Delhi High Court
Sanjay vs State & Anr. on 15 January, 2019
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Order: January 15, 2019
+ CRL.M.C. 168/2019 & CRL.M.A. 735/2019
SANJAY .....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vivek Kumar Pandit,
Advocate
versus
STATE & ANR. .....Respondents
Through: Mr. M.S. Oberoi, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor
with SI Ram Naresh
Respondent no. 2 in person
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL GAUR
ORDER
(ORAL)
Quashing of FIR No.20/2017, under Section 308 of IPC,
registered at police station Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi is sought on the
basis of Memorandum of Understanding of 5th November, 2018
(Annexure P-2 colly.) and on the ground that misunderstanding
which led to registration of the FIR in question now stands cleared
between the parties.
Upon notice, Mr. M.P.Singh, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor for respondent-State submits that respondent No.2,
present in the Court, is complainant/first-informant of the FIR in
question and she has been identified to be so by SI Ram Naresh on
the basis of identity proof produced by her.
Respondent No.2, present in the Court, submits that the
dispute with petitioner has been amicably resolved. She affirms the
contents of her affidavit of 5th November, 2018 filed in support of
this petition and submits that she is happily living with petitioner and
to restore cordiality between the parties, the proceedings arising out
of the FIR in question be brought to an end.
Supreme Court in Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai
Bhimsinhbhai Vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641 has reiterated
the parameters for exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR / criminal complaint, which are as
under:-
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents
on the subject, may be summarised in the following
propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognises and preserves powers which
inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to
quash a first information report or a criminal proceeding on
the ground that a settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the invocation of
jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction
under Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether
the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide
ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves
ultimately on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious offences
involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape
and dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the
victim or the family of the victim have settled the dispute.
Such offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature but
have a serious impact upon society. The decision to continue
with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding
element of public interest in punishing persons for serious
offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing
insofar as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is
concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in
appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause
oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic offences
involving the financial and economic well-being of the State
have implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere
dispute between private disputants. The High Court would
be justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud
or misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained
of upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance."
Since the subject matter of this FIR is essentially matrimonial,
which now stands mutually and amicably settled between parties,
therefore, continuance of proceedings arising out of the FIR in
question would be an exercise in futility.
Accordingly, this petition is allowed subject to cost of
`10,000/- to be deposited by petitioner with Prime Minister's
National Relief Fund within four weeks from today and upon placing
on record the receipt of deposit of cost within two weeks thereafter,
FIR No.20/2017, under Section 308 of IPC, registered at police
station Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi and the proceedings emanating
therefrom shall stand quashed qua petitioner. However, it is made
clear that this order will not stand in the way of respondent No.2 to
have recourse to law, if need be.
This petition and the application are accordingly disposed of.
Dasti.
(SUNIL GAUR)
JUDGE
JANUARY 15, 2019
v
