Delhi High Court
Balwan Singh vs International Airport Authority ... on 30 January, 2020
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 30th January, 2020.
+ CS(OS) 130/2009
BALWAN SINGH ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Jayant Mehta, Mr. Tushar
Bhushan, Mr. Israel Ali and Mr.
P.D.V. Srikar, Advs.
Versus
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF INDIA
& ORS ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Digvijay Rai and Mr. Aman
Yadav, Advs. for D-1 with Mr.
Rajeshwar Gautam, Manager (Land
Management), AAI.
Mr. Sanjay Kumar Pathak, Mr. K.K.
Kiran Pathak, Mr. Sunil Kumar Jha
and Mr. M.S. Akhtar, Advs. for D-3.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1.
The plaintiff instituted this suit, as far back as on 5 th December, 2006,
impleading International Airport Authority of India (IAAI), Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) and Nodal Officer/Land Acquisition
Collector (LAC)/Additional District Magistrate (South-West), as defendants
thereto, for the reliefs of (i) declaration that the plaintiff is entitled for
independent and separate rehabilitation plot of Category No.10 admeasuring
450 sq. mtrs. in lieu of his land measuring 745 sq. yds. under the
Rehabilitation Scheme of Village Nangal Dewat; (ii) permanent injunction
restraining the defendants from dispossessing the plaintiff from his land
situated within the Lal Dora Abadi of Village Nangal Dewat; and, (iii)
mandatory injunction directing the defendants to allot a rehabilitation plot of
Category No.10 admeasuring 450 sq. mtrs. to the plaintiff under the
Rehabilitation Scheme.
2. Needless to state, all the three defendants contested the suit by filing
separate written statement and to which replications were filed by the
plaintiff.
3. Vide order dated 2nd February, 2015, the following issues were
framed in the suit:
"1. Whether the suit is maintainable? OPD
2. Whether the present suit has not been properly valued for
the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction? OPD-
3. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the
present suit?OPD-1
4. Whether the present suit for declaration without seeking
consequential relief is not maintainable? OPD-2
5. Whether this Hon'ble Court has no jurisdiction to
entertain and try the present suit in view of the
guidelines/criteria formulated by Hon'ble High Court of
Delhi in WP (C) No.481/1982? OPD-2
6. Whether the present suit filed by the plaintiffs is barred
under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC? OPD-2
7. Whether in the absence of notice under Section 80 CPC,
the present suit is not maintainable? OPD-2
8. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for decree of
declaration as prayed for? OPP
9. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for a decree of
mandatory injunction? OPP
10. Relief."
and the parties relegated to evidence.
4. The plaintiff failed to lead any evidence whatsoever inspite of several
opportunities and the evidence of the plaintiff was closed on 9th July, 2015
and the matter posted for evidence of the defendants.
5. Vide order dated 16th September, 2016, recording that the plaintiff
had not taken any steps to challenge the order closing his evidence, the suit
was dismissed for non-prosecution. The plaintiff applied for restoration of
the suit but still without challenging the order closing his evidence. Be that
as it may, vide order dated 15th November, 2017, the suit was restored.
6. It is only thereafter that the plaintiff challenged the order dated 9 th
July, 2015 closing his evidence by filing a Chamber Appeal being OA
No.156/2017 and seeking condonation of delay of fifteen months in
preferring the Chamber Appeal. However, the order of 28 th November,
2017, when the said Chamber Appeal came up first before this Court,
records that the delay in filing the Chamber Appeal was nearly of two and a
half years and not merely fifteen months.
7. During the hearing of the Chamber Appeal, it was found that one of
the issues framed in the suit was qua the very maintainability of the suit and
the counsel for the plaintiff was directed to satisfy this Court about the
maintainability. On the counsels stating that he was not prepared therefor,
the hearing was adjourned.
8. In the order dated 30th November, 2017, the following was inter alia
recorded:
"3. The position which emerges is as under:
(i) On 28th April, 1972, Notification under the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 for acquisition of land at village
Nangal Devat, for purposes of expansion of Indira
Gandhi International Airport, was issued;
(ii) Writ petitions were filed in this Court challenging the
said acquisition;
(iii) Vide a consent order in the said writ petitions, apart from
compensation to be paid for acquired lands, those who
would be uprooted from their homes were agreed to be
provided alternative land for their residence;
(iv) This court in the aforesaid litigation, with the consent of
the parties, devised a scheme for allotment of alternative
land and a Nodal Officer was appointed for preparing
the list of persons eligible for allotment of alternate land
and for deciding the objections to the list of eligible
persons so drawn up and guidelines framed for
determining the eligibility;
(v) Objections to the list so prepared by the Nodal Officer,
including by filing fresh writ petitions, were preferred by
a large number of persons;
(vi) Finally, vide judgment dated 30th May, 2007 reported as
Airports Authority of India Vs. Karan Singh 141 (2007)
DLT 277, while disposing of the matters, it was inter
alia:
(a) Clarified that no further petitions challenging the
orders of the Nodal Officer or by persons who
never filed their claims before the Nodal Officer
should hereafter be entertained, either by this
Court or by the Civil Court; it was reasoned that
all these claimant belong to the same village
Nangal Devat and the litigation had been on since
1982 and it is inconceivable that any resident of
the village would have been unaware of the
pendency of the proceedings and the claims filed
by the residents of that village; and, that time limit
had been set in the guidelines for the Nodal officer
to entertain claims and it had been made clear that
no further claims beyond the time set in the order
dated 26th August, 2004 would be entertained;
however, even thereafter the Court had permitted
some claims to be filed before the Nodal officer;
however all claims must come to an end at some
stage and the time limit cannot be open ended to
enable the fence sitter to take a chance, after
watching the outcome of the petitions filed by the
others;
(b) Recording that this Court did not want to
encourage this;
(c) Further recording that this was necessary to allay
the apprehensions that if the Court continues to
interfere with the orders of the Nodal Officer,
others similarly situated who had not approached
the Court may want similar relief;
(d) Clarifying that the relief being granted in some of
the petitions was confined to the petitions covered
by that judgment and would not result in re-
opening the claims of others who had not
challenged the order of the Nodal Officer till then;
(e) Recording that some of the petitions decided by the
said judgment were filed belatedly and no attempt
had been made to show why those petitioners could
not approach the writ Court earlier; the award of
acquisition was made in 1986 and till August,
2001, the petitions were pending in the Court and
the petitions which were decided were being heard
from December, 2006 onwards and that in these
circumstances, it was impossible to believe that
other residents of the village were not aware of the
pendency of the cases before the writ Court and
the writ Court was thus not prepared to entertain
those petitions which had been filed at a very late
stage;
(f) Also making it clear that no further petitions
challenging the order of the Nodal officer would be
entertained and that this approach is necessary
keeping in view the time bound directions the
Court had made earlier;
(vii) The plaintiff herein claims to have filed objection before
the Nodal Officer for the first time on 31 st May, 2005 and
which objection was dismissed vide order dated 10th
November, 2006 of the Nodal Officer inter alia reasoning
that the objection had been filed after the objections /
representations were heard and decided on merits and
the final list submitted before the High Court and that the
plaintiff was not entitled to a separate plot claimed by
him, as his father had been allotted a plot;
(viii) The plaintiff filed this suit before the Court of the Senior
Civil Judge on 5th December, 2006 seeking declaration
that he is entitled to independent and separate plot and
permanent injunction restraining IAAI, Delhi
Development Authority (DDA) and Nodal officer from
dispossessing the plaintiff from his land in village Nangal
Devat and for mandatory injunction directing the
defendants to allot a plot to the plaintiff;
(ix) The counsel for IAAI informs that besides the suit filed by
the plaintiff, some other persons had also filed similar
suits before the Senior Civil Judge (SCJ) and in some of
which interim orders were also passed; that Delhi
International Airport Authority Ltd. (DIAL), to whom
Airport Authority of India (AAI) leased out the airport,
being affected by the said interim orders, filed CM(M)
No.564/2007 in this Court and vide order dated 24th
April, 2007 all the said suits including the suit filed by
the plaintiff were directed to be requisitioned in this
Court;
(x) Vide subsequent order dated 31st July, 2017 in CM(M)
No.564/2007, all the requisitioned suits were ordered to
be listed before the Hon'ble Judge who had passed the
judgment reported in 141 (2007) DLT 277;
(xi) However owing to change of Roster, the Judge who had
passed the judgment reported in 141 (2007) DLT 277
supra was not presiding over the writ Court and the
Judge who was then presiding the writ Court, vide order
dated 1st December, 2008 in CM(M) No.1066/2007,
directed all the requisitioned suits to be registered as
Original Civil Suits before this Court; and,
(xii) This is how this suit was numbered as CS(OS)
No.130/2009.
4. On the basis of the aforesaid history, the counsel for the
defendant no.1 IAAI has argued that the present suit does not
lie in terms of observations set out herein above in the judgment
reported in 141 (2007) DLT 277.
5. Per contra, it is the contention of the counsel for the
plaintiff that the observations aforesaid bar a challenge after
30th May, 2007 while the plaintiff herein had filed his suit on 5 th
December, 2006.
6. Though I was of the opinion that a suit would still not lie
inasmuch as the entire scheme of allotment of alternate plot
having been devised by this Court in writ jurisdiction and the
Nodal officer also having been appointed by this Court in writ
jurisdiction and the Nodal officer having acted as per the
guidelines laid down by this Court was in the position of a
Commissioner appointed by the Court and against the orders of
the Commissioner no suit lies and the remedy if any is to
approach in the proceeding in which the Commissioner is
appointed but the counsel for the defendant no.1 IAAI has fairly
also drawn attention to the orders dated 15th July, 2013 in
W.P.(C) No.340/2013 and dated 26th August, 2013 in LPA
No.613/2013 preferred thereagainst and in which case the
parties were relegated to the suit remedy against the orders of
the Nodal Officer.
7. Though issues have been framed in the suit and it was
posted for evidence but it appears that since other orders of the
Nodal Officer have been decided by this Court in writ
jurisdiction, there is no need for any evidence in this matter
also.
8. To enable me to satisfy myself as to the merits of the
claim of the plaintiff, for the purpose of this Chamber Appeal,
list for hearing on 7th December, 2017.
9. The counsel for the defendant no.3 Nodal Officer to also
bring all the relevant records on that date."
9. Thereafter, on 27th April, 2018, the following order was passed:
"OA No.156/2017 (of the plaintiff against the order dated 9 th
July, 2015) & IA No.14047/2017 (of the plaintiff for
condonation of 2½ years delay in filing OA)
1. This order is in continuation of the earlier orders dated
28 November, 2017, 29th November, 2017 and 30th November,
th
2017.
2. The counsel for the defendant no.3 Nodal Officer has
brought the record requisitioned from him today and the
counsel for the defendant no.1 International Airport Authority
of India states, on the basis of the said records, no entitlement
of the plaintiff is found.
3. Needless to state, the counsel for the plaintiff controverts
and states that the holding of the plaintiff was in the old lal
dora and of which there were no revenue records and the
entitlement of the plaintiff to the land is independent from that
of his father. It is contended that the plaintiff has received
separate compensation for his holding.
4. The counsel for the defendant no.1 states that the
compensation received by the plaintiff was only for the super-
structure and not for the land.
5. The counsel for the plaintiff draws attention to the land
acquisition award No.16/86-87 at page no.39 of the Part-III file
and particularly to pages 54, 61 and 69 thereof to show that the
plaintiff has received compensation separately from the father.
6. The counsel for the defendant no.1 states that the said
compensation, as evident from page no.54, is only for super-
structures and is not for holding.
7. The counsel for the plaintiff states that as per the
aforesaid land acquisition award, the entitlement of the father
of the plaintiff was not to alternate land ad-measuring 650 sq.
mtrs. and the said allotment must have been made for some
other land belonging to the father of the plaintiff. It is stated
that the other land is evident from documents which are sought
to be handed across in the Court.
8. The stage for filing documents is long since gone and no
documents can be received in this fashion.
9. The counsel for the plaintiff also draws attention to page
8 of Part-III file to contend that the holding of the plaintiff was
separate.
10. The aforesaid exercise was undertaken just to satisfy the
judicial conscience of this Court.
11. Else, neither is there any ground for condonation of long
delay in preferring this Chamber Appeal nor is there any
ground for the plaintiff having not led any evidence in the suit.
12. The need to replicate in this order the detailed facts
mentioned in the orders dated 28th November, 2017, 29th
November, 2017 and 30th November, 2017 in continuation of
which this order is being made, is not felt.
13. Thus the judicial conscience of this Court also does not
require any opportunity to be granted to the plaintiff.
14. The IA No.14047/2017 for condonation of delay of 2½
years is thus dismissed as no sufficient cause is found for the
delay and axiomatically the Chamber Appeal is also dismissed.
CS(OS) 130/2009
15. The onus of the issues being on the plaintiff and the
plaintiff having not led any evidence, the suit has to be
dismissed and is dismissed.
16. However, I am refraining from imposing any costs.
17. Decree sheet be drawn up."
10. The plaintiff preferred RFA(OS) No.33/2018 against the aforesaid
order of dismissal of the suit and which was dismissed by the Division
Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 4th October, 2018.
11. The plaintiff thereafter preferred SLP(C) No.1029/2019, which vide
order dated 31st July, 2019 was granted and Civil Appeal No.6000/2019
registered. A perusal of the order of the Supreme Court shows that the
counsel for the plaintiff during the hearing of the Special Leave Petition
(SLP) on 25th January, 2019 confined the grievance therein to, this Bench,
while dismissing the suit on 27th April, 2018 on the ground that no evidence
had been led by the plaintiff, having not noticed the order dated 1 st
September, 2012 of the Joint Registrar of the Delhi High Court in the course
of admission/denial of documents and wherein exhibit marks were put on
some documents. The order dated 31st July, 2019 of the Supreme Court
further records that on that date also, the same grievance was reiterated, i.e.
that the documents Ex.P-2 to P-4, inspite of being admitted by the
defendants during the admission/denial, had not been adverted to while
dismissing the suit on 27th April, 2018. The order dated 31st July, 2019
further records the statement of the counsel for the plaintiff that the plaintiff
will not lead any further evidence and the order closing the right of the
plaintiff to lead further evidence was not assailed. Supreme Court, in view
of the aforesaid statement, vide order dated 31st July, 2019 remanded the
matter to this Bench to consider this suit having regard to the documents
which had been existing on the record. Accordingly, the order dated 27 th
April, 2018 dismissing the suit as well as the order dated 4 th October, 2018
dismissing the appeal preferred thereagainst were set aside and the suit
restored for disposal afresh and by further directing that no further evidence
would be adduced by the plaintiff and the suit would be disposed of on the
basis of evidence on record.
12. The suit so restored came up before this Bench on 13th September,
2019, when on request of the counsel for the plaintiff, the same was posted
for today.
13. The counsel for the plaintiff today states that the plaintiff has obtained
another document by seeking information from the Land Acquisition
Collector (LAC) and seeks adjournment to file the said document and
contends that the said document be considered at the time of hearing.
14. The adjournment for filing the document has been refused and the
counsel for the plaintiff and the counsel for LAC and IAAI have been heard.
15. The counsel for the plaintiff, during the course of hearing has handed
over a single sheet along with English translation thereof and has contended
that the same is an extract of Naksha Muntzamin of village Nangal Dewat,
recording the name of the plaintiff for compensation against the land
holding.
16. No application seeking information stated to have been made or the
response received thereto has been handed over; though the counsel for the
plaintiff states that the document is what it is claimed to be, but else there is
nothing to indicate the same. The document in any case is stated to be a part
of another document and is not the complete document.
17. The counsel for the plaintiff states that the said document was also
filed before the Supreme Court.
18. However, on enquiry, whether the said document has been dealt with
in the order dated 31st July, 2019 of the Supreme Court, it is stated that it has
not been dealt with.
19. The counsels for the defendants contend that no further document can
be seen, as stated by the counsel for the plaintiff before the Supreme Court
and as ordered by the Supreme Court.
20. The counsel for the plaintiff contends that the document being
information received from the defendant no.3 LAC should be taken into
consideration. The magnanimity of this Court to permit fresh documents to
be taken into consideration is also invoked and it is stated that the Court, to
do justice, can always look at such a document.
21. I am unable to agree. The plaintiff having on his own, confined the
grievance before the Supreme Court to non-consideration in the order dated
27th April, 2018 of Ex.P-2 to P-4 and the Supreme Court having remanded
the matter for disposal afresh on consideration of Ex.P-2 to P-4 and having
further directed that no further evidence would be adduced by the plaintiff
and the suit would be disposed of on the basis of Ex.P-2 to P-4, it is not
open to the plaintiff to now seek to produce additional documents.
Moreover, when the additional document now sought to be handed over,
was available to the plaintiff before the Supreme Court but the plaintiff did
not feel the need to seek permission for consideration thereof also by this
Bench, the plaintiff cannot be permitted to overreach in this manner. The
determination by this Court at this stage, has to be strictly in terms of
remand order, as recently held in Muni Reddy Vs. C. Nagaraju (2019) 11
SCC 410. Yet further, the document, as aforesaid, is incomplete and is
not even accompanied by the application seeking information and response
thereto and for this reason itself does not inspire confidence. I therefore
decline the request for consideration of the document handed over today.
However to avoid any ambiguity, the said document comprising of two
sheets is taken on record and for the sake of identification mark „X‟ is put
thereon in today‟s date and the said document be tagged to Part-I file.
22. I may at this stage record that the counsel for the plaintiff, before the
Supreme Court stated that Ex.P2, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 were admitted into
evidence on 1st September, 2012. However on that date only Ex.P1 and
Ex.D1 were admitted into evidence. Ex.P2, Ex.P3 and Ex.P4 were admitted
into evidence on 29th September, 2014.
23. The counsel for the plaintiff, with reference to the documents, after
consideration whereof, the remanded suit has been ordered to be disposed
of, has referred to Ex.P-2 and has stated that the same is Naksha and Survey
document in which the plaintiff and his father Brahma Nand are shown as
joint owners of plot measuring 1306 sq. yds. With reference to Ex.P-3, it is
stated that the same is a part of the Land Acquisition Award Ex.P-4 and
shows calculation for compensation for land. However, again there is
nothing in Ex.P-3, though admitted by the counsel for the defendant LAC, to
indicate so. The list of documents under which the counsel for the plaintiff
filed the said document Ex.P-3 on 24th May, 2014 however describes Ex.P-3
as „certified copy of relevant part of Naksha Muntzamin of Award No.16/86-
87‟. Ex.P-4 is the Land Acquisition Award and attention is drawn by the
counsel for the plaintiff to page 51 of Part-III file, being a computation
under the head "summary" to the typed copy of the Award. Attention is
further drawn to page 61, where at serial No.192, the name of Brahma Nand
i.e. the father of the plaintiff Balwan Singh appears with amount of
Rs.29,960/- against his name and at serial No.194, where the name of
Balwan Singh son of Brahma Nand appears with amount of Rs.35,080/-
against his name.
24. I have however drawn attention of the counsel for the plaintiff again
to page 51, where summary of compensation of land and compensation of
structure is given and to page 53 i.e. before the list of names at page 61, to
which attention was drawn commences, and which shows that the
compensation indicated therein is of "structures and wells".
25. Thus, page 61 of Ex.P-4 on which reliance is placed, indicates
compensation for structure paid separately to plaintiff and his father and
does not show compensation for land being paid to the plaintiff.
26. I may in this context record that in the order dated 27 th April, 2018,
the same pages of Part-III file were referred to and discussed and my
circling of the relevant entries thereon also exists on the file and to that
extent the plaintiff is found to have misrepresented before the Supreme
Court that Ex.P-4 was not considered while dismissing the suit.
27. Be that as it may, I have again considered the entitlement if any of the
plaintiff to the reliefs claimed on the basis of Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4.
28. I may at the very outset record that the plaintiff, notwithstanding the
aforesaid admission of documents by the defendants and admission thereof
into evidence on 29th September, 2014, on 2nd February, 2015, when the suit
was listed for framing of issues, did not state that in view of the admitted
documents, the plaintiff was entitled to the relief claimed and no issues were
required to be framed. On the contrary, the plaintiff participated in framing
of issues and posting of the matter for recording of evidence. The same res
ipsa loquitur shows that the plaintiff, at least till then was not of the view
that the plaintiff was entitled to the reliefs claimed in the suit on the basis of
the said documents alone. The said stand of the plaintiff continued, (a) on
each of the dates when the suit was listed for evidence of the plaintiff and
the plaintiff sought adjournments to lead evidence as well as on 16 th
September, 2016 when the suit, for the reason of the plaintiff having not led
any evidence, was dismissed for non-prosecution; (b) when the plaintiff
filed and pursued the application for restoration of the suit; (c) when the
plaintiff preferred a Chamber Appeal against the order closing his evidence
and pursued the suit; and (d) lastly on dismissal of the Chamber Appeal,
when the suit was considered and / or when appeal was preferred before the
Division Bench against the order of dismissal of suit and was dismissed.
Such having been the consistent stand of the plaintiff for long, it is not
understandable on what basis the plaintiff, for the first time in the Supreme
Court contended that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief on the basis of
Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 alone.
29. Be that as it may, Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 only show that the name
of the plaintiff was entered along with the name of his father in the revenue
records with respect to plot of land ad-measuring 1306 sq. yds. It is not as if
the plaintiff and his father had two separate plots of land and their names
existed with respect to separate plots.
30. The counsel for the plaintiff, with reference to the dicta of this Court
in Airports Authority of India Vs. Karan Singh (2007) 141 DLT 277 with
respect to W.P.(C) No.782/2007 titled Nirmala Devi Vs. K.K. Dahiya -
Nodal Officer has contended that the case of the plaintiff is identical to that
of Nirmala Devi and since the order of the Nodal Officer in the case of
Nirmala Devi denying alternate plot to Nirmala Devi was set aside by the
said judgment, similarly the plaintiff is also entitled to relief.
31. It is argued that the said portion of judgment of the Single Judge was
not interfered with by the judgment of the Division Bench in appeal
preferred thereagainst, being LPA No.429/2007 titled Airports Authority of
India Vs. Nirmala Devi & Ors. (2013) 199 DLT 373.
32. Per contra, the counsel for the defendants has contended that the
judgment of the Single Judge, insofar as in Nirmala Devi supra, was set
aside by the Division Bench and thus the reliance thereon is misconceived.
33. The counsel for the defendants has also referred to para 1 of the plaint
filed by the plaintiff, where the plaintiff has pleaded that the predecessor in
interest of the plaintiff owned and possessed the land and to para no.6 of the
plaint where the plaintiff has pleaded that the grandfather of the plaintiff
separated the plaintiff from the joint family in the year 1969 and the plaintiff
started residing in a plot separate from his grandfather, father and brother
and that the plaintiff got two properties in abadi area from his grandfather. It
is argued that the plaintiff has not proved any such transfer from the
grandfather to the plaintiff. It is argued that Ex.P-2 also shows the holding
to be joint of the plaintiff and his father and not exclusively of the plaintiff.
It is contended that the Nodal Officer, in his order dated 10 th November,
2006 qua the claim of the plaintiff, held as under:
"In some cases, separate plot has been demanded merely
on the basis of the names appearing in the list of the
structures in the Award which is in no way connected with
allotment of alternative plot as land acquired was the only
basis for determination of eligibility of plots. It is clearly
established that no injustice has been done in these cases
as their landholdings have been clubbed for alternative
plots. There is no justification that separate alternative
plots are given to each brother / sister / sons or other
family members on the basis of their names appearing in
the survey. This is a rehabilitation scheme and the claim
of merely living separately from grandfather, father, and
brothers etc. cannot be a basis for allotment of separate
plot.
The Hon'ble high Court laid down certain guidelines
for the nodal officer but specifically mentioned that these
guidelines are to facilitate the decision making by the
nodal officer. The Hon'ble High Court authorized /
empowered the Nodal officer to take a decision in the
matter. I have taken utmost care to examine each case. I
have also examined the documents filed by the applicants
in support of their claim for independent plot but the
applicants were not able to produce any document to show
that they have purchased the land or the holding shown in
their names have been acquired by them which can entitle
them to apply for allotment of independent plot in their
own names. In the absence of any document or any
evidence it has to be presumed that the land holding shown
in their names is an ancestral land. The survey has been
read in the light of entries in the extended abadi record.
The then nodal officer has extended the benefit of
alternative plots in the name of head of family etc. The
nodal officer has rightly clubbed the holdings of a family
to recommend allotment of a plot in the name of surviving
head of family / jointly. In case separate plots are allotted
in the names of each person whose name appears in the
survey or in the claims for the structures, it will unduly
favour those persons who were able to get the names of
their sons, daughters etc. recorded in the old abadi /
structures survey. The then nodal officer has rightly given
precedence to revenue record of extended abadi over the
survey of old abadi. Therefore the survey of old abadi
conducted in the year 1972-73 has to be read and utilized
with revenue record of extended abadi.
Most of the applicants had filed objections /
representations before the then nodal officer and their
claim were heard and decided on merit. The final list was
submitted before the Hon'ble High Court only after
disposal of their claims. Now, on almost similar issues,
applications were flied. I am of the considered view that
the applicants are not entitled for separate plots in their
names. There is no justification that every family member
i.e. each son, daughter or each brother should get
independent plot in his own name merely because of their
names appearing in the survey. In view of the facts and
circumstances of the case the applicants are not entitled
for sperate plots in their individual names and their
applications are disposed off accordingly."
and no challenge was made by the plaintiff thereto.
34. I have considered the dicta of the Single Judge as well as Division
Bench in the case of Nirmal Devi supra. The name of Nirmala Devi figured
in the Survey Report and in the Naksha Muntzamin and in the list prepared
by the Nodal Officer and submitted to the High Court; her name also figured
in the award in relation to compensation for land and house. The Nodal
Officer however clubbed the landholding of the entire family with the other
holding in the extended abadi and held Nirmala Devi to be not entitled to a
separate plot. The Single Judge of this Court held that since the guideline
laid down by this Court was that where the members of one family have
separate holdings, their holdings were not to be clubbed together for
allotment of alternate land, the decision of the Nodal Officer was not correct
and Nirmala Devi was entitled to a separate alternate plot.
35. Before considering the judgment of the Division Bench, I may record
that the facts of Nirmala Devi supra are distinct from that of the plaintiff.
36. The plaintiff‟s name is jointly recorded with that of his father with
respect to a single holding and it cannot be said that the plaintiff had a
separate holding from his father.
37. The Division Bench held that if the name of the wife is entered in the
Survey Report though the land belonged to the husband and the wife had
herself raised superstructure on the land which she had received from the
husband, she would be entitled to allotment of an alternate plot of land on
account of her name appearing in the Survey Report, provided her name also
appeared in the Naksha Muntzamin and she was awarded separate
compensation in the award in respect of the land on which superstructure
was raised by her; however in such a case the land on which the independent
superstructure was raised by the wife shall not be taken into consideration
for the purpose of determining the size of alternate plot to be allotted to the
husband.
38. It was the contention of the counsel for the defendants on 27 th April,
2018 as well as today, that no separate compensation for land was awarded
to the plaintiff herein and thus the plaintiff is not entitled to any separate
allotment of alternate land.
39. Though the counsel for the plaintiff from Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4
has attempted to contend that the plaintiff was awarded separate
compensation from his father for land also, but from Ex.P-4, being the
award, it is clear that the plaintiff was awarded separate compensation only
for the superstructure and not for the land. Just like the name of the plaintiff
is found separately from the name of his father, in the list of recipients of
compensation for superstructure, had the plaintiff been also awarded
compensation for land separately from his father, the name of the plaintiff
would have found mention in Ex.P-4 in this context also and which is not so.
40. The counsel for the plaintiff at this stage states that Ex.P-4 has no
names of recipients of compensation for land.
41. Merely because it has no name, that does not mean that the name of
the plaintiff is there and that probably explains why the plaintiff, at no
earlier point of time, contended that Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4 were
sufficient for the plaintiff to be granted relief and continued to want to lead
evidence to prove his case and which he failed to do.
42. No litigant has liberty to continue with the lis at his / her own pace.
The scheme devised by this Court at its own initiative, in the challenge made
to the acquisition, has kept the litigations with respect thereto boiling for the
last so many years and a plaintiff, who is found to be not diligent at each and
every stage, cannot be permitted to hold the Court at ransom and keep on re-
hearing him and giving him opportunity after opportunity to prove his case.
43. Thus, even after considering Ex.P-2, Ex.P-3 and Ex.P-4, the plaintiff
is not found entitled to the reliefs claimed.
44. The suit is dismissed.
Decree sheet be drawn up.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
JANUARY 30, 2020
„bs/gsr‟..
(corrected & release on 17th February, 2020)
