Delhi High Court
Siddhartha Singh vs Union Of India & Ors on 5 September, 2018
$~47.
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 9340/2018 & CM No.36148/2018
Date of Decision: 5th September, 2018
SIDDHARTHA SINGH ..... Petitioner
Through: Petitioner in person.
Versus
UNION OF INDIA & ORS ..... Respondents
Through: Mr.Bhagwan Swarup Shukla, CGSC
with Mr.Kamaldeep, Mr.Shravan Kumar, Advs.
for UOI.
Mr.Rishikesh Kumar, ASC with Mr.Premsagar
Pal, Adv. for Govt. of NCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V. KAMESWAR RAO
JUDGMENT
Rajendra Menon, Chief Justice (Oral)
1. This petition in public interest has been filed challenging the
Notification No.S.O.1522(E) dated 06.04.2018 issued by the Ministry of
Road Transport and Highways, Government of India increasing the speed
limit for plying of motor vehicles from 100 kmph to 120 kmph on National
Highways and for motor cycles from 60 kmph to 80 kmph.
2. Challenge to the notification increasing the speed limit for plying of
motor vehicles and motor cycles on the national highways is made on the
ground that it violates the fundamental right to life available to the citizens
under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the consequence of the
increase of the speed limit would be loss of life due to increase in the
number of accidents which may result due to permitting increase of the
indiscreet plying of the vehicle. Inter alia it is contended that the impugned
notification permitting increase of the speed is unsustainable. In view of the
above, the petition has been field by the petitioner, a practicing advocate in
public interest.
3. The learned counsel for the respondents submit that on the basis of
expert opinion, the quality of the roads and the scientific manner in which
the vehicles are now being manufactured, a conscious decision by the
executives have been taken after collecting various information germane to
the issue in question and, therefore, in such matter, interference by this
Court in a public interest litigation exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction
under Article 226 of the Constitution need not be made.
4. Having considered the contentions advanced, we are of the considered
view that the question of permitting plying of vehicle at a particular speed
on a particular road like the national highway is an administrative action, an
executive decision, in fact, a policy matter taken by the administrative
authorities after due consideration of various factors which includes the
manner in which the roads are constructed, the scientific manner in which
the vehicles are manufactured and the speed limit based on safety provisions
available in a vehicle prescribing the manner of plying of the vehicles and
various other factors based on expert and scientific evaluation and merely
because there is possibility of accident due to plying of vehicles on the road
in a speed which, according to the petitioner is too high, we see no reason to
interfere into the matter.
5. The notification in question is purely within the domain of the policy
decision or the legislative power available with the government and in the
absence of any statutory rules, regulations or constitutional provisions
having been shown to be violated, we are not inclined to interfere in the
matter. It is for the government to decide as to what should be the speed
limit permissible for plying of a vehicle in a particular road and it is not for a
writ Court to go into the various aspects and interfere in such matters until
and unless statutory provisions in doing so are found to be breached or
violated.
6. The petition is, accordingly, dismissed.
CHIEF JUSTICE
V. KAMESWAR RAO, J
SEPTEMBER 05, 2018
'anb'
