administration & Ors.
4. Countering the above said arguments learned Additional Standing
Counsel for the State contends that the contention of the petitioner that he
was not given sufficient opportunity to defend is incorrect for the reason
show cause notice under Section 50 of the DP Act was issued to the
petitioner on 25th July, 2019 whereafter the petitioner appeared on 3 rd
September, 2019 and the final order was passed on 23rd March, 2021. All
these grounds were urged before the Lt. Governor also who considered the
same and passed a reasoned order. Section 52 of the Delhi Police Act
attaches finality to the order passed by the Externing Authority and the
Appellate Authority, hence the scope of interference by judicial review in a
writ petition is very limited, the same being that the Additional DCP and the
Lt. Governor did not follow the procedure as prescribed under Section 50
and 51 of the DP Act. Reliance is placed on sub-Section (b) of Section 52of
the DP Act. There is nothing on record to show that the procedure as
envisaged under Section 50 and 51 of the DP Act was not followed. On
merits it is stated that the contention of the petitioner that the grounds raised
by the petitioner were not considered by the Lt. Governor is incorrect. Both
the Additional DCP and the Lt. Governor have passed reasoned orders.
Reliance is placed on the decisions reported in W.P.(CRL) 583 & 641 of
1997 Surjeet Singh Vs. State & Ors. decided on 16th March, 1998; 2017
(166) DRJ 50 Avinash Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.; (1973) 1 SCC 372
Pandharinath Shridhar Rangnekar Vs. Dy. Commissioner of Police, State of
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Maharashtra; (2006) 5 SCC 228 Governor, NCT & Ors. Vs. Ved Prakash
and (2005) 5 SCC 181 State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Sanjeev.
5. Section 52 of the Delhi Police Act provides as under:
"52. Finality of order in certain cases.- An order passed by
the Commissioner of Police under section 46, section 47 or
section 48 or the Administrator under section 51 shall not be
called in question in any court except on the ground-
(a) that the Commissioner of Police or the Administrator, as
the case may be, had not followed the procedure laid down in
sub- section (1), sub- section (2) or sub- section (4) of section
50 or in section 51, as the case may be; or
(b) that there was no material before the Commissioner of
Police or the Administrator, as the case may be, upon which he
could have based his order; or
(c) in the case of an order made under section 47 or an
order in appeal therefrom to the Administrator under section
51, the Commissioner of Police or the Administrator, as the
case may be, was not of the opinion that witnesses were
unwilling to come forward to give evidence in public against the
person against whom such order has been made."
6. Section 52 DP Act thus provides that in case there is no material
before the Commissioner of Police or the Administrator to form an opinion
for externing a person, the Court would interfere in the same and as long as
there is material before the Commissioner of Police or the Administrator the
sufficiency of the same cannot be gone into by the Court. Hon'ble Supreme
Court in State of NCT of Delhi & Ors. Vs. Sanjeev dealing with the scope of
interference against an administrative order of externment in a writ petition
held as under:
"15. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope
for judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions.
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Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of
governmental activities in which the repositories of power may
exercise every class of statutory function of executive, quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise
of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside
if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the
exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary (see State of
U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. [(1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 SC
1737] ). At one time, the traditional view in England was that
the executive was not answerable where its action was
attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor de
Smith in his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative
Action, 4th Edn. at pp. 285-87 states the legal position in his
own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by
the courts may be broadly summarised as follows : The
authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to
exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular
manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the
authority to which it is committed. That authority must
genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act
under the dictates of another body or disable itself from
exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported
exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been
forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised
to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant
considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant
considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the
letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act,
and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several
principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories :
(i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of
discretionary power. The two classes are not, however,
mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered
because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account,
and where an authority hands over its discretion to another
body it acts ultra vires.
16. The present trend of judicial opinion is to restrict the
doctrine of immunity from judicial review to those classes of
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cases which relate to deployment of troupes, entering into
international treaties, etc. The distinctive features of some of
these recent cases signify the willingness of the courts to assert
their power to scrutinise the factual basis upon which
discretionary powers have been exercised. One can
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which
administrative action is subject to control by judicial review.
The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and
the third "procedural impropriety". These principles were
highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service
Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 :
1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] (commonly known
as CCSU case). If the power has been exercised on a non-
consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors,
the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous.
If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised
on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently
erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated.
(See CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. [(1983) 4 SCC 392 :
1983 SCC (Tax) 336 : AIR 1984 SC 1182] ) The effect of
several decisions on the question of jurisdiction has been
summed up by Grahame Aldous and John Alder in their
book Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice thus:
"There is a general presumption against ousting the
jurisdiction of the courts, so that statutory provisions
which purport to exclude judicial review are construed
restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of
governmental activity, national security being the
paradigm, which the courts regard themselves as
incompetent to investigate, beyond an initial decision as
to whether the government's claim is bona fide. In this
kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely
excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that
powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are inherently
unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of
Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for
the Civil Service [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 :
(1984) 3 WLR 1174 (HL)] this is doubtful. Lords Diplock,
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Scarman and Roskill appeared to agree that there is no
general distinction between powers, based upon whether
their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial
review can be limited by the subject-matter of a
particular power, in that case national security. Many
prerogative powers are in fact concerned with sensitive,
non-justiciable areas, for example, foreign affairs, but
some are reviewable in principle, including the
prerogatives relating to the civil service where national
security is not involved. Another non-justiciable power is
the Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether to
institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public
interest."
(Also see Padfield v. Minister of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food [1968 AC 997 : (1968) 1 All ER 694 :
(1968) 2 WLR 924 (HL)] .)
17. The court will be slow to interfere in such matters
relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by
any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality
and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of
the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that
regard would not be sufficient.
18. The famous case commonly known as "the Wednesbury
case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
Corpn., (1947) 2 All ER 680 : (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] " is
treated as the landmark so far as laying down various basic
principles relating to judicial review of administrative or
statutory direction.
19. Before summarising the substance of the principles laid
down therein we shall refer to the passage from the judgment of
Lord Greene in Associated Provincial Picture Houses
Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn. [Associated Provincial Picture
Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1947) 2 All ER 680 :
(1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)] (KB at p. 229 : All ER pp. 682 H-683
A). It reads as follows:
"... It is true that discretion must be exercised
reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar
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with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of
statutory discretions often use the word „unreasonable‟ in a
rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and
is frequently used as a general description of the things that
must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a
discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law.
He must call his own attention to the matters which he is
bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration
matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If
he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often
is said, to be acting „unreasonably‟. Similarly, there may be
something so absurd that no sensible person could even
dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. ... In
another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters.
It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being
done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one
another."
Lord Greene also observed (KB p. 230 : All ER p. 683
F-G)
"... it must be proved to be unreasonable in the sense
that the court considers it to be a decision that no
reasonable body can come to. It is not what the court
considers unreasonable. ... The effect of the legislation is
not to set up the court as an arbiter of the correctness of one
view over another."
(emphasis supplied)
Therefore, to arrive at a decision on
"reasonableness" the court has to find out if the
administrator has left out relevant factors or taken into
account irrelevant factors. The decision of the administrator
must have been within the four corners of the law, and not
one which no sensible person could have reasonably arrived
at, having regard to the above principles, and must have
been a bona fide one. The decision could be one of many
choices open to the authority but it was for that authority to
decide upon the choice and not for the court to substitute its
view.
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20. The principles of judicial review of administrative action
were further summarised in 1985 by Lord Diplock in CCSU
case [(1984) 3 All ER 935 : 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 WLR 1174
(HL)] as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He
said more grounds could in future become available, including
the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed
by certain other members of the European Economic
Community. Lord Diplock observed in that case as follows : (All
ER p. 950h-j)
"Judicial review has I think developed to a stage
today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps
by which the development has come about, one can
conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on
which administrative action is subject to control by
judicial review. The first ground I would call „illegality‟,
the second „irrationality‟ and the third „procedural
impropriety‟. That is not to say that further development
on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add
further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible
adoption in the future of the principle of „proportionality‟
which is recognised in the administrative law of several
of our fellow members of the European Economic
Community;"
Lord Diplock explained "irrationality" as follows : (All
ER p. 951a-b)
"By „irrationality‟ I mean what can by now be
succinctly referred to as „Wednesbury unreasonableness‟.
It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its
defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no
sensible person who had applied his mind to the question
to be decided could have arrived at it."
21. In other words, to characterise a decision of the
administrator as "irrational" the court has to hold, on material,
that it is a decision "so outrageous" as to be in total defiance of
logic or moral standards. Adoption of "proportionality" into
administrative law was left for the future.
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22. These principles have been noted in the aforesaid terms
in Union of India v. G. Ganayutham [(1997) 7 SCC 463 : 1997
SCC (L&S) 1806] . In essence, the test is to see whether there is
any infirmity in the decision-making process and not in the
decision itself. (See Indian Rly. Construction Co. Ltd. v. Ajay
Kumar [(2003) 4 SCC 579 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 528] .)
23. Though Section 52 limits the scope of consideration by
the courts, the scope for judicial review in writ jurisdiction is
not restricted, subject of course to the parameters indicated
supra.
24. It is true that some material must exist but what is
required is not an elaborate decision akin to a judgment. On the
contrary the order directing externment should show existence
of some material warranting an order of externment. While
dealing with the question mere repetition of the provision would
not be sufficient. Reference is to be made to some material on
record and if that is done, the requirements of law are met. As
noted above, it is not the sufficiency of material but the
existence of material which is sine qua non.
25. As observed in Gazi Saduddin case [(2003) 7 SCC 330 :
2003 SCC (Cri) 1637] satisfaction of the authority can be
interfered with if the satisfaction recorded is demonstratively
perverse based on no evidence, misreading of evidence or
which a reasonable man could not form or that the person
concerned was not given due opportunity resulting in prejudice.
To that extent, objectivity is inbuilt in the subjective satisfaction
of the authority."
7. Supreme Court in the decision reported as Governor, NCT & Ors. Vs.
Ved Prakash culled out the law laid operating in the field of externment as
under:
"13. The law operating in the field is no longer res integra
which may hereinafter be noticed:
(i) In a proceeding under the Act all statutory and
constitutional requirements must be fulfilled.
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(ii) An externment proceeding having regard to the purport
and object thereof, cannot be equated with a preventive
detention matter.
(iii) Before an order of externment is passed, the proceedee
is entitled to an opportunity of hearing.
(iv) The test of procedural safeguards contained in the Act
must be scrupulously complied with.
(v) The satisfaction of the authority must be based on
objective criteria.
(vi) A proceeding under Section 47 of the Delhi Police Act
stands on a different footing than the ordinary proceeding in
the sense that whereas in the latter the details of the
evidence are required to be disclosed and, thus, giving an
opportunity to the proceedee to deal with them, in the
former, general allegations would serve the purpose.
The High Court ordinarily should insist on
production of the entire records including the statement of
the witnesses to express their intention to keep their identity
in secret so as to arrive at a satisfaction that such
statements are absolutely voluntary in nature and had not
been procured by the police officers themselves.
14. We have noticed hereinbefore, that the High Court itself
held that the allegations made in the notice satisfy the statutory
requirement but, in our opinion, the High Court was not correct
in coming to the finding that the third appellant was bound to
disclose the cases in which the witnesses had not deposed
against the respondent out of fear or because of threat, etc. If
an attempt is made to communicate the cases in which witnesses
were not forthcoming due to the activities of the proceedee, the
same would violate the secrecy required to be maintained and
would otherwise defeat the purpose for which Section 47 of the
Act had been enacted.
15. An order of externment must always be restricted to the
area of illegal activities of the externee. The executive order
must demonstrate due application of mind on the part of the
statutory authority. When the validity of an order is questioned,
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what would be seen is the material on which the satisfaction of
the authority is based. The satisfaction of the authority although
primarily subjective, should be based on objectivity. But
sufficiency of material as such may not be gone into by the writ
court unless it is found that in passing the impugned order the
authority has failed to take into consideration the relevant facts
or had based its decision on irrelevant factors not germane
therefor. Mere possibility of another view may not be a ground
for interference. It is not a case where malice was alleged
against the third appellant.
16. The High Court and this Court would undoubtedly
jealously guard the fundamental rights of a citizen. While
exercising the jurisdiction rested in them invariably, the courts
would make all attempts to uphold the human right of the
proceedee. The fundamental right under Article 21 of the
Constitution undoubtedly must be safeguarded. But while
interpreting the provisions of a statute like the present one and
in view of the precedents operating in the field, the court may
examine the records itself so as to satisfy its conscience not only
for the purpose that the procedural safeguards available to the
proceedee have been provided but also for the purpose that the
witnesses have disclosed their apprehension about deposing in
court truthfully and fearlessly because of the activities of the
proceedee. Once such a satisfaction is arrived at, the superior
court will normally not interfere with an order of externment.
The court, in any event, would not direct the authorities to
either disclose the names of the witnesses or the number of
cases where such witnesses were examined for the simple
reason that they may lead to causing of further harm to them. In
a given case, the number of prosecution witnesses may not be
many and the proceedee as an accused in the said case is
expected to know who were the witnesses who had been
examined on behalf of the prosecution and, thus, the purpose of
maintaining the secrecy as regards identity of such persons may
be defeated. The court must remind itself that the law is not
mere logic but is required to be applied on the basis of its
experience."
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8. One of the contentions raised by the petitioner is that he was not given
a proper hearing. A perusal of the externment file as also the orders reveal
that after the show cause notice was issued on 25 th July, 2019 the petitioner
appeared before the competent authority on 3rd September, 2019 without a
counsel. The allegations in the notice were explained to him in Hindi
language which he denied, pleaded not guilty and desired to contest the case.
The petitioner was given an opportunity to file his written reply to the
notice, furnish his surety and supply the list of defence witnesses to be
produced for examination in his defence. However, no written reply was
filed by the petitioner. He neither submitted his written reply to the notice
nor furnished his surety till the conclusion of the proceedings. Since the
petitioner was further involved in criminal activities and one case under the
Gambling Act was registered against him besides a DD entry for breach of
peace, a supplementary show cause notice was issued to the petitioner on 4th
August, 2020 for which also he did not submit any written reply. The
petitioner was also given sufficient opportunity to engage a lawyer through
Delhi Legal Services Authority, however the petitioner did not avail the said
right. The petitioner examined one defence witness whose statement was
recorded on 28th November, 2019, however, the said witness denied having
any knowledge about the criminal cases against the petitioner. Further, an
appeal against the order of the Additional DCP was filed before the Lt.
Governor by the counsel for the petitioner and thereafter he is duly
represented by a counsel. Therefore this Court finds no merit in the
contention that the petitioner was not given a fair opportunity to defend
himself.
9. The petitioner was furnished show cause notice in relation to the
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following cases:
S.No. FIR DATED SECTION OF LAW POLICE PRESENT
STATION POSITION
1 269 25.05.1993 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
2 981 09.12.1998 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
3 704 31.08.1999 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
4 884 29.10.1999 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
5 235 03.04.2000 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
6 273 12.05.2001 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
7 351 29.05.2002 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
8 507 06.07.2002 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
9 97 16.02.2004 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
10 199 05.04.2004 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
11 325 26.05.2004 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
12 541 17.07.2004 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
13 645 18.08.2004 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
14 127 23.02.2005 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
15 215 29.05.2005 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
16 739 15.11.2005 61, 78, 1(E), 1, 14 Excise Tilak Nagar Convicted
Act
17 188 11.03.2006 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
18 426 07.06.2006 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
19 651 30.08.2006 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
20 689 11.09.2006 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
21 332 02.05.2007 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
22 344 08.05.2007 61/1/14 Excise Act Tilak Nagar Convicted
23 258 19.10.2011 33/38 Delhi Ex. Act Tilak Nagar Acquitted
24 155 03.03.2014 33/38 Delhi Ex. Act Khyala Acquitted
25 157 15.03.2016 33/38 Delhi Ex. Act Khyala PT
26 134 20.04.2019 33/38 Delhi Ex. Act Khyala PT
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10. Further, a supplementary show cause notice was issued for the
following cases:
S.No. FIR No./ DATE UNDER SECTION POLICE PRESENT
DD No. STATION POSITION
1 DD No. 16.01.2020 107/150 Cr.P.C. Khyala Bound Down
44A
2 133 16.02.2020 12/9/55 Gambling Act Khyala Pending
Investigation
11. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that he has been
wrongly noted as the habitual offender by the Externing Authority. A
perusal of the order impugned passed by the Externing Authority would
show that the word habitual offender was used by the PW Inspector
Gursewak Singh, SHO PS Khyala in his statement. However, the Externing
Authority did not extern the petitioner based on the finding of the habitual
offender in terms of the explanation to Section 47 of the DP Act. The
finding of the learned Additional DCP was that based on the statement of the
witnesses, record of his criminal activity and the evidence adduced he has no
hesitation in concluding that the petitioner was a criminal who is not likely
to reform his way of life and his activities and his acts in the area of NCT of
Delhi are calculated to cause harm to the respectable citizens and his
continuous presence in the area is a constant source of tension and
disturbance to other law abiding citizens of the area who also have a right to
peaceful life. Thus the impugned orders cannot be set aside on this court.
12. Undoubtedly, the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that
cases too remote in time could not have been considered deserves
consideration. For a show cause notice of externment issued in the year
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2019, 22 alleged offences committed till the year 2007 out of which the
petitioner stood convicted in 17 cases would be too remote in time. These
cases can, however, be noted to show the past history. Further, the issue is
whether based on the cases of the year 2011, 2014, 2016 and 2019 as also of
the year 2020 when supplementary show cause notice was given, the
Externing Authority can be said to have no material before it to come to the
conclusion that there is no material against the petitioner to pass the
impugned order. Even after having been convicted in 17 cases, the
petitioner continued to be involved in cases under the Excise Act. Hence
there was material before the Externing Authority to proceed against the
petitioner and pass the impugned order. Further, in the decision reported as
33 (1987) DLT 119 Kaushalya Vs. State this Court noted that even cases
under the Excise Act can be considered for externing a person.
13. Contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that cases in which
the petitioner has been acquitted have also been considered and thus the
externment order stands vitiated deserved to be rejected. As noted above,
even though the cases till the year 2007 were remote, however considering
the continuous propensity of the petitioner to involve himself in cases of
Excise Act despite having been convicted in 17 out of 22 cases gives
sufficient background material to the Externing Authority to form an
opinion bases on the current involvements. At the time of issuance of show
cause notice though the petitioner was acquitted in two cases of the year
2011 and 2014, however two cases under the Delhi Excise Act of the year
2016 and 2019 were pending trial. This Court has perused the statements of
the witnesses recorded in camera by the Externing Authority who have
deposed about the situation prevailing in the area because of the appellant's
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:ATISH
Signing Date:02.09.2022
19:48:55
activities, due to which people do not come forward to make complaints
against him. Hence, it cannot be held that there was no sufficient material
much less no material before the Externing Authority to extern the
petitioner.
14. Further, the finding of the Lt. Governor in the impugned order was
that after having gone through the case file and considering submissions
made by both the sides it was observed that the petitioner was involved in 28
cases involving offences under the Excise Act and Gambling Act from 1993
to 2020 which adversely affect the normal life of citizens and therefore it is
a fit case for externment under Section 47(c)(i) of the DP Act. Thus, the
externment order has been passed under Section 47(c)(i) and not under
Section 47(c)(ii), (iii) or (iv) of the DP Act.
15. In view of the discussion aforesaid, this Court finds no error in the
two impugned orders.
16. Petition and application are dismissed.
17. Order be uploaded on the website of this Court.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 2, 2022
'ga'
Signature Not Verified
Digitally Signed By:ATISH
Signing Date:02.09.2022
19:48:55
