Delhi High Court
M/S Kss-Kssiipl Consortium vs M/S Gail India Ltd on 30 September, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Reserved on: 30th August, 2019
Decided on: 30th September, 2019
+ CS(COMM) 198/2017 & I.A. 14017/2018 (u/O 1 R 10 CPC by P.)
M/S KSS-KSSIIPL CONSORTIUM
..... Plaintiff
Represented by: Mr. Arun Kumar Varma, Sr. Adv.
with Mr. Abhay Raj Varma,
Mr.Vishal Nautiyal, Advs.
versus
M/S GAIL INDIA LTD
..... Defendant
Represented by: Mr. Sacchin Puri, Sr. Adv. with
Mr.Yoginder Handoo, Mr. Kamil
Khan, Mr. Navroop Singh,
Mr.Sandeep Kumar, Mr. Dhananjay
Grover, Mr. Dhan Singh, Advs.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE MUKTA GUPTA
I.A.10585/2017 (u/O 7 R 11 CPC by D)
1. Plaintiff has filed the present suit claiming that it is a consortium of
M/S JSC OGCC Kazstroyservices (KSS) as the leader and M/S
Kazstroyservices Infrastructure India Pvt. Ltd. as its member. It is the case
of the plaintiff that Engineers India Limited, a project management
consultant and a Government of India undertaking, was appointed by the
defendant as the Engineer in-charge of the project in question i.e. an
approximately 1000 km long pipeline project for transportation and
distribution of RLNG from Dabhol in the State of Maharashtra to Bidadi in
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 1 of 16
the State of Karnataka by the defendant. The said tender was floated in June
2010 and the entire work of tender was divided into 10 Spreads 'A' to 'J'.
The pipeline was to traverse via 18 National Highways, 382 roads, 20
railway tracks, 11 major rivers and 276 water bodies. The plaintiff
participated in the tender and the defendant issued two separate faxes for
acceptance both dated 6th October, 2010 based on the rates quoted by the
plaintiff for Spread 'D' and Spread 'J respectively. On 30th December, 2010
the plaintiff sent to the defendant duly signed and executed contract
agreement dated 30th December, 2010 independently for Spread 'D' and
Spread 'J'.
2. That during the course of execution of work, certain issues were
raised by the plaintiff claiming various amounts from the defendant which
were refuted. The claims, inter alia, related to extra expenditure incurred by
the plaintiff during the extended period of contract beyond 5 th February,
2012, the originally stipulated date of completion of project both for Spread
'D' and 'J'. The plaintiff filed a petition under Section 11(6) of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
and the two petitions being Arbitration (Civil) No. 36/2014 and 38/2014
were decided by a common order dated 12th February, 2015. It is the case of
the plaintiff that in so far as disputes/ claims related to the period beyond 5 th
February, 2012 (i.e. extended stay beyond the contractual period), the
Supreme Court held that the same was not an arbitral dispute under the
terms and conditions of the contract and therefore could not be referred to
arbitration. Hence, the plaintiff filed the present suit limited to its claim on
account of various costs, expenses, losses and damages incurred by it during
the aforesaid extended stay beyond the contractual period only.
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 2 of 16
3. By this application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC case of the
defendant is that the two petitions before the Supreme Court clearly dealt
with the issue and in view of the fact that the plaintiff in its tender
documents had not claimed any amount for the extended stay beyond the
contractual period noting 'NIL' in the said column, the Supreme Court held
that in view of the no claim of the plaintiff on that count, the said purported
dispute could not be referred to arbitration. Hence the present suit is not
maintainable. To support his arguments that there being no dispute, the suit
is liable to be dismissed for want of cause of action, learned counsel for the
defendant relies upon the decision of the Supreme Court dated 12th
February, 2015 as also the decision reported as AIR 1963 SC 1405 Fateh
Chand Vs. Balkishan Dass to claim that the plaintiff cannot even claim
compensation under Section 74 of the Contract Act.
4. Learned counsel for the defendant also contends that the claim of the
plaintiff that the decision of the Supreme Court dated 12th February, 2015
has no application to the present suit deserves to be rejected for the reason
the plaintiff himself states that the cause of action finally arose when the
Supreme Court passed the order dated 12th February, 2015. In case the
passing of the order by the Hon'ble Supreme Court does not give rise to a
cause of action, the present suit filed by the plaintiff is barred by limitation
and liable to be rejected on the said ground itself.
5. During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the defendant
also challenged the maintainability of the present suit on the ground that the
present suit has been filed by a consortium which is akin to a partnership
firm and since the same is an unregistered partnership, the suit was not
maintainable. However, in view of the application of the plaintiff I.A.
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 3 of 16
14017/2018 under Order I Rule 10 CPC, this Court will not be adverting to
the said issue in the present application.
6. Learned counsel for the plaintiff contends that the order of the
Supreme Court dated 12th February, 2015 merely held that dispute with
regard to the extended stay beyond contractual period was not an arbitrable
dispute, however the said order does not foreclose the right of the plaintiff to
seek its claim by way of filing a civil suit. Further an order passed by the
Supreme Court in an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 does not operate as a res-judicata as the same is not a
judgment deciding the lis between the parties. Reliance is placed on the
decisions in (2005) 8 SCC 618 SBP & Co. Vs. Patel Engineering Ltd. &
Anr., (2015) 1 SCC 32 State of West Bengal & Ors. Vs. Associated
Contractors, (2013) 9 SCC 438 Ramji Gupta & Anr. Vs. Gopi Krishan
Agrawal (dead) & Ors., (2016) 2 SCC 200) City Municipal Council Bhalki
Vs. Gurappa (dead) by LR & Anr. and (2013) 15 SCC 655 Erach Boman
Khavar Vs. Tukaram Shridhar Bhat & Anr. Referring to the decision of this
Court reported as 2010 (115) DRJ 616 Simplex Concrete Piles (India) Ltd.
Vs. Union of India it is contended that rights created under Section 73 and
55 of the Contract Act cannot be waived.
7. Before proceeding further it would be appropriate to note Clause 42
of the Special Conditions of Contract, as applicable to the contract between
the parties, which reads as under:
"42.0 COMPENSATION FOR EXTENDED STAY
42.1 The clause No.87(vi) of GCC is modified to the following
extent:
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 4 of 16
42.1.1 In case the time of completion of work is delayed
beyond the time schedule indicated in the bidding
document plus a grace period equivalent to 1/5th of the
time schedule or 10 weeks whichever is more, due to
reasons solely attributable to Employer/ Consultant, the
contractor shall be paid extended stay compensation in
order to maintain necessary organizational set up and
construction tools, tackles, equipments etc. at site of
work. The bidder shall mention the rate for such
extended stay compensation per month in the 'priced
part' which will be considered for evaluation. The
period for the purpose of evaluation shall be 1/5th of the
time schedule for 1 (one) month whichever is less.
42.1.2 In case bidder does not indicate the rate for extended
stay compensation as per the proforma in Priced Part, it
will be presumed that no extended stay compensation is
required to be paid to the contractor.
42.1.3 In case the completion of work is delayed beyond a
period of one month after the grace period then both the
Employer/Consultant and the Contractor shall mutually
decide the future course of action including payment of
further extended stay compensation.
42.1.4 Bidder to note that in case they don't indicate the rate
for extended stay compensation as per proforma,
provisions of clause No.42.0 will not be applicable for
them."
8. The detailed letter of acceptance dated 30th December, 2010 for
Spread 'D' issued by the defendant and duly signed and returned by the
plaintiff in respect of summary of prices of Spread 'D' reads as under:
"Name of Work: Pipeline Laying and Terminal Works for
Dabhol - Bangalore Pipeline Project of
GAIL (India) Limited
Bidding Document No. A027/T-170/09-10/RKS/02
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 5 of 16
NAME of contractor M/S KSS-KSSIIPL CONSORTIUM
S.No. Description Price in Indian Rupees (INR)
In figure In words
1. Total of quoted price for EGP & 63,17,946.00 Sixty Three Lakh
Corrosion Monitoring system Seventeen Thousand
Nine Hundred Forty Six
Only.
2. Total of quoted price for Mechanical 2,60,000.00 Two Lakh Sixty Thousand
Eqpt Works only
3. Total of quoted price for General 4,42,73,511.00 Four Crore Forty Two
Civil Works Lakh Seventy Three
Thousand Five Hundred
Eleven Only.
4. Total of quoted price for structural 4,81,06,650.00 Four Crore Eighty One
works Lakh Six Thousand Six
Hundred Fifty Only.
5. Total of quoted price for Architecture 1,49,54,310.00 One Crore Forty Nine
Works Lakh Fifty Four
Thousand Three
Hundred Ten Only.
6. Total of quoted price for Electrical 1,39,95,855.00 One Crore Thirty Nine
works Lakh Ninety Five
Thousand Eight Hundred
Fifty Five Only.
7. Total of quoted price for 1,48,43,910.00 One Crore Forty Eight
Instrumentation Works Lakh Forty Three
Thousand Nine Hundred
Ten only.
8. Total of quoted price for Pipelines 64,01,98,261.00 Sixty Four Crore One
Works (including optional items) Lakh Ninety Eight
Thousand Two Hundred
Sixty One only.
8a. Total price for Optional Items 28,13,000.00 Twenty Eight Lakh
Thirteen Thousand only.
9. Gross total amount of all above 78,01,37,443.00 Seventy Eight Crore One
(inclusive of all Taxes, duties & Lakh Thirty Seven
levies except service tax and optional Thousand Four Hundred
items Forty Three only.
(Sr. No. 1+2+3+4+5+6+7+8+8a)
10. Rebate offered on total of quoted NIL
price (Sr.No.9) above (which will be
applicable on each item of Schedule
of Rates)
11. Amount of Rebate as per Sr. No. 10 NIL
above
12. Net Total price (9-11) (After 78,01,37,443.00 Seventy Eight Crore One
considering rebate indicated at Sr. Lakh Thirty Seven
No.10) Thousand Four Hundred
Forty Three only.
13. Amount of service tax under 3,21,41,662.65 Three Crore Twenty One
composite scheme @ 4.12% Lakh Forty One
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 6 of 16
(including cess) (presently applicable Thousand Six Hundred
rate) on the net total price indicated Sixty Two & Paise Sixty
at Sl.No.12 above Five only.
14. Gross Total price for Spread D 81,22,79,105.65 Eighty One Crore
(Sl.No. 12 + 13 above) Twenty Two Lakh
Seventy Nine Thousand
One Hundred Five &
Paise Sixty Five only.
15. Amount of service tax under 4,47,67,920.00 Four Crore Forty Seven
composite scheme @ 4.12% Lakh Sixty Seven
(including cess) (Presently applicable Thousand Nine Hundred
rate) on free issue material of amount Twenty only.
INR 1086.60 Million
"
9. Further the agreement qua the extended stay compensation for Spread
'D' in the detailed letter of acceptance dated 30th December, 2010 notes as
under:
"Name of Work: Pipeline Laying and Terminal Works for
Dabhol - Bangalore Pipeline Project of
GAIL (India) Limited
Bidding Document No. A027/T-170/09-10/RKS/02
NAME of contractor M/S KSS-KSSIIPL CONSORTIUM
S.No. Description RATE
1.0 Rate of Extended stay compensation per NIL
Month beyond the Time Schedule and grace
period mentioned in Bidding Document for
reasons solely attributable to Employer.
"
10. Though in the plaint, plaintiff has made out that the project related to
various Sections bifurcated as Spreads 'A' to 'J', however as noted above,
the summary of prices agreed and the extended stay compensation now
claimed both relate to the Spread 'D'. Further, the rate of extended stay
compensation per month beyond the time schedule and grace period
mentioned in bidding document for reasons solely attributable to employer
was noted as 'NIL'.
CS(COMM) 198/2017 Page 7 of 16
11. As per the case of the plaintiff itself after disputes arose between the
plaintiff and defendant it filed two petitions before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in respect of its different claims which were decided by the common
order dated 12th February, 2015. Relevant Paras of the order dated 12th
February, 2015 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Arbitration Case
No. 36/2014 and 38/2014 arising from two separate agreements between the
parties, are as under:
"6. According to the petitioner, on account of the delays due
to the aforesaid reasons, the petitioner became entitled for
extended stay compensation in terms of Clause 42 of the SCC
read with clause 12 of the detailed letter of acceptance. Apart
from extended stay compensation, the petitioner claims to be
entitled for payment for additional works undertaken during the
course of execution of contracts. On 4th January, 2013 and 5th
July, 2013, the petitioner submitted its claim to the respondent
for ₹34,70,11,907/- (Rupees Thirty Four Crore Seventy Lacs
Eleven thousand Nine Hundred and seven only) [In Arbitration
Petition (Civil) No.36 of 2014] and for ₹1,79,23,83,208/-
(Rupees one Arab Seventy Nine Crore Twenty Three Lacs
Eighty Three thousand Two hundred and Eight only) [In
Arbitration Petition (Civil) No.38 of 2014] respectively. The
petitioner alleges that the respondent rejected the said claims
which was not acceptable to the petitioner. The petitioner,
thereafter, invoked clause 40.2 of the General Conditions of
Contract which provides for conciliation. As the petitioner's
proposal for conciliation was rejected by the respondent, the
petitioner had no option but to invoke the Arbitration Clause
(Clause 59) and seek appointment of a sole arbitrator in respect
of the disputes arising from each of the two agreements. The
said demand was repeated in several communications which
were not responded to. The petitioner, therefore, has lodged the
present applications under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act
for the reliefs earlier noticed.
7. The claims made by the petitioner have been resisted by
the respondent by filing separate counter affidavits in both the
cases. A reading of the affidavits filed by the respondent
indicate that insofar as the claim for extended stay
compensation is concerned, the respondent contend that the
said claim does not give rise to any arbitrable issue inasmuch
as under 42.1.1 the bidder is required to mention the rate for
extended stay compensation per month in the "Priced Part".
Under Clause 42.1.2 in case the bidder did not indicate such
rate it is to be presumed that no extended stay compensation is
required to be paid. Under Clause 42.1.4 it was expressly
mentioned that "Bidder to note that in case they don't indicate
the rate for extended stay compensation as per proforma,
provisions of clause No.42.0 will not be applicable to them".
According to the respondent in the relevant proforma relating
to "Compensation for Extended stay", the petitioner had
mentioned/ quoted "NIL". Thus, according to the clauses
42.1.2 and 42.1.4, no extended stay compensation is required to
be paid to the petitioner. The above position was also expressly
stated in clause 12 of the detailed Letter of acceptance dated
13th December, 2010, which is in the following terms:
"12.0 COMPENSATION FOR EXTENDED STAY
Extended stay compensation is
not applicable and shall not be
payable to the Contractor as per
clause No.42.0 of Special
Conditions of Contract.
8. According to the respondent, the aforesaid clause was
further amplified in Annexure-1 to the said detailed letter of
acceptance which was not placed before the Court though the
detailed letter of acceptance dated 13th December, 2010 formed
a part of the petitions filed by the petitioner.
9. Insofar as the claim of payments for additional works is
concerned, according to the respondent, clause 91.0 of the GCC
deals with such claims. Clause 91.1 and 91.2 contemplate that
such claims will be verified by the Engineer-in-charge whose
decision will be final. The respondent further states that the
claims made by the petitioner for additional costs had been
rejected by the Engineer-in-charge and in terms of clause 91.2
of the GCC such a decision(s) must be construed to be final and
binding between the parties and therefore would stand excluded
from arbitration.
10. There can be no manner of doubt that before exercising
the power under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act to make
appointment of an arbitrator the Court will have to decide on
the existence of an arbitrable dispute/ enforceable claim by and
between the parties to the contract. The existence of a claim
and denial thereof giving rise to a dispute is required to be
determined on the basis of what the parties had agreed upon as
embodied in the terms of the contract and only for the purpose
of a decision on the question of arbitrability and nothing
beyond. It is from the aforesaid standpoint that the issues
raised in the present proceedings will have to be considered.
11. Clause 42.0 deals with "Compensation for extended
stay". Under clause 42.1.1 the contractor is required to
mention the rate for extended stay of compensation in the event
the contract is to be prolonged/extended beyond the
contemplated date of completion. Clause 42.1.2 and 42.1.4 of
the SCC contemplate that in the event the contractor/bidder
does not indicate the rate of extended stay, it will be presumed
that no extended stay compensation is required to be paid. In
the present case, admittedly, the petitioner had quoted "NIL"
against compensation for extended stay in its bid. If that is so,
it must be understood that the petitioner had agreed to forego
its claim to extended stay compensation in the event the period
of performance of the contract is to be extended as had
happened in the present case. This position was conveyed to
the petitioner by the letter of acceptance dated 13 th December,
2010. The petitioner did not raise any objection on the
aforesaid score. If the petitioner had voluntarily and
consciously agreed to the above situation, it will be difficult to
accept the contrary position that has sought to be now adopted
by seeking to claim extended stay compensation which was
earlier agreed to be foregone. It must therefore be held that the
claim against the aforesaid 'Head' i.e. 'extended stay
compensation' does not give rise to an arbitrable dispute so as
to permit/require reference to arbitration under clause 59. "
12. A bare perusal of the decision of the Supreme Court reveals that the
plaintiff having claimed 'NIL' compensation for "the extended stay
compensation", Supreme Court held that the same was not a dispute and
could not be referred to arbitration. Noting that before exercising power
under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration Act to make appointment of an
arbitrator, the Court has to decide on the existence of an arbitrable dispute/
enforceable claim by and between the parties to the contracts and in the light
of the plaintiff quoting 'NIL' against compensation for extended stay in its
bid, it must be understood that the plaintiff had agreed to forego its claim to
the extended stay compensation in the event period of performance of
contract was to be extended, as had happened in the present case. This
position having been conveyed to the plaintiff by the letter of acceptance
dated 30th December, 2010 and the plaintiff having not raised any objection
on the said score and had voluntarily and consciously agreed to the said
situation, it would be difficult to accept the contrary position that was sought
to be adopted by seeking a claim of extended stay compensation which was
earlier agreed to be foregone. It was on these findings that the Supreme
Court held that it was not an arbitrable dispute and no arbitration on that
count was required.
13. Learned counsel for the plaintiff has laid great emphasis on the fact
that the finding of the Supreme Court in its order dated 12 th February, 2015
would neither be binding nor operate as res-judicata. In SBP and company
(supra) the Constitution Bench laid down the scope of decision in an
application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act. It was held that the
power exercised by the Chief Justice of India or the Chief Justice of the
High Court under Section 11(6) of the Act is not an administrative power
but a judicial power. It is not disputed that the parties before the Supreme
Court were same. The lis between the parties was reference of the disputes
between the parties to the arbitration. The contract in question was also the
one before this Court and on the basis thereof the Supreme Court held that
as the plaintiff had quoted 'NIL' against "compensation for extended stay"
in its bid, it must be understood that the plaintiff has agreed to forego its
claim to extended stay compensation in the event the period of performance
of the contract is to be extended as has happened in the present case.
Decision of the Supreme Court dated 12th February, 2015 to the extent of
existence of disputes between the parties would operate as res-judicata as it
satisfies all the tests for applicability of the principles of res-judicata.
14. Further, the plaintiff in its cause of action seeks extended period of
limitation based on the fact that the cause of action last arose on 12 th
February, 2015 when the Hon'ble Supreme Court ordered that the claim
raised by the plaintiff was not capable of being adjudicated in arbitration
under the contract between the parties. In case the decision of the Supreme
Court has no relevance and the plaintiff was entitled to seek compensation
for breach of contract, then the present suit has been instituted beyond the
period of limitation.
15. Learned counsel for the plaintiff in the alternative claims that de-hors
the finding of the Supreme Court, the plaintiff is entitled to lay a claim
against the defendant for the extended stay compensation under Section 73
and 55 of the Contract Act and liable to prove the same in a civil suit. He
relies upon the decision of this Court in Simplex Concrete Piles (supra) in
this regard.
16. Sections 55 and 73 of the Contract Act read as under:
"55. Effect of failure to perform at a fixed time, in contract in
which time is essential. --When a party to a contract
promises to do a certain thing at or before a specified time, or
certain things at or before specified times, and fails to do any
such thing at or before the specified time, the contract, or so
much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the
option of the promisee, if the intention of the parties was that
time should be of the essence of the contract.
Effect of such failure when time is not essential. --If it
was not the intention of the parties that time should be of the
essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable
by the failure to do such thing at or before the specified time;
but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor
for any loss occasioned to him by such failure.
Effect of acceptance of performance at time other than
that agreed upon. --If, in case of a contract voidable on
account of the promisor's failure to perform his promise at the
time agreed, the promisee accepts performance of such promise
at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim
compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance
of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such
acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do
so.
73. Compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of
contract. --When a contract has been broken, the party who
suffers by such breach is entitled to receive, from the party who
has broken the contract, compensation for any loss or damage
caused to him thereby, which naturally arose in the usual
course of things from such breach, or which the parties knew,
when they made the contract, to be likely to result from the
breach of it.
Such compensation is not to be given for any remote and
indirect loss or damage sustained by reason of the breach.
Compensation for failure to discharge obligation
resembling those created by contract. --When an obligation
resembling those created by contract has been incurred and has
not been discharged, any person injured by the failure to
discharge it is entitled to receive the same compensation from
the party in default, as if such person had contracted to
discharge it and had broken his contract. "
17. The precursor for application of Section 73 of the Contract Act is a
breach of contract. As noted above, in the contract between the parties the
plaintiff while bidding did not claim any compensation on the said count.
Hence there cannot be any breach of contract between the parties on that
count permitting compensation under Section 73 of the Contract Act.
Section 55 of the Contract Act also provides that in a contingency where the
contract has to be performed in a fixed time and on failure to perform in the
fixed time, when the time is essential, the claimant would be entitled to sue
for the same.
18. In Simplex Concrete Piles relied upon by the counsel this Court was
dealing with issue whether a contract clause can disentitle a person from
claiming damages which a person is otherwise entitled to under law. In the
said decision this Court considered the two decisions of the Supreme Court
in Ramnath International Construction (P) Ltd. Vs. Union of India (2007) 2
SCC 453 and Asian Techs Limited Vs. Union of India and Others (2009) 10
SCC 354. In Simplex concrete Piles (supra) this Court was dealing with
Clauses 11(a) to 11(c) of the Contract therein which provided that if time
was essence of the contract and was specified in the contract document or
any individual work order and there is a delay on account of force majeure,
abnormal weather, serious loss or damage by fire, civil commotion etc. or
due to the non-availability of the Government source or breakdown of
government tools and plants etc. no claim in respect of compensation or
otherwise for extension of time would be granted. Interpreting these
clauses, the learned Single Judge of this Court held that a contract which can
be broken at will, will destroy the very edifice of the Contract Act and it
therefore is a matter of public policy that the sanctity of the contracts and the
bindingness thereof should be given precedence over the entitlement to
breach the same by virtue of contractual clauses with no remedy to the
aggrieved party.
19. In Simplex Concrete (supra) this Court clarified that if there is a
public policy or public interest element involved, then the rights under
Section 73 and 55 of the Contract Act cannot be exercised. In the present
case if the plaintiff had claimed compensation on account of extended stay
compensation, the same would have impacted the financial bid inter-se the
parties and having tried to take advantage on that count, the plaintiff cannot
now turn around and ask for compensation on the said count.
20. As noted above, the claim sought by the plaintiff is not in breach of
the contract, the plaintiff on its own volition having given up its claim on the
said count. Further as noted above, based on the contract between the
parties wherein the plaintiff agreed 'NIL' compensation on the extended
stay, Supreme Court has already held that the said dispute could not be
referred to arbitration as the plaintiff had voluntarily and consciously agreed
to the said situation and cannot be now permitted to adopt a contrary
position seeking to claim extended stay compensation.
21. In view of the discussion aforesaid, this Court is clearly of the opinion
that the present suit is liable to be rejected for want of cause of action.
Accordingly, the application is allowed and the plaint is rejected.
CS(COMM) 198/2017
Plaint having been rejected in terms of the decision in I.A.10585/2017
(u/O 7 R 11 CPC by D), the Suit is dismissed.
I.A. 14017/2018 (u/O 1 R 10 CPC by P.)
Dismissed as infructuous.
(MUKTA GUPTA)
JUDGE
SEPTEMBER 30, 2019
'ga'
