M/S Vashisht Infratech Pvt. Ltd. & ... vs State & Anr.
2019 Latest Caselaw 5733 Del

*     IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

%                               Judgment Reserved On: 03.09.2019
                              Judgment Pronounced On: 19.11.2019

+       W.P.(CRL) 1280/2019

        M/S VASHISHT INFRATECH PVT. LTD. & ORS.
                                                         ..... Petitioners
                           Through:     Mr. Rajesh Ranjan, Mr. Attin
                                        Rastogi, Mr. Shiv Kumar, Mr.
                                        R. K. Singh, Ms. Beauty
                                        Singh and Mr. Randeep
                                        Punder, Advs.
                           versus
        STATE & ANR
                                                       ..... Respondents
                           Through:     Ms. Sanjay Lao, ASC for
                                        State with Mr. Karan Jeet Rai
                                        Sharma with SI Vinod Yadav
                                        from EOW.
                                        Mr. Sunil Dalal and Mr.
                                        Vivek Jain, Adv. For R-2

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BRIJESH SETHI

                           JUDGMENT

BRIJESH SETHI, J

1. This is a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of

India r/w. Section 482Cr.P.C. filed by the petitioners for quashing of

FIR No.0767/15 u/s 420/468/471/34/120B IPC, PS Najafgarh, New

Delhi.

2. While praying for quashing of FIR, the petitioner has pleaded

that petitioner no.1 who is a Pvt. Ltd. company through its

Director/AR Mr. Karan Vashishta @ Madhup Vashisht i.e.

petitioner no.2 availed a Cash Credit Limit of Rs.2.97 Crore from

the respondent no.2 bank vide A/C no. 1519008700002005 and due

to financial crunch the petitioner no.1 failed to deposit the amount in

time.

3. It is further submitted that bank official filed a complaint

against the petitioners no.1 to 4 and on the basis of a complaint filed

by the Principal Officer G.L. Arora, Chief Manager, Punjab

National Bank and an FIR bearing no. 0767/2015, U/Sec

420/468/471/34/120-B IPC, P.S. Najafgarh was registered.

Thereafter, the case was transferred to EOW Mandir Marg, N. Delhi

and the same is pending investigation.

4. It is submitted that petitioners have settled the account with

the Bank by One Time Settlement (OTS) and the bank has adjusted

the same in the account of petitioner no.1 on 30.12.2017 and issued

'No Outstanding Due Certificate' on 19.01.2018 to the petitioner

no.1 and thus, nothing remains unsettled between them and since

there is no grievances pending between them, it is, therefore, prayed

that FIR bearing No.0767/15, u/s 420/468/471/34/120B IPC, PS

Najafgarh, New Delhi be quashed.

5. On the other hand, Ld. APP for the state has opposed the

petition and submitted that M/s. Vashisht Infratech Pvt. Ltd. availed

the cash credit facility of Rs. 2.97 Crores through its directors

namely Madhup @ Karan Vashisht and Sunil Kumar Singh by

mortgaging two properties i.e. (1) Flat no. 803, Block-B-1 (M),

Pitam Pura, Delhi and (2) Flat No. 102, Block B-1 (M), Pitam Pura,

Delhi and on 12.05.2014, Madhup @ Karan Vashisht wrote a letter

to the Bank regarding change of existing collateral/ mortgage

security with new one and petitioners changed their collateral/

mortgage security with the document of a third property i.e. H. No.

32, Pocket No. 5A, Sector-25, Rohini, Delhi.

6. Ld. APP for the State has submitted that during investigation

certified copy of conveyance deeds of all the three properties were

taken from the office of Sub-Registrar and it was found that all

three conveyance deed submitted by the accused persons are

forged as photographs are different than the photographs of

certified copies. He further submitted that petitioners Karan @

Madhup Vashisht and Sunil Kumar Singh had joined the

investigation and stated that they submitted forged documents in the

complainant bank and all the documents of above mentioned three

properties were prepared by one of their friend namely Sunil @

Samunder Chikkara and, thereafter, Section 467 IPC was added in

the case. During investigation, it came into notice that Sunil @

Samunder Chikkara has expired on 12.04.2019. It is submitted that

petitioners have submitted forged documents for obtaining loan

from PNB, Najafgarh. The forged papers pertain to the property

owned by Ms. Shikha Prasad, Suneet Mishra and Dr. Naveen

Bansal and as per their submission they had never mortgaged

the property neither they knew the petitioners. He further

submitted that petitioners have used forged documents for

procuring loan of Rs. 2.97 Crore and have settled the loan for

Rs. 1.25 crore only.

7. I have considered the rival submissions and also gone through

the record. A case FIR No.0767/2015 under Sections

420/468/471/120-B/34 IPC was registered at PS Najafgarh on 20th

September, 2015 on the basis of statement made by complainant Sh.

G.L. Arora, Principal Officer/ Chief Manager, Punjab National

Bank, New Delhi. Section 467 IPC was added later on.

8. In the decision reported as Parbathhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai

Bhimsinhbhai Karmur & Ors. Vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.,Crl. A.

No. 1723 of 2017, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has discussed the

scope and power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to

quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement in a

heinous/serious offence has been dealt with.

(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere in the High Court;

(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a First Information Report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for

the purpose of compounding an offence.

While compounding an offence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;

(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court;

(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated;

(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to

continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences;

(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute;

(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions (viii) and

(ix) above. Economic offences involving the financial and economic well-being of the state have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the balance.(emphasis supplied)

9. In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab &

Anr.,(2014)6SCC466, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that in

respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the state to

punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale

for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement,

the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the

interest of society that the offender should be punished to deter

others from committing a similar crime.

10. Thus, in view of the above law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, criminal proceedings cannot be quashed by

invoking the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 CrPC.

11. In the case in hand, it is the case of the petitioner that they

have settled the account with the Bank/respondent no.2 in One Time

Settlement (OTS) and the bank has adjusted the amount paid by

them in the account of the petitioner no.1 on 30.12.2017. The facts

of the case reveal a very well planned criminal conspiracy vide

which bank has been cheated by taking a loan/cash credit limit on

the basis of forged documents. The appellants were beneficiary of a

sum of Rs. 2.97 Crore by committing offence of cheating and

forgery and have only paid back an amount of Rs. 1.25 Crore to the

bank. They are in fact still beneficiary of an amount of Rs. 1.72

Crore. Thus, a wrongful loss has been caused to the bank to the

tune of Rs. 1.72 Crores approximately and a wrongful gain to the

petitioners has accrued on account of above settlement of loan/cash

credit facility on the basis of forged documents. The offences

alleged against the petitioners are serious and grave in nature and it

affects the public at large and economy of the nation. One of the

offence u/s 467 IPC is punishable with life and shows the magnitude

of the alleged offence committed by the applicants. In such

circumstances and in view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, this court cannot allow the Writ Petition praying for

quashing of FIR no. 0767/15 u/s 420/468/471/34/120B IPC

registered at PS Najafgarh, New Delhi.

12. Ld. Counsel for the petitioner has, however, relied upon 'CBI

vs. Sadhu Ram Singla & Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 396/2017,

arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 1010 of 2012, decided on

23.02.2017.

13. I have considered the above judgment. In the said case, the

petitioners were charged with offences u/s. 420/471 IPC read with

Section 120-B of IPC. However, as discussed above, the petitioners

in this case have been charged with offences under Section

420/467/468/471/34/120-B IPC. There are serious allegations that

on the basis of forged documents, the loan was obtained by the

petitioners. One of the offence under Section 467 IPC for which the

petitioners are charged is punishable with a sentence up to life.

Thus, the facts of the present case are clearly distinguishable and the

authority cited by Ld. Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, does not

help the petitioners.

14. In view of the above discussion, the petitioners cannot be let

off under the garb of a resolution of a One Time Settlement. The

petition for quashing of FIR bearing no. 0767/15 u/s

420/467/468/471/34/120B IPC, PS Najafgarh, New Delhi, is,

therefore, dismissed.

15. The petition stand disposed of accordingly.

BRIJESH SETHI, J.

November, 19, 2019 (AP & Dh.)