Citation : 2019 Latest Caselaw 403 Del
Judgement Date : 22 January, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ RFA No. 842/2016
% 22nd January, 2019
SURESH CHANDER ..... Appellant
Through: Mr. Ashok Gupta and Ms.
Laxmi Gupta, Advocates
(Mobile No. 9810309723).
versus
DURGA DUTTA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. R.K. Somkiya, Advocate
for R-1 and 6 (Mobile No.
9810124896).
Mr. Rahul Gupta, Advocate for
R-2 (Mobile No. 9145487483).
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J. MEHTA
To be referred to the Reporter or not?
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J (ORAL)
1. This Regular First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC) is filed by the plaintiff in the suit
impugning the Judgment of the trial court dated 09.09.2016 by which
the trial court has rejected the suit plaint as barred by limitation and
the trial court has also held that the appellant/plaintiff has no locus
standi to file the suit.
2. The facts of the case are that the appellant/plaintiff is a
handicapped person, but is appointed as a Head Constable with the
Delhi Police. The plaint filed by the appellant/plaintiff seeks the
reliefs of permanent injunction and declaration stating that he was
allotted plot no. 79, Pocket-3, Sector 25, Rohini, Delhi by the Delhi
Development Authority (hereinafter 'DDA') in terms of the Letter
dated 27.03.1991. It was pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff that since
he was a handicapped person, he could not pursue the matter with the
DDA and therefore he appointed one, Sh. Radhey Shyam, son of Sh.
Mange Ram on 10.10.1992 as his power of attorney holder and the
appellant/plaintiff also gave some blank papers to the said Sh. Radhey
Shyam. It is pleaded that Sh. Radhey Shyam failed to pursue the
matter and therefore the appellant/plaintiff cancelled the General
Power of Attorney issued in favour of Sh. Radhey Shyam on
27.11.1996. The appellant/plaintiff further pleads in the plaint that he
came to know from one Mr. Kaptan Singh that Sh. Radhey Shyam had
expired in a road accident. It was further pleaded that the DDA had
executed a Perpetual Lease Deed on 17.10.1996 in favour of the
appellant/plaintiff. It is also pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff got
possession of the suit property vide Letter dated 06.08.1998. It is
then pleaded in the plaint that from August, 2010 he was harassed by
gunda elements and property dealers in the area with respect to the
suit property and it was stated that the respondent no. 1/defendant no.
1 along with one Sh. Devinder Mann/respondent no. 6/defendant no. 6
claimed to have purchased the suit property. These respondent nos. 1
and 6/defendant nos. 1 and 6 are said to have created a scene at the
house of the appellant/plaintiff. The appellant/plaintiff pleads that on
11.09.2010 he was forcibly taken to the office of one Sh. Sunil Gupta
property dealer and subjected to threats and was forced to sign certain
papers failing which he and his family would be eliminated. It was
pleaded that the appellant/plaintiff being so threatened was forced to
sign the General Power of Attorney, Possession letter and other related
documents of the suit property. It was pleaded that the appellant/
plaintiff thereafter discussed the matter with his senior officers and
contacted the SHO of Police Station Shahbad Dairy and a Complaint
was given vide DD No. 26B dated 18.09.2010 but no action was
taken. Reminder was also said to be given to the SHO on 06.10.2010
vide Diary LC No. 967 dated 06.10.2010. The appellant/plaintiff
being aggrieved by the non-registration of the FIR filed a complaint
case under Section 200 read with Section 156(3) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the concerned Metropolitan
Magistrate (M.M.) and in this case a report was filed on by the
Investigating Officer on 04.02.2011. The appellant/plaintiff pleads
that he has paid property tax for the month of March, 2012. It is also
further pleaded in the plaint that only on getting the final report on
03.07.2013 in the criminal court that he approached DDA to know the
status as to why the perpetual lease of the appellant/plaintiff was
cancelled and a fresh perpetual lease was executed in favour of the
respondent no.1/defendant no.1 as the DDA had executed a perpetual
lease in favour of the respondent no.1/defendant no.1. Accordingly,
pleading that the appellant/plaintiff continues to be the owner of the
suit property and had never sold the suit property to the respondent
nos. 1 and 6/defendant nos. 1 and 6, the subject suit for declaration
and injunction was filed.
3. The trial court has decided the issue of limitation as a
preliminary issue, and rightly so, because only the admitted facts
stated in the plaint have been looked at. Once only the admitted facts
stated in the plaint have been looked at, in fact, the suit could have
been rightly dismissed by a preliminary issue because there were no
disputed question of fact which required trial. Admissions of plaint
are admissions of the plaintiff, and therefore, the argument of the
counsel for the appellant/plaintiff before this Court that there is a
mixed question of law and fact is a misconceived argument, and is
therefore rejected.
4(i). The period of limitation for cancelling of a document is
provided in Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963. This article provides
that there is a period of three years of limitation to set aside an
instrument and the limitation commences from the date when the facts so
as to cancel the instrument become known to the plaintiff. In the present
case, as per the plaint itself, the appellant/plaintiff pleads that on
11.09.2010 he forcibly signed documents and thereafter filed a complaint
with the concerned police station on 18.09.2010. Paras 8 and 9 of the
plaint specifically plead the factum that documents with respect to the
suit property were forcibly got signed from the appellant/plaintiff.
However, the subject suit for declaration with respect to the invalidity of
the documents alleged to have been executed by the appellant/plaintiff
has been filed on 07.01.2016. The period of limitation of three years
began from 11.09.2010 and in any case from filing of the complaint by
the appellant/plaintiff with the police on 18.09.2010, and therefore, the
present suit plaint filed on 07.01.2016 as per Article 59 of the Limitation
Act was clearly time barred, and this is so rightly held by the trial court.
4(ii). Also, in my opinion, the trial court has rightly held that as
per the plaint, the appellant/plaintiff admits that the perpetual lease in his
favour was cancelled and another perpetual lease had been executed by
the DDA in favour of the respondent no.1/defendant no.1/Sh. Durga
Dutta, and this fact was also known to the appellant/plaintiff when the
report was filed in the criminal case on 10.02.2011. Also, if this
document had to be got cancelled by the appellant/plaintiff, such a suit as
per Article 59 of the Limitation Act had to be filed by 10.02.2014, but it
is noted that the subject suit has been filed on 07.01.2016 only, and
therefore besides the fact that the challenge to the perpetual lease
executed in favour of the respondent no.1/defendant no.1 became time
barred, consequently, the appellant/plaintiff had no locus standi with
respect to the suit property because the title of the suit property stood
transferred in favour of the respondent no.1/defendant no.1 to the
knowledge of the appellant/plaintiff by 10.02.2011.
5. In view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no merit in the
appeal and the same is hereby dismissed.
JANUARY 22, 2019 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J AK
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