Delhi High Court
School Of Planning & Architecture vs P.O.Labour Court, Kkd Court on 17 February, 2020
$~30
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Decided on: 17.02.2020
+ W.P.(C) 4850/2003 & CM APP. 25233/2017
SCHOOL OF PLANNING & ARCHITECTURE...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. R.K. Singh, Adv. with
Ms. Deepa Rai, Adv.
versus
P.O LABOUR COURT, KKD COURT ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Rajiv Agarwal, Adv. with
Ms. Meghna De, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAJMI WAZIRI
NAJMI WAZIRI, J (Oral)
1. This petition impugns the Award dated 02.01.2003, insofar as the
respondent has been directed to be taken back into service with full back
wages. There is no dispute that the workman had worked for six years and
obviously had suffered the agony of trial which lasted for about 12 years.
Her services were illegally terminated i.e. there was no process of due prior
inquiry followed by the termination. That being the position, the learned
Labour Court has rightly held that that the termination was illegal. It
referred to the dicta of this Court in Management of Horticulture
Department, Delhi Administration vs. Trilok Chand, 82 (1999) DLT 747 in
this regard.
2. Admittedly, the management did not comply with the provisions of
section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The respondent was
W.P.(C) 4850/2003
working as a steno-typist when her services were illegally terminated. The
workman has now attained the age of superannuation. The Court finds no
error in the impugned order.
3. The learned counsel for the respondent submits that question of fact
has been duly settled after full trial before learned Industrial Tribunal and
there is no cause for disturbing the settled position. He refers to the dicta
of the Supreme Court in Anoop Sharma vs. Executive Engineer, Public
Health Division No. 1 Panipat (Haryana), Civil Appeal No. 3478/2010
(arising out of SLP (C) No. 17965/2008) decided on 09.04.2010, which
held, inter alia, as under:-
"10. A reading of the impugned order shows that the Division
Bench of the High Court set aside the award of the Labour Court
without even adverting to the fact that challenge to similar award
passed in the cases of other employees was negatived by the High
Court and this Court. We have no doubt that if the Division
Bench had taken the trouble of ascertaining the status of the
disputes raised by other employees, then it would have
discovered that the award of reinstatement of similarly situated
employees has been upheld by the High Court and this Court and
in that event, it may not have passed the impugned order. That
apart, we find that even though the Division Bench did not come
to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the Labour Court
on the issue of non-compliance of Section 25-F of the Act is
vitiated by an error of law apparent on the face of the record, it
allowed the writ petition by assuming that the appellant's initial
engagement/employment was not legal and the respondent had
complied with the conditions of a valid retrenchment. In our
view, the approach adopted by the Division Bench is contrary to
the judicially recognised limitations of the High Court's power to
issue writ of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution -
Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (1964) 5 SCR 64, Municipal
Board, Saharanpur v. Imperial Tobacco of India Ltd. (1999) 1
SCC 566, Lakshmi Precision Screws Ltd. v. Ram Bhagat (2002) 6
W.P.(C) 4850/2003
SCC 552, Mohd. Shahnawaz Akhtar v. Ist ADJ Varanasi JT 2002
(8) SC 69, Mukand Ltd. v. Mukand Staff and Officers'
Association (2004) 10 SCC 460, Dharamraj and others v.
Chhitan and others 2006 (11) SCALE 292 and Assistant
Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock
Exchange Ltd. 2008 (12) SCALE 582.
11. In Syed Yakoob v. K.S. Radhakrishnan (supra), the
Constitution Bench of this Court considered the scope of the
High Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in cases
involving challenge to the orders passed by the authorities
entrusted with quasi judicial functions under the Motor Vehicles
Act, 1939. Speaking for majority of the Constitution Bench,
Gajendragadkar, J. observed as under:
".....................A writ of certiorari can be issued for
correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior
courts or Tribunals; these are cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals without
jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or as a result of failure
to exercise jurisdictions. A writ can similarly be issued
where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the
Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for
instance, it decides a question without giving an
opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the
order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with
the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction
and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an
appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or
Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence
cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the
record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of
fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording
W.P.(C) 4850/2003
the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has
influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding
of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded
as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of
certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases,
however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of
fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in
proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that
the relevant and material evidence adduced before the
Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the
impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of
evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be
drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot
be agitated before a writ court. It is within these limits
that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts
under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be
legitimately exercised."
4. Insofar as the illegal termination has been duly established, there is
no cause for interference with the impugned order.
5. The petition is without merit and is accordingly dismissed.
NAJMI WAZIRI, J
FEBRUARY, 17, 2020
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W.P.(C) 4850/2003
