Delhi High Court
Beejakshree Varman vs M/S Worlds Window Impex India Pvt ... on 28 May, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Order: May 28, 2019
+ CRL.M.C. 4571/2017
+ CRL.M.C. 4587/2017
+ CRL.M.C. 4588/2017
+ CRL.M.C. 4589/2017
+ CRL.M.C. 4590/2017
+ CRL.M.C. 2817/2018
BEEJAKSHREE VARMAN ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Akshay Singh and Ms.Tosha
Singh, Advocates
Versus
M/S WORLDS WINDOW IMPEX INDIA PVT LTD.....
Respondent
Through: Mr.A.K. Babbar & Mr. Surinder
Kumar, Advocates
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
In the above captioned six petitions, quashing of six complaints
under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the
summoning orders is sought on the ground that the allegations levelled
against petitioner are vague and that petitioner had resigned as Director of
the accused-company on 19th July, 2014.
With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the above
captioned petitions have been heard together and are being disposed of by
this common order while treating Crl.M.C. 4571/2017 as lead case.
Petitioner's counsel submitted that no specific allegation has been
levelled against petitioner in the complaint under Section 138 of The
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and Form No.DIR-11 has been
downloaded from the official website, Ministry of Corporate Affairs and
perusal of this form (Annexure P-6) reveals that effective date of
petitioner's resignation was 19th July, 2014 and the cheques have been
issued in August and September, 2014. Reliance was placed upon
Supreme Court's decision in Pooja Ravinder Devidasani Vs. State of
Maharashtra and Ors.Anr. (2014) 16 SCC 1 to submit that the
complainant in such types of complaints is required to show as to how
and in what manner a Director of accused- company was responsible for
the conduct of the business of the company, which has not been done in
the instant cases and so, the impugned complaints and the summoning
orders qua petitioner deserve to be set aside.
On the contrary, learned counsel for respondent-complainant had
drawn attention of this Court to paragraph No.2 of the complaints in
question to point out that petitioner was very much party to the
negotiating of price while placing orders for purchase of aluminium foils
and that the purported resignation of petitioner was sent by the accused-
company to the Registrar of Companies on 18th October, 2014 i.e. after
the issuance of cheques in question. It is submitted that the pleas raised
by the petitioner herein are required to be tested at trial and so, these
petitions deserve dismissal.
The submissions advanced by counsel for the parties have been
duly considered and on scrutiny of the complaints in question,
summoning orders passed under Section 138 of The Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881 and the decision cited, I find that petitioner is
sought to be arrayed as an accused vicariously. It is a matter of record
that petitioner had resigned as Director of accused-Company on 19th July,
2014 and as per acknowledgment of resignation (Annexure P-5 colly),
petitioner's resignation was duly accepted. There is no basis to conclude
that the resignation of petitioner from accused-company was sent to
Registrar of Companies on 18th October, 2014 i.e. after issuance of
cheques in question. A document dated 4th August, 2018 showing
Designated Partner Details of accused-Company issued by Ministry of
Corporate Affairs placed on record by respondent's counsel shows that
the date of cessation of petitioner from accused-company is 19th July,
2014, whereas cheques in question were issued on 30th August, 2014; 3rd
September, 2014 and 5th September, 2014. It is relevant to note that
dishonouring of cheques in question is of November/ December, 2014.
Even otherwise, petitioner cannot be made vicariously liable because in
the complaints in question, no specific allegation have been levelled
against petitioner. Supreme Court in Pooja Ravinder Devidasani (supra)
has reiterated that mere verbatim reproduction of words of Section
without a clear statement of fact is not enough to make a person
vicariously liable. To make a Director of Company liable for the offence
committed by the company under Section 141 of The Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, there has to be a specific averment against a
Director, showing as to how and in what manner the Director was
responsible for the conduct of business of the company.
Upon considering the case of petitioner in its totality, this Court is
of the considered opinion that summoning of petitioner in the complaints
in question is wholly unwarranted. Consequentially, impugned
complaints under Section 138 of The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
and summoning orders qua petitioner are hereby quashed.
These petitions are accordingly disposed of while making it clear
that any observation made herein shall have no bearing on merits of the
case qua petitioner's co-accused.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
MAY 28, 2019
neelam/r
