Delhi High Court
Sanjay Grover vs Kumud Grover on 1 February, 2022
$~16
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision : 01.02.2022
+ CONT.APP.(C) 3/2022
SANJAY GROVER ..... Appellant
Through Mr Rahul Shukla, Adv
versus
KUMUD GROVER ..... Respondent
Through Mr Mohit Jolly, Adv
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE TALWANT SINGH
[Court hearing convened via video-conferencing on account of COVID-19]
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. (ORAL):-
CM APPL. 5685/2022
1. Allowed, subject to just exceptions.
CONT.APP.(C) 3/2022 & CM APPL.5684/2022[Application filed on
behalf of the appellant for interim relief]
2. This appeal is directed against the order dated 08.12.2021, passed by
the learned single judge in CONT.CAS(C) 861/2020. Via the impugned
order, the learned single judge has held the appellant, who is the husband of
the respondent, guilty of contempt.
2.1. The matter has been fixed for sentencing before the learned single
judge on 02.02.2022.
3. Mr Rahul Shukla, who appears on behalf of the appellant, assails the
order passed by the learned single judge on two grounds:
(i) First, since remedy by way of execution proceedings is
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available to the respondent, contempt proceedings are not
maintainable.
(ii) Second, the appellant does not have the wherewithal to pay the
money due and payable to the respondent.
4. Insofar as the first ground is concerned, we are of the view that the
same is not tenable. The execution proceedings, both in scope and nature,
are different from the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 [in short, the "1971 Act"].
4.1. Since the proceedings initiated under the 1971 Act concern the
contemnor and the court, and are premised on upholding the rule of law, the
respondent cannot, possibly, obtain redressal ( in this case recover monies)
under the said proceedings. Execution proceedings are essentially remedial
in character, whereas civil contempt proceedings are founded on wilful
breach and not just non- compliance. [See Niaz Mohammed & Others vs
State of Haryana & Others, (1994) 6 SCC 3321; Kapildeo Prasad Sah vs.
State of Bihar, (1999) 7 SCC 5692.] It may happen that, in a given case, an
"Where the contempt consists in failure to comply with or carry out an order of a court
made in favour of a party, it is a civil contempt. The person or persons in whose favour
such order or direction has been made can move the court for initiating proceeding for
contempt against the alleged contemner, with a view to enforce the right flowing from
the order or direction in question. But such a proceeding is not like an execution
proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure.
.....Before a contemner is punished for non-compliance of the direction of a
court, the court must not only be satisfied about the disobedience of any judgment,
decree, direction or writ but should also be satisfied that such disobedience was wilful
and intentional. The civil court while executing a decree against the judgment-debtor is
not concerned and bothered whether the disobedience to any judgment, or decree, was
wilful."
"10. In his famous passage, Lord Diplock in Attorney General v. Times Newspapers
Ltd. [(1973) 3 All ER 54 (HL)] said that there is also
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offshoot of the contempt proceedings may result in remediation. A perusal
of the record of the case would show that this is a case of wilful default; an
aspect which is elaborated hereafter. Therefore, this submission is rejected.
5. Inasmuch as the second ground is concerned, its tenability needs to be
examined in the backdrop of the record of the case.
5.1. The record shows that the contempt proceedings were initiated
pursuant to the orders passed by the learned Metropolitan Magistrate-02,
Mahila Court, Saket, New Delhi [in short, "MM"] in CC No.6505/2017.
This was an action instituted by the respondent under Section 12 of the
Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 [hereafter referred
to as "the DV Act"]
5.2. In these proceedings, two significant orders were passed by the
learned MM; the first was passed on 15.02.2018 while the second was
passed on 14.08.2020.
5.3. Curiously, the appellant has not placed on record the second order i.e.,
order dated 14.08.2020, although the same has been screen-shared by the
counsel-on-record for the respondent i.e., Mr Mohit Jolly.
5.4. A perusal of the order dated 15.02.2018 shows that the respondent
had moved the learned MM for issuance of directions for securing residence
for her and her son in the "shared household" and/or alternate
accommodation.
"an element of public policy in punishing civil contempt, since administration of
justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law could be disregarded
with impunity".
Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate sanction against the person
who refuses to comply with the order of the court or disregards the order continuously.
Initiation of contempt proceedings is not a substitute for execution proceedings though at
times that purpose may also be achieved."
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5.5. The appellant, however, opposed the request, and offered instead to
pay Rs.15,000/- per-month to the respondent towards rent that she may have
to pay for securing an accommodation for herself and their son.
5.6. Given the stand of the appellant, a direction was issued to that effect.
5.7. Likewise, a perusal of the order dated 14.08.2020 shows that since
there was a default by the appellant in remitting Rs 15,000/- p.m. as
directed, an application was moved by the respondent. The appellant, to
avoid a coercive order offered to pay the outstanding dues within one month.
5.8. Pertinently, both the orders [i.e., orders dated 15.02.2018 and
14.08.2020] are predicated on the appellant's stance; taken of his own free-
will.
5.9 Therefore, to our minds, for the appellant to now say that he does not
have the wherewithal, seems incredulous. Therefore this ground is rejected
as well
6. Admittedly, the parties' shared-household is located in the property
situate at 98, Indira Vihar, New Delhi. That being said, there is a dispute as
to the floor on which the parties were residing. According to Mr Shukla, the
parties were residing on the ground floor, whereas Mr Jolly says that the
respondent, along with her son, was residing on the first floor of the
aforesaid property;
6.1 We queried Mr Shukla as to the amount which, according to the
appellant, is payable to the respondent. Mr Shukla says that approximately
Rs.1.65 lakhs is payable to the respondent.
6.2 We may note that the learned single judge, in paragraph 1 of the
impugned order, has recorded Rs.1.95 lakhs as the amount payable to the
respondent.
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7. Thus, given the aforesaid circumstances, in particular, the appellant's
stance before the learned MM, which is, that he would pay the outstanding
dues, we are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order.
7.1. To us, it seems very unlikely that the appellant undertook the
obligation to pay Rs 15000/- p.m. to the respondent towards rent, without
being cognizant of his resources. The fact that the appellant allowed arrears
to mount and, then, agreed to pay the outstanding dues also points in the
direction that the violation of the first order i.e., order dated 15.02.2018 was
wilful.
8. The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. Consequently, pending
application shall also stand closed.
RAJIV SHAKDHER, J
TALWANT SINGH, J
FEBRUARY 1, 2022/pmc
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