Delhi High Court
Anil Shere vs Choyang Health Care India Pvt Ltd on 27 September, 2018
$~22 to 24
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Decided on: 27th September, 2018
+ CRL.M.C. 4943/2018 and Crl. M.A. 33054/2018
ANIL SHERE ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dudeja,
Advocate
versus
CHOYANG HEALTH CARE INDIA PVT LTD ... Respondent
Through: None
+ CRL.M.C. 4944/2018 and Crl. M.A. 33055/2018
ANIL SHERE ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dudeja,
Advocate
versus
CHOYANG HEALTH CARE INDIA PVT LTD .... Respondent
Through: None
+ CRL.M.C. 4945/2018 and Crl. M.A. 33056/2018
ANIL SHERE ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Rakesh Kumar Dudeja,
Advocate
versus
CHOYANG HEALTH CARE INDIA PVT LTD... Respondent
Through: None
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.K.GAUBA
Crl. M.C. No.4943-4945/2018 Page 1 of 4
ORDER (ORAL)
1. These petitions arise out of proceedings relating to three
different criminal complaint cases (CC 6358/17, 6359/17 and
6357/17) which were brought before the court of the Metropolitan
Magistrate by the respondent company each alleging offences
punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
having been committed by the petitioner respecting different cheques.
2. The complaint cases had earlier been pending on the file of the
Metropolitan Magistrate of West District, Delhi, they having been
instituted in the year 2012 concededly within the period of limitation
under the said law, but the same having been returned on the finding
that there was no territorial jurisdiction in light of the ruling of the
Supreme Court reported as Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of
Maharasthra and anr (2014) 9 SCC 129. The Negotiable Instruments
Act, 1881 was subsequently amended in terms of which the ruling of
the Supreme Court in the said case lost its effect, the jurisdiction to
deal with the three cases consequently now prima facie vesting in the
court of the Metropolitan Magistrate for South District at Saket, New
Delhi.
3. It is against the aforesaid backdrop that the complaint cases
were presented afresh before the court where they are now pending,
each accompanied by application under Section 5 of the Limitation
Act for condonation of delay. A copy of the proceedings recorded in
each case has been submitted, the same would show that upon
complaint cases with such applications having been presented, the
Metropolitan Magistrate issued notice on the prayer for condonation
of delay by similar orders dated 27.05.2017. After securing the
response of the petitioner (accused in the case), by similar orders
passed on 28.03.2018, the Metropolitan Magistrate condoned the
delay which had occurred during the interregnum pursuant to the
return of the complaints after the ruling in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod
(supra) and the fresh filing thereafter.
4. The petitioner challenged the said orders in the court of
Sessions by invoking its revisional jurisdiction by filing petitions (Crl.
Revision no.214/18, 211/18 and 213/18). The revisional court was not
impressed. Holding that there was no infirmity in the order of the
Metropolitan Magistrate, the revision petitions were dismissed
affirming the view that the delay had been properly explained.
5. Against the above backdrop, question arose as to whether the
petitioner having availed of the remedy of revision should be allowed
to have recourse to the petition at hand as a substitute for virtually a
second revisional challenge or scrutiny which is clearly barred under
Section 397 (3) Cr.P.C.
6. This Court in an almost similar fact-situation, taking note of the
decisions of the Supreme Court reported as Krishnan Vs. Krishnaveni,
(1997) 4 SCC 241; Rajinder Prasad Vs. Bashir, (2001) 8 SCC 522 and
Kailash Verma vs. Punjab State Civil Supplies Corporation & Anr.,
(2005) 2 SCC 571 and following similar view taken by a learned
single Judge of this Court in Surender Kumar Jain vs. State & Anr.,
ILR (2012) 3 Del 99 in absence of a special case being made out, has
earlier declined to interfere by the ruling (dated 03.07.2018) in
Crl.M.C. 164/2018 Ajay Maini vs. The State Govt. of NCT of Delhi &
Ors. in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482
Cr.P.C.
7. The courts below, by their consistent orders exercising the
judicial discretion vested in them, have accepted the explanation for
delay. There is no reason why this court should interfere in the said
judicial discretion which has been properly exercised.
8. The petitions and the applications filed therewith are dismissed.
R.K.GAUBA, J.
September 27, 2018
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