Delhi High Court
Som Dutt & Anr. vs Commissioner Of Police & Ors. on 19 September, 2018
$~
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on:- 30.08.2018
Date of Decision:-19.09.2018.
+ W.P.(C) 3854/2017
SOM DUTT & ANR ..... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Nalin Kohli with Mrs. Harvinder
Oberoi, Advocates
versus
COMMISSIONER OF POLICE & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, ASC, GNCTD
with Mr. Ravi Sehgal, Advocates for R-1 to R-4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA PALLI
REKHA PALLI, J
JUDGMENT
1. The present writ petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of
India impugns the judgment dated 10.05.2016 passed by the Central
Administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi dismissing O.A.
No.2050/2010, filed by the petitioners challenging the respondents' order
dated 11.05.2010 whereunder the appeals filed by them against the penalty
of permanent forfeiture of one year approved service with proportionate
reduction in pay, were not only rejected but the penalty imposed on them
was enhanced from a period of one year to three years.
2. The facts relevant to decide the present petition are that the
petitioners, both Constables (Executive) working with the Delhi Police, were
posted at Police Station Mandawali, where one Sub-Inspector (SI)
Badruddin was their superior officer. On 11.01.2003, the petitioners
alongwith one Constable Kewal Singh, while working as members of the
Special Staff of Police Station Mandawali, had accompanied SI Badruddin
for investigating FIR No.17/2003, lodged under Section 38 Indian Penal
Code, 1860, for which purpose they had visited the shop of one Mohd. Shaid
alongwith two informers, Guddu and Pappu.
3. It transpired that Mohd. Shaid and his employee, Mr. Banwari Lal
were brought to the Police Station and were released after about two to three
hours. On 14.01.2003, on the statements made by the complainant, Mohd.
Shaid and his brother-in-law Mobin Khan, a preliminary enquiry was
initiated against the petitioners as also against Constable Kewal Singh and
SI Badruddin on the following charges:-
" It is alleged that SI Badruddin, No. D-3024 (PIS No.
16900069) Ct. Kewal Singh No. 8947/DAP (PIS No. 28892823),
Ct. Rajender No. 8223/DAP (PIS No. 289603343) and Ct. Som
Datt No. 8985/DAP (PIS No. 28800564) while posted in police
Station Mandawali and acted as a special staff of PS
Mandawali, they were sent to the shop of Shri. Mohd. Shaid r/o.
H. No. 1216, Gali No. 48, Jafrabad, Delhi alongwith two
informers Guddu and Pappu. They brought Shri Mohd. Shaid
and his employee Banwari Lal at PS Mandawali and beat them
mercilessly. They took Rs.10,000 as a bribe and relieved them
in midnight on 12.01.2003, they did not make any DD entry in
the Roznameha of PS Mandawali in this regard.
The above Act on the part of above mentioned police
officials amounts to gross misconduct, negligence, carelessness
and dereliction in the discharge of their official duty which
renders them liable for department action under the provision
of Delhi Police (Punishment & Appeal) Rules, 1980"
4. Based on the aforesaid charges, on 09.06.2004, a Disciplinary Enquiry
was initiated against the petitioners, Constable Kewal Singh and SI
Badruddin. Vide order dated 23.06.2006, the aforesaid enquiry resulted in
the imposition of a penalty of withholding the next increment of the
petitioners temporarily for a period of one year. Aggrieved by the penalty
imposed by the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioners approached the
Appellate Authority, which vide order dated 30.01.2006 maintained the
penalty order imposed by the Disciplinary Authority.
5. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order dated 30.01.2006 passed by the
Appellate Authority, the petitioners filed O.A. No.694/2006, which was
partly allowed by the Tribunal by quashing the penalty order of the
Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority on the ground of
violation of Rule 15(ii) of the Delhi Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules,
1980 as it was found that the mandatory prior approval of the Competent
Authority had not been obtained before the initiation of the Departmental
Enquiry against the petitioners. However, liberty was granted to the
respondents to initiate proceedings against the petitioners afresh from the
stage of obtaining prior approval of the Additional Commissioner of Police,
who was the Competent Authority.
6. Pursuant to the Tribunal's orders, the respondents initiated another
enquiry against the petitioners. In this Departmental Enquiry, six prosecution
witnesses were examined, including the complainant Mohd. Shaid, his
brother-in-law, Mr. Mobin Khan and his relative, Mr. Zahid Khan in
addition to three defence witnesses. Based on the evidence adduced in the
enquiry both the petitioners and SI Badruddin were found guilty by the
Enquiry Officer, whereas Constable Keval Singh, who had also
accompanied the petitioners to the complainant's shop, was 'exonerated'.
Consequently, by a common order dated 21.10.2009, a penalty of temporary
forfeiture of one year of approved service was imposed on the petitioners
and SI Badruddin.
7. Aggrieved by the punishment imposed on them, the petitioners and SI
Badruddin preferred a Departmental Appeal, wherein after coming to a
conclusion that the penalty imposed on the petitioners was not
commensurate with the gravity of misconduct conducted by them, the
Appellate Authority vide its order dated 11.05.2010 enhanced the said
penalty to forfeiture of three years of approved service permanently,
entailing proportionate reduction of their pay, after giving due opportunity to
them to reply to a show-cause notice.
8. Aggrieved by the penalty imposed on them by the Disciplinary
Authority as enhanced by the Appellate Authority, the petitioners preferred
O.A. No. 2050/2010 before the Tribunal, which was dismissed by the
impugned judgment dated 16.04.2012, inter alia holding that it was not for
the Tribunal to go into the sufficiency of evidence.
9. Aggrieved by the rejection of their O.A No.2050/2010, the petitioners
preferred a writ petition in the High Court, registered as W.P(C) No.
6290/2012 which was disposed of vide order dated 23.04.2013 by setting
aside the Tribunal's order dated 16.04.2012 and remanding the matter back
for fresh adjudication on merits.
10. It may be noted that while remanding the matter back to the Tribunal,
on perusing the testimony of the complainant the High Court had observed
as under:-
" 6. We have perused the testimony of the complainant
PW-2. We have also perused the complaint made by him
proved at the enquiry as PW-1/A and his earlier statement
made at the stage of summary of allegations being proved as
Exhibit PW-1/B.
7. In his statement recorded at the enquiry PW-2 has
simply stated that SI Badruddin along with the three
constables had brought to the police station.
8. He does not depose that the three constables remained
present when SI Badruddin statedly extracted `10,000/- from
him. In Exhibit PW-1/A and Exhibit PW-1/B no specific role
of either of three constables is alleged.
9. Whenever more than one person faces joint enquiry,
one has to carefully analyse the evidence even at a domestic
enquiry for the reason care has to be ensured that tainted
evidence qua one is not used to brush the others. More so,
when a senior and a junior are facing a common domestic
enquiry.
10. Illustratively, an Inspector may tell his subordinate
officers to accompany him because he has some secret
information about the presence of some accused at a
particular place. Upon being apprehended the three police
officers return to the police station. It is the senior
police officer who is having the custody of the accused and it
is for him to complete the necessary formalities of making
entries in the daily diaries. It is he who takes the accused to
the interrogation. Unless there is evidence that the constables
were present along with him in the interrogation room; and if
the allegation is of extorting money, unless it is proved that
extortion took place in their presence, it would be difficult to
hold guilty the junior officers with reference to the wrong
committed by the senior officer.
11. We have written aforesaid only to illustrate and bring
home a logic.
12. It is trite that a Tribunal is the first forum where
evidence has to be noted with care. Suffice would it be to state
that it is the duty of the Tribunal to highlight the same. It
would be a completely misdirected approach by a Tribunal to
write that it is not the job of a Tribunal to re-appreciate
evidence in a case where the case projected is that it is a case
of no evidence. Appreciation of evidence would mean
to determine its creditworthiness and its weight. But a finding
relating to existence of evidence or no evidence is mechanical
in nature by referring to said part of the evidence which has
something to do with the finding of guilt."
11. After hearing arguments in the matter afresh, vide the impugned
judgment, the Tribunal has once again dismissed the petitioners' O.A
No.2050/2010 by observing that the concerned Authorities had examined the
matter in the right perspective and therefore it was not for the Tribunal to
re-appreciate the evidence and to consider the adequacy of the evidence or
reliability of the evidence laid in the departmental proceedings.
12. Aggrieved the dismissal of their O.A, the petitioners have preferred
the present writ petition.
13. Arguing for the petitioners, Mr. Nalin Kohli, learned counsel for the
petitioners, at the outset submits that even though while remanding the
matter back the High court had specifically observed that it would be
completely misdirected to re-appreciate evidence in a matter where the plea
taken is that it is a case of no evidence, still the Tribunal has failed to
consider the said plea taken by the petitioners that this was a clear case of no
evidence at all. He submits that the Tribunal has failed to appreciate that
even in a department enquiry, the decision arrived by the enquiry officer
must be on basis of some evidence and can't be based on mere surmises and
conjectures. He submits that the Tribunal has proceeded on an erroneous
presumption that it does not have the jurisdiction to examine as to whether
there was any evidence at all before the inquiry officer to hold the petitioners
guilty.
14. In support of his contention that there was absolutely no evidence
against the petitioners in the Departmental Enquiry, learned counsel drew
our attention to the statement of the five prosecution witnesses as also the
three defence witnesses and contends that the same clearly show that none of
them including the complainant himself had at any stage alleged that any of
the two petitioners were involved either in the alleged beating of the
complainant, or in receiving a bribe of Rs. 10,000/-, allegedly paid to S.I.
Badruddin.
15. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance of the decision of
the Apex Court in the cases of Roop Singh Negi Vs. Punjab National Bank
& Ors. (2009) 1 SCC (LS) 398 & State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. Vs. Saroj
Kumar Sinha (2010) 2 SCC 772 to contend that a Departmental Enquiry
cannot be treated as casual exercise and an employee can be held guilty only
if the charges are proved on basis of the evidence led in the enquiry.
16. He further submitted that merely because the petitioners had
accompanied their superior officers to the shop of the complainant as a part
of the team, cannot be a ground to hold them guilty of either misbehaving
with the complainant or receiving any bribe from him. Placing reliance on
Section 60 (e) of the Delhi Police Act it was canvassed before us that it was
the duty of the petitioners to obey the orders of their superior officers and
therefore they could not be held guilty for any alleged misconduct of their
superior officers.
17. Mr.Kohli, learned counsel further submitted that instead of examining
the plea of the petitioners that it was a case of no evidence, the Tribunal has
rejected the O.A by merely stating that the enquiry officer had appreciated
and evaluated the evidence of the parties in the right prospective and
discussed in detail, the evidence produced by the parties. He submitted that
a perusal of the impugned order itself shows that the approach of the
Tribunal is contrary to the well settled legal position that even in a
departmental enquiry, a decision as to the guilt of an employee has to be
arrived at on the basis of some evidence. It was argued that in the present
case, despite the absence of any evidence to link the petitioners with the
charges levelled against them, they have been held guilty by the enquiry
officer with a pre-determined mind.
18. On the other hand, Mr.Anuj Aggarwal, learned ASC appearing for the
respondents while supporting the impugned judgment, contends that once
the Departmental Authorities had after due appreciation of evidence held the
petitioners guilty, it was not open for the Tribunal to re-appreciate the same.
He therefore contended that the Tribunal was fully justified in refraining
from interfering with the well reasoned findings of the Enquiry Officer. He
also produced the original file of the Departmental Enquiry which has been
perused by us in order to examine the original complaint made by Mohd.
Shaid as also the statements recorded in the preliminary enquiry.
19. Having considered the rival contentions of the parties we find merit in
the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that an enquiry
officer acts like a quasi judicial authority and while performing this quasi
judicial function, it is incumbent upon him to carefully examine the evidence
led before him and before holding a delinquent employee guilty, he is
expected to ensure that the evidence led in the enquiry, is sufficient to hold
that the charge is proved.
20. In this context, it would be apt to refer to the case of Roop Singh Negi
(supra), the relevant para 10 & 17 whereof read as under:-
"10. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding is a quasi
judicial proceeding. The Enquiry Officer performs a quasi
judicial function. The charges levelled against the delinquent
officer must be found to have been proved. The enquiry
officer has a duty to arrive at a finding upon taking into
consideration the materials brought on record by the parties.
The purported evidence collected during investigation by the
Investigating Officer against all the accused by itself could
not be treated to be evidence in the disciplinary proceeding.
No witness was examined to prove the said documents. The
management witnesses merely tendered the documents and
did not prove the contents thereof. Reliance, inter alia, was
placed by the Enquiry Officer on the FIR which could not have
been treated as evidence. We have noticed hereinbefore that
the only basic evidence whereupon reliance has been placed
by the Enquiry Officer was the purported confession made by
the appellant before the police. According to the appellant, he
was forced to sign on the said confession, as he was tortured
in the police station. Appellant being an employee of the bank,
the said confession should have been proved. Some evidence
should have been brought on record to show that he had
indulged in stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly, there was
no direct evidence. Even there was no indirect evidence. The
tenor of the report demonstrates that the Enquiry Officer had
made up his mind to find him guilty as otherwise he would not
have proceeded on the basis that the offence was committed in
such a manner that no evidence was left.
17. Furthermore, the order of the disciplinary authority as
also the appellate authority are not supported by any reason.
As the orders passed by them have severe civil consequences,
appropriate reasons should have been assigned. If the enquiry
officer had relied upon the confession made by the appellant,
there was no reason as to why the order of discharge passed
by the Criminal Court on the basis of self-same evidence
should not have been taken into consideration. The materials
brought on record pointing out the guilt are required to be
proved. A decision must be arrived at on some evidence,
which is legally admissible. The provisions of the Evidence
Act may not be applicable in a departmental proceeding but
the principles of natural justice are. As the report of the
Enquiry Officer was based on merely ipse dixit as also
surmises and conjectures, the same could not have been
sustained. The inferences drawn by the Enquiry Officer
apparently were not supported by any evidence. Suspicion, as
is well known, however high may be, can under no
circumstances be held to be a substitute for legal proof."
In this regard it would also be appropriate to refer to the decision in
the case of Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), the relevant paras 26 to 28 whereof
read as under:-
"26. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi judicial authority is
in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not
supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary
authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence
presented by the Department, even in the absence of the
delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence
is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present
case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no
oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been
proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to
conclude that the charges have been proved against the
Respondents.
27. Apart from the above by virtue of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India the departmental inquiry had to be
conducted in accordance with rules of natural justice. It is a
basic requirement of rules of natural justice that an employee be
given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in any proceeding
which may culminate in a punishment being imposed on the
employee.
28. When a department enquiry is conducted against the
Government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise.
The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a
closed mind. The enquiry officer has to be wholly unbiased.
The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to
ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be
done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a
government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may
culminate in imposition of punishment including
dismissal/removal from service."
21. In the light of the aforesaid principles enunciated by the standing
counsel, we may now refer to the conclusion of the enquiry officer as also
the evidence of the prosecution witnesses which formed the basis for holding
the petitioners guilty in the enquiry. As noted hereinabove, five prosecution
witnesses were examined in the enquiry out of which two were formal in
nature. Before proceeding further, the statements of the said witnesses
forming a part of the enquiry report, are being referred to hereinbelow in
extenso:-
"PW-2 Mhod. Shaid s/o Mohd.Saddique R/O H.No.1216
Jafrabad, Seelampur Delhi.
This PW stated that he has a kabari shop in Lastend Apts.
New Ashok Nagar for the last 15-16 Years. On 11.01.03, at
about 9:30 PM S.I. Badrudddin, Ct. Kewal Singh, Ct. Rajender
Singh and Ct. Som Dutt came to his shop along with police
informers Guddu and Pappu and at their instance the said
police officials took him and his servant Banwari Lal Rickshaw
puller to P.S Mandawali. In the P.S. they interrogated them
and in the meantime his real brother Zahid and brother in law
Mobin Khan also came there. The police officials had suspicion
as he was working as a „Kabari‟ and that was why they were
brought to P.S. and interrogated. After interrogating for 2-3
hours they were allowed to go. Guddu and Pappu had enmity
with him and used to make false complaints against him in P.S.
and he had strong suspicion that only at their instance they
were brought to P.S. On 14-01-2003 he made a complaint
regarding this and identified the photocopy of the same which
was on file and it was marked as Ex PW-2/A(1). His statements
dt. 4-8-03 whose photocopies are attached were marked Ex
PW-2/B (1, 2, 3).
During cross-examination the PW, on being asked that
on 11-1-03 when they were brought to P.S. and after some time
his brother and brother in law came, whether in between this
any other person came there HC replied that no person related
to him came there. At this point E.O. clarified that in his
complaint dated 14-1-03 he had stated that at the instance of
informers Guddu and Pappu, S.I. Badruddin and staff brought
them to P.S. and gave then beatings and later on allowed to go
after paying Rs.10,000/-. The same fact was there in his
statement dated 4.8.03 whether the facts narrated were true. To
this the P.W. replied that this was true that his brother Zahid
paid Rs.10,000/- for getting him and his servant released. On
being asked that he had stated in his above statement that
Guddu and Pappu, informers used to make false complaints in
P.S. against him and because of them he had made that false
complaint. The P.W. replied that due to the excesses of S.I.
Badurddin. He made complaint on 14.01.03 and gave
subsequent statements.
PW-3 MOBIN KHAN s/o sh. CHOTTE KHAN R/O B-
145, NEW ASHOK NAGAR, DELHI
This P.W. stated that about 6-6 ½ years ago S.I.
Badruddin along with other police officials present today took
his brother in law Mohd. Shaid to PS.Mandawali and on
getting this information he went to P.S. with Zahid (brother of
Shaid) in the night itself. There he came to know that police
officials had given beatings to Shaid and later on he gave
Rs.10,000/- to Zahid for giving to the police officials for release
them. At that time the servant of Shaid, Banwari Lal was also
present there and he was also released with Shaid. His
statements in this connection was taken on 5.8.03 and the
photocopy of the same were on file which was marked Ex. PW-
3/A(1-2).
During cross examination the PW on being asked who
told him that Shaid had been taken to P.S. Mandawali by police
officials. He replied that one Rajesh, his neighbour, told him
about this. To the question that with whom he went to P.S. he
replied that he went to P.S. with Zahid. The brother of Shaid.
Whether the money was paid in front of him to any police
official he replied that no money was paid in his presence. To
the question that where did he go after getting Shaid released,
he replied that they went to their home. On further questioning
that during their stay in P.S. whether he and Zahid were
together all the time, the PW replied that he doesn‟t know as a
lot of time had elapsed.
PW-5 SH. ZAHID S/O MOHD. SADDIQUE R.O.
H.NO. 1216 GALI-1-8 JAFFRABAD SEELAMPUR DELHI.
This PW stated that about 6 years ago he came to know
that his brother Shaid and his servant Banwari had been taken
to P.S. Mandawali by police officials. Later on he went to P.S.
Mandawali to enquire about his bro5ther, where police
released them afterwards. Now he doesn‟t remember why his
brother was taken to P.S. and he can‟t identity the police
officials involved as he met with an accident consequently lost
memory.
During cross examination on being asked how did he
come to know that Shaid was taken to P.S. Mandawali, the PW
replied he doesn‟t remember. To the question who
accompanied him to P.S. and who out of the present police
officials was present in P.S. at that time the PW replied that he
doesn‟t remember who went to P.S. with him and who met him
at P.S. To the question that did any one demanded money in
order to release that did you pay any money to police to get
your brother released, he refused to have paid any money to
any one. On being asked whether his brother Shaid had
complained against any police official earlier also, the PW
showed ignorance. I.O. sought clarification that in his
statement dt. 5.8.03 this PW had stated that in order to get his
brother Shaid and his servant Banwari Lal released he went to
P.S., where Pappu and Guddu were present with SI Badruddin
and police demanded Rs.15,000/- to release Shaid and
Banwari. On this he and brother in law of Shaid brought
Rs.10,000/- and gave to SI Badruddin and 2-3 other police
officials were also present there. To this PW replied that he
made statement dt 5.8.03 at the instance of Shaid and his
advocate and identified his signatures on the photocopy of
statement which was marked PW-5/A. On confronting with his
statement that he had stated that Shaid and Banwari were
beaten by police and they sustained injuries, the PW showed his
ignorance. On being asked whether he was deposing of his free
will or under duress he replied that he was deposing his own
free will and without duress."
Discussion of Evidence:-
(i) It is correct that DD No.8A and DD No.17 A dt.
11.01.2003 were marked to SI Badruddin to enquiry and he
made his arrival vide DD No.28 A dated 11.01.2003 at 9:40 pm
after request proceedings and investigating of case FIR
No.17/2003 u/s 380 IPC P.S. Mandawali Delhi. He did not
mention in the arrival entry about briefing of Sh.Shaid and
Banwari Lal etx. They were called for investigation and
interrogation in the theft case by the defaulter SI Badruddin.
(ii) Complaint Mohd. Shahi and Banwari Lal were taken to
the police station earlier. His brother Jahid (PW-5) and
brother in law Mobin Khan (PW 3) reached there after
receiving information to them later on, other public person
came there afterwards. SI Badruddin had mentioned that i.e.
CD No.1 dated 11.01.2003 in case FIR No. 17 of 2003.
(iii) Complainant stated also that he made his complaint
dated 14.01.2003 and gave statements after words due to the
atrocities/excesses by SI Badruddin PW 5 Jahid stated that he
lost his memory due to an accident but he remember that he
went to P.S. Mandawali to get his brother released. PW 6 went
to P.S. Mandawali to get his brother released. PW-6 Banwari
Lal and he however not stated about the money transaction.
(iv) DW No.2 Tahir Amin and DW No.3 Smt.Amna Khatoon
reached there after Jahid and Mobin Khan, who were
demanded money for the release of Mohd Shaid and Banwari
Lal.
(v) This point has been discussed at S.No.(ii) above.
(vi) He requested that the allegations are base less so charge
may be dropped.
22. On examining the statement of the aforesaid witnesses, we find that
none of them had even attributed any role to the petitioners, except for
stating that on 11.01.2003, they had accompanied their superior officer,
S.I.Badruddin as a part of the investigation team to the shop of the
complainant. In order to satisfy ourselves as to whether there is any merit in
the plea of the petitioners that it is a case of no evidence, we have also
examined the original complaint dated 14.01.2003 filed by the complainant
with the respondents as also his employee's statement, as recorded in the
preliminary enquiry. Having examined the evidence led in the enquiry, we
have no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry officer has
acted in a most mechanical and casual manner and the inferences drawn by
him were not at all supported by any evidence. It appears that instead of
ensuring that his conclusions are based on evidence which would prove the
guilt of the petitioners, the enquiry officer acted with a pre-determined mind
so as to hold them guilty. In our view for the aforesaid reasons, the enquiry
report cannot be sustained and stand vitiated.
23. We may next refer to the impugned judgment. On perusing the same,
we are constrained to observe that despite the High Court clearly holding in
remand order dated 23.04.2013, that the Tribunal being the first forum,
where the evidence has to be appreciated and it is the duty of the said forum
to examine whether it is case of no evidence, in its impugned judgment, the
Tribunal has simply brushed aside the pleas of the petitioners by stating that
it is not open for it to re-appreciate the evidence led in the Departmental
Enquiry. In our view, the Tribunal has failed to draw a distinction between a
situation where re-appreciation of evidence is required as against a situation,
where a case of no evidence is pleaded. In the present case, it has been the
consistent stand of the petitioners that the findings of the enquiry officer are
based on no evidence. We are therefore unable to fathom as to why the
Tribunal did not consider the aforesaid plea in its proper prospective. In
view of the above discussion, we are not persuaded to concur with the view
expressed in the impugned judgment and the same is accordingly quashed
alongwith the orders dated 11.05.2010 passed by the Appellate Authority
and the initial penalty order dated 21.10.2009, passed by the Disciplinary
Authority.
24. Having come to a conclusion that the enquiry report as also the
original penalty order and the Appellate order are liable to be quashed, we
may now deal with the issue as to whether in the facts of the present case,
the matter should be remanded back to the disciplinary authority for
conducting a de novo enquiry against the petitioners in accordance with law
from the stage of issuance of the charge sheet. The record reveal that the
charge sheet based on which the penalty was imposed on the petitioners
relates to an incident of 11.01.2003 i.e. more than 15 1/2 years ago, during
which period, the petitioners have not only suffered the penalty, which in our
opinion was wholly unwarranted, but have also had to approach the Tribunal
thrice. Even the present petition is the second round of litigation before this
Court. In any event, having examined the evidence led not only during the
Departmental Enquiry, but also in the preliminary enquiry and keeping in
view the time period which has elapsed since the date of the incident, we are
convinced that ordering a fresh departmental enquiry at this stage, would be
highly prejudicial to both the petitioners and the respondents. Therefore, no
useful purpose shall be served in remanding the matter back to the
respondents, for holding de novo enquiry.
25. For all the aforesaid reasons, the impugned orders dated 10.05.2016 of
the Tribunal as also orders dated 11.05.2010 & 12.03.2010 passed by the
respondents are quashed and set aside. The writ petition is allowed
with a direction to the respondents to grant all the consequential
benefits to the petitioners within a period of 12 weeks from today. Parties are
left to bear their own costs.
REKHA PALLI
(JUDGE)
HIMA KOHLI
(JUDGE)
September 19, 2018
sr
