Savitri vs Union Of India And Anr
2020 Latest Caselaw 535 Del

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*    IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
%                                       Date of Order : 28th January, 2020
+       W.P.(C) 1048/2020
        SAVITRI                                                ..... Petitioner
                         Through:            Mr.Rajat Malhotra and Mr.Uday
                                             Arora, Advocates
                               versus
   UNION OF INDIA AND ANR.                   ..... Respondents
                 Through: Ms.Manpreet Kaur Bhasin, G.P. for
                           UOI for respondents no.1 and 2.
CORAM:
    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE G.S.SISTANI
    HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI

                               JUDGMENT

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J.

C.M.3474/2020 (exemption) Exemption is allowed subject to just exceptions. Application stands disposed of.

W.P.(C) 1048/2020 The petitioner impugns order dated 07.02.2019 made by the Central Administrative Tribunal ('Tribunal' for short) in M.A. No.3616/2017 in O.A. 2797/2017, whereby the Tribunal has dismissed the petitioner's application seeking condonation of delay of about 6 years in filing the O.A.; and has thereby also dismissed the O.A. as being time-barred. The petitioner also impugns order dated 05.08.2019, whereby M.A. No.2464/2019 seeking condonation of delay in filing a review application has also been rejected by the Tribunal by circulation, on the ground that no sufficient reason has been cited to condone the delay; and as a result, the review application also stands rejected.

2. The genesis of the matter is an application made by the petitioner for appointment to the post of 'Junior Hindi Translator' and 'Hindi Pradhyapak' in different offices/divisions of the Ministry of Defence. The petitioner is aggrieved by letter dated 15.07.2016 whereby the petitioner's candidature in the Scheduled Caste category has been rejected, although according to the petitioner, she was eligible; had qualified the written test; and had even been asked to appear for interview.

3. Since no view was taken by the Tribunal on the merits of the petitioner's contentions and the O.A. as well as the review application have been rejected on point of limitation, we confine our discussion only to the issue of whether the petitioner was entitled to condonation of delay in filing both applications.

On the issue of delay in filing the Original Application

4. It is the petitioner's contention in the present petition, that :

"12. Though the results were never published, successful candidates were apparently called to fill in the vacancies against various posts. The Petitioner never received any communication from the Respondents in this regard and continued to wait for the results. After waiting for about six months, the Petitioner approached the SSC and was informed that the results had been declared and successful candidates had been informed. However, since all appointments had not yet been completed, she should wait as a revised list to include candidates immediate next in line may also to be issued. She was informed that she had a bright chance of being chosen as she had been called for the interview. Further, that she will need to wait for at least a year for all vacancies to be filled up and till such time the SSC could not confirm whether her candidature had actually been rejected as the final result would not be known till filling up of all vacancies.

"13. The Petitioner continued to follow up till during one such follow up an employee of the Respondents checked in the system and inter alia informed her that as against the 3 Post D vacancies to be filled in from eligible SC candidates, while the first selected

candidate had scored 270.75 marks the last selected candidates had secured 234.20. The Petitioner accordingly began efforts to seek information with respect to her total marks to ascertain if she had been successful for the vacancies however no information was forthcoming from the SSC.

"14. During further visits to the SSC over the years it came to the knowledge of the Petitioner that as against 4 vacancies only 3 candidates had been recommended for employment as Junior Hindi Translator in Ministry of Defense (Post D). This kept the Petitioner's hopes alive as one vacancy was yet to be filled in and she continued her efforts to request information with respect to her aggregate marks and the overall results. The Petitioner with great difficulty and after requesting various officers of SSC finally got to know her marks in the two papers and the interview, and accordingly calculated her aggregate to be 265.75. It was at that time that she realized that her marks were much higher than that of the last selected candidate in respect of vacancies for Post D. "15. Since she was eligible for selection as against Post D vacancies as per published qualifying criteria, the Petitioner began doubting herself as to whether she had filled in her state preferences properly and if the same had a bearing on Post D eligibility. She could not fathom the possibility of such a major blunder at the end of the Respondents (SSC). Accordingly, she wrote to Respondent No. 1 on 16.05.2016 assuming that she may not have filled in her State preferences properly while filling in her application form and that she may have not been considered for Post D for that reason, requesting Respondent No. 1 to kindly consider her candidature as she was otherwise successful having scored above the ''cut-off marks for Junior Hindi Translator [i.e.] 234.50".

"16. In the said representation dated 16.05.2016 she requested that her candidature be considered for Post D, especially since one vacancy had remined unfilled during the relevant year. However, no response was received against the said representation. One reminder dated Nil was also submitted to Respondent No. 1 on 27.06.2016 enclosing therewith the earlier representation dated 16.05.2016. In response to the reminder, the SSC through Under Secretary (C-1/2) CPIO informed the Petitioner that ''As per data, you are eligible only for Junior Translators (SCOLS)/JHT (In Subordinate Offices) Examination 2011 (In Subordinate Offices) i.e. Preference 'B'" Further, that since her marks were less than the last selected candidate for Post B, she could not be considered as per provisions of the Employment Notification.

"17. Knowing this information to be incorrect, the Petitioner gave her detailed representation to Respondent No. 1 on 15.09.2016 specifically stating therein that while she was eligible for Post B as also Post D but her application had only been considered for Post B thereby automatically excluding her for the realm of consideration for vacancies against Post D. It was also specifically reiterated that her marks were well above the cut-off and that one vacancy had remained unfilled.

"18. The said representation was also met with a stoic response dated 29.11.2016 wherein it was simply stated that her marks were less than the last selected candidates for Post B. No mention whatsoever were made with regard to SSC's consideration of her eligibility against Post D and reasons for her rejection, if any. It was also not denied that one vacancy against Post D was unfilled. "19. The Petitioner therefore made another representation on 09.01.2017 to Respondent No. 2 in regard to post under reference specifically capturing therein the entire past correspondence. It was highlighted that "Your office again & again is giving reply of preference - B instead of Preference D." It was also submitted that "According to the educational qualification, I am very much eligible the Post Preference - D." The representation was replied to by the Respondents vide letter dated 30.01.2017 stating that "On basis of your educational qualification you were not eligible for selection to any other post preferences (which includes Post Preference D).""

xxxxx xxxxx xxxxx "21. Therefore, the Petitioner filed a complaint dated 21.02.2017 with the Centralized Public Grievance Redress and Monitoring System through the Prime Minister office. The complaint was replied to by the Respondents by restating the Petitioner's qualifications and submitting that though she had applied for all Posts by choosing preference A, B, C, D, E and F, she was not found eligible for Post D as she had failed to produce proof of any Diploma or Certificate Course in any English to Hindi or Hindi to English translation course....."

"22. This prompted the Petitioner-.to file another complaint dated 10.03.2017 with the PMO highlighting in specific the educational qualification required for Post D. Their mistake having been called out, the Respondents deflected the query by simply stating that "all requisite information and reply to all your representations were examined at HQrs and Regional Office NR and reply has been sent

to you in respect of all your representations. No further action is pending on part of SSC." A similar complaint dated 30.03.2017 also met with the same end."

(Emphasis supplied)

5. As is evident from the above, it is the petitioner's contention that from the time she sat her interview on 06.03.2012 up until 30.03.2017, she made a series of complaints and representations to the respondents and other higher authorities; and remained locked in correspondence with them in relation to her grievance. It is of course the petitioner's contention that she had a good case on merits; and that her O.A. ought not to have been dismissed merely on the ground of delay, which delay she says had been duly explained. It is the petitioner's contention that the impugned orders suffer from non-appreciation of the merits of the case and non-application of mind.

6. Ms. Manpreet Kaur Bhasin, learned counsel has entered appearance for the respondents on advance copy; and has opposed the petition.

7. In essence, the petitioner explains the delay between 2012 to 2017 in approaching the Tribunal on the basis that during this period she was engaged in correspondence with the respondents, by making representations and filing complaints. The petitioner urges that the time spent in making such representations/complaints ought not to be counted towards the period of limitation for filing the O.A. before the Tribunal.

8. Opposing the petition, counsel for the respondents submits that making of representations and engaging in correspondence, as the petitioner has done, does not extend the statutorily prescribed period of limitation and cannot be the basis for condoning delay.

9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have considered their rival contentions; and have also perused the relevant case-law.

10. Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 ('Act' for short) prescribes the period of limitation for filing an application before the Tribunal, in the following words :

"21. Limitation.--

(1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,--

(a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made;

(b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where--

(a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and

(b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause

(b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period."

(Emphasis supplied)

11. Section 20 of the Act further mandates that an application would not ordinarily be admitted by the Tribunal unless other administrative

remedies have been exhausted by an applicant. Section 20 of the Act reads as under :

"20. Applications not to be admitted unless other remedies exhausted.--

(1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances,--

(a) if a final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance; or

(b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired.

(3) For the purposes of sub-sections (1) and (2), any remedy available to an applicant by way of submission of a memorial to the President or to the Governor of a State or to any other functionary shall not be deemed to be one of the remedies which are available unless the applicant had elected to submit such memorial."

(Emphasis supplied)

12. While it is only natural for an aggrieved party to attempt a resolution of a grievance by making representations before governmental authorities, hoping for a review of an adverse decision without having to resort to the somewhat arcane and cumbersome procedures of approaching a court or a tribunal, as a matter of legal policy a period of limitation is prescribed under various statutes, for the following purpose, as explained by the Supreme Court1 :

1 N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy: (1998) 7 SCC 123

"11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. The law of limitation fixes a lifespan for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and wasted time would never revisit. During the efflux of time, newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a lifespan must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for launching the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maxim interest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time."

(Emphasis supplied)

13. In the present case, the Act mandates that a proceeding may be filed before the Tribunal within one year :

a. of the date on which a final order is made by the Government or other authority rejecting any appeal or representation made by a person (Section 20(2)(a));

b. after expiration of a period of six months from the date on which an appeal or representation is made, if the Government or other authority has not made a final order on such appeal or representation by that time (Section 20(2)(b)); and c. with the further qualification that the submission of a memorial to the President or Governor or any other functionaries is not deemed to be one of the remedies available to a person, unless the person has elected to submit such memorial.

14. Ergo the Act not only provides a period of limitation under section 21, it also statutorily provides that an application shall not ordinarily be

admitted by a Tribunal unless an aggrieved person has first availed administrative remedies by way of an appeal or representation or memorial. Other things apart, it is also stipulated that an aggrieved person must wait for a period of six months for a final order to be made by the administrative authorities on a representation or appeal, failing which the person would be entitled to approach the Tribunal even if such final order has not been made. Upon a conjoint reading of sections 20 and 21 of the Act, it is evident that a period of six months has already been factored-in, to allow a person to avail administrative remedies by way of appeal or representation; and it is only after a final order is made or, if six months have elapsed, without a final order being made by the administrative authorities, that the limitation period of one year will start running.

15. It is of course true that section 21(3) gives discretion to the Tribunal to admit an application even after the expiration of the limitation period, if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause for not making the application within the stipulated time.

16. The issue at hand has been conclusively settled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs. M.K. Sarkar2, where the Supreme Court was considering a case in which, in the first round, the Tribunal had allowed an O.A. without examining its merits and had directed the governmental authority to consider the applicant's representation. The representation having been rejected, the applicant approached the Tribunal again with the same grievance, but well after

2 2010 (2) SCC 59

the expiration of the period of limitation. In this backdrop in M.K. Sarkar (supra), the Supreme Court observed as under:

"14. The order of the Tribunal allowing the first application of respondent without examining the merits, and directing the appellants to consider his representation has given rise to unnecessary litigation and avoidable complications. The ill-effects of such directions have been considered by this Court in C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining [(2008) 10 SCC 115 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 961] : (SCC pp. 122-23, para 9)

9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly, they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any 'decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realise the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored.

"15. When a belated representation in regard to a "stale" or "dead" issue/dispute is considered and decided, in compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so, the date of such decision cannot be considered as furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the "dead" issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or delay and laches should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches.

16. A court or tribunal, before directing "consideration" of a claim or representation should examine whether the claim or representation is

with reference to a "live" issue or whether it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue. If it is with reference to a "dead" or "stale" issue or dispute, the court/tribunal should put an end to the matter and should not direct consideration or reconsideration. If the court or tribunal deciding to direct "consideration" without itself examining the merits, it should make it clear that such consideration will be without prejudice to any contention relating to limitation or delay and laches. Even if the court does not expressly say so, that would be the legal position and effect."

(Emphasis supplied)

17. While the above discussion and observations of the Supreme Court are with reference to delay caused by reason of the court/tribunal having remitted a matter back to the administrative authorities for considering a representation made by an aggrieved party, the principle laid down is clearly that the question of limitation, or of delay and laches, should be considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which a representation is decided by administrative authorities.

18. Even otherwise, there is no provision of law which provides for extension or exclusion of time spent in making representations to administrative authorities for the purpose of computing the period of limitation or of condonation of delay. To that extent, section 20 of the Act is in fact a salutary provision that expressly affords an opportunity to an aggrieved person to make a representation or an appeal before the administrative authorities; and to exhaust all administrative remedies to that extent, before invoking the formal judicial procedures under the Act. However, even section 20 provides that a representation or an appeal having been made, if the same is not finally decided within a period of six months, an aggrieved person would be entitled to invoke the formal judicial procedure by filing an original application before the

Tribunal. It is accordingly provided that where a representation or appeal made has not been finally decided, the limitation period of one year would be reckoned from the date when such period of six months runs-out.

19. In this view of the matter, there is little scope for contending that an aggrieved person must be granted any further relaxation in the limitation period stipulated under the Act. In the present case, it is seen that the petitioner lingered on making representation upon representation, before multiple administrative authorities including one to the Prime Minister's Office, before invoking her legal remedy by filing the O.A. before the Tribunal.

20. At this point we may also discuss the principles to be applied for considering an application seeking condonation of delay under the general law of the land.

21. In Esha Bhattacharjee Vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others3, the Supreme Court has culled-out the principles to be applied while considering the issue of condonation of delay, while adding some other principles/guidelines taking note of the current scenario, in the following words :

"21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the

3 (2013) 12 SCC 649

fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation.

21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.

21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice.

21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play.

21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

21.11. (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation.

21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial

discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

"22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are:

22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system.

22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto.

22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters."

(Emphasis Supplied)

the underscored principles being our guide for the present case.

22. We may also refer to the precedent cited by the Tribunal while dismissing the O.A. viz. Chennai Metropolitan Vs. T.T. Murali Babu4. This however is a decision on the doctrine of delay and laches in filing a writ petition. Since it is nobody's contention that the present writ petition suffers from delay and laches, we do not think it relevant to discuss this decision.

4 2014 (4) SCC 108

23. On their part, the respondents have cited Pardeep Kumar vs. Union of India and Ors.5, in which a Division Bench of this court had declined to entertain a writ petition filed impugning a rejection letter dated 17.04.2012 since the writ petition was filed on 13.04.2017, that is five years after the impugned letter. The Division Bench accordingly declined to entertain the petition on the ground of delay and laches and also observed that the recruitment process under challenge in that matter was long over; that granting relief in the writ petition would set the clock back by 4-5 years; and that that would lead to administrative difficulty and chaos. The court in that matter also said that the petitioner had failed to explain the long delay of 4-5 years satisfactorily and thereby dismissed the writ petition. Pardeep Kumar (supra) is however again a decision relating to delay and laches; and would not have direct bearing on this case.

24. The respondents have also placed reliance on P.K. Ramachandran vs. State of Kerala and Anr.6 citing the following observations of the Supreme Court in that case:

"6. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous first appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs."

(Emphasis supplied)

5 W.P.(C) 3410/2017 decided on 22.05.2017 6 (1997) 7 SCC 556

On the issue of delay in filing the Review Application

25. On the O.A. being dismissed, the petitioner filed a review application;

and from a reading of impugned order dated 05.08.2019, it would appear that the delay in filing the review application is about 135 days. Since we have considered the issue of delay in filing of O.A. itself, it is not necessary to delve into the question of delay in filing the review application. Accordingly, we refrain from doing so.

26. Based upon the aforecited factual backdrop and judicial precedents, we would crystalize our inferences and conclusions, to say:

(a) that in the present case, to be sure, the issue is not of delay and laches in filing the present writ petition but of inordinate delay of about 6 years in filing the O.A. and of about 135 days in filing the review application before the Tribunal, which is beyond the prescribed period of limitation;

(b) that mere engagement with a governmental authority by filing multiple representations or complaints or appeals, will neither extend limitation; nor would it be permissible to exclude the time spent in making such representations/complaints/appeals for computing the period of limitation under section 21 read with section 20 of the Act. Accordingly, regardless of the reasons why the petitioner spent almost six years in filing and chasing-up on representations and appeals preferred before various administrative authorities; and regardless of the response of the authorities thereto, such period has to be counted towards the delay in filing the O.A. before the Tribunal; by reason of which the Tribunal has correctly held the O.A. to

have been filed way beyond the period of limitation provided under section 21 of the Act.

(c) that since the only cause cited by the petitioner for not filing the O.A. within the one year limitation period prescribed under section 21 is that the petitioner was pursuing her representations/appeals/memorials before various administrative authorities, in view of the settled law as cited and discussed above, this reason cannot be regarded as 'sufficient cause' within the meaning of section 21(3) of the Act for condoning the delay and admitting the application after the period of limitation.

27. In view of the above, the contentions raised by the petitioner cannot be accepted.

28. We therefore see no infirmity in Tribunal's orders dated 07.02.2019 and 05.08.2019; and thereby no reason to interfere with the impugned orders. We accordingly see no reason to entertain the present writ petition in our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

29. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, J

G.S. SISTANI, J JANUARY 28, 2020/ck